area handbook series 

Sri Lanka 

a country study 



A,. 



Sri Lanka 

country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Russell R. Ross 
and Andrea Matles Savada 
Research Completed 
October 1988 



On the cover: Ruwanveli Dagoba, Buddhist shrine built by 
Dutthagamani, near Anuradhapura 



Second Edition, First Printing, 1990. 

Copyright ®1990 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Sri Lanka: A Country Study. 

Area handbook series, DA pam 550-96 
Research completed October 1988. 
Bibliography: pp. 281-300. 
Includes index. 

1. Sri Lanka. I. Ross, Russell R., 1935- . II. Savada, Andrea 
Matles, 1950- . III. Library of Congress. Federal Research 
Division. IV. Series. V. Series: Area handbook series. 

DS489.S68 1990 954.93 89-600370 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-96 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



111 



Acknowledgments 



This edition supercedes the Area Handbook for Sri Lanka written 
by Richard F. Nyrop, et alia, in 1970. Some parts of that edition 
have been used in the preparation of the current book, and the 
authors of Sri Lanka: A Country Study are grateful for the seminal 
work done by the earlier edition's authors. The authors also wish 
to thank various members of the staff of the Embassy of the 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka in Washington, D.C. 
for their assistance. 

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division 
of the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book. 
Richard F. Nyrop made helpful suggestions during his review of 
all parts of the book. Elizabeth A. Park prepared the telecommu- 
nication sections in chapters 3 and 4; Robert L. Worden researched 
the data used in preparing maps for the book; Carolina E. Forrester 
checked the content of all of the maps and reviewed the text of the 
section on geography; and Arvies J. Staton contributed to the figures 
on military ranks and insignia. David P. Cabitto, Kimberly Lord, 
and Paulette Marshall did the illustrations; and David P. Cabitto, 
Sandra K. Ferrell, and Kimberly Lord prepared the graphics. 
Martha E. Hopkins edited portions of the manuscript and managed 
editing of the book; Marilyn L. Majeska edited portions of the 
manuscript and managed production; and Barbara Edgerton and 
Izella Watson performed word processing. 

Others who contributed were Harriet R. Blood, who assisted 
in the preparation of maps; Mimi Cantwell, Richard Kollodge, 
Ruth Nieland, and Gage Ricard, who edited portions of the manu- 
script; Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed final prepublica- 
tion editorial review, and Shirley Kessel of Communications 
Connection, who prepared the index. Malinda B. Neale of the 
Library of Congess Composing Unit prepared camera- ready copy, 
under the direction of Peggy Pixley. The inclusion of photographs 
in this book was made possible by the generosity of various individ- 
uals and public and private agencies. 



Contents 



Page 



Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Country Profile XV 

Introduction XXV 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting l 

Peter R. Blood 

ORIGINS 5 

Ancient Legends and Chronicles 6 

The Impact of Buddhism 7 

THE CLASSICAL AGE, 200 B.C.-A.D. 1200 8 

Early Settlements 8 

Rise of Sinhalese and Tamil Ethnic Awareness 11 

DECLINE OF THE SINHALESE KINGDOM, 1200-1500 . . 16 

Sinhalese Migration to the South 16 

A Weakened State: Invasion, Disease, and 

Social Instability 16 

EUROPEAN ENCROACHMENT AND DOMINANCE, 

1500-1948 17 

The Portuguese 17 

The Dutch 22 

The British 24 

INDEPENDENCE 40 

Divisions in the Body Politic 41 

United National Party "Majority" Rule, 1948-56 ... 41 

Emergence of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 43 

Tamil Politics 44 

Sri Lanka Freedom Party Rule, 1956-65 45 

The United National Party Regains Power, 1965-70 . 48 

United Front Rule and Emerging Violence, 1970-77 . 49 

The United National Party Returns to Power 51 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 57 

James Heitzman 

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 61 

Geology 61 



vii 



Topography 61 

Climate 64 

Ecological Zones 65 

Land Use and Settlement Patterns 67 

PEOPLE 68 

Population 68 

Ethnic Groups 72 

Ethnic Group Relations 78 

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 80 

Caste 80 

Family 86 

RELIGION 89 

Buddhism 89 

Hinduism 95 

Islam 99 

Christianity 101 

SOCIAL SERVICES 102 

Education 102 

Health 108 

Living Conditions 110 

Chapter 3. The Economy 117 

John D. Rogers 

NATURE OF THE ECONOMY 120 

Structure of the Economy 120 

Role of Government 121 

Development Planning 124 

The Economy in the Late 1980s 125 

AGRICULTURE 126 

Changing Patterns 126 

Land Use 129 

Government Policies 130 

Land Tenure 133 

Cropping Pattern 134 

INDUSTRY 137 

Changing Patterns 138 

Industrial Policies 138 

Manufacturing 140 

Construction 142 

Mining 143 

ENERGY 143 

TRANSPORTATION 145 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS 148 



viii 



LABOR 149 

Characteristics and Occupational Distribution 149 

Government Labor Policies 150 

Working Conditions 151 

Labor Relations 154 

TRADE 156 

Internal Trade 156 

External Trade 157 

Foreign Exchange System 160 

External Debt 161 

FINANCE 162 

Budgetary Process, Revenues, and Expenditures .... 162 

Foreign Aid 166 

Fiscal Administration 166 

Monetary Process 167 

TOURISM 169 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 173 

Donald M. Seekins 

POLITICS AND SOCIETY 177 

Race, Religion, and Politics 177 

The Sinhalese: Racial Uniqueness and 

Politicized Buddhism 180 

Tamil Exclusivism 182 

THE 1978 CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT 

INSTITUTIONS 182 

Historical Perspective, 1802-1978 183 

Government Institutions 185 

Presidency and Parliament 186 

Local Government 188 

Electoral System 189 

Judiciary 191 

Civil Service 192 

THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM 193 

Sinhalese Parties 194 

Tamil United Liberation Front 197 

Other Parties 198 

Electoral Performance 199 

THE EMERGENCE OF EXTREMIST GROUPS 199 

Tamil Alienation 201 

Tamil Militant Groups 203 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 213 

Relations with Western States 215 



The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and Foreign Relations . . 215 

ix 



Chapter 5. National Security 217 

Robert J. Levy 

PRIMARY THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 221 

The Tamil Insurgency 221 

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 226 

THE ARMED FORCES 230 

Historical Background 231 

Structure and Administration of the Armed Forces . . . 236 

Foreign Military Relations 248 

Foreign Military Presence 250 

The Defense Budget 251 

NATIONAL POLICE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES ... 252 

Organization 252 

Strength 253 

Equipment and Training 254 

The Home Guard 254 

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 255 

Criminal Justice and the Effects of Insurgency 255 

The Penal Code 257 

Criminal Procedure and the Structure of the Courts . . 258 

Rules of Search, Arrest, and Detention 260 

Executive Powers of Pardon and Commutation 261 

Penal Institutions and Trends in the Prison 

Population 261 

Drug Abuse and Drug Legislation 263 

Appendix A. Tables 267 

Appendix B. Political Parties and Groups 277 

Bibliography 281 

Glossary 30 1 

Index 305 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Sri Lanka, 1988 xxiv 

2 The Early Kingdoms of Sri Lanka, Third Century B.C.- 

Eighteenth Century A.D 14 

3 Topography and Drainage, 1988 62 

4 Precipitation and Irrigation 66 

5 Distribution of Population, 1985 70 

6 Ethnolinguistic Groups and Religions, 1988 74 

7 Accelerated Mahaweli Program, 1988 128 

8 Agriculture and Land Use, 1988 132 



x 



9 Industry, Mining, and Power, 1988 144 

10 Transportation System, 1988 146 

11 The Structure of Government, 1987 190 

12 Enlisted Rank Insignia, 1988 244 

13 Officer Rank Insignia, 1988 246 



XI 



Preface 



SRI LANKA: A COUNTRY STUDY replaces the edition of 
this work published in 1982. Like its predecessor, this study attempts 
to treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant social, 
political, economic, and military aspects of Sri Lankan society. Cen- 
tral to the study of contemporary Sri Lanka is the Sinhalese-Tamil 
conflict, its history, ramifications, and the toll it has taken on the 
country. For all intents and purposes, the national capital of Sri 
Lanka is Colombo — the site of its government ministries and foreign 
embassies. In 1982, however, a new parliamentary complex opened 
in Sri Jayewardenepura, Kotte, a suburb of Colombo, and the ad- 
ministrative capital was moved there. 

Sources of information included books, scholarly journals, foreign 
and domestic newspapers, and numerous periodicals. Chapter bib- 
liographies appear at the end of the book, and brief comments on 
some of the more valuable sources recommended for further read- 
ing appear at the end of each chapter. A Glossary also is included. 
Contemporary place names used in this book are those approved 
by the United States Board on Geographic Names. Measurements 
are given in the metric system, and a conversion table is provided 
to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric measure- 
ments (see table 1, Appendix A). 



xiii 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. 
Short Form: Sri Lanka (formerly known as Ceylon). 
Term for Citizens: Sri Lankan(s). 
Capital: Colombo, located on the southwestern coast. 
Administrative Capital: Sri Jayewardenepura since 1982. 

Geography 

Size: Pear-shaped island 29 kilometers off southeastern coast of 
India; total area 65,610 square kilometers, of which land area 64,740 
square kilometers. 



xv 



Topography: Irregular, dissected, central massif dominates south; 
highest elevation Pidurutalagala (2,524 meters) but better-known 
mountain Adam's Peak (2,243 meters), destination of interfaith 
pilgrimages. Coastal belt (less than 100 meters elevation) succeeded 
by rolling plains (100-500 meters elevation) of varying width 
extends from seashore to foothills of central massif. In northern 
half of island, topography falls away to rolling plain, relieved only 
by isolated ridges. Rivers extend radially from central massif to 
coast; longest Mahaweli Ganga (860 kilometers), which flows in 
northeasterly direction. About 40 percent of island forested. Coast- 
line regular but indented by numerous lagoons and marked by 
sandy beaches. 

Climate: Equatorial and tropical influenced by elevation above sea 
level, but marked by only slight diurnal and seasonal variations; 
temperature in Colombo (at sea level) varies from 25°C to 28°C, 
and in central massif (site of highest elevations) 14°C to 16°C. Sub- 
ject to southwest monsoon from mid-May to October and north- 
east monsoon December to March. Rainfall uneven; divides 
country climatically into wet zone comprising southwestern quarter 
and dry zone on remainder of island. Annual precipitation in wet 
zone averages 250 centimeters; in dry zone precipitation varies from 
120 to 190 centimeters. 

Society 

Population: 14,846,750 (according to 1981 census); 16,639,695 
(estimated 1988). Average annual growth rate 1 .6 percent; average 
life expectancy 67.5 years (males 66 years, females 69 years); gender 
ratio 103.7 males to 100 females. 

Ethnic Groups: Sinhalese 74 percent; Tamil 18 percent; Moor 
(Muslims) 7 percent; others (Burghers, Eurasians, Malay, Veddha) 
1 percent. Largest ethnic group divided into low-country Sinhalese 
(subjected in coastal areas to greater colonial acculturation) and 
Kandyan Sinhalese (more traditional upland dwellers, named after 
Kingdom of Kandy, which resisted European encroachments until 
1815-18). Tamils divided into Sri Lankan Tamils (on island since 
early historic times) and Indian Tamils (brought in as plantation 
labor in the nineteenth century). 

Languages: Sinhalese speak Sinhala (official language); Tamils 
speak Tamil (equal with Sinhala as official language since July 29, 
1987); English spoken in government and educated circles by about 
10 percent of population. 



xvi 



Education and Literacy: Schooling organized in four levels: primary 
(six years), junior secondary (five years), senior secondary (two 
years), and tertiary (at least two years). Education compulsory to 
age thirteen, free in government schools, and fee paid in private 
institutions. Number of students enrolled (1986) about 3.75 mil- 
lion (government) and 101,000 (private). Government expendi- 
ture on education (1986) about 3.6 million rupees (see Glossary). 
Overall literacy (over age 10) about 87 percent. 

Religion: Theravada Buddhist, 69 percent; Hindu, 15 percent; 
Christian, 8 percent; Muslim, 8 percent. Sinhalese generally Bud- 
dhist; Tamils Hindu; Burghers, Eurasians, and minority of 
Sinhalese and Tamils profess Christianity; Moors adherents of 
Islam. 

Health and Welfare: Nationwide health care system, including 
maternity services provided by government, but facilities and per- 
sonnel overtaxed, supplies and equipment lacking; medical infra- 
structure consists of more than 3,000 Western-trained physicians, 
8,600 nurses, 338 central dispensaries, and 490 hospitals of all types. 
Smallpox eradicated; incidence of malaria declining; unsanitary 
conditions and lack of clean water major cause of gastroenteritis 
among adults and infants. Death rate declined from 6.6 to 6.1 per 
1,000 in decade from mid-1970s to mid-1980s; infant mortality 
declined from 50 to 34 deaths per 1 ,000 in decade from early 1970s 
to early 1980s. Traditional medicine (ayurveda), supported by 
government, enjoys great credibility. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In mid-1980s, GDP rose 
incrementally at current and constant factor costs in spite of insur- 
gency and domestic turmoil. Gross national product (GNP) 
increased from US$5.48 billion (US$349 per capita) in 1984 to 
US$5.71 billion (US$354 per capita) in 1986. GDP went from 
US$5.57 billion in 1984 to US$5.84 billion in 1986, with additional 
increase to US$6.08 billion (subject to revision) in 1987 and 
projected US$6.27 billion in 1988. Real (constant) growth rate 
dipped from 5.1 percent in 1984 to 4.3 percent in 1986, with a 
further estimated 1.5 percent decline for 1987. Reversal of trend 
expected in 1988, with increase to 3.5 percent growth. 

Agriculture: Including forestry and fishing, agriculture accounted 
for slightiy over 25 percent of GDP in 1982-86, but occupied nearly 
half of labor force during same period. Wet rice (paddy) main sub- 
sistence crop with two harvests a year; paddy hectareage and 



xvn 



production have risen steadily since 1977; reached about 900,000 
hectares under cultivation and 2.6 million tons harvested in 1986, 
making country about 75 percent self-sufficient in rice production. 
Principal commercial crops tea, rubber, and coconuts; tea produc- 
tion in the 1980s varied between 180 and 210 million kilograms 
annually; rubber production remained constant at about 140 mil- 
lion kilograms annually since 1983; coconut production rose by 
about 10 percent a year in 1980s, reaching a peak of slightly over 
3 million nuts in 1986. Production of all crops dealt setback by 
drought in 1987, with recovery expected in 1988. 

Industry: Contributes somewhat over 15 percent of GDP and 
occupies nearly 30 percent of labor force; major industrial output 
consumer goods, especially garments and textiles, and processed 
agriculture commodities. State plays major role in manufacturing 
sector, controlling some twenty large-scale enterprises and about 
fifty corporations; government committed to expanding role of pri- 
vate sector in developing nontraditional exports, import substitutes, 
and employment opportunities. 

Energy: Firewood traditional source, accounts for 60 to 70 per- 
cent of energy consumption; main commercial/industrial sources 
hydroelectric and thermal power; installed capacity in 1986 slightly 
over a thousand megawatts. Accelerated Mahaweli Program, when 
completed, expected to provide extra 450 megawatts of power and 
render nation self-sufficient in energy production. 

Services: Accounts for about 15.7 percent of labor force. Active 
tourism sector slumped badly because of widespread unrest in 
country after 1983. 

Imports: Equivalent to US$1.95 billion in 1986. Major imported 
commodities include petroleum products, machinery, transporta- 
tion equipment, food (including rice, wheat, flour, sugar), fertilizer, 
yarn, and textiles. Principal trading partners Japan, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United States. Imports from United States dominated by 
wheat, machinery, and equipment. 

Exports: Equivalent to approximately US$1.22 billion in 1986; 
major exported goods ready-made clothing and processed agricul- 
tural commodities such as tea, rubber, coconuts, and spices. 
Dominant trading partner throughout 1980s the United States, 
which took US$350 million worth of goods in 1987, or fully 25 per- 
cent of all Sri Lankan exports. 

Balance of Payments: Negative balance of payments throughout 
1980s, but chronic trade deficit partially offset by foreign aid and 



xvm 



remittances from abroad. Current account balance amounted to 
minus US$425 million for 1986, with minus US$357 million esti- 
mated for 1987. Total external debt for 1986 amounted to US$412 
billion, with debt service ratio about 18.4 percent. 

Exchange Rate: For five-year period ending in mid- 1988, exchange 
rate of Sri Lankan rupee fluctuated, on average, less than ten per- 
cent annually against value of United States dollar. Most precipi- 
tous decline occurred from 1987 to 1988, when value of rupee fell 
from 26 (free rate) or 28.93 (official rate) to 32.58 (free rate) or 
32.32 (official rate) per dollar. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: Government owned; about 1,944 kilometers of track; 
network extends radially from Colombo to northern, eastern, and 
southern coastal cities; service to northern and eastern areas erratic 
because of domestic unrest. 

Roads: Total approximately 75,000 kilometers; paved (bituminous) 
about 25,500 kilometers; 478,000 registered vehicles in mid-1980s. 

Waterways: About 430 kilometers of rivers and canals navigable 
by shallow draft vessels. 

Ports: Deep water ports at Colombo, Trincomalee, and Galle, latter 
two underutilized; government shipping corporation possessed eight 
freighters and two tankers in late 1980s. 

Airfields: Fourteen, of which twelve usable in late 1980s, eleven 
having permanent surface runways, one (Bandaranaike Inter- 
national Airport at Katunayaka) with runway more than 2,500 
meters. 

Telecommunications: International service provided by satellite 
earth station and submarine cable; international telephone, telex, 
and direct dialing in operation; about 106,500 telephones nation- 
wide; about 29 radio stations, 24 of which are AM, at least 5 are 
FM) in operation, with more than 2 million registered receivers 
in use; 2 television networks broadcast over 4 channels; 350,000 
television sets nationwide. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Constitution of September 7, 1978, guarantees fun- 
damental rights of thought, conscience, and worship and estab- 
lished unitary state with strong executive power. President, elected 
directly for six-year term, serves as chief of state and government 



xix 



and appoints cabinet of ministers; October 1982 presidential elec- 
tion won by incumbent Junius R. ("J.R.") Jayewardene of United 
National Party (UNP), who received 52.9 percent of vote. Legis- 
lature consists of 196-member unicameral Parliament having power 
to pass laws by simple majority and amend Constitution by two- 
thirds majority. Parliamentary members, chosen by universal 
suffrage from electoral constituencies corresponding generally to 
administrative districts, serve six-year terms. Below national level, 
popularly elected provincial councils established in seven of nine 
provinces in 1988. Until provincial councils fully operational, basic 
administrative subdivision remains district governed by council of 
elected and appointed members, presided over by district minister, 
who serves concurrently in Parliament. At lowest governmental 
echelon, administrative functions carried out by popularly elected 
urban, municipal, town, and village councils. In rural areas, village 
councils exercise governance over 90 percent of nation's territory. 

Politics: UNP headed by President Jayewardene, in power since 
1977, retained over two-thirds majority in Parliament and won 
provincial council elections in 1988. Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
(SLFP), left-of-center, alternated in power with UNP since indepen- 
dence, but boycotted 1988 provincial council elections, and sur- 
rendered place as principal opposition group to newly formed 
United Socialist Alliance (USA), which finished second in elections. 
USA consisted of four left-of-center parties: Communist Party of 
Sri Lanka (CPSL), Ceylon Equal Society Party (Lanka Sama 
Samaja Party — LSSP), New Equal Society Party (Nava Sama 
Samaja Party— NSSP), and Sri Lanka People's Party (SLPP— 
Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya). Sri Lanka Muslim Congress 
(SLMC) only minor party to gain seats in provincial council elec- 
tions. Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) principal Tamil 
party, advocates separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka, but not 
represented in Parliament since 1983. People's Liberation Front 
(Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna — J VP), formally proscribed, in 
armed opposition to government. 

Administrative Divisions: Nine provinces (Northern and Eastern 
provinces may be combined into a single province in 1989); twenty- 
four administrative districts. 

Legal System: 1978 Constitution guarantees independence of 
judiciary. Legal system based on British common law, Roman- 
Dutch (Napoleonic) law, and customary practices of Sinhalese, 
Tamils, and Muslims. Supreme Court, highest court in nation, 
has chief justice and between six and ten associate justices appointed 



xx 



by president. Country divided into five judicial circuits, subdivided 
into districts with district courts and divisions with magistrates' 
courts. Lowest courts are conciliation boards with responsibility 
for minor criminal and civil cases. 

International Memberships: Asian Development Bank, Colombo 
Plan, Commonwealth of Nations, Group of 77, Intelsat, Interpol, 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, Nonaligned Movement, South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation, United Nations and special- 
ized agencies, World Federation of Trade Unions. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Total strength about 48,000 personnel, including 
reservists on active duty. President serves as commander in chief 
and defense minister. Minister of national security reports to presi- 
dent, serves as deputy defense minister, presides over Joint Oper- 
ations Command, which exercises overall responsibility for 
government counterinsurgency and counterterrorist effort. Chain 
of command extends downward to individual service commanders, 
deputy commanders, and chiefs of staff. 

Army: Total strength including reservists on active duty, up to 
40,000 personnel. Major tactical units five infantry brigade-sized 
task forces, each with three battalions. Other formations include 
one or two battalion-sized reconnaissance regiments, plus artillery, 
engineer, signals, and logistical units. In 1988 army reorganized 
territorially with individual battalions assigned to each of twenty- 
one sectors, corresponding generally to administrative districts; sec- 
tors grouped into two area commands: Division One for southern 
half of country, Division Two for northern half. Following Indo- 
Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987, army deployed against Tamil 
insurgents in Mannar and Vavuniya Districts, Northern Province, 
and against J VP terrorists in Southern Province. Military equip- 
ment includes small arms of Chinese, Singapore, Pakistani, and 
Western origin; armored cars and armored personnel carriers of 
British, South African, and domestic manufacture; mortars and 
light-to-medium-artillery pieces from Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and 
the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). 

Navy: Total strength, including reservists on active duty, about 
4,000 to 6,000 personnel. Service organized administratively into 
three naval area commands: Northern, Eastern, and Western 
(a fourth, Southern, to be established), with main naval base at 
Trincomalee, smaller installations at Karainagar, Tangalla, and 
Kalpitiya, major facility under construction at Galle. In 1988 



xxi 



principal naval mission patrol of " surveillance zone" in Palk Strait 
to prevent gun-running by Tamil insurgents between India and 
Sri Lanka; other naval tasks include enforcement of Sri Lankan 
Exclusive Economic Zone. Total inventory fifty-five vessels; major 
surface combatants six command ships (used as tenders for patrol 
vessels in "surveillance zone"); other ships include Cougar patrol 
craft and amphibious vessels from Britain, Dvora and Super Dvora 
craft from Israel, plus locally manufactured and older patrol boats 
from China and the Soviet Union; additional ships under construc- 
tion in Republic of Korea (South Korea). 

Air Force: Total strength, including reservists on active duty, about 
3,700 personnel deployed at 3 large and 9 smaller airbases country- 
wide. Principal air force missions tactical air support for ground 
operations, military airlift, and medical evacuation. Organization 
and inventory include one counterinsurgency squadron with Italian 
SIAI Marchetti SF-260TP light trainer aircraft, one helicopter 
squadron with United States Bell models 212, 412, and Jet Ranger, 
and French SA-365 Dauphin-IIs rotary wing aircraft; one trans- 
port squadron with Chinese Yun-8 and Yun-12 turboprops, plus 
assorted older aircraft, including United States DC-3s (C-47s) and 
an Indian HS-748; and one trainer squadron of light aircraft, 
including United States Cessnas. 

Paramilitary Forces: Sri Lankan National Police, total strength 
21,000 to 28,000 personnel, organized territorially into three 
"ranges," subdivided into divisions, districts, and police stations; 
includes National Intelligence Bureau and Police Special Force 
(formerly Special Task Force), latter comprising 1,100 personnel 
organized into one oversize battalion of seven companies, with units 
deployed against J VP terrorists in Southern Province, or serving 
in rotation as presidential security guard. 

Foreign Military Presence: Prior to Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 
1987, small number of Pakistani, Israeli, and retired British mili- 
tary advisers. Since August 1987 Indian Peacekeeping Force 
(IPKF), reported strength 70,000 personnel, organized into 15 
brigades, plus supporting units, deployed against Tamil insurgents 
in Northern and Eastern provinces. 

Defense Expenditures: Increased from less than 1 percent of GDP 
in early 1980s to over 5 percent in 1987 because of Tamil insur- 
gency, but levelled off following Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. In 1987 
expenditures, including supplemental appropriations, amounted to 
US$408 million or about 5.4 percent of GDP. Projected defense ex- 
penditures for 1988 expected to decline somewhat to US$340 million. 



xxn 



Internal Security: Insurgent movement known generically as 
Tamil Tigers, active since about 1975, fighting for independent 
state in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka; total estimated strength 5,000 
combatants; most prominent insurgent group Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); other groups include People's Libera- 
tion Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOT or PLOTE), Eelam 
Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), Tamil Eelam 
Liberation Organization (TELO), Eelam People's Revolutionary 
Liberation Front (EPRLF). Separate terrorist movement, known 
as J VP, composed of Sinhalese chauvinists, estimated strength 
several hundred, opposed to Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, active in 
Southern Province. 



xxm 




Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Sri Lanka, 1988 



xxiv 



Introduction 



SRI LANKA WAS NOT IMMUNE to the spirit of the global and 
monumental change that swept the world in the late 1980s, promis- 
ing to usher in a new international order in the 1990s. Indeed, at 
this writing events on the troubled island nation somehow seemed 
more under control than they had been in the immediate past. Yet 
Sri Lanka still had to cope with many of the same daunting and 
unresolved security problems that it faced in 1983, when a vicious 
separatist war broke out in the north — a situation later aggravated 
by an altogether different but equally debilitating insurrection in 
the south. 

Sri Lanka's descent into violence was especially disturbing 
because for many years the nation was considered a model of 
democracy in the Third World. A nation with one of the world's 
lowest per capita incomes, Sri Lanka nevertheless had a nascent 
but thriving free-market economy that supported one of the most 
extensive and respected education systems among developing coun- 
tries. Sadly, in 1990 the recollection of a peaceful and prosperous 
Sri Lanka seemed a distant memory. 

Prospects for an enduring peace, however remote, lingered as 
the new decade began. On February 4, 1990, as Sri Lanka cele- 
brated its forty-second Independence Day, the president, 
Ranasinghe Premadasa, who had assumed power a little over one 
year before, once again appealed direcdy to the island nation's more 
than 16 million people for an end to the long-standing communally 
based friction between the majority Sinhalese and the largest ethnic 
minority group, the Sri Lankan Tamils. He also pleaded for a cessa- 
tion of the internecine struggle among competing groups within 
the Tamil community and of the open warfare by Sinhalese 
extremists against the government. The collective strife on the island 
nation, according to international human rights groups, had over 
the previous year alone taken as many as 20,000 lives and over 
the span of a decade killed thousands more. The economy was 
crippled, the democratic values of the country threatened, and the 
national memory scarred. 

Soothsayers had characterized Premadasa' s assumption of power 
in early 1989 as auspicious. Sri Lanka needed a person of stature 
and vision to guide the country in its healing process. Many thought 
Premadasa could fill that role. For the first time since indepen- 
dence, Sri Lanka had a leader who did not belong to the island's 
high-born Sinhalese Buddhist caste, the Goyigama. Premadasa 



xxv 



came instead from more humble origins and was viewed by many 
Sri Lankans as more accessible than his predecessor, Junius Richard 
(J.R.) Jayewardene, under whom he had served as prime minister 
for ten years. One of Premadasa's first actions on assuming office 
in January 1989 was to lift the five-and-a-half-year state of emer- 
gency declared by his predecessor. Six months later, Premadasa 
was praised by both the Tamils and the Sinhalese for his unyield- 
ing opposition to the presence of the Indian Peacekeeping Force 
(IPKF), a military contingent sent into Sri Lanka in 1987 after 
an agreement between former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi 
and Jayewardene. The IPKF, originally a small force tasked with 
performing a police action to disarm Tamil separatists in the north, 
became increasingly entangled in the ethnic struggle and guerrilla 
insurrection and had grown at one point to as many as 70,000 
troops. 

By mid- 1989 Premadasa was demanding from a sullen India the 
quick withdrawal of the remaining 45,000 Indian soldiers then on 
the island. Considering the resentment most Sri Lankans — both 
Sinhalese and Tamil — had by then developed toward India, the 
entreaty was both popular and politically expedient. Yet, having 
to rely on the Sri Lankan military's questionable ability to control 
the island's mercurial political milieu was a calculated gamble. Still, 
in June 1989, hopes soared as delicate negotiations were initiated 
between the government and the most powerful of the Tamil 
separatist groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
But by then Premadasa was faced with more immediate challenges. 
A spate of assassinations in the south and a nationwide transpor- 
tation strike were orchestrated by Sinhalese extremists who had 
been in the forefront of political agitation against the presence of 
Indian troops on the island and also against any concessions the 
government made to Tamil demands for increased autonomy. 
Premadasa was forced to take urgent action, and he reimposed a 
national state of emergency, giving his security forces new and 
draconian powers of enforcement. As bickering between the Sri 
Lankan and Indian governments over a timetable for the Indian 
troop withdrawal continued, the Sri Lankan government unleashed 
a brutal campaign against the Sinhalese extremists. Reports of 
"death squads" composed of army and police officers who in their 
zealous pursuit of the subversives also claimed the lives of many 
innocent victims attracted the attention and ire of Amnesty Inter- 
national and other international human rights groups. 

In late March 1990, India withdrew its last troops from Sri 
Lanka, thereby ending its much maligned three-year period of for- 
eign entanglement, which had inflamed rather than defused the 



xxvi 



island's communal and political passions. The pullout created a 
power vacuum in the island's Tamil-dominated Northeastern 
Province that was expected to be filled by the resurgent Tamil 
Tigers. The Tamil Tigers, represented by their own political party, 
the People's Front of the Liberation Tigers — cautiously recognized 
by the government — were expected to combine political as well as 
military pressure against the rival Tamil groups favored by the 
Indians. Without waiting for the completion of the Indian depar- 
ture, the Tamil Tigers already were reasserting their control, waging 
a vigorous and thus far successful military offensive against the 
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, which headed the 
provincial government, and several secondary Tamil politico- 
military groups and their allied militia — the India-armed and 
trained Tamil National Army. Politically, their prestige enhanced 
by a reputation honed by their prolonged and skillful combat against 
the Indians, and what they called their Tamil "quislings," the 
feared Tamil Tigers were in a good position to win the elections 
for the Northeastern Provincial Council to be held later in 1990. 

In their dialog with the government, the Tamil Tigers no longer 
emphasized full secession and seemed instead to be more intent, 
in the absence of their Indian adversaries, on consolidating their 
military and political power over rival Tamil groups. The govern- 
ment, aware that the Tamil Tigers had not formally renounced 
the concept of a separate Tamil state, however, realized that the 
hiatus in fighting could end in renewed fighting and in what could 
ultimately be the "Lebanization" of the country. 

What went so tragically wrong for the beautiful island sometimes 
referred to as Shangri-la? The answer is elusive and can only partly 
be explained by the duress experienced by a multifaceted tradi- 
tional culture undergoing rapid change in an environment 
restrained by limited resources. A close reckoning also would have 
to be made of the island's troubled past — both ancient and recent. 

Sri Lanka claims the world's second-oldest continuous written 
history — a history that chronicles the intermittent hostility between 
two peoples — the Indo- Aryan Sinhalese or "People of the Lion," 
who arrived from northern India around 500 B.C. to establish mag- 
nificent Buddhist kingdoms on the north-central plains, and the 
Tamils of Dravidian stock, who arrived a few centuries later from 
southern India. The Tamil symbol became the tiger, and during 
one brief juncture in the island's history during the tenth century, 
Sri Lanka was ruled as a province by the Tamil Chola dynasty 
in southern India. The ancient linkage of northern Sri Lanka with 
the Tamil kingdoms of southern India has not been forgotten by 
today's Sinhalese, who cite as a modern embodiment of the 



xxvn 



historical threat of Tamil migration, the proximity of India's 
southern Tamil Nadu state and its 55 million Tamils — a source 
of psychological and military support for Tamil separatists on the 
island. 

In the sixteenth century, the island was colonized by the Por- 
tuguese, later to be followed by the Dutch, and finally, and most 
significantly, the British in the late eighteenth century. The Brit- 
ish succeeded in uniting the island, which they called Ceylon. They 
established and then broadened a colonial education system cen- 
tered in British liberalism and democratic values, which would even- 
tually groom the generation of native leaders who had successfully 
lobbied for independence. The British favored the Tamils some- 
what over the Sinhalese, enabling them to take better advantage 
of what educational and civil service opportunities were available. 
By the time independence was attained in 1948, a body of able 
Sri Lankans, pooled from both the Sinhalese and Tamil elites, was 
ready to take control from the British in a peaceful and well- 
orchestrated transfer of power. 

In its early post-independence years, Sri Lanka was fortunate 
to be led by Don Stephen Senanayake. He was a Sinhalese who 
was leader of the United National Party (UNP), an umbrella party 
of disparate political groups formed during the pre-independence 
years and one of the two political parties that has since dominated 
Sri Lankan politics. Senanayake was a man scrupulously even- 
handed in his approach to ethnic representation, but his vision of 
communal harmony survived only for a short time after his death 
in 1952. He was succeeded briefly by two UNP successors, one 
of whom was his son Dudley. In 1956 control of the government 
went to the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by 
Solomon West Ridgeway Dias (S.W.R.D.) Bandaranaike, who be- 
came the island's fourth prime minister after winning an emotion- 
ally charged election. 

The 1956 election marked the first instance of serious communal 
disharmony since independence and presaged the troubled years 
to come. Symbolically, the election coincided with the 2,500th anni- 
versary of the death of the Buddha and also that of the arrival of 
Vijaya — the legendary founder of the Sinhalese people — on the 
island. Emotions became dangerously overwrought because 
Bandaranaike ran primarily on a "Sinhala Only" platform, which 
decreed that the language of the Sinhalese would be the only offi- 
cial language, with both English and Tamil branded as cultural 
imports. Bandaranaike also proclaimed that he would restore Bud- 
dhism to its historically elevated place in Sri Lankan society. The 
argument can be made that the 1956 election and its attendant 



xxvin 



emotionalism marked the beginning of the great division between 
what have become two completely separate and mutually hostile 
political systems in Sri Lanka, one Sinhalese and Buddhist, the 
other Tamil and Hindu. Post-election emotions escalated, and it 
was not long before tragedy followed. In 1958 an anti-Tamil rumor 
was all that was needed to trigger nationwide riots in which 
hundreds of people, most of whom were Tamils, died. The riots 
marked the first major episode of communal violence after indepen- 
dence and left a deep psychological rift between the two major ethnic 
groups. 

In the years after the death of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1959, 
the SLFP has been headed by his widow Sirimavo, who led her 
left of center party to victory in the election of 1 960 and again in 
1970. Popularly regarded as a woman with a mandate to carry on 
her husband's legacy, she was esteemed by many Sinhalese who 
heeded her political guidance even when she was out of power. 
While in office, she vigorously enforced legislation such as the Offi- 
cial Language Act, which openly placed Sinhalese interests over 
Tamil, further dividing the body politic. During Bandaranaike' s 
last tenure in power, from 1970 to 1977, the deteriorating security 
situation on the island intensified. In 1971 her new government 
sanctioned university admissions regulations that were openly preju- 
dicial to Tamils. In the following year, she promulgated a new con- 
stitution that declared Sri Lanka a republic, but that was notorious 
for its lack of protection for minorities. 

In 1972 a serious new threat to the stability of the island appeared. 
Established in the late 1960s, the People's Liberation Front (Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna — J VP), a violent movement alternatively 
described as Maoist and Trokskyite but one indisputably chauvinist 
in its championship of Sinhalese values, launched its first major 
offensive in 1972. The J VP attempted a blitzkrieg operation to take 
over the country within twenty-four hours; it was suppressed only 
after considerable fighting during a protracted state of emergency 
declared by the government. In the late 1980s, an invigorated J VP 
would arise and gather strength from the anti-Indian sentiment 
that followed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and the arrival of Indian 
troops in 1987. 

In 1977 the UNP, led by J.R. Jayewardene, easily defeated 
Bandaranaike, whose Common Programme with its loosely admin- 
istered socialist politics had proven so injurious to the economy. 
Declaring that his government would inaugurate an era of 
dharmishta, or righteous society, Jayewardene crafted a new con- 
stitution the following year, changing the previous Westminster- 
style parliamentary government to a new presidential system 



xxix 



modeled after that of France. The 1978 Constitution, unlike its 
predecessor, made substantial concessions to Tamil sensitivities. 
The most blatant excesses of the Bandaranaike government were 
stopped, especially the discriminatory university admissions criteria 
aimed at Tamils and the refusal to give Tamil national language 
status. Yet these measures appeared to be a classical case of too 
little too late. The political disillusionment of Tamil youth, which 
had grown during the Bandaranaike years, continued unabated, 
and the separatist call for a Tamil Eelam, or "Precious Land," 
became increasingly accompanied by attacks on government targets. 

Jayewardene, widely admired as one of the most learned leaders 
in South Asia, nevertheless was criticized for his inability — or 
reluctance — to recognize the disturbances in Sri Lanka as some- 
thing more profound than merely a law and order problem. In 1979 
with communal unrest growing steadily worse, his government 
passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, at first a temporary, but 
later a permanent, piece of legislation that gave unbridled powers 
of search and arrest to the police and military. Government abuses 
soon followed, attracting the harsh scrutiny and condemnation of 
international human rights organizations. In time, Jayewardene 
was forced to broaden his assessment of the deteriorating security 
situation, and he initiated a series of negotiations on increased 
autonomy with the major Tamil political organization on the island, 
the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). While the TULF and 
the government pressed for a conference of all appropriate bodies — a 
peace forum to represent all the religious and ethnic groups in the 
country — the Tamil Tigers escalated their terrorist attacks, provok- 
ing a Sinhalese backlash against Tamils and precluding any suc- 
cessful accommodation resulting from the talks. Thereafter, the talks 
took place intermittently and at best with only partial representa- 
tion between representatives of the heterogeneous Tamil commu- 
nity and the government. 

Important opportunities for a constructive dialog on Tamil and 
Sinhalese concerns continued to be missed as negotiators, driven 
by events seemingly beyond their control, hardened their positions. 
Under steady pressure from Tamil extremists and in their abhor- 
rence of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the moderate Tamil 
political organizations, notably the TULF, decided to boycott the 
1982 presidential election. When the government proposed the fol- 
lowing year to amend the Constitution to ban all talk of separatism, 
all sixteen TULF members of parliament were expelled for refus- 
ing to recite a loyalty oath. The government lost its vital link to 
mediation. The fissures in Sri Lankan society also grew wider with 
each new episode of communal violence. Serious rioting again broke 



xxx 



out in 1977 and 1981, but the magnitude of unrest and violence 
that exploded in the July 1983 riots could not have been anticipated. 
The riots unleashed an unprecedented wave of violence that 
engulfed the island and divided Sri Lankan society. The aftermath 
of that social conflagration was still felt in the early 1990s. 

The 1983 riots were in response to the ambush and killing of 
thirteen Sinhalese soldiers by the Tamil Tigers on the outskirts of 
Jaffna, the capital of Sri Lanka's Tamil-dominated Northern 
Province. A five-day rampage ensued, with lynchings and sum- 
mary executions occurring all over the island. As many as 1,000 
people, mostly Tamils, were slaughtered. Carefully carried out 
attacks by Sinhalese rioters in possession of voter lists and addresses 
of Tamils suggested collusion by some members of Sri Lanka's mili- 
tary and security forces. 

Shortly after the riots Jayewardene hurriedly convened an All 
Party Conference, which was envisioned as a series of ongoing talks 
with the aim of bringing Tamils and Sinhalese together to nego- 
tiate a political settlement of their communal confrontation. The 
conference, which was first convened in January 1984, resulted 
in a series of proposals. These proposals, however, were rejected 
by several of the major Tamil opposition parties, including the 
TULF. In July 1985, the government, now joined by the active 
participation of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India, reopened 
a dialog with the TULF and other smaller Tamil political groups 
in a series of proposals and counter-proposals. Tamil demands 
focused on the issues of the devolution of central legislative, admin- 
istrative, and judicial authority. Progress in the talks soon proved 
illusory, however, because the moderate TULF had little credi- 
bility among the militants, especially the powerful Tamil Tigers, 
who were steadfast in their opposition to any settlement with the 
government short of the establishment of a Tamil Eelam. 

Jayewardene notified India and the TULF in 1986 that he would 
significantly devolve state powers, a concession he was previously 
unwilling to make. Jayewardene 's proposed plan offered all nine 
provinces substantial autonomy, with many of the central govern- 
ment powers pertaining to law and order, representation, and land 
settlement transferred to provincial councils. The proposed devolu- 
tion of central powers at that time fell short of meeting Tamil 
demands for a merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces into 
a single Tamil-speaking unit. Predictably, the Jayewardene Plan 
was attacked by Bandaranaike, who also refused to participate in 
the 1986 All Party Conference through which Jayewardene had 
hoped to achieve a national consensus. 



xxxi 



By early summer 1987 Jayewardene, sensing that Tamil Tiger 
guerrilla activities against the government were an insurmount- 
able impediment to his efforts at a negotiated peace settlement, 
launched a military campaign to dislodge them from their strong- 
hold in the north. The Sri Lankan military succeeded in wresting 
a good proportion of the Jaffna Peninsula from the Tamil Tigers, 
who then withdrew to the city of Jaffna relying on the consum- 
mate guerrilla tactic of using a sympathetic citizenry to insulate 
them from pursuing troops. When the troops continued to advance 
and threatened to enter the Tamil stronghold, India, pressured by 
its Tamil politicians, warned that it would militarily intervene to 
prevent them from doing so. 

New Delhi accused Colombo of employing starvation tactics 
against the people of Jaffna in its anti-Tiger military operations 
and demanded to be allowed to send humanitarian relief. Insulted, 
Sri Lanka refused the demand. In response, India sent a small 
flotilla of fishing vessels, carrying supplies of food and medicine. 
Sri Lanka's tiny but tenacious navy turned it away, however, chang- 
ing India's gesture into a public relations fiasco. Perhaps because 
of wounded pride, India sent cargo planes escorted by fighters into 
Sri Lanka's airspace dropping a few symbolic supplies over Jaffna. 
Sri Lanka, vociferously protesting that its territorial sovereignty 
had been violated, labeled India a regional bully. While Tamil 
separatists applauded India's move, most others in Sri Lanka were 
incensed. Relations between the two countries plummeted. 

Good relations with India had been of great importance to Sri 
Lanka since independence, but the ethnic crisis between the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils, which culminated in the mid-1980s, 
poisoned relations between the two states. India had been particu- 
larly strident in its accusations of alleged atrocities by the Sri Lankan 
security forces against the Sri Lankan Tamils and once went so 
far as to declare that the Sri Lankan government's "genocide" was 
responsible for the flight of thousands of refugees to India. Sri Lanka 
accused India of encouraging Tamil separatism and providing 
Tamil guerrillas sanctuary and training facilities in the southern 
Indian state of Tamil Nadu since the early 1980s. Jayewardene 
specifically leveled his public outrage at Tamil Nadu, calling the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam guerrillas a private army of the 
late M.G. Ramachandran, then the Tamil Nadu chief minister. 
Ranasinghe Premadasa, as Jayewardene 's prime minister, did not 
distinguish Tamil Nadu's role from that of India, calling that coun- 
try's alleged support of Sri Lanka's Tamil separatism the "terrorist 
equation." 



xxxn 



Overcoming much bitterness, both Gandhi and Jayewardene 
eventually agreed that a confrontational approach would never 
address the complicated security and bilateral issues linking the two 
nations. On July 29, 1987, within two months of the airdrop inci- 
dent, an agreement, henceforth referred to as the Indo-Sri Lankan 
Accord, was signed between the Indian and Sri Lankan leaders 
with the purpose of establishing peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka. 
The accord was timely and politically advantageous to both leaders. 
Jayewardene in Colombo was increasingly perceived as isolated 
from the events in the north, and his instrument of influence there, 
the Sri Lankan military, was depicted by the international media 
as an ill-trained and poorly disciplined force. He agreed to a plan 
of devolution that would give Sri Lankan Tamils more autonomy 
over a newly created Northeastern Province but would at the same 
time safeguard Sri Lanka's unitary status. Gandhi's government, 
reeling from an arms scandal, was able to trumpet a foreign rela- 
tions victory as regional peacekeeper. Gandhi's strategy was to exer- 
cise India's military clout to weaken the separatist insurgency in 
Sri Lanka by collecting weapons from the same Tamil militant 
groups that it was accused of having previously trained and 
equipped. Furthermore, it was agreed that India would expel all 
Sri Lankan Tamil citizens resident in India who were found to be 
engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism in Sri 
Lanka. To enforce this new state of cooperation between the two 
nations, the Indian Navy and Indian Coast Guard would assist 
the Sri Lankan Navy in intercepting arms from Tamil militants 
based in India. 

The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord had another, lesser known aspect, 
the importance of which Indian officials acknowledged afterwards, 
which bears on India's geopolitical perception of itself as a regional 
superpower. India, wary of competing influence in the Indian 
Ocean region, insisted that the accord be accompanied by docu- 
ments which assured New Delhi veto power over what foreign 
nation could use the harbor facilities at Trincomalee in the north- 
east. Sri Lanka also was asked to cancel an earlier agreement with 
the United States that gave the Voice of America rights to expand 
its transmission installations on the island. 

New Delhi was able to obtain the agreement of the TULF, as 
well as some of the lesser Tamil political groups, and for a brief 
time the acquiescence of the powerful LTTE, for a cease-fire. 
Within forty-eight hours of the signing of the agreement in 
Colombo, the cease-fire went into effect and the first troops of the 
IPKF arrived in northern Sri Lanka. Yet implementation of the 
accord proved problematic. Rioting Sinhalese mobs, inspired by 



xxxin 



anti-accord rhetoric voiced by Bandaranaike, disrupted the capital. 
At the farewell ceremony for Gandhi, following the signing of the 
accord, in a circumstance that proved more embarrassing than dan- 
gerous, a Sri Lankan honor guard clubbed the Indian leader with 
his rifle butt. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the 
accord held for less than three months. 

By early September, violence was breaking out in Eastern 
Province where Sinhalese and Muslims were protesting the 
provisional merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces effected 
for the purpose of electing a single provincial council. The Sinhalese 
and Muslims felt that because the Northern Province was over- 
whelmingly Tamil, a merger of the two provinces would result in 
their minority status. Bandaranaike 's SLFP skillfully capitalized 
on this atmosphere of panic, allying itself with influential Buddhist 
monks, who together mounted a well publicized campaign against 
the government's "betrayal" of the non-Tamil population of the 
Eastern Province. 

In October 1987, the accord was repudiated outright by the 
LTTE following a bizarre episode in which seventeen Tamil Tigers 
were arrested for trying to smuggle in a cache of weapons from 
India. While in transit to Colombo, fifteen of the seventeen Tamil 
Tigers committed suicide by swallowing cyanide capsules. The 
LTTE, claiming that the prisoners had been forced to take such 
a desperate action while in custody, immediately made a number 
of retaliatory attacks on Sinhalese setdements in the east. The IPKF, 
ill suited to counter- guerrilla warfare, was accused by many 
Sinhalese of allowing the attacks to take place. Jayewardene angrily 
declared that if the Indians could not protect the citizenry, he would 
order the IPKF to withdraw from the province and put his own 
soldiers on the job. India denounced the Tamil Tigers for attempt- 
ing to wreck the accord and declared its determination to main- 
tain law and order. The IPKF then began what was the first of 
its many operations against the Tamil Tigers. The Jaffna opera- 
tion was costly, taking the lives of over 200 Indian soldiers and 
bringing home to India the realization that it had underestimated 
the strength and persistence of the Tamil Tigers. Taking advan- 
tage of the distractions in the north, Sinhalese extremists of the 
JVP gained strength in the south, successfully carrying out several 
arms raids on military camps. The most spectacular attack the JVP 
attempted occurred in August 1987 during a government 
parliamentary group meeting, when a hand grenade exploded near 
the table where President Jayewardene and Prime Minister 
Premadasa were sitting. 



xxxiv 



In 1988 Jayewardene continued working toward the controversial 
merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces, where the Tamil 
separatists had long been active. The merger, initially a temporary 
measure, was a central part of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord 
under which India sought to ensure that an elected provincial coun- 
cil in the Tamil majority areas enjoyed substantial power to 
administer Tamil affairs. Although the LTTE boycotted the provin- 
cial election and tried to disrupt it, as did the J VP, there was a 
surprisingly high voter turnout. Still, few Sinhalese voted, and 
without LTTE participation, the credibility of the provincial council 
was limited. Furthermore, many viewed the resulting provincial 
government, dominated by the Tigers' main rival group, the Eelam 
People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, as a creation of India. 

As 1988 drew to a close, Jayewardene announced he would retire 
and not run in the presidential election scheduled for December. 
Premadasa, the UNP's candidate, ran against two others, the 
SLFP's Bandaranaike and a relative political unknown. As the 
presidential election approached, J VP subversives concentrated on 
crippling essential services such as buses and trains, fuel supplies, 
and banking. The UNP's presidential candidate, Premadasa, stated 
that this was a battle between the ballot and the bullet and that 
the bullet must not win. The election proved to be the bloodiest 
in Sri Lanka's history, but the ballot did in fact prevail, with voters 
defying threats from Tamil as well as Sinhalese extremists. Despite 
predictions that the voter turnout would not exceed 30 percent in 
contrast to the 80 percent turnout in the past presidential election, 
well over 50 percent of the nations 's 9.4 million eligible voters 
showed up at the polls. Premadasa won by a large margin over 
his closest rival, Sirimavo Bandaranaike. 

One of Premadasa' s first problems when he took over on Janu- 
ary 2, 1989, was what to do about the J VP, which was believed 
responsible for numerous assassinations the year before. In his vic- 
tory speech, Premadasa appealed to the J VP to enter into talks 
with him. The Sinhalese extremists initially were willing to distin- 
guish between him and the outgoing president, Jayewardene, whom 
they had earlier tried to assassinate. The J VP, which unleashed 
a steady barrage of anti-Indian propaganda against "Indian 
expansionism, invading Indian armies," was impressed by 
Premadasa' s anti-Indian rhetoric and even went so far as to praise 
him as a patriotic leader. Encouraged, Premadasa used the occa- 
sion of Sri Lanka's Independence Day celebrations to make an 
impassioned appeal for an end to the killings on the island and 
proceeded a little more than a week later to hold the nation's first 
parliamentary elections in eleven years. The nation had endured 



xxxv 



another challenge to its democratic institutions despite the killing 
of substantial numbers of candidates of various parties and their 
supporters by the LTTE and J VP. 

In May 1989, LTTE guerrillas decided to negotiate with the new 
government of Premadasa, holding the first direct peace talks 
between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tiger separatist 
fighters since July 1985. The unexpected decision underscored the 
fundamental changes that had been taking place among Sri Lanka's 
Tamil political groups. Political differences among the groups had 
widened, with some former separatist groups now represented in 
the Northeastern Provincial Council and in the national Parlia- 
ment. The LTTE, the remaining guerrilla army in the field, had 
been isolated and weakened by prolonged combat with Indian 
troops. Premadasa, stating that he wanted to settle the Tamil 
problem among Sri Lankans, circumvented Indian participation 
in the talks. On June 1, Premadasa abruptly called for the with- 
drawal by the end of July of 45,000 Indian soldiers still in Sri Lanka. 
Gandhi, for his part, was determined not to lose face by having 
his forces hurried out of Sri Lanka too quickly in an election year. 
Yet, India's participation in the struggle had been costly in human, 
military, and diplomatic terms. The Indian troops were viewed 
suspiciously by most Sri Lankans, and India's police action had 
made its neighbors in South Asia uneasy. The Indians, with more 
than 1,200 casualties, accepted that it was time to go — but at their 
own pace. 

There were critics who believed that Premadasa, who in June 
1989 was forced to reimpose a state of national emergency after 
having lifted it for the previous six months, was making unrealistic 
demands on India to withdraw quickly; they also believed that he 
was unwisely pandering to prevalent anti-Indian emotions in order 
to recover from an early period of unpopularity. Although the argu- 
ment was made that the longer the IPKF stayed in Sri Lanka, the 
stronger the support would be for the J VP, it was questionable 
whether the Sri Lankan military, which admittedly had grown dra- 
matically since 1983, could have successfully controlled the ferocity 
of both the Tamil Tigers and the J VP without Indian help. Yet, 
as one Sri Lankan politician admitted, the president was in the 
unenviable position of having the "IPKF holding his legs and the 
J VP at his throat." 

The Tamil Tigers, despite their truce with the government, 
remained a ruthless and effective military force. It was not known 
in 1990 how long their gesture of conciliation would last. The J VP 
had lost its charismatic leader, Rohana Wijewera, in November 
1989, when he was captured and subsequently killed by government 



xxxvi 



security forces, and it had been brutally suppressed by the govern- 
ment in late 1989 and early 1990. The group, however, still was 
active and might ultimately pose the most dangerous long-term 
threat to Sri Lanka's national security. 

Premadasa placed much faith in his poverty alleviation plan — 
his remedy for much of the unrest plaguing the island. But the plan 
as originally unveiled alarmed both foreign lenders and many Sri 
Lankan technocrats and would have greatly burdened the already 
huge government budget. After a period of mounting defense 
expenditures, systematic destruction of the economic infrastruc- 
ture by subversives, a worldwide decline in demand for Sri Lanka's 
traditional raw products, and the partial eclipse of its once robust 
tourist industry, Premadasa' s plan, while well intentioned, was per- 
ceived as economically unfeasible. 

As Sri Lanka entered the 1990s, there were no clear answers as 
to whether its democratic institutions could survive another 
onslaught of anarchy, terror, and violence. As India withdrew its 
last troops from the island amid charges that it had failed to per- 
form its primary task of disarming Tamil separatists, it, too, accused 
Sri Lanka of not having fully implemented the 1987 Indo-Sri 
Lankan Accord — charging that there had not been an adequate 
devolution of central power. Yet Premadasa has declared that "Sri 
Lanka's problems must be settied among Sri Lankans." 

Certainly Sri Lanka's problems were increasingly complex and 
difficult to comprehend. Perhaps the culture of the island with its 
countervailing forces and fractured institutions can be glimpsed 
in the somber evocation of struggle captured in lines from 
"Elephant," a poem written by D.H. Lawrence following a visit 
to Sri Lanka: 

In elephants and the east are two devils, in all men maybe. 
The mystery of the dark mountain of blood, reeking in 

homage, in lust, in rage, 
And passive with everlasting patience. . . . 

May 1, 1990 Peter R. Blood 



XXXVll 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Reclining and standing Buddhas at Polonnaruwa 



SRI LANKA'S HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 
covers more than 2,000 years. Known as Lanka — the "resplen- 
dent land" — in the ancient Indian epic Ramayana, the island has 
numerous other references that testify to the island's natural beauty 
and wealth. Islamic folklore maintains that Adam and Eve were 
offered refuge on the island as solace for their expulsion from the 
Garden of Eden. Asian poets, noting the geographical location of 
the island and lauding its beauty, called it the "pearl upon the brow 
of India." A troubled nation in the 1980s, torn apart by communal 
violence, Sri Lanka has more recently been called India's "fallen 
tear." 

Sri Lanka claims a democratic tradition matched by few other 
developing countries, and since its independence in 1948, succes- 
sive governments have been freely elected. Sri Lanka's citizens enjoy 
a long life expectancy, advanced health standards, and one of the 
highest literacy rates in the world despite the fact that the country 
has one of the lowest per capita incomes. 

In the years since independence, Sri Lanka has experienced 
severe communal clashes between its Buddhist Sinhalese 
majority — approximately 74 percent of the population — and the 
country's largest minority group, the Sri Lankan Tamils, who are 
Hindus and comprise nearly 13 percent of the population. The com- 
munal violence that attracted the harsh scrutiny of the international 
media in the late 1980s can best be understood in the context of 
the island's complex historical development — its ancient and 
intricate relationship to India's civilization and its more than four 
centuries under colonial rule by European powers. 

The Sinhalese claim to have been the earliest colonizers of Sri 
Lanka, first settling in the dry north-central regions as early as 500 
B.C . Between the third century B.C . and the twelfth century A.D. , 
they developed a great civilization centered around the cities of 
Anuradhapura and later Polonnaruwa, which was noted for its 
genius in hydraulic engineering — the construction of water tanks 
(reservoirs) and irrigation canals, for example — and its guardian- 
ship of Buddhism. State patronage gave Buddhism a heightened 
political importance that enabled the religion to escape the fate it 
had experienced in India, where it was eventually absorbed by 
Hinduism. 

The history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, especially its extended 
period of glory, is for many Sinhalese a potent symbol that links 



3 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

the past with the present. An enduring ideology defined by two 
distinct elements — sinhaladipa (unity of the island with the Sinhalese) 
and dhammadipa (island of Buddhism) — designates the Sinhalese as 
custodians of Sri Lankan society. This theme finds recurrent ex- 
pression in the historical chronicles composed by Buddish monks 
over the centuries, from the mythological founding of the Sinha- 
lese "lion" race around 300 B.C. to the capitulation of the King- 
dom of Kandy, the last independent Sinhalese polity in the early 
nineteenth century. 

The institutions of Buddhist-Sinhalese civilization in Sri Lanka 
came under attack during the colonial eras of the Portuguese, the 
Dutch and the British. During these centuries of colonialization, 
the state encouraged and supported Christianity — first Roman 
Catholicism, then Protestantism. Most Sinhalese regard the en- 
tire period of European dominance as an unfortunate era, but most 
historians — Sri Lankan or otherwise — concede that British rule was 
relatively benign and progressive compared to that of the Dutch 
and Portuguese. Influenced by the ascendant philosophy of liberal 
reformism, the British were determined to anglicize the island, and 
in 1802, Sri Lanka (then called Ceylon) became Britain's first crown 
colony. The British gradually permitted native participation in the 
governmental process; and under the Donoughmore Constitution 
of 1931 and then the Soulbury Constitution of 1946, the franchise 
was dramatically extended, preparing the island for independence 
two years later. 

Under the statesmanship of Sri Lanka's first postindependence 
leader, Don Stephen (D.S.) Senanayake, the country managed to 
rise above the bitterly divisive communal and religious emotions 
that later complicated the political agenda. Senanayake envisioned 
his country as a pluralist, multiethnic, secular state, in which minori- 
ties would be able to participate fully in government affairs. His 
vision for his nation soon faltered, however, and communal rivalry 
and confrontation appeared within the first decade of independence. 
Sinhalese nationalists aspired to recover the dominance in society 
they had lost during European rule, while Sri Lankan Tamils 
wanted to protect their minority community from domination or 
assimilation by the Sinhalese majority. No compromise was forth- 
coming, and as early as 1951, Tamil leaders stated that "the Tamil- 
speaking people in Ceylon constitute a nation distinct from that 
of the Sinhalese by every fundamental test of nationhood." 

Sinhalese nationalists did not have to wait long before they found 
an eloquent champion of their cause. Solomon West Ridgeway Dias 
(S.W.R.D.) Bandaranaike successfully challenged the nation's 
Westernized rulers who were alienated from Sinhalese culture; he 



4 



Historical Setting 



became prime minister in 1956. A man particularly adept at har- 
nessing Sinhalese communal passions, Bandaranaike vowed to make 
Sinhala the only language of administration and education and to 
restore Buddhism to its former glory. The violence unleashed by 
his policies directly threatened the unity of the nation, and com- 
munal riots rocked the country in 1956 and 1958. Bandaranaike 
became a victim of the passions he unleashed. In 1959 a Buddhist 
monk who felt that Bandaranaike had not pushed the Buddhist- 
Sinhalese cause far enough assassinated the Sri Lankan leader. 
Bandaranaike 's widow, Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias (S.R.D.) Ban- 
daranaike, ardently carried out many of his ideas. In 1960, she 
became the world's first woman prime minister. 

Communal tensions continued to rise over the following years. 
In 1972 the nation became a republic under a new constitution, 
which was a testimony to the ideology of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, 
and Buddhism was accorded special status. These reforms and new 
laws discriminating against Tamils in university admissions were 
a symbolic threat the Tamil community felt it could not ignore, 
and a vicious cycle of violence erupted that has plagued successive 
governments. Tamil agitation for separation became associated with 
gruesome and highly visible terrorist acts by extremists, trigger- 
ing large communal riots in 1977, 1981, and 1983. During these 
riots, Sinhalese mobs retaliated against isolated and vulnerable 
Tamil communities. By the mid-1980s, the Tamil militant under- 
ground had grown in strength and posed a serious security threat 
to the government, and its combatants struggled for a Tamil 
nation — "Tamil Eelam" — by an increasing recourse to terrorism. 
The fundamental, unresolved problems facing society were sur- 
facing with a previously unseen force. Foreign and domestic ob- 
servers expressed concern for democratic procedures in a society 
driven by divisive symbols and divided by ethnic loyalties. 

Origins 

Ancient Indian and Sri Lankan myths and chronicles have been 
studied intensively and interpreted widely for their insight into the 
human settlement and philosophical development of the island. 
Confirmation of the island's first colonizers — whether the Sinha- 
lese or Sri Lankan Tamils — has been elusive, but evidence sug- 
gests that Sri Lanka has been, since earliest times, a multiethnic 
society. Sri Lankan historian K.M. de Silva believes that settle- 
ment and colonization by Indo-Aryan speakers may have preceded 
the arrival of Dravidian settlers by several centuries, but that early 
mixing rendered the two ethnic groups almost physically indis- 
tinct. 



5 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Ancient Legends and Chronicles 

The first major legendary reference to the island is found in the 
great Indian epic, the Ramayana (Sacred Lake of the Deeds of 
Rama), thought to have been written around 500 B.C. The 
Ramayana tells of the conquest of Lanka in 3000 B.C. by Rama, 
an incarnation of the Hindu god Vishnu. Rama's quest to save 
his abducted wife, Ska, from Ravanna, the demon god of Lanka, 
and his demon hordes, is, according to some scholars, a poetic 
account of the early southward expansion of Brahmanic civilization. 

Buddhist Chronicles 

The most valuable source of knowledge for scholars probing the 
legends and historical heritage of Sri Lanka is still the Mahavamsa 
(Great Genealogy or Dynasty), a chronicle compiled in Pali, the 
language of Theravada Buddhism, in the sixth century. Buddhist 
monks composed the Mahavamsa, which was an adaptation of an 
earlier and cruder fourth century epic, the Dipavamsa (Island Geneal- 
ogy or Dynasty). The latter account was compiled to glorify Bud- 
dhism and is not a comprehensive narrative of events. The 
Mahavamsa, however, relates the rise and fall of successive Bud- 
dhist kingdoms beginning with Vijaya, the legendary colonizer of 
Sri Lanka and primogenitor of the Sinhalese migrant group. In 
the Mahavamsa, Vijaya is described as having arrived on the island 
on the day of the Buddha's death (parinibbana) or, more precisely, 
his nirvana or nibbana (see Glossary), his release from the cycle of 
life and pain. The Mahavamsa also lavishes praise on the Sinhalese 
kings who repulsed attacks by Indian Tamils. 

Vijaya is the central legendary figure in the Mahavamsa. He was 
the grandson of an Indian princess from Vanga in northern India 
who had been abducted by an amorous lion, Simha, and son of 
their incestuous and half-leonine offspring. Along with 700 of his 
followers, Vijaya arrived in Lanka and established himself as ruler 
with the help of Kuveni, a local demon-worshiping princess. 
Although Kuveni had betrayed her own people and had given birth 
to two of Vijaya's children, she was banished by the ruler, who 
then arranged a marriage with a princess from Madurai in 
southeastern India. Kuveni' s offspring are the folkloric ancestors 
of the present day Veddahs, an aboriginal people now living in 
scattered areas of eastern Sri Lanka (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). 
Many scholars believe that the legend of Vijaya provides a glimpse 
into the early settlement of the island. Around the fifth century 
B.C., the first bands of Sri Lankan colonists are believed to have 
come from the coastal areas of northern India. The chronicles 



6 



Historical Setting 



support evidence that the royal progeny of Vijaya often sought wives 
from the Pandyan and other Dravidian (Tamil) kingdoms of 
southern India. The chronicles also tell of an early and constant 
migration of artisan and mercantile Tamils to Sri Lanka. 

From the fifth century A.D onward, periodic palace intrigues 
and religious heresies weakened Buddhist institutions leaving 
Sinhalese-Buddhist culture increasingly vulnerable to successive and 
debilitating Tamil invasions. A chronicle, a continuation of the 
Mahavamsa, describes this decline. The main body of this chroni- 
cle, which assumed the less than grandiloquent tide Culavamsa 
(Lesser Genealogy or Dynasty), was attributed to the thirteenth 
century poet-monk, Dhammakitti. The Culavamsa was later ex- 
panded by another monk the following century and, concluded by 
a third monk in the late eighteenth century. 

The Impact of Buddhism 

Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka in the third century 
B.C. from India, where it had been established by Siddartha 
Gautama three centuries earlier (see Buddhism, ch. 2). The power- 
ful Indian monarch, Asoka, nurtured the new comprehensive 
religio-philosophical system in the third century B.C. Asoka' s con- 
version to Buddhism marks one of the turning points in religious 
history because at that time, Buddhism was elevated from a minor 
sect to an official religion enjoying all the advantages of royal 
patronage. Asoka' s empire, which extended over most of India, 
supported one of the most vigorous missionary enterprises in 
history. 

The Buddhist tradition of chronicling events has aided the verifi- 
cation of historical figures. One of the most important of these 
figures was King Devanampiya Tissa (250-c. 207 B.C.). Accord- 
ing to the Mahavamsa, Asoka' s son and emissary to Sri Lanka, 
Mahinda, introduced the monarch to Buddhism. Devanampiya 
Tissa became a powerful patron of Buddhism and established the 
monastery of Mahavihara, which became the historic center of 
Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka. 

Subsequent events also contributed to Sri Lanka's prestige in 
the Buddhist world. It was on the island, for example, that the oral 
teachings of the Buddha — the Tripitaka — were committed to writing 
for the first time. 

Devanampiya Tissa was said to have received Buddha's right 
collarbone and his revered alms bowl from Asoka and to have built 
the Thuparama Dagoba, or stupa (Buddhist shrine), to honor these 
highly revered relics. Another relic, Buddha's sacred tooth, had 
arrived in Sri Lanka in the fourth century A.D. The possession 



7 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

of the Tooth Relic came to be regarded as essential for the legitimi- 
zation of Sinhalese royalty and remained so until its capture and 
probable destruction by the Portuguese in 1560. The sacred Tooth 
Relic (thought by many to be a substitute) that is venerated in the 
Temple of the Tooth in Kandy links legendary Sri Lanka with the 
modern era. The annual procession of Perahera held in honor of 
the sacred Tooth Relic serves as a powerful unifying force for the 
Sinhalese in the twentieth century. Asoka's daughter, Sanghamitta, 
is recorded as having brought to the island a branch of the sacred 
bo tree under which the Buddha attained enlightenment. Accord- 
ing to legend, the tree that grew from this branch is near the ruins 
of the ancient city of Anuradhapura in the north of Sri Lanka. The 
tree is said to be the oldest living thing in the world and is an ob- 
ject of great veneration. 

The connection between religion, culture, language, and edu- 
cation and their combined influence on national identity have been 
an age-old pervasive force for the Sinhalese Buddhists. Devanam- 
piya Tissa employed Asoka's strategy of merging the political state 
with Buddhism, supporting Buddhist institutions from the state's 
coffers, and locating temples close to the royal palace for greater 
control. With such patronage, Buddhism was positioned to evolve 
as the highest ethical and philosophical expression of Sinhalese cul- 
ture and civilization. Buddhism appealed directly to the masses, 
leading to the growth of a collective Sinhalese cultural consciousness. 

In contrast to the theological exclusivity of Hindu Brahmanism, 
the Asokan missionary approach featured preaching and carried 
the principles of the Buddha directly to the common people. This 
proselytizing had even greater success in Sri Lanka than it had in 
India and could be said to be the island's first experiment in mass 
education. 

Buddhism also had a great effect on the literary development 
of the island. The Indo- Aryan dialect spoken by the early Sinha- 
lese was comprehensible to missionaries from India and facilitated 
early attempts at translating the scriptures. The Sinhalese literati 
studied Pali, the language of the Buddhist scriptures, thus influenc- 
ing the development of Sinhala as a literary language. 

The Classical Age, 200 B.C.-A.D. 1200 

Early Settlements 

The first extensive Sinhalese settlements were along rivers in the 
dry northern zone of the island. Because early agricultural activity — 
primarily the cultivation of wet rice — was dependent on unreliable 



8 




9 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

monsoon rains, the Sinhalese constructed canals, channels, water- 
storage tanks, and reservoirs to provide an elaborate irrigation sys- 
tem to counter the risks posed by periodic drought. Such early at- 
tempts at engineering reveal the brilliant understanding these 
ancient people had of hydraulic principles and trigonometry. The 
discovery of the principle of the valve tower, or valve pit, for regulat- 
ing the escape of water is credited to Sinhalese ingenuity more than 
2,000 years ago. By the first century A.D., several large-scale irri- 
gation works had been completed. 

The mastery of hydraulic engineering and irrigated agriculture 
facilitated the concentration of large numbers of people in the north- 
ern dry zone, where early settlements appeared to be under the 
control of semi-independent rulers (see Land Use and Settlement 
Patterns, ch. 2). In time, the mechanisms for political control be- 
came more refined, and the city-state of Anuradhapura emerged 
and attempted to gain sovereignty over the entire island. The state- 
sponsored flowering of Buddhist art and architecture and the con- 
struction of complex and extensive hydraulic works exemplify what 
is known as Sri Lanka's classical age, which roughly parallels the 
period between the rise and fall of Anuradhapura (from ca. 200 
B.C. to ca. A.D. 993). 

The Sinhalese kingdom at Anuradhapura was in many ways typi- 
cal of other ancient hydraulic societies because it lacked a rigid, 
authoritarian and heavily bureaucratic structure. Theorists have 
attributed Anuradhapura' s decentralized character to its feudal 
basis, which was, however, a feudalism unlike that found in Europe. 
The institution of caste formed the basis of social stratification in 
ancient Sinhalese society and determined a person's social obliga- 
tion, and position within the hierarchy. 

The caste system in Sri Lanka developed its own characteristics. 
Although it shared an occupational role with its Indian prototype, 
caste in Sri Lanka developed neither the exclusive Brahmanical 
social hierarchy nor, to any significant degree, the concept of defile- 
ment by contact with impure persons or substances that was cen- 
tral to the Indian caste system. The claims of the Kshatriya (warrior 
caste) to royalty were a moderating influence on caste, but more 
profound was the influence of Buddhism, which lessened the severity 
of the institution. The monarch theoretically held absolute powers 
but was nevertheless expected to conform to the rules of dharma, 
or universal laws governing human existence and conduct (see 
Religion, ch. 2). 

The king was traditionally entitled to land revenue equivalent 
to one-sixth of the produce in his domain. Furthermore, his sub- 
jects owed him a kind of caste-based compulsory labor (rajakariya 



10 



Historical Setting 



in Sinhala) as a condition for holding land and were required to 
provide labor for road construction, irrigation projects, and other 
public works. During the later colonial period, the Europeans ex- 
ploited the institution of rajakariya, which was destined to become 
an important moral and economic issue in the nineteenth century 
(see European Encroachment and Dominance, 1500-1948, this ch.). 

Social divisions arose over the centuries between those engaged 
in agriculture and those engaged in nonagricultural occupations. 
The Govi (cultivators — see Glossary) belonged to the highest Sin- 
halese caste (Goyigama) and remained so in the late twentieth cen- 
tury. All Sri Lankan heads of state have, since independence, 
belonged to the Goyigama caste, as do about half of all Sinhalese. 
The importance of cultivation on the island is also reflected in the 
caste structure of the Hindu Tamils, among whom the Vellala (cul- 
tivator) is the highest caste. 

Rise of Sinhalese and Tamil Ethnic Awareness 

Because the Mahavamsa is essentially a chronicle of the early 
Sinhalese-Buddhist royalty on the island, it does not provide in- 
formation on the island's early ethnic distributions. There is, for 
instance, only scant evidence as to when the first Tamil settlements 
were established. Tamil literary sources, however, speak of active 
trading centers in southern India as early as the third century B.C. 
and it is probable that these centers had at least some contact with 
settlements in northern Sri Lanka. There is some debate among 
historians as to whether settiement by Indo-Aryan speakers preceded 
settlement by Dravidian- speaking Tamils, but there is no dispute 
over the fact that Sri Lanka, from its earliest recorded history, was 
a multiethnic society. Evidence suggests that during the early cen- 
turies of Sri Lankan history there was considerable harmony be- 
tween the Sinhalese and Tamils. 

The peace and stability of the island were first significantly 
affected around 237 B.C. when two adventurers from southern 
India, Sena and Guttika, usurped the Sinhalese throne at Anura- 
dhapura. Their combined twenty- two-year rule marked the first 
time Sri Lanka was ruled by Tamils. The two were subsequently 
murdered, and the Sinhalese royal dynasty was restored. In 145 
B.C., a Tamil general named Elara, of the Chola dynasty (which 
ruled much of India from the ninth to twelfth centuries A.D.), took 
over the throne at Anuradhapura and ruled for forty-four years. 
A Sinhalese king, Dutthagamani (or Duttugemunu), waged a fifteen- 
year campaign against the Tamil monarch and finally deposed him. 

Dutthagamani is the outstanding hero of the Mahavamsa, and 
his war against Elara is sometimes depicted in contemporary 



11 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

accounts as a major racial confrontation between Tamils and Sin- 
halese. A less biased and more factual interpretation, according 
to Sri Lankan historian K.M. de Silva, must take into considera- 
tion the large reserve of support Elara had among the Sinhalese. 
Furthermore, another Sri Lankan historian, Sinnappah Arasarat- 
nam, argues that the war was a dynastic struggle that was purely 
political in nature. As a result of Dutthagamani's victory, Anura- 
dhapura became the locus of power on the island. Arasaratnam 
suggests the conflict recorded in the Mahavamsa marked the begin- 
ning of Sinhalese nationalism and that Dutthagamani's victory is 
commonly interpreted as a confirmation that the island was a 
preserve for the Sinhalese and Buddhism. The historian maintains 
that the story is still capable of stirring the religio-communal pas- 
sions of the Sinhalese. 

The Tamil threat to the Sinhalese Buddhist kingdoms had be- 
come very real in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. Three Hindu 
empires in southern India — the Pandya, Pallava, and Chola — were 
becoming more assertive. The Sinhalese perception of this threat 
intensified because in India, Buddhism — vulnerable to pressure and 
absorption by Hinduism — had already receded. Tamil ethnic and 
religious consciousness also matured during this period. In terms 
of culture, language, and religion, the Tamils had identified them- 
selves as Dravidian, Tamil, and Hindu, respectively. 

Another Sinhalese king praised in the Mahavamsa is Dhatusena 
(459-77), who, in the fifth century A.D., liberated Anuradhapura 
from a quarter-century of Pandyan rule. The king was also hon- 
ored as a generous patron of Buddhism and as a builder of water 
storage tanks. Dhatusena was killed by his son, Kasyapa (477-95), 
who is regarded as a great villain in Sri Lankan history. In fear 
of retribution from his exiled brother, the parricide moved the cap- 
ital from Anuradhapura to Sigiriya, a fortress and palace perched 
on a monolithic rock 180 meters high. Although the capital was 
returned to Anuradhapura after Kasyapa was dethroned, Sigiriya 
is an architectural and engineering feat displayed in an inaccessi- 
ble redoubt. The rock fortress eventually fell to Kasyapa' s brother, 
who received help from an army of Indian mercenaries. 

In the seventh century A.D., Tamil influence became firmly 
embedded in the island's culture when Sinhalese Prince Mana- 
vamma seized the throne with Pallava assistance. The dynasty that 
Manavamma established was heavily indebted to Pallava patronage 
and continued for almost three centuries. During this time, Pallava 
influence extended to architecture and sculpture, both of which bear 
noticeable Hindu motifs. 



12 



Historical Setting 



By the middle of the ninth century, the Pandyans had risen to 
a position of ascendancy in southern India, invaded northern Sri 
Lanka, and sacked Anuradhapura. The Pandyans demanded 
an indemnity as a price for their withdrawal. Shortly after the 
Pandyan departure, however, the Sinhalese invaded Pandya in sup- 
port of a rival prince, and the Indian city of Madurai was sacked 
in the process. 

In the tenth century, the Sinhalese again sent an invading army 
to India, this time to aid the Pandyan king against the Cholas. The 
Pandyan king was defeated and fled to Sri Lanka, carrying with 
him the royal insignia. The Chola, initially under Rajaraja the 
Great (A.D. 985-1018), were impatient to recapture the royal in- 
signia; they sacked Anuradhapura in A.D. 993 and annexed 
Rajarata — the heartland of the Sinhalese kingdom — to the Chola 
Empire. King Mahinda V, the last of the Sinhalese monarchs to 
rule from Anuradhapura, fled to Rohana, where he reigned until 
1017, when the Chola took him prisoner. He subsequently died 
in India in 1029. 

Under the rule of Rajaraja's son, Rajendra (1018-35), the Chola 
Empire grew stronger, to the extent that it posed a threat to states 
as far away as the empire of Sri Vijaya in modern Malaysia and 
Sumatra in Indonesia. For seventy-five years, Sri Lanka was ruled 
directly as a Chola province. During this period, Hinduism 
flourished, and Buddhism received a serious setback. After the des- 
truction of Anuradhapura, the Chola set up their capital farther 
to the southeast, at Polonnaruwa, a strategically defensible loca- 
tion near the Mahaweli Ganga, a river that offered good protec- 
tion against potential invaders from the southern Sinhalese kingdom 
of Ruhunu (see fig. 2). When the Sinhalese kings regained their 
dominance, they chose not to reestablish themselves at Anurad- 
hapura because Polonnaruwa offered better geographical security 
from any future invasions from southern India. The area surround- 
ing the new capital already had a well-developed irrigation system 
and a number of water storage tanks in the vicinity, including the 
great Minneriya Tank and its feeder canals built by King Mahasena 
(A.D. 274-301), the last of the Sinhalese monarchs mentioned in 
the Mahavamsa. 

King Vijayabahu I drove the Chola out of Sri Lanka in A.D. 
1070. Considered by many as the author of Sinhalese freedom, the 
king recaptured Anuradhapura but ruled from Polonnaruwa, 
slightly less than 100 kilometers to the southeast. During his forty- 
year reign, Vijayabahu I (A.D. 1070-1110) concentrated on 
rebuilding the Buddhist temples and monasteries that had been 
neglected during Chola rule. He left no clearly designated successor 



13 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



to his throne, and a period of instability and civil war followed his 
rule until the rise of King Parakramabahu I, known as the Great 
(A.D. 1153-86). 

Parakramabahu is the greatest hero of the Culavamsa, and under 
his patronage, the city of Polonnaruwa grew to rival Anuradhapura 
in architectural diversity and as a repository of Buddhist art. 
Parakramabahu was a great patron of Buddhism and a reformer 
as well. He reorganized the sangha (community of monks) and healed 
a longstanding schism between Mahavihara — the Theravada Bud- 
dhist monastery — and Abhayagiri — the Mahayana Buddhist 
monastery. Parakramabahu 's reign coincided with the last great 
period of Sinhalese hydraulic engineering; many remarkable irri- 
gation works were constructed during his rule, including his crown- 
ing achievement, the massive Parakrama Samudra (Sea of 
Parakrama or Parakrama Tank). Polonnaruwa became one of the 
magnificent capitals of the ancient world, and nineteenth-century 
British historian Sir Emerson Tenant even estimated that during 
Parakramabahu 's rule, the population of Polonnaruwa reached 3 
million — a figure, however, that is considered to be too high by 
twentieth-century historians. 

Parakramabahu 's reign was not only a time of Buddhist renais- 
sance but also a period of religious expansionism abroad. 
Parakramabahu was powerful enough to send a punitive mission 
against the Burmese for their mistreatment of a Sri Lankan mis- 
sion in 1164. The Sinhalese monarch also meddled extensively in 
Indian politics and invaded southern India in several unsuccessful 
expeditions to aid a Pandyan claimant to the throne. 

Although a revered figure in Sinhalese annals, Parakrama- 
bahu is believed to have greatly strained the royal treasury and 
contributed to the fall of the Sinhalese kingdom. The post- 
Parakramabahu history of Polonnaruwa describes the destruction 
of the city twenty-nine years after his death and fifteen rulers later. 

For the decade following Parakramabahu 's death, however, a 
period of peace and stability ensued during the reign of King 
Nissankamalla (A.D. 1187-97). During Nissankamalla's rule, the 
Brahmanic legal system came to regulate the Sinhalese caste sys- 
tem. Henceforth, the highest caste stratum became identified with 
the cultivator caste, and land ownership conferred high status. 
Occupational caste became hereditary and regulated dietary and 
marriage codes. At the bottom of the caste strata was the Chandala, 
who corresponded roughly to the Indian untouchable. It was dur- 
ing this brief period that it became mandatory for the Sinhalese 
king to be a Buddhist. 



15 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



Decline of the Sinhalese Kingdom, 1200-1500 

Sinhalese Migration to the South 

After Nissankamalla's death, a series of dynastic disputes 
hastened the breakup of the kingdom of Polonnaruwa. Domestic 
instability characterized the ensuing period, and incursions by Chola 
and Pandyan invaders created greater turbulence, culminating in 
a devastating campaign by the Kalinga, an eastern Indian dynasty. 
When Magha, the Kalinga king, died in 1255, another period of 
instability began, marking the beginning of the abandonment of 
Polonnaruwa and the Sinhalese migration to the southwest from 
the northern dry zone. The next three kings after Magha ruled 
from rock fortresses to the west of Polonnaruwa. The last king to 
rule from Polonnaruwa was Parakramabahu III (1278-93). The 
migration is one of the great unsolved puzzles of South Asian his- 
tory and is of considerable interest to academics because of the 
parallel abandonment of dry-zone civilizations in modern Cam- 
bodia, northern Thailand, and Burma. 

A Weakened State: Invasion, Disease, and Social Instability 

The Sinhalese withdrawal from the north is sometimes attributed 
to the cumulative effect of invasions from southern India (a ra- 
tionale that has been exploited against the Tamils in modern Sin- 
halese politics). This interpretation has obvious weaknesses because 
after each of the south Indian invasions of the preceding centu- 
ries, the Sinhalese returned to the dry zone from the hills and 
repaired and revived the ancient irrigation system. K.M. de Silva 
suggests that the cumulative effects of repeated invasions "ate into 
the vitals of a society already losing its vigour with age." A civili- 
zation based on a dry-zone irrigation complex presupposes a high 
degree of organization and a massive labor force to build and main- 
tain the works. The decline of these public works mirrored the 
breakdown in the social order. Another factor that seems to have 
retarded the resettlement of the dry zone was the outbreak of malaria 
in the thirteenth century. The mosquito found ideal breeding 
grounds in the abandoned tanks and channels. (Malaria has often 
followed the destruction of irrigation works in other parts of Asia.) 
Indeed, all attempts at large-scale resettlement of the dry area in 
Sri Lanka were thwarted until the introduction of modern pesticides. 

During the thirteenth century, the declining Sinhalese kingdom 
faced threats of invasion from India and the expanding Tamil king- 
dom of northern Sri Lanka. Taking advantage of Sinhalese weak- 
ness, the Tamils secured control of the valuable pearl fisheries 
around Jaffna Peninsula. During this time, the vast stretches of 

16 



Historical Setting 



jungle that cover north-central Sri Lanka separated the Tamils and 
the Sinhalese. This geographical separation had important psycho- 
logical and cultural implications. The Tamils in the north devel- 
oped a more distinct and confident culture, backed by a resurgent 
Hinduism that looked to the traditions of southern India for its 
inspiration. Conversely, the Sinhalese were increasingly restricted 
to the southern and central area of the island and were fearful of 
the more numerous Tamils on the Indian mainland. The fact that 
the Hindu kingdom at Jaffna was expending most of its military 
resources resisting the advances of the expansionist Vijayanagara 
Empire (1336-1565) in India enhanced the Sinhalese ability to resist 
further Tamil encroachments. Some historians maintain that it was 
the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century that prevented 
the island from being overrun by south Indians. 

Foreign rulers took advantage of the disturbed political state of 
the Sinhalese kingdom, and in the thirteenth century Chandra- 
bhanu, a Buddhist king from Malaya, invaded the island twice. 
He attempted to seize the two most sacred relics of the Buddha 
in Sinhalese custody, the Tooth Relic and the Alms Bowl. In the 
early fifteenth century, the Ming dynasty Chinese interceded on 
behalf of King Parakramabahu VI (1412-67), an enlightened 
monarch who repulsed an invasion from the polity of Vijayanagara 
in southern India, reunited Sri Lanka, and earned renown as a 
patron of Buddhism and the arts. Parakramabahu VI was the last 
Sinhalese king to rule the entire island. 

During this extended period of domestic instability and frequent 
foreign invasion, Sinhalese culture experienced fundamental 
change. Rice cultivation continued as the mainstay of agriculture 
but was no longer dependent on an elaborate irrigation network. 
In the wet zone, large-scale administrative cooperation was not as 
necessary as it had been before. Foreign trade was of increasing 
importance to the Sinhalese kings. In particular, cinnamon — in 
great demand by Europeans — became a prime export commodity. 
Because of the value of cinnamon, the city of Kotte on the west 
coast (near modern Colombo) became the nominal capital of the 
Sinhalese kingdom in the mid-fifteenth century. Still, the Sinha- 
lese kingdom remained divided into numerous competing petty 
principalities. 

European Encroachment and Dominance, 1500-1948 

The Portuguese 

By the late fifteenth century, Portugal, which had already 
established its dominance as a maritime power in the Atlantic, was 
exploring new waters. In 1497 Vasco da Gama sailed around the 



17 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Cape of Good Hope and discovered an ocean route connecting 
Europe with India, thus inaugurating a new era of maritime 
supremacy for Portugal. The Portuguese were consumed by two 
objectives in their empire-building efforts: to convert followers of 
non-Christian religions to Roman Catholicism and to capture the 
major share of the spice trade for the European market. To carry 
out their goals, the Portuguese did not seek territorial conquest, 
which would have been difficult given their small numbers. Instead, 
they tried to dominate strategic points through which trade passed. 
By virtue of their supremacy on the seas, their knowledge of fire- 
arms, and by what has been called their "desperate soldiering" 
on land, the Portuguese gained an influence in South Asia that 
was far out of proportion to their numerical strength. 

At the onset of the European period in Sri Lanka in the sixteenth 
century, there were three native centers of political power: the two 
Sinhalese kingdoms of Kotte and Kandy and the Tamil kingdom 
at Jaffna. Kotte was the principal seat of Sinhalese power, and it 
claimed a largely imaginary overlordship not only over Kandy but 
also over the entire island. None of the three kingdoms, however, 
had the strength to assert itself over the other two and reunify the 
island. 

In 1505 Don Lourenco de Almeida, son of the Portuguese vice- 
roy in India, was sailing off the southwestern coast of Sri Lanka 
looking for Moorish ships to attack when stormy weather forced 
his fleet to dock at Galle. Word of these strangers who "eat hunks 
of white stone and drink blood (presumably wine) . . . and have 
guns with a noise louder than thunder ..." spread quickly and 
reached King Parakramabahu VIII of Kotte (1484-1508), who 
offered gifts of cinnamon and elephants to the Portuguese to take 
back to their home port at Cochin on the Malabar Coast of south- 
western India. The king also gave the Portuguese permission to 
build a residence in Colombo for trade purposes. Within a short 
time, however, Portuguese militaristic and monopolistic intentions 
became apparent. Their heavily fortified "trading post" at Colombo 
and open hostility toward the island's Muslim traders aroused 
Sinhalese suspicions. 

Following the decline of the Chola as a maritime power in the 
twelfth century, Muslim trading communities in South Asia claimed 
a major share of commerce in the Indian Ocean and developed 
extensive east- west, as well as Indo-Sri Lankan, commercial trade 
routes. As the Portuguese expanded into the region, this flourish- 
ing Muslim trade became an irresistible target for European in- 
terlopers. The sixteenth-century Roman Catholic Church was 
intolerant of Islam and encouraged the Portuguese to take over 



18 



Historical Setting 



the profitable shipping trade monopolized by the Moors. In addi- 
tion, the Portuguese would later have another strong motive for 
hostility toward the Moors because the latter played an important 
role in the Kandyan economy, one that enabled the kingdom suc- 
cessfully to resist the Portuguese. 

The Portuguese soon decided that the island, which they called 
Cilao, conveyed a strategic advantage that was necessary for pro- 
tecting their coastal establishments in India and increasing Lisbon's 
potential for dominating Indian Ocean trade. These incentives 
proved irresistible, and, the Portuguese, with only a limited num- 
ber of personnel, sought to extend their power over the island. They 
had not long to wait. Palace intrigue and then revolution in Kotte 
threatened the survival of the kingdom. The Portuguese skillfully 
exploited these developments. In 1521 Bhuvanekabahu, the ruler 
of Kotte, requested Portuguese aid against his brother, Mayadunne, 
the more able rival king who had established his independence from 
the Portuguese at Sitawake, a domain in the Kotte kingdom. Power- 
less on his own, King Bhuvanekabahu became a puppet of the Por- 
tuguese. But shortly before his death in 1551, the king successfully 
obtained Portuguese recognition of his grandson, Dharmapala, as 
his successor. Portugal pledged to protect Dharmapala from at- 
tack in return for privileges, including a continuous payment in 
cinnamon and permission to rebuild the fort at Colombo on a 
grander scale. When Bhuvanekabahu died, Dharmapala, still a 
child, was entrusted to the Franciscans for his education, and, in 
1557, he converted to Roman Catholicism. His conversion broke 
the centuries-old connection between Buddhism and the state, and 
a great majority of Sinhalese immediately disqualified the young 
monarch from any claim to the throne. The rival king at Sitawake 
exploited the issue of the prince's conversion and accused 
Dharmapala of being a puppet of a foreign power. 

Before long, rival King Mayadunne had annexed much of the 
Kotte kingdom and was threatening the security of the capital city 
itself. The Portuguese were obliged to defend Dharmapala (and 
their own credibility) because the ruler lacked a popular follow- 
ing. They were subsequently forced to abandon Kotte and retreat 
to Colombo, taking the despised puppet king with them. 
Mayadunne and, later, his son, Rajasinha, besieged Colombo many 
times. The latter was so successful that the Portuguese were once 
even forced to eat the flesh of their dead to avoid starvation. The 
Portuguese would probably have lost their holdings in Sri Lanka 
had they not had maritime superiority and been able to send rein- 
forcements by sea from their base at Goa on the western coast of 
India. 



19 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

The Kingdom of Sitawake put up the most vigorous opposition 
to Western imperialism in the island's history. For the seventy- 
three-year period of its existence, Sitawake (1521-94) rose to be- 
come the predominant power on the island, with only the Tamil 
kingdom at Jaffna and the Portuguese fort at Colombo beyond its 
control. When Rajasinha died in 1593, no effective successors were 
left to consolidate his gains, and the kingdom collapsed as quickly 
as it had arisen. 

Dharmapala, despised by his countrymen and totally com- 
promised by the Portuguese, was deprived of all his royal duties 
and became completely manipulated by the Portuguese advisers 
surrounding him. In 1580 the Franciscans persuaded him to make 
out a deed donating his dominions to the king of Portugal. When 
Dharmapala died in 1597, the Portuguese emissary, the captain- 
general, took formal possession of the kingdom. 

Portuguese missionaries had also been busily involving them- 
selves in the affairs of the Tamil kingdom at Jaffna, converting 
almost the entire island of Mannar to Roman Catholicism by 1544. 
The reaction of Sangily, king of Jaffna, however, was to lead an 
expedition to Mannar and decapitate the resident priest and about 
600 of his congregation. The king of Portugal took this as a per- 
sonal affront and sent several expeditions against Jaffna. The Por- 
tuguese, having disposed of the Tamil king who fled south, installed 
one of the Tamil princes on the throne, obliging him to pay an 
annual tribute. In 1619 Lisbon annexed the Kingdom of Jaffna. 

After the annexation of Jaffna, only the central highland King- 
dom of Kandy — the last remnant of Buddhist Sinhalese power — 
remained independent of Portuguese control. The kingdom ac- 
quired a new significance as custodian of Sinhalese nationalism. 
The Portuguese attempted the same strategy they had used suc- 
cessfully at Kotte and Jaffna and set up a puppet on the throne. 
They were able to put a queen on the Kandyan throne and even 
to have her baptized. But despite considerable Portuguese help, 
she was not able to retain power. The Portuguese spent the next 
half century trying in vain to expand their control over the King- 
dom of Kandy. In one expedition in 1630, the Kandyans ambushed 
and massacred the whole Portuguese force, including the captain- 
general. The Kandyans fomented rebellion and consistently frus- 
trated Portuguese attempts to expand into the interior. 

The areas the Portuguese claimed to control in Sri Lanka were 
part of what they majestically called the Estado da India and were 
governed in name by the viceroy in Goa, who represented the king. 
But in actuality, from headquarters in Colombo, the captain- 
general, a subordinate of the viceroy, directly ruled Sri Lanka with 



20 



Gadaladeniya Temple, fourteenth century 
Courtesy Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington 

all the affectations of royalty once reserved for the Sinhalese 
kings. 

The Portuguese did not try to alter the existing basic structure of 
native administration. Although Portuguese governors were put in 
charge of each province, the customary hierarchy, determined by 
caste and land ownership, remained unchanged. Traditional Sinhalese 
institutions were maintained and placed at the service of the new 
rulers. Portuguese administrators offered land grants to Europeans 
and Sinhalese in place of salaries, and the traditional compulsory 
labor obligation was used for construction and military purposes. 

The Portuguese tried vigorously, if not fanatically, to force reli- 
gious and, to a lesser extent, educational, change in Sri Lanka. 
They discriminated against other religions with a vengeance, de- 
stroyed Buddhist and Hindu temples, and gave the temple lands 
to Roman Catholic religious orders. Buddhist monks fled to Kandy, 
which became a refuge for people disaffected with colonial rule. 
One of the most durable legacies of the Portuguese was the con- 
version of a large number of Sinhalese and Tamils to Roman 
Catholicism. Although small pockets of Nestorian Christianity had 
existed in Sri Lanka, the Portuguese were the first to propagate 
Christianity on a mass scale. 

Sixteenth-century Portuguese Catholicism was intolerant. But 
perhaps because it caught Buddhism at its nadir, it nevertheless 



21 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

became rooted firmly enough on the island to survive the subse- 
quent persecutions of the Protestant Dutch Reformists. The Roman 
Catholic Church was especially effective in fishing communities — 
both Sinhalese and Tamil — and contributed to the upward mobil- 
ity of the castes associated with this occupation. Portuguese em- 
phasis on proselytization spurred the development and 
standardization of educational institutions. In order to convert the 
masses, mission schools were opened, with instruction in Portuguese 
and Sinhalese or Tamil. Many Sinhalese converts assumed Por- 
tuguese names. The rise of many families influential in the twen- 
tieth century dates from this period. For a while, Portuguese became 
not only the language of the upper classes of Sri Lanka but also 
the lingua franca of prominence in the Asian maritime world. 

The Dutch 

The Dutch became involved in the politics of the Indian Ocean 
in the beginning of the seventeenth century. Headquartered at Bata- 
via in modern Indonesia, the Dutch moved to wrest control of the 
highly profitable spice trade from the Portuguese. The Dutch began 
negotiations with King Rajasinha II of Kandy in 1638. A treaty 
assured the king assistance in his war against the Portuguese in 
exchange for a monopoly of the island's major trade goods, par- 
ticularly cinnamon. Rajasinha also promised to pay the Dutch's 
war-related expenses. The Portuguese fiercely resisted the Dutch 
and the Kandyans and were expelled only gradually from their 
strongholds. The Dutch captured the eastern ports of Trincomalee 
and Batticaloa in 1639 and restored them to the Sinhalese. But when 
the southwestern and western ports of Galle and Negombo fell in 
1640, the Dutch refused to turn them over to the king of Kandy. 
The Dutch claimed that Rajasinha had not reimbursed them for 
their vastly inflated claims for military expenditures. This pretext 
allowed the Dutch to control the island's richest cinnamon lands. 
The Dutch ultimately presented the king of Kandy with such a large 
bill for help against the Portuguese that the king could never hope 
to repay it. After extensive fighting, the Portuguese surrendered 
Colombo in 1656 and Jaffna, their last stronghold, in 1658. Supe- 
rior economic resources and greater naval power enabled the Dutch 
to dominate the Indian Ocean. They attacked Portuguese positions 
throughout South Asia and in the end allowed their adversaries 
to keep only their settlement at Goa. 

The king of Kandy soon realized that he had replaced one foe 
with another and proceeded to incite rebellion in the lowlands where 
the Dutch held sway. He even attempted to ally the British in 
Madras in his struggle to oust the Dutch. These efforts ended with 



22 



Historical Setting 



a serious rebellion against his rule in 1664. The Dutch profited 
from this period of instability and extended the territory under their 
control. They took over the remaining harbors and completely cor- 
doned off Kandy, thereby making the highland kingdom landlocked 
and preventing it from allying itself with another foreign power 
(see fig. 2). This strategy, combined with a concerted Dutch dis- 
play of force, subdued the Kandyan kings. Henceforth, Kandy was 
unable to offer significant resistance except in its internal frontier 
regions. The Dutch and the Kingdom of Kandy eventually settled 
down to an uneasy modus vivendi, partly because the Dutch be- 
came less aggressive. Despite underlying hostility between Kandy 
and the Dutch, open warfare between them occurred only once — in 
1762 — when the Dutch, exasperated by Kandy 's provocation of 
riots in the lowlands, launched a punitive expedition. The expedi- 
tion met with disaster, but a better-planned second expedition in 
1765 forced the Kandyans to sign a treaty that gave the Dutch 
sovereignty over the lowlands. The Dutch, however, maintained 
their pretension that they administered the territories under their 
control as agents of the Kandyan ruler. 

After taking political control of the island, the Dutch proceeded 
to monopolize trade. This monopoly was at first limited to cinna- 
mon and elephants but later extended to other goods. Control was 
vested in the Dutch East India Company, a joint-stock corpora- 
tion, which had been established for the purpose of carrying out 
trade with the islands of Indonesia but was later called upon to 
exercise sovereign responsibilities in many parts of Asia. 

The Dutch tried with little success to supplant Roman Catholi- 
cism with Protestantism. They rewarded native conversion to the 
Dutch Reformed Church with promises of upward mobility, but 
Catholicism was too deeply rooted. (In the 1980s, the majority of 
Sri Lankan Christians remained Roman Catholics.) The Dutch 
were far more tolerant of the indigenous religions than the Por- 
tuguese; they prohibited open Buddhist and Hindu religious ob- 
servance in urban areas, but did not interfere with these practices 
in rural areas. The Dutch banned Roman Catholic practices, 
however. They regarded Portuguese power and Catholicism as 
mutually interdependent and strove to safeguard against the 
reemergence of the former by persecuting the latter. They harassed 
Catholics and constructed Protestant chapels on confiscated church 
property. 

The Dutch contributed significantly to the evolution of the 
judicial, and, to a lesser extent, administrative systems on the is- 
land. They codified indigenous law and customs that did not con- 
flict directly with Dutch-Roman jurisprudence. The outstanding 



23 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



example was Dutch codification of the Tamil legal code of Jaffna — 
the Thesavalamai. To a small degree, the Dutch altered the tradi- 
tional land grant and tenure system, but they usually followed the 
Portuguese pattern of minimal interference with indigenous social 
and cultural institutions. The provincial governors of the territo- 
ries of Jaffnapatam, Colombo, and Trincomalee were Dutch. These 
rulers also supervised various local officials, most of whom were 
the traditional mudaliyar (headmen). 

The Dutch, like the Portuguese before them, tried to entice their 
fellow countrymen to settle in Sri Lanka, but attempts to lure mem- 
bers of the upper class, especially women, were not very success- 
ful. Lower-ranking military recruits, however, responded to the 
incentive of free land, and their marriages to local women added 
another group to the island's already small but established popu- 
lation of Eurasians — the Portuguese Burghers. The Dutch Burghers 
formed a separate and privileged ethnic group on the island in the 
twentieth century. 

During the Dutch period, social differences between lowland and 
highland Sinhalese hardened, forming two culturally and politi- 
cally distinct groups. Western customs and laws increasingly in- 
fluenced the lowland Sinhalese, who generally enjoyed a higher 
standard of living and greater literacy. Despite their relative eco- 
nomic and political decline, the highland Sinhalese were nonethe- 
less proud to have retained their political independence from the 
Europeans and thus considered themselves superior to the lowland 
Sinhalese. 

The British 

Early Contacts 

In 1592 an English privateer attacked the Portuguese off the 
southwestern port of Galle. This action was England's first recorded 
contact with Sri Lanka. A decade later, Ralph Fitch, traveling from 
India, became the first known English visitor to Sri Lanka. The 
English did not record their first in-depth impressions of the island 
until the mid-seventeenth century, when Robert Knox, a sailor, 
was captured when his ship docked for repairs near Trincomalee. 
The Kandyans kept him prisoner between 1660 and 1680. After 
his escape, Knox wrote a popular book entitled An Historical Rela- 
tion of the Island of Ceylon in which he described his years among 
his "decadent" captors. 

By the mid-eighteenth century, it was apparent that the Mughal 
Empire (1526-1757) in India faced imminent collapse, and the 
major European powers were positioning themselves to fill the power 



24 



Historical Setting 



vacuum in the subcontinent. Dutch holdings on Sri Lanka were 
challenged in time by the British, who had an interest in the excel- 
lent harbor at Trincomalee. The British interest in procuring an 
all-weather port was whetted when they almost lost the Indian port 
of Madras to the French in 1758. The Dutch refused to grant the 
British permission to dock ships at Trincomalee (after The Nether- 
lands 's decision to support the French in the American War of 
Independence), goading the British into action. After skirmishing 
with both the Dutch and French, the British took Trincomalee in 
1796 and proceeded to expel the Dutch from the island. 

The British Replace the Dutch 

In 1766 the Dutch had forced the Kandyans to sign a treaty, 
which the Kandyans later considered so harsh that they immedi- 
ately began searching for foreign assistance in expelling their foes. 
They approached the British in 1762, 1782, and 1795. The first 
Kandyan missions failed, but in 1795, British emissaries offered 
a draft treaty that would extend military aid in return for control 
of the seacoast and a monopoly of the cinnamon trade. The 
Kandyan king unsuccessfully sought better terms, and the British 
managed to oust the Dutch without significant help in 1796. 

The Kandyans' search for foreign assistance against the Dutch 
was a mistake because they simply replaced a relatively weak master 
with a powerful one. Britain was emerging as the unchallenged 
leader in the new age of the Industrial Revolution, a time of tech- 
nological invention, economic innovations, and imperialist expan- 
sion. The nations that had launched the first phase of European 
imperialism in Asia — the Portuguese and the Dutch — had already 
exhausted themselves. 

While peace negotiations were under way in Europe in 1796, 
the British assumed Sri Lanka would eventually be restored to the 
Dutch. By 1797 however, London had decided to retain the island 
as a British possession. The government compelled the British East 
India Company to share in the administration of the island and 
guaranteed the company a monopoly of trade, especially the moder- 
ately profitable — but no longer robust — cinnamon trade. The gover- 
nor of the island was responsible for law and order, but financial 
and commercial matters were under the control of the director of 
the East India Company. This system of "dual control" lasted from 
1798 to 1802. After the Dutch formally ceded the island to the Brit- 
ish in the 1801 Peace of Amiens, Sri Lanka became Britain's first 
crown colony. Following Lord Nelson's naval victory over the 
French at Trafalgar in 1805, British superiority on the seas was 



25 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

unchallenged and provided new security for the British colonies 
in Asia. 

Once the British had established themselves in Sri Lanka, they 
aggressively expanded their territorial possessions by a combina- 
tion of annexation and intervention, a policy that paralleled the 
approach pursued by Lord Wellesley in India in the early nineteenth 
century. This strategy directly threatened the continued existence 
of the Kingdom of Kandy. Unrest at the Kandyan court between 
a ruling dynasty of alien, southern Indian antecedents and power- 
ful, indigenous Sinhalese chieftains provided opportunities for 
British interference. The intrigue of the king's chief minister precipi- 
tated the first Kandyan war (1803). With the minister's knowledge, 
a British force marched on Kandy, but the force was ill prepared 
for such an ambitious venture and its leaders were misinformed 
of the extent of the king's unpopularity. The British expedition 
was at first successful, but on the return march, it was plagued 
by disease, and the garrison left behind was decimated. During 
the next decade, no concerted attempt was made to take Kandy. 
But in 1815 the British had another opportunity. The king had 
antagonized local Sinhalese chiefs and further alienated the Sin- 
halese people by actions against Buddhist monks and temple 
property. In 1815 the Kandyan rebels invited the British to inter- 
vene. The governor quickly responded by sending a well-prepared 
force to Kandy; the king fled with hardly a shot fired. 

Kandyan headmen and the British signed a treaty known as the 
Kandyan Convention in March 1815. The treaty decreed that the 
Kandyan provinces be brought under British sovereignty and that 
all the traditional privileges of the chiefs be maintained. The King- 
dom of Kandy was also to be governed according to its customary 
Buddhist laws and institutions but would be under the adminis- 
tration of a British "resident" at Kandy, who would, in all but 
name, take the place of the monarch. 

In general, the old system was allowed to continue, but its fu- 
ture was bleak because of the great incongruity between the prin- 
ciples on which the British administration was based and the 
principles of the Kandyan hierarchy. Because the changes under 
the treaty tended to diminish the power and influence of the chiefs, 
the British introduced the new procedures with great caution. The 
monks, in particular, resented the virtual disappearance of the 
monarchy, which was their traditional source of support. They also 
resented the monarchy's replacement by a foreign and impartial 
government. Troubled by the corresponding decline in their sta- 
tus, the monks began to stir up political and religious discontent 
among the Kandyans almost immediately following the British 



26 



Kandyan dancer, 
Temple of the Tooth 
Courtesy Doranne Jacobson 



annexation. The popular and widespread rebellion that followed was 
suppressed with great severity. When hostilities ended in 1818, the 
British issued a proclamation that brought the Kandyan provinces 
under closer control. British agents usurped the powers and privileges 
of the chiefs and became the arbitrators of provincial authority. Fi- 
nally, the British reduced the institutional privileges accorded Bud- 
dhism, in effect placing the religion on an equal footing with other 
religions. With the final British consolidation over Kandy, the coun- 
try fell under the control of a single power — for the first time since 
the twelfth-century rule of Parakramabahu I and Nissankamalla. 

Modernization and Reform 

According to Sri Lankan historian Zeylanicus, each of the three 
epochs of European rule on the island lasted roughly 150 years, 
but rather than being assessed separately, these epochs should be 
thought of collectively as a "mighty cantilever of time with the Pax 
Britannica as the central pillar." Many British institutions have 
survived and currently have a direct and lasting influence on cul- 
tural and political events. Historian E.F.C. Ludowyck concurs, 
stating that whatever the Portuguese and Dutch did, the British 
improved upon. He attributed this accomplishment to British 
grounding in liberalism, a belief in the emancipation of slaves, the 
absence of religious persecution, and conscious attempts to main- 
tain good relations between the rulers and the ruled. 



27 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



When the British first conquered the maritime provinces of Sri 
Lanka, the indigenous population of the island was estimated at 
only 800,000. When the British left a century and a half later, the 
population had grown to more than 7 million. Over a relatively 
short period, the island had developed an economy capable of sup- 
porting the burgeoning population. Roads, railways, schools, hospi- 
tals, hydroelectric projects, and large well-operated agricultural 
plantations provided the infrastructure for a viable national 
economy. 

In the early years of British colonization, Sri Lanka was not con- 
sidered a great economic asset but was viewed instead almost ex- 
clusively in terms of its strategic value. By the 1820s, however, 
this perception was changing. As governor, Sir Edward Barnes was 
responsible for consolidating British military control over the 
Kandyan provinces through a program of vigorous road construc- 
tion. He also began experimenting with a variety of commercial 
crops, such as coffee. These experiments provided the foundation 
of the plantation system that was launched a decade later. In ad- 
ministrative matters, the British were initially careful not to change 
the existing social order too quickly and were not inclined to min- 
gle socially. A sharp distinction was made between the rulers and 
the ruled, but in time the distinction became less defined. The gover- 
nor, who held all executive and legislative power, had an advisory 
council made up of colonial officials with top posts filled by mem- 
bers of a civil service recruited in Britain. The governor was under 
the director of the Colonial Office in London but was given whatever 
discretionary powers he needed to balance the colony's budget and 
to make sure that the colony brought in enough revenue to cover 
its military and administrative expenses. 

By the early 1830s, the British had almost finished consolidat- 
ing their position in Sri Lanka and began to take more of an in- 
terest in securing the island's political stability and economic 
profitability. A new wave of thought, influenced by the reformist 
political ideology articulated by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, 
promised to change fundamentally Britain's relationship to its colo- 
nies. Known as utilitarianism, and later as philosophical radical- 
ism, it promoted the idea of democracy and individual liberty. This 
philosophy sponsored the idea of the trusteeship, i.e. , that new ter- 
ritories would be considered trusts and would receive all the benefits 
of British liberalism. These philosophical abstractions were put into 
practical use with the recommendations of a commission led by 
W.M.G. Colebrooke and C.H. Cameron. Their Colebrooke Report 
(1831-32) was an important document in the history of the island. 
G.C. Mendis, considered by many to be the doyen of modern Sri 



28 



Historical Setting 



Lankan history, considers the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms to be 
the dividing line between the past and present in Sri Lanka. 

The Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms 

In 1829 the British Colonial Office sent a Royal Commission 
of Eastern Inquiry — the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission — to 
assess the administration of the island. The legal and economic 
proposals made by the commission in 1833 were innovative and 
radical. The proposed reforms opposed mercantilism, state mo- 
nopolies, discriminatory administrative regulations, and, in general, 
any interference in the economy. Many of the proposals were 
adopted and helped set a pattern of administrative, economic, judi- 
cial, and educational development that continued into the next 
century. 

The commission worked to end the protested administrative divi- 
sion of the country along ethnic and cultural lines into low-country 
Sinhalese, Kandyan Sinhalese, and Tamil areas. The commission 
proposed instead that the country be put under one uniform ad- 
ministrative system, which was to be divided into five provinces. 
Colebrooke believed that in the past, separate administrative sys- 
tems had encouraged social and cultural divisions, and that the first 
step toward the creation of a modern nation was the administra- 
tive unification of the country. Cameron applied the same princi- 
ple to the judicial system, which he proposed be unified into one 
system and be extended to all classes of people, offering everyone 
equal rights in the eyes of the law. His recommendations were 
adopted and enforced under the Charter of Justice in 1833. 

The commissioners also favored the decentralization of execu- 
tive power in the government. They stripped away many of the 
autocratic powers vested in the governor, replacing his advisory 
council with an Executive Council, which included both official 
and unofficial nominees. The Executive Council appointed the 
members of the Legislative Council, which functioned as a forum 
for discussion of legislative matters. The Legislative Council placed 
special emphasis on Sri Lankan membership, and in 1833 three 
of the fifteen members were Sri Lankans. The governor nominat- 
ed them to represent low-country Sinhalese, Burghers, and Tamils, 
respectively. The commissioners also voted to change the exclu- 
sively British character of the administrative services and recom- 
mended that the civil service include local citizens. These proposed 
constitutional reforms were revolutionary — far more liberal than 
the legal systems of any other European colony. 

The opening of the Ceylon Civil Service to Sri Lankans required 
that a new emphasis be placed on English education. In time, the 



29 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



opening contributed to the creation of a Westernized elite, whose 
members would spearhead the drive for independence in the twen- 
tieth century. The Colebrooke-Cameron Commission emphasized 
the standardization of educational curriculum and advocated the 
substitution of English for local languages. Local English schools 
were established, and the missionary schools that had previously 
taught in the vernacular also adopted English. 

Economic Innovations 

The Colebrooke-Cameron reforms had an immediate impact on 
the economic development of the island. Many features of the eco- 
nomic structure the reforms helped put into place still exist. The 
commission advocated a laissez-faire economy. To encourage free 
trade, the government monopolies over cinnamon cultivation and 
trade were abolished. Traditional institutions, such as land tenure 
by accommodessan (the granting of land for cultivation, as opposed 
to its outright sale), was abolished, as was the rajakariya system. 
Rajakariya was opposed not only on moral grounds but also because 
it slowed the growth of private enterprise, impeded the creation 
of a land market, and interfered with the free movement of labor. 

In the mid- 1830s, the British began to experiment with a vari- 
ety of plantation crops in Sri Lanka, using many of the technolog- 
ical innovations developed earlier from their experience in Jamaica. 
Within fifteen years, one of these crops, coffee, became so successful 
that it transformed the island's economy from reliance upon sub- 
sistence crops to plantation agriculture. The first coffee plantation 
was opened in the Kandyan hill region in 1827, but it was not until 
the mid- 1830s that a number of favorable factors combined to make 
the widespread cultivation of the crop a highly profitable enter- 
prise. Governor Edward Barnes (1824-31) foresaw the possibili- 
ties of coffee cultivation and introduced various incentives for its 
cultivation, particularly the lifting of coffee export duties and ex- 
emption from the land produce tax. When slavery was abolished 
in the West Indies and coffee production there declined, Sri Lankan 
coffee exports soared, filling the gap in the world market. The 
problem of limited availability of land for coffee estates was solved 
when the British government sold lands that it had acquired from 
the Kandyan kings. 

The coffee plantation system faced a serious labor shortage. 
Among the Sinhalese, a peasant cultivator of paddy land held a 
much higher status than a landless laborer. In addition, the low 
wages paid to hired workers failed to attract the Kandyan peasant, 
and the peak season for harvesting plantation coffee usually coin- 
cided with the peasant's own harvest. Moreover, population 



30 



Historical Setting 



pressure and underemployment were not acute until the twentieth 
century. To compensate for this scarcity of native workers, an 
inexpensive and almost inexhaustible supply of labor was found 
among the Tamils in southern India. They were recruited for the 
coffee-harvesting season and migrated to and from Sri Lanka, often 
amid great hardships. The immigration of these Indian Tamils 
began as a trickle in the 1830s and became a regular flow a decade 
later, when the government of India removed all restrictions on 
the migration of labor to Sri Lanka. 

British civilian and military officials resident in Kandy provided 
initial capital for coffee cultivation, provoking contemporary ob- 
servations in the 1840s that they behaved more like coffee planters 
than government employees. This private capitalization led to seri- 
ous abuses, however, culminating in an 1840 ordinance that made 
it virtually impossible for a Kandyan peasant to prove that his land 
was not truly crown land and thus subject to expropriation and 
resale to coffee interests. In this period, more than 80,000 hectares 
of Kandyan land were appropriated and sold as crown lands. 

Between 1830 and 1850, coffee held the preeminent place in the 
economy and became a catalyst for the island's modernization. The 
greater availability of capital and the increase in export trade 
brought the rudiments of capitalist organization to the country. 
The Ceylon Bank opened in 1841 to finance the rapid expansion 
of coffee plantations. Since the main center of coffee production 
was in the Kandyan provinces, the expansion of coffee and the net- 
work of roads and railroads ended the isolation of the old Kandyan 
kingdom. The coffee plantation system had served as the economic 
foundation for the unification of the island while reinforcing the 
administrative and judicial reforms of the Colebrooke-Cameron 
Commission. 

The plantation system dominated the economy in Sri Lanka to 
such an extent that one observer described the government as an 
"appendage of the estates (plantations)." Worldwide depression 
in 1846 temporarily checked the rapid development of the planta- 
tion system. Falling coffee prices caused financial disruption, ag- 
gravating the friction that had been developing between the static 
traditional feudal economy and modernized commercial agricul- 
ture. In order to make up for lost revenue, the government im- 
posed a series of new taxes on firearms, dogs, shops, boats, 
carriages, and bullock carts. All of these taxes affected Sinhalese 
farmers. Other measures that further alienated the Kandy ans 
included a land tax and a road ordinance in 1848 that reintroduced 
a form of rajakariya by requiring six days' free labor on roads or 
the payment of a cash equivalent. But the measure that most 



31 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

antagonized the Kandyans (especially those associated with the 
Buddhist sanghd) was the alienation of temple lands for coffee plan- 
tations. 

British troops so severely repressed a rebellion that broke out 
among the Kandyans in 1848 that the House of Commons in Lon- 
don commissioned an investigation to look into the matter. The 
governor and his chief secretary were subsequently dismissed, and 
all new taxes, except the road ordinance, were repealed. The 
government adopted a new policy toward Buddhism after the rebel- 
lion, recognizing the importance of Buddhist monks as leaders of 
Kandyan public opinion. 

The plantation era transformed the island's economy. This was 
most evident in the growth of the export sector at the expense of 
the traditional agricultural sector. The colonial predilection for 
growing commercial instead of subsistence crops later was con- 
sidered by Sri Lankan nationalists to be one of the unfortunate lega- 
cies of European domination. Late nineteenth-century official 
documents that recorded famines and chronic rural poverty sup- 
port the nationalists' argument. Other issues, notably the British 
policy of selling state land to planters for conversion into planta- 
tions, are equally controversial, even though some members of the 
indigenous population participated in all stages of plantation agricul- 
ture. Sri Lankans, for example, controlled over one- third of the 
area under coffee cultivation and most of the land in coconut 
production. They also owned significant interests in rubber. 

In 1869 a devastating leaf disease — hemleia vastratrix struck the 
coffee plantations and spread quickly throughout the plantation dis- 
trict, destroying the coffee industry within fifteen years. Planters 
desperately searched for a substitute crop. One crop that showed 
promise was chinchona (quinine) . After an initial appearance of suc- 
cess, however, the market price of the crop fell and never fully recov- 
ered. Cinnamon, which had suffered a setback in the beginning 
of the century, was revived at this time, but only to become an 
important minor crop. 

Among all of the crops experimented with during the decline 
of coffee, only tea showed any real promise of success. A decline 
in the demand for Chinese tea in Britain opened up possibilities 
for Indian tea, especially the fine variety indigenous to Assam. Cli- 
matic conditions for the cultivation of tea were excellent in Sri 
Lanka, especially in the hill country. By the end of the century, 
tea production on the island had risen enormously. Because of the 
inelasticity of the market, however, British outlets soon became 
saturated. Attempts to develop other markets, especially in the 



32 



Historical Setting 



United States, were largely unsuccessful, and a glut emerged after 
World War II. 

The tea estates needed a completely different type of labor force 
than had been required during the coffee era. Tea was harvested 
throughout the year and required a permanent labor force. Waves 
of Indian Tamil immigrants settled on the estates and eventually 
became a large and permanent underclass that endured abomina- 
ble working conditions and squalid housing. The census of 1911 
recorded the number of Indian laborers in Sri Lanka at about 
500,000 — about 12 percent of the island's total population. In the 
1980s, the Indian Tamils made up almost 6 percent of the island's 
population (see Population, ch. 2). 

The Tamil laborers emigrated to Sri Lanka from India not as 
individuals but as part of family units or groups of interrelated 
families. Thus, they tended to maintain their native cultural pat- 
terns on the estates where they setded. Although the Indian Tamils 
spoke the same language as the Sri Lankan Tamils, were Hindus, 
and traced their cultural origins to southern India, they considered 
themselves to be culturally distinct from the Sri Lankan Tamils. 
Their distinctiveness as a group and their cultural differences from 
the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils were recognized in the 
constitutional reforms of 1924, when two members of the Indian 
Tamil community were nominated to the Legislative Council. 

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, experimentation in 
crop diversification, on a moderate level in the years before the 
collapse of the coffee market, became of greater importance. 
Responding to international market trends, planters attempted to 
diversify the crops they produced to insulate their revenues from 
world price fluctuations. Not all their experiments were success- 
ful. The first sugar plantation was established in 1837, but sugar 
cultivation was not well-suited to the island and has never been 
very successful. Cocoa was also tried for a time and has continued 
as one of the lesser exports. Rubber, which was introduced in 1837, 
became a major export during the slump in the tea export market 
in the 1900s. The rubber export trade exceeded that of tea during 
World War I. But after suffering severe losses during the depres- 
sion of the 1930s, rubber exports never again regained their pre- 
eminent position. 

Rise of the Sri Lankan Middle Class 

By the nineteenth century, a new society was emerging — a 
product of East and West. It was a society with strict rules separating 
the rulers from the ruled, and most social association between the 
British and Sri Lankans was taboo. The British community was 



33 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

largely a microcosm of English society with all its class divisions. 
At the top of the social pyramid were the British officials of the 
Ceylon Civil Service. Elaborate social conventions regulated the 
conduct of the service's members and served to distinguish them 
as an exclusive caste. This situation, however, changed slowly in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century and quite rapidly in the 
next century. 

In Sri Lanka as in India, the British created an educated class 
to provide administrative and professional services in the colony. 
By the late nineteenth century, most members of this emerging 
class were associated directly or indirectly with the government. 
Increased Sri Lankan participation in government affairs demanded 
the creation of a legal profession; the need for state health services 
required a corps of medical professionals; and the spread of edu- 
cation provided an impetus to develop the teaching profession. In 
addition, the expansion of commercial plantations created a legion 
of new trades and occupations: landowners, planters, transport 
agents, contractors, and businessmen. Certain Sinhalese caste 
groups, such as the fishermen (Karava) and cinnamon peelers 
(Salagama), benefited from the emerging new economic order, to 
the detriment of the traditional ruling cultivators (Goyigama). 

The development of a capitalist economy forced the traditional 
elite — the chiefs and headmen among the low-country Sinhalese 
and the Kandyan aristocracy — to compete with new groups for the 
favors of the British. These upwardly mobile, primarily urban, 
professionals formed a new class that transcended divisions of race 
and caste. This class, particularly its uppermost strata, was steeped 
in Western culture and ideology. This anglicized elite generally 
had conservative political leanings, was loyal to the government, 
and resembled the British so much in outlook and social customs 
that its members were sometimes called brown sahibs. At the apex 
of this new class was a handful of Sri Lankans who had been able 
to join the exclusive ranks of the civil service in the nineteenth cen- 
tury. The first Sri Lankan entered by competitive examination in 
1840. At that time, entrance examinations were held only in Lon- 
don and required an English education, so only a few members 
of the native middle class could aspire to such an elitist career. Con- 
sequently, in spite of the liberal policies that Colebrooke and Came- 
ron recommended, the British held virtually all high posts in the 
colonial administration. 

Buddhist Revivalism 

Beginning around the middle of the nineteenth century, the Bud- 
dhist clergy attempted to reform the sangha (religious community), 



34 



Historical Setting 



particularly as a reaction against Christian missionary activities. 
In the 1870s, Buddhist activists enlisted the help of an American, 
Colonel Henry Steele Olcott. An ardent abolitionist in the years 
leading up to the American Civil War, Olcott cofounded and later 
became president of the Theosophical Movement, which was 
organized on a worldwide basis to promote goodwill and to cham- 
pion the rights of the underprivileged. Shortly after his arrival in 
Sri Lanka, Olcott organized a Buddhist campaign against British 
officials and British missionaries. His Buddhist Theosophical Society 
of Ceylon went on to establish three institutions of higher learn- 
ing: Ananda College, Mahinda College, and Dharmaraja College. 
Olcott' s society founded these and some 200 lower schools to im- 
part Buddhist education with a strong nationalist bias. Olcott and 
his society took a special interest in the historical past of the Sin- 
halese Buddhist kingdoms on the island and managed to persuade 
the British governor to make Vesak, the chief Buddhist festival, 
a public holiday. 

Constitutional Reform 

The rediscovery of old Buddhist texts rekindled a popular in- 
terest in Sri Lanka's ancient civilization. The study of the past 
became an important aspect of the new drive for education. 
Archaeologists began work at Anuradhapura and at Polonnaruwa, 
and their finds contributed to the resurgent national pride. In the 
1880s, a Buddhist-inspired temperance movement was also initiated 
to fight drunkenness, and the Ceylon Social Reform Society was 
founded in 1905 to combat other temptations associated with 
Westernization. Encouraged by the free reign of expression that 
the government extended to these reformists, a growing number 
of communal and regional political associations began to press for 
constitutional reform in the closing years of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. The colonial government was petitioned for permission to 
have Sri Lankan representation in the Executive Council and ex- 
panded regional representation in the Legislative Council. In 
response, the colonial government permitted a modest experiment 
in 1910, allowing a small electorate of Sri Lankans to send one 
of their members to the Legislative Council. Other seats held by 
Sri Lankans retained the old practice of communal representation. 

World War I 

World War I had only a minimal military impact on Sri Lanka, 
which entered the war as part of the British Empire. The closest 
fighting took place in the Bay of Bengal, where an Australian war- 
ship sank a German cruiser. But the war had an important influence 



35 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

on the growth of nationalism. The Allies' wartime propaganda ex- 
tolled the virtues of freedom and self-determination of nations, and 
the message was heard and duly noted by Sri Lankan nationalists. 
There was, however, an event, only indirectly related to the war, 
that served as the immediate spark for the growth of nationalism. 
In 1915 communal rioting broke out between the Sinhalese and 
Muslims on the west coast. The British panicked, misconstruing 
the disturbances as part of an antigovernment conspiracy; they 
blamed the majority ethnic group and indiscriminately arrested 
many Sinhalese, including D.S. Senanayake — the future first prime 
minister of Sri Lanka — who had actually tried to use his influence 
to curb the riots. The British put down the unrest with excessive 
zeal and brutality, which shocked British and Sri Lankan observ- 
ers alike. Some sympathetic accounts of the unrest take into con- 
sideration that the judgment of the governor of the time, Sir Robert 
Chalmers (1913-16), may have been clouded by the loss of his two 
sons on the Western Front in Europe. At any rate, his actions in- 
sured that 1915 was a turning point in the nationalist movement. 
From then on, activists mobilized for coordinated action against 
the British. 

The nationalist movement in India served as a model to nation- 
alists in Sri Lanka. In 1917 the Indian National Congress and the 
Muslim League mended their differences and issued a joint decla- 
ration for the "progressive realization" of responsible government 
in India. Nationalists in Sri Lanka learned from their Indian coun- 
terparts that they had to become more national and less partisan 
in their push for constitutional reform. In 1919 the major Sinha- 
lese and Tamil political organizations united to form the Ceylon 
National Congress. One of the first actions of the congress was to 
submit a proposal for a new constitution that would increase local 
control over the Executive Council and the budget. These demands 
were not met, but they led to the promulgation of a new constitu- 
tion in 1920. Amendments to the constitution in 1924 increased 
Sri Lankan representation. Although the nationalists' demand for 
representation in the Executive Council was not granted, the Legis- 
lative Council was expanded to include a majority of elected Sri 
Lankan unofficial members, bringing the island closer to represen- 
tative government. Yet the franchise remained restrictive and in- 
cluded only about 4 percent of the island's population. 

The Donoughmore Commission 

In 1927 a royal commission under the Earl of Donoughmore 
visited Sri Lanka to ascertain why representative government as 
chartered by the 1924 constitution had not succeeded and to suggest 



36 



Historical Setting 



constitutional changes necessary for the island's eventual self-rule. 
The commission declared that the constitution had authorized a 
government characterized by the "divorce of power from respon- 
sibility," which at times seemed "rather like holy matrimony at 
its worst." The 1924 constitution, considered by the commission 
to be "an unqualified failure," failed to provide a strong, credible 
executive body of representatives. To remedy these shortcomings, 
the commission proposed universal adult franchise and an ex- 
perimental system of government to be run by executive commit- 
tees. The resulting Donoughmore Constitution, promulgated in 
1931 to accommodate these new proposals in government, was a 
unique document that provided Sri Lankans with training for self- 
government. The document, however, reserved the highest level 
of responsibility for the British governor, whose assent was neces- 
sary for all legislation. The legislative branch of the government — 
the State Council — functioned in both an executive and legislative 
capacity. Seven committees performed executive duties. Each com- 
mittee consisted of designated members of the State Council and 
was chaired by an elected Sri Lankan, who was addressed as 
minister. Three British officers of ministerial rank, along with the 
seven Sri Lankan ministers, formed a board of ministers. The Brit- 
ish ministers collectively handled responsibility for defense, external 
affairs, finance, and judicial matters. 

The Donoughmore Constitution ushered in a period of ex- 
perimentation in participatory democracy but contemporary 
political scientists have criticized it for not having provided an at- 
mosphere conducive to the growth of a healthy party system. The 
system of executive committees did not lead to the development 
of national political parties. Instead, a number of splinter political 
groups evolved around influential personalities who usually followed 
a vision too limited or an agenda too communally partisan to have 
an impact on national politics. 

Among the Sinhalese, a form of nationalism arose that sought 
once again to restore Buddhism to its former glory. The Great 
Council of the Sinhalese (Sinhala Maha Sabha), which was founded 
by S. W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1937, was the strongest proponent 
of this resurgent ideology. Other groups followed suit, also organiz- 
ing on communal grounds. These groups included the Burgher 
Political Association in 1938, the Ceylon Indian Congress in 1939, 
and the All Ceylon Tamil Congress in 1944. 

Growth of Leftist Parties 

During the Donoughmore period of political experimentation, 
several leftist parties were formed. Unlike most other Sri Lankan 



37 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

parties, these leftist parties were noncommunal in membership. 
Working-class activism, especially trade unionism, became an im- 
portant political factor during the sustained economic slump be- 
tween the world wars. The first important leftist party was the 
Labour Party, founded in 1931 by A.E. Goonesimha. Three 
Marxist-oriented parties — the Ceylon Equal Society Party (Lanka 
Sama Samaja Party — LSSP), the Bolshevik-Leninist Party, and 
the Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL) — represented the far 
left. All three were divided on both ideological and personal 
grounds. The Soviet Union's expulsion of Leon Trotsky from the 
Communist Party after Lenin's death in 1924 and Stalin's subse- 
quent decision to enter World War II on the Allied side exacer- 
bated these differences, dividing the Communists into Trotskyites 
and Stalinists. The LSSP, formed in 1935 and the oldest of the 
Sri Lankan Marxist parties, took a stance independent of the Soviet 
Union, becoming affiliated with the Trotskyite Fourth International, 
which was a rival of the Comintern. Most LSSP leaders were 
arrested during World War II for their opposition to what they 
considered to be an ''imperial war." Although in more recent years, 
the LSSP has been considered a politically spent force, gaining, 
for example less than 1 percent of the vote in the 1982 presidential 
elections, it has nevertheless been touted as the world's only suc- 
cessful Trotskyite party. 

The CPSL, which began as a Stalinist faction of the LSSP that 
was later expelled, formed its own party in 1943, remaining faith- 
ful to the dictates of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
The Bolshevik-Leninist Party was formed in 1945 as another 
breakaway group of the LSSP. The leftist parties represented the 
numerically small urban working class. Partly because these par- 
ties operated through the medium of trade unionism, they lacked 
the wider mass appeal needed at the national level to provide an 
effective extraparliamentary challenge to the central government. 
Nonetheless, because the leftists occasionally formed temporary 
political coalitions before national elections, they posed more than 
just a mere "parliamentary nuisance factor." 

World War II and the Transition to Independence 

When Singapore fell to the Japanese in February 1942, Sri Lanka 
became a central base for British operations in Southeast Asia, and 
the port at Trincomalee recaptured its historically strategic impor- 
tance. Because Sri Lanka was an indispensable strategic bastion 
for the British Royal Navy, it was an irresistible military target 
for the Japanese. For a time, it seemed that Japan planned a sweep- 
ing westward offensive across the Indian Ocean to take Sri Lanka, 



38 



Colombo Harbor with its breakwater 
Courtesy Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington 

sever the Allies' lifeline to Persian Gulf oil, and link up with the 
Axis powers in Egypt. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, mastermind 
of the raid on Pearl Harbor, ordered Vice Admiral Chuichi 
Nagumo to command a large armada to seek and destroy the British 
Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean. The two nations' fleets played 
a game of hide-and-seek, but never met. Some military historians 
assert that if they had met, the smaller British fleet would have 
met with disaster. The British instead fought several desperate air 
battles over Colombo and Trincomalee and lost about thirty- six 
aircraft and several ships. 

Yamamoto 's grand strategy failed to isolate and destroy any 
major units of the British fleet. But if the Japanese had persisted 
with their offensive, the island, with its limited British naval 
defenses, probably would have fallen. The Japanese carrier force, 
however, suffered such high aircraft losses over Sri Lanka — more 
than 100 warplanes — that it returned to Japan for refitting rather 
than press the attack. By returning to Japan, the force lost its op- 
portunity for unchallenged supremacy of the Indian Ocean. The 
focus of the war in this theater then shifted away from the island. 

On the whole, Sri Lanka benefited from its role in World War 
II. The plantation sector was busy meeting the urgent demands 
of the Allies for essential products, especially rubber, enabling the 
country to save a surplus in hard currency. Because Sri Lanka was 



39 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

the seat of the Southeast Asia Command, a broad infrastructure 
of health services and modern amenities was built to accommo- 
date the large number of troops posted into all parts of the coun- 
try. The inherited infrastructure improved the standard of living 
in postwar, independent Sri Lanka. 

Unlike India, where nationalists demanded a guarantee of in- 
dependence as recompense for their support in the war effort, Sri 
Lanka committed itself wholeheartedly to the Allied war effort. 
Although the island was put under military jurisdiction during the 
war, the British and the Sri Lankans maintained cooperative rela- 
tions. Sri Lankan pressure for political reform continued during 
the war, however, and increased as the Japanese threat receded 
and the war neared its end. The British eventually promised full 
participatory government after the war. 

In July 1944, Lord Soulbury was appointed head of a commis- 
sion charged with the task of examining a new constitutional draft 
that the Sri Lankan ministers had proposed. The commission made 
recommendations that led to a new constitution. As the end of the 
war approached, the constitution was amended to incorporate a 
provision giving Sri Lanka dominion status. 

British constitutional principles served as a model for the Soul- 
bury Constitution of independent Sri Lanka, which combined a 
parliamentary system with a bicameral legislature. Members of the 
first House of Representatives were directiy elected by popular vote. 
Members of the Senate, or upper house, were elected partly by 
members of the House and partly by the governor general, who 
was primarily a figurehead. The British monarch appointed the 
governor general on the advice of the most powerful person in the 
Sri Lankan government — the prime minister (see Historical Per- 
spective, 1802-1978, ch. 4). 

Independence 

The British negotiated the island's dominion status with the 
leader of the State Council, D.S. Senanayake, during World War 
II. Senanayake was also minister of agriculture and vice chairman 
of the Board of Ministers. The negotiations ended with the Ceylon 
Independence Act of 1947, which formalized the transfer of power. 
Senanayake was the founder and leader of the United National 
Party (UNP), a partnership of many disparate groups formed dur- 
ing the Donoughmore period, including the Ceylon National Con- 
gress, the Sinhala Maha Sabha, and the Muslim League. The UNP 
easily won the 1947 elections, challenged only by a collection of 
small, primarily leftist parties. On February 4, 1948, when the new 



40 



Historical Setting 



constitution went into effect (making Sri Lanka a dominion), the 
UNP embarked on a ten-year period of rule. 

Divisions in the Body Politic 

The prospects for an economically robust, fully participatory, 
and manageable democracy looked good during the first years of 
independence. In contrast to India, which had gained independence 
a year earlier, there was no massive violence and little social un- 
rest. In Sri Lanka there was also a good measure of governmental 
continuity. Still, important unresolved ethnic problems soon had 
to be addressed. The most immediate of these problems was the 
"Indian question," which concerned the political status of Tamil 
immigrants who worked on the highland tea plantations. The Soul- 
bury Commission had left this sensitive question to be resolved by 
the incoming government. 

After independence, debate about the status of the Indian Tamils 
continued. But three pieces of legislation — the Ceylon Citizenship 
Act of 1948, the Indian and Pakistani Residents Act No. 3 of 1948, 
and the Ceylon Parliamentary Elections Amendment Act No. 48 
of 1949 — all but disenfranchised this minority group. The Ceylon 
Indian Congress vigorously but unsuccessfully opposed the legis- 
lation. The acrimonious debate over the laws of 1948 and 1949 
revealed serious fissures in the body politic. There was a cleavage 
along ethnic lines between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, and also 
a widening rift between Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils. 

In 1949 a faction of the Ceylon Tamil Congress (the major Tamil 
party in Sri Lanka at the time) broke away to form the (Tamil) 
Federal Party under the leadership of S.J.V. Chelvanayakam. The 
creation of the Federal Party was a momentous postindependence 
development because it set the agenda for Tamil exclusivity in Sri 
Lankan politics. Soon after its founding, the Federal Party replaced 
the more conciliatory Tamil Congress as the major party among 
Sri Lankan Tamils and advocated an aggressive stance vis-a-vis 
the Sinhalese. 

United National Party "Majority" Rule, 1948-56 

The largest political party in independent Sri Lanka, the United 
National Party (UNP), emerged as an umbrella party from the 
colonial era. It was similar in some respects to the Indian National 
Congress. Like its Indian counterpart, the UNP represented a union 
of a number of groups espousing different personalities and ideol- 
ogies. Known later as the "uncle-nephew party" because of the 
kinship ties among the party's top leadership, the UNP served as 
the standard-bearer of conservative forces. In late 1947, when the 



41 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

party won the country's first general election, the UNP attempted 
to establish an anticommunist, intercommunal parliamentary form 
of government. Prominent nationalists, such as D.S. Senanayake 
and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (the country's first and fourth prime 
ministers, respectively), led the UNP. The party's internal differ- 
ences gradually worsened, however. The first and most serious 
break came in July 1951, when Bandaranaike 's left-of-center bloc 
seceded to form the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the first 
major non-Marxist political movement to oppose the UNP. 

Despite the benevolent guidance of Senanayake, the UNP could 
not defuse the nascent dissension between the Sinhalese and the 
Tamils. Some of Senanayake 's policies, particularly his awarding 
of land grants to Sinhalese settlers for the resettlement of the north- 
ern dry zone, precipitated renewed competition between the two 
ethnic groups. 

When Senanayake died in a horseback-riding accident in March 
1952, not only the UNP, but also the entire nation suffered from 
the loss of the only man who could pose as a credible symbol for 
the country's unity. In the election that was held immediately after 
Senanayake' s death, the UNP, led by his son Dudley, and the 
SLFP, led by Bandaranaike, vied for Sinhalese votes, while the 
Tamil Congress and Federal Party competed for the Tamil vote. 
The UNP won the election, and the SLFP emerged as major op- 
position party. The SLFP managed to win only nine out of forty- 
eight seats in Parliament. The Tamil Congress, having supported 
the UNP, lost much of its following to the Federal Party, which 
continued to advocate an autonomous homeland within a Sri 
Lankan federation. Ethnic tensions, although mounting, remained 
manageable . 

After D.S. Senanayake 's death, the nation's economic problems 
became apparent. The terms of world trade were turning against 
Sri Lanka. The population was growing faster than production in 
most sectors. A World Bank (see Glossary) study completed in 1952 
noted that social and welfare services were consuming 35 percent 
of the budget. The report recommended that the government 
rice subsidy — which accounted for the major portion of the 
expenditure — be reduced. Prime Minister Senanayake followed the 
advice, but the move proved to be his political undoing. A mas- 
sive, sometimes violent civil disobedience movement was launched 
to protest the reduction of the rice subsidy and provoked the resig- 
nation of Senanayake. In October 1953, his cousin, Sir John 
Kotelawala, became prime minister and remained in office until 
the UNP defeat in the 1956 election. 



42 



Historical Setting 



The UNP government under Kotelawala disagreed with India's 
interpretation of political solidarity in the developing world. This 
divergence became painfully clear to India at the Colombo Con- 
ference of 1954 and the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955. 
Kotelawala' s strident condemnation of communism, as well as the 
more fashionable condemnation of Western imperialism, especially 
irritated India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Kotelawala was 
also anxious to have Ceylon join the Southeast Asia Treaty Or- 
ganization (SEATO), but he encountered strong domestic oppo- 
sition to the plan. The Soviet Union was especially sensitive to what 
it considered the government's pro- Western attitude and repeat- 
edly vetoed Sri Lanka's application to join the United Nations 
(UN). Sri Lanka was finally admitted in 1955 as part of an East- 
West agreement. 

The UNP continued a defense agreement with the British that 
spared Sri Lanka the cost of maintaining a large military estab- 
lishment. National defense consumed less than 4 percent of the 
government budget in the postindependence years, and hence the 
military was not in a position to interfere with politics. 

Emergence of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 

Following its defeat in 1952, the SLFP marshaled its forces in 
preparation for the next national election. The 1956 election was 
destined to become a turning point in the modern history of Sri 
Lanka and is seen by many observers as a social revolution result- 
ing in the eclipse of the Westernized elite. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike 
campaigned as the "defender of a besieged Sinhalese culture" and 
demanded radical changes in the system. Bandaranaike came from 
a family of Westernized Sinhalese and was educated at Oxford, 
but early in his political career, he rejected many of the Western 
elements of his background and embraced the Buddhist faith and 
adopted native garb (regarded at the time as an affectation among 
members of his class). Bandaranaike brought to the election a deep 
knowledge of the passions that communal politics could provoke. 
His Sinhala Maha Sabha, founded in 1937 as a movement within 
the Ceylon National Congress, was the only wing of the congress 
at that time that sought to infuse a Sinhala consciousness into Sri 
Lankan nationalism. The Sinhala Maha Sabha formed the back- 
bone of Bandaranaike 's SLFP and helped spread his 1956 election 
warning that Buddhism was in danger. Accusations of a "conspira- 
cy" between the UNP and the Roman Catholic Church helped 
raise emotions feverishly. As one commentator put it, "Ban- 
daranaike built up a popular following based on the Sinhalese dislike 



43 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

of Christian influence, essentially stoking the fires of communal 
and religious bigotry." 

Bandaranaike and his supporters used the UNP's pro-Western 
stance as a potent propaganda weapon against the party. He claimed 
that the independence granted in 1948 was "fake" and that real 
independence could only be attained by severing all links with the 
Commonwealth of Nations. In economic matters, Bandaranaike 
planned to nationalize plantations, banks, and insurance compa- 
nies. He advocated the control over trade and industry vested in 
Sinhalese hands. With such a radical platform, Bandaranaike 
managed to unite many disparate groups into his People's United 
Front (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna — MEP), a political coalition 
under the leadership of his SLFP formed to defeat the UNP. In 
addition, he was able to forge a no-contest pact with two Marxist 
parties, the LSSP and the CPSL. 

The central and most explosive issue of the 1956 election was 
a linguistic one. After independence, it was commonly accepted 
that Sinhala and Tamil would replace English as the language of 
administration, but Bandaranaike announced that only Sinhala 
would be given official status if his coalition won the election. Ban- 
daranaike introduced a dangerous emotionalism into the election 
with his "Sinhala only" platform, which labeled both Tamil and 
English as cultural imports. 

The 2,500th anniversary of the death of the Buddha (which also 
marked the legendary landing of Vijaya and his followers on the 
island) coincided with the 1956 election, electrifying the political 
atmosphere. The UNP was susceptible to the emotional power of 
these issues. In what was later seen as a shameless last-minute rever- 
sal, the party also espoused the "Sinhala only" program. This po- 
litical about-face came too late to help the UNP, for the party lost 
the election, winning only eight seats in parliament. The People's 
United Front won the majority share of fifty-one seats. 

Tamil Politics 

Some political commentators hold that it was in the wake of the 
1956 elections that two completely separate and basically hostile 
political systems emerged in Sri Lanka: one for the Sinhalese and 
another for the Tamils. The trend toward Tamil exclusivity, 
however, despite periods of accommodation with Sinhalese politi- 
cal parties, had begun developing before independence. The first 
political organization to be formed specifically to protect the wel- 
fare of an ethnic minority was the All Ceylon Tamil Congress 
(ACTC), which G.G. Ponnambalam founded in 1944. The Tamil 
Congress attempted to secure adequate constitutional safeguards 



44 



Historical Setting 



before the country attained its independence. These attempts re- 
flected Tamil anxieties that British domination would simply give 
way to domination by the Sinhalese majority. 

After independence, a dissident Tamil group in the ACTC 
emerged under the leadership of S.J. V. Chelvanayakam. The new 
group disagreed with Ponnambalam's policy of collaboration with 
the intercommunal, but Sinhalese-dominated, UNP. In 1949 the 
dissidents broke away from the ACTC and formed the rival Federal 
Party, which proposed establishing an autonomous Tamil linguistic 
state within a federal union of Sri Lanka. The Federal Party regarded 
this alternative as the only practical way to preserve Tamil identity. 

In 1956 the Federal Party emerged as the dominant Tamil po- 
litical group as a result of its convincing victory over the conserva- 
tive Tamil Congress. The Federal Party had a distinct advantage 
because the Tamil Congress had suffered considerably from the 
stigma of its association with the UNP (which had abandoned its 
policy of making both Sinhala and Tamil national languages in 
an attempt to obtain the support of the numerically greater Sinha- 
lese vote). 

The Federal Party continued to consolidate its strength and be- 
came an important player in national politics. In 1965 the party 
became a component of the UNP-led coalition government by com- 
mitting its bloc of parliamentary seats to the UNP, which at that 
time needed the Federal Party's support to form a stable parliamen- 
tary majority. In 1968 however, the Federal Party withdrew from 
the UNP government because its leaders were convinced that the 
party could no longer derive any tangible benefits from further 
association with the UNP. In 1970 the Federal Party campaigned 
independently, unlike the Tamil Congress, whose leaders called 
on the Tamils to join a united front with the Sinhalese. 

Sri Lanka Freedom Party Rule, 1956-65 

Legislation and Communal Agitation 

Some of the first actions taken by the new SLFP government 
reflected a disturbing insensitivity to minority concerns. Shortly 
after its victory, the new government presented parliament with 
the Official Language Act, which declared Sinhala the one official 
language. The act was passed and immediately caused a reaction 
among Tamils, who perceived their language, culture, and eco- 
nomic position to be under attack. 

The passage of the Official Language Act precipitated a current 
of antagonism between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. The Sri 



45 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Lankan Tamils, represented by the Federal Party, launched a 
satyagraha (nonviolent protest) that resulted in a pact between 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and S.J.V. Chelvanayakam. The agree- 
ment provided a wide measure of Tamil autonomy in North- 
ern and Eastern provinces. It also provided for the use of the 
Tamil language in administrative matters. The Bandaranaike- 
Chelvanayakam Pact also promised that "early consideration" 
would be extended to Indian "plantation" Tamils on the ques- 
tion of Sri Lankan citizenship. But the pact was not carried out 
because of a peaceful protest by Buddhist clergy, who, with sup- 
port from the UNP, denounced the pact as a "betrayal of 
Sinhalese-Buddhist people." 

In May 1958, a rumor that a Tamil had killed a Sinhalese sparked 
off nationwide communal riots. Hundreds of people, mostly Tamils, 
died. This disturbance was the first major episode of communal 
violence on the island since independence. The riots left a deep 
psychological scar between the two major ethnic groups. The 
government declared a state of emergency and forcibly relocated 
more than 25,000 Tamil refugees from Sinhalese areas to Tamil 
areas in the north. 

Populist Economic Policies 

The Bandaranaike government actively expanded the public sec- 
tor and broadened domestic welfare programs, including pension 
plans, medical care, nutrition programs, and food and fuel subsi- 
dies. This social agenda threatened to drain the nation's treasury. 
Other popular but economically unfeasible schemes promoted by 
the Bandaranaike government included restrictions on foreign in- 
vestment, the nationalization of critical industries, and land reform 
measures that nationalized plantations and redistributed land to 
peasants. 

When a Buddhist extremist assassinated Bandaranaike in Sep- 
tember 1959, the nation faced a period of grave instability. The 
institution of parliamentary multiparty politics proved strong 
enough to endure, however, and orderly, constitutional actions 
resolved the leadership succession. The office of prime minister 
passed to the minister of education, Wijeyananda Dahanayake, who 
pledged to carry on the socialist policies of his predecessor. But 
policy differences and personality clashes within the ruling circle 
forced the new leader to dissolve Parliament in December 1959. 
The short-lived Dahanayake government, unable to hold Ban- 
daranaike 's coalition government together, was defeated by the 
UNP in the March 1960 general elections. The UNP won 33 



46 



Historical Setting 



percent of the seats in the lower house, giving the party a plurality 
but not a majority. 

United National Party Interlude 

The new prime minister, Dudley Senanayake, honored his elec- 
tion pledge to avoid compromise with the leftist parties and formed 
an all-UNP government with support from minor right-of-center 
parties. His overall parliamentary majority, however, was below 
the minimum seats required to defeat an opposition motion of no- 
confidence in the UNP cabinet. Less than a month after its for- 
mation, the UNP government fell. A new election was scheduled 
for July 1960. 

Return of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party 

The UNP fell because it lacked the support of any other major 
party in Parliament. The leftists tried to bring it down, and the 
Tamils withheld their support because the UNP had earlier hedged 
on the issue of the use of the Tamil language. Most important, 
the UNP had earned the reputation among Sinhalese voters of being 
a party inimical to Sinhalese nationalism. 

Meanwhile the SLFP had grown stronger because of its unwaver- 
ing support for making Sinhala the only official language. The SLFP 
found in the former prime minister's widow, Sirimavo Ratwatte 
Dias (S.R.D.) Bandaranaike, a candidate who was more capable 
of arousing Sinhalese emotions than Dahanayake had been in the 
March elections. 

In the July 1960 general election, Bandaranaike was profiled as 
a woman who had nobly agreed to carry on the mandate of her 
assassinated husband. She received the support of many of the same 
small parties on the right and left that had temporarily joined 
together to form the People's United Front coalition (which had 
brought her husband victory in 1956). She won the election with 
an absolute majority in Parliament and became Sri Lanka's seventh, 
and the world's first woman, prime minister. The new government 
was in many ways the torchbearer for the ideas of S. W.R.D. Ban- 
daranaike, but under his widow's direction, the SLFP carried out 
these ideas with such zeal and force that Sinhalese-Tamil relations 
sharply deteriorated. One of Sirimavo Bandaranaike 's first official 
actions was to enforce the policy of Sinhala as the only officially 
recognized language of government. Her aggressive enforcement 
of this policy sparked immediate Tamil resistance, which resulted 
in civil disobedience in restive Northern and Eastern provinces. 
Bandaranaike reacted by declaring a state of emergency and cur- 
tailing Tamil political activity. 



47 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Bandaranaike also antagonized other significant minority groups, 
particularly the Christians. In response to a recommendation by 
an unofficial Buddhist commission, her government took over the 
management of state-assisted denominational schools. The move 
deprived many Christian missionary schools of support. Roman 
Catholic activists spearheaded demonstrations, which forced the 
government to reconsider some of its measures. Still, relations be- 
tween the prime minister and the Christian denominations re- 
mained unstable. 

Bandaranaike moved vigorously early in her administration to 
nationalize significant sectors of the economy, targeting industries 
that were under foreign control. The 1961 creation of the State 
Petroleum Corporation adversely affected the major petroleum 
companies — Shell, Esso, and Caltex. The new corporation was guar- 
anteed 25 percent of the country's total petroleum business. Under 
Bandaranaike 's instruction, state corporations began to import oil 
from new sources, effectively altering for the first time the pattern 
of trade that had been followed since British rule. Sri Lanka signed 
oil import agreements with the Soviet Union, Romania, Egypt, and 
other countries not traditionally involved in Sri Lankan trade. The 
government also put important sectors of the local economy, par- 
ticularly the insurance industry, under state control. Most alarm- 
ing to Bandaranaike 's conservative opponents, however, were her 
repeated unsuccessful attempts to nationalize the largest newspaper 
syndicate and establish a press council to monitor the news media. 

In foreign relations, Bandaranaike was faithful to her late hus- 
band's policy of "dynamic neutralism," which aimed to steer a 
nonaligned diplomatic stance between the superpowers. Sri Lanka 
exercised its new foreign policy in 1962 by organizing a confer- 
ence of neutralist nations to mediate an end to the Sino-Indian 
border war of 1962. Although the conference failed to end the war, 
it highlighted Sri Lanka's new role as a peacebroker and enhanced 
its international status. 

The UNP opposition was apprehensive of Bandaranaike 's left- 
ward drift and was especially concerned about the SLFP alliance 
with the Trotskyite LSSP in 1964. The UNP approached the March 
1965 election as a senior partner in a broad front of "democratic 
forces" dedicated to fight the "totalitarianism of the left." It enjoyed 
significant support from the Federal Party (representing Sri Lankan 
Tamils) and the Ceylon Workers' Congress (representing Indian 
Tamils). 

The United National Party Regains Power, 1965-70 

The UNP "national government" emerged victorious in 
the March 1965 elections, capturing more than 39 percent of 



48 



Historical Setting 



parliamentary seats, compared to SLFP's 30.2 percent. One of 
the first actions of the new government, led by Senanayake, was 
to declare that the nation's economy was virtually bankrupt. 
Senanayake also announced his intention to improve relations with 
the United States. (In 1963 the United States had suspended aid 
to Sri Lanka because of Bandaranaike's nationalization of foreign 
oil concerns.) 

The government tried to develop a mixed economy with an 
emphasis on the private sector. Between 1965 and 1970, private 
sector investment was double that of the public sector, thereby 
reversing the trend set in the previous administration. Despite the 
UNP's emphasis on the private sector, the economy generally failed 
to show a major improvement. This failure was partly caused by 
a nearly 50 percent increase in the cost of rice imports after a world- 
wide shortage in 1965 and a concurrent steep decline in the price 
of Sri Lanka's export commodities. In 1966 the UNP government 
was forced to declare a state of emergency to ward off food riots. 
Senanayake reduced the subsidized weekly rice ration by half. The 
reduction remained in effect throughout the remainder of the "na- 
tional government" period and contributed greatly to UNP's defeat 
in the 1970 general elections. 

The UNP paid more attention to Buddhist sensitivities than it 
had in the past, and in an effort to widen the party's popularity, 
it replaced the Christian sabbath with the Buddhist poya full-moon 
holiday. This action satisfied Buddhist activists but alienated the 
small but powerful Roman Catholic lobby. The UNP also tried 
to earn favor with the Tamils by enacting the Tamil Regulations 
in 1966, which were designed to make Tamil a language officially 
"parallel" to Sinhala in Tamil- speaking regions. Sinhalese activists 
immediately expressed hostility toward the Tamil Regulations. Civil 
violence ensued, and the government was forced to proclaim a state 
of emergency that lasted for most of the year. 

United Front Rule and Emerging Violence, 1970-77 

In order to prepare for the 1970 general election, Sirimavo Ban- 
daranaike formed a coalition in 1968 with the LSSP and CPSL 
to oppose the UNP. The new three-party United Front (Samagi 
Peramuna) announced that it would work toward a "people's 
government" under the leadership of Bandaranaike and that it 
would follow a so-called Common Programme, which promised 
radical structural changes, including land reform, increased rice 
subsidies, and nationalization of local and foreign banks. 

The United Front resurrected communal emotionalism as a 
timely and potent campaign weapon. It attacked the UNP for its 



49 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

alliance with the two main Tamil political groups, the Federal Party 
and the Ceylon Workers' Congress. At the same time, the United 
Front also announced that it would adopt a new constitution to 
make Sri Lanka a republic and that it would restore "Buddhism 
to its rightful place." The United Front won 118 of the 135 seats 
it contested, with the SLFP, the biggest-single party, winning 90 
seats, the LSSP 19 seats, and the CPSL 6 seats. The UNP won 
a meager seventeen seats. 

The United Front government moved quickly to implement key 
features of its Common Programme. The philosophy of the coali- 
tion government was seen most transparently from its foreign and 
economic policies. The United Front issued declarations that it fol- 
lowed a nonaligned path; opposed imperialism, colonialism, and 
racism; and supported national liberation movements. The govern- 
ment quickly extended diplomatic relations to the German 
Democratic Republic (East Germany), the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (then North Vietnam), the Democratic People's Repub- 
lic of Korea (North Korea), and the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of South Vietnam. It also pledged to suspend recog- 
nition of Israel. In economic matters, the United Front vowed to 
put private enterprise in a subsidiary role. 

Prime Minister Bandaranaike tolerated the radical left at first 
and then lost control of it. Sensing mounting unrest, the govern- 
ment declared a state of emergency in March 1971. In April, the 
People's Liberation Front Qanatha Vimukthi Peramuna — J VP), 
a Maoist and primarily rural Sinhalese youth movement claiming 
a membership of more than 10,000, began a "blitzkrieg" opera- 
tion to take over the government "within 24 hours." The JVP fol- 
lowed a program — known as the Five Lectures — that included an 
agenda to deal with "Indian expansionism," the island's unstable 
economic situation, and the inability of the traditionalist leftist 
leadership to assert power or attract widespread support (an allu- 
sion to the LSSP and the CPSL). The JVP threatened to take power 
by extraparliamentary means. Fierce fighting erupted in the north- 
central, south-central, and southern rural districts of the island, 
causing an official estimate of 1,200 dead. Unofficial tallies of the 
number of dead were much higher. The JVP came perilously close 
to overthrowing the government but the military finally suppressed 
the movement and imprisoned J VP's top leadership and about 
16,000 suspected insurgents. 

In May 1972, the United Front followed through on its 1970 
campaign promise to promulgate a new constitution to make Sri 
Lanka a republic. Under the new constitution, the legislative, ex- 
ecutive, and judicial branches of government were vested in the 



50 



Historical Setting 



National State Assembly. Many important and vocal sectors of 
society opposed this concentration of power. The 1972 constitu- 
tion disturbed the UNP, which feared an authoritarian government 
might emerge because of the new document. The UNP was 
especially alarmed that a Trotskyite, Dr. Colvin de Silva (Ban- 
daranaike's minister of constitutional affairs), had drafted the con- 
stitution. 

The distinct lack of protection for the rights of minorities in the 
new constitution dismayed many sectors of the population. The 
Tamils were especially disturbed because the 1972 constitution con- 
tained no elements of federalism. Instead, a newly conferred sta- 
tus for Buddhism replaced the provisions for minorities provided 
by Article 29 in the 1948 constitution. The constitution also sanc- 
tioned measures that discriminated against Tamil youth in univer- 
sity admissions. Tamil youth were particularly irked by the 
"standardization" policy that Bandaranaike's government in- 
troduced in 1973. The policy made university admissions criteria 
lower for Sinhalese than for Tamils. The Tamil community — the 
Federal Party, the Tamil Congress, and other Tamil organiza- 
tions — reacted collectively against the new atmosphere the new con- 
stitution produced, and in May 1972, they founded the Tamil 
United Front (which became the Tamil United Liberation Front — 
TULF— in 1976). 

By the mid-1970s, the antagonism between the right and left was 
destroying the United Front coalition. The growing political in- 
fluence of the right wing led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike's son, 
Anura, precipitated the expulsion of the LSSP from the United 
Front in September 1975. The withdrawal of the CPSL in 1977 
further weakened the coalition. 

The United National Party Returns to Power 

After Dudley Senanayake died in 1973, a struggle for the leader- 
ship of the UNP ensued between his nephew, Rukman Senanayake, 
and Junius Richard (J.R.) Jayewardene, a more distant relative. 
Jayewardene had been involved in politics for years, having been 
elected to the State Council, the parliament's colonial predeces- 
sor, as early as 1943. A leader of the UNP since independence, 
Jayewardene had deferred to the Senanayake family. But in 1970, 
when the UNP suffered a resounding defeat to the United Front, 
Jayewardene became more assertive. His party manifesto — The 
UNP in Opposition, 1970 — contended that the majority of Sri 
Lankans perceived the party as the party of the "haves, the af- 
fluent, and the employers." He also contended that the people had 
come to perceive the SLFP as the party of the "have nots, the needy, 



51 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

and the unemployed." Jayewardene moved forcefully to refurbish 
UNP's image and announced that the party would inaugurate an 
era of a just and righteous (dharmishta) society. After becoming presi- 
dent of the party, Jayewardene began to restructure the UNP and 
make the party more attractive, especially to young people. By the 
time of the general election of 1977, Jayewardene had developed 
an extensive grass roots party organization. 

Election of 1977 and More Violence 

After molding the UNP around his personality and having suc- 
cessfully built up the party's infrastructure, Jayewardene easily be- 
came prime minister. The UNP won an unprecedented landslide 
victory in the 1977 elections, winning 140 of 168 seats. The SLFP 
was reduced to eight seats. The Sri Lankan Tamils, however, gave 
little support to Jayewardene or any other non-Tamil politician. 
The Sri Lankan Tamils entered the parliamentary election fray 
under the banner of TULF, which had elevated its earlier demand 
for regional self-rule to a demand for an independent state, or Eelam 
(see Glossary). TULF became the largest opposition party in Parlia- 
ment and captured all fourteen seats in the heavily Tamil North- 
ern Province and four east coast seats. TULF won in every 
constituency with a Tamil majority on the island, except one. In 
Jaffna District, TULF candidates won all eleven seats, although 
forty-seven other candidates contested the seats. TULF originally 
included the largest Indian (plantation) Tamil political organiza- 
tion, the Ceylon Workers' Congress, but after the 1977 election, 
the leader of the Ceylon Workers' Congress accepted a cabinet post 
in the UNP government. The Sri Lankan Tamil demand for Tamil 
Eelam had never been of central concern to the Indian Tamils, 
who lived mostly outside the territory being claimed for the Tamil 
state. 

The opportunities for peace that the 1977 UNP electoral vic- 
tory provided were soon lost. Just before the 1977 elections, Chel- 
vanayakam, the charismatic leader of TULF, died, leaving the party 
without strong leadership. A Tamil separatist underground (which 
had split into six or more rival and sometimes violently hostile 
groups that were divided by ideology, caste, and personal an- 
tagonisms) was filling the vacuum left by the weakened TULF and 
was gaining the allegiance of an increasing number of disenchanted 
Tamil youths. These groups were known collectively as the Tamil 
Tigers. The strongest of these separatists were the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), founded in 1972 by Velupillai Prabhaka- 
ran. The LTTE was responsible for some of the earliest and most 
gruesome acts of Tamil terrorism (see the Tamil Insurgency, ch. 5). 



52 



Historical Setting 



The LTTE first gained notoriety by its 1975 assassination of the 
mayor of Jaffna, a supporter of the SLFP. During the 1977 elec- 
tions, many Tamil youths began to engage in extraparliamentary 
and sometimes violent measures in their bid for a mandate for a 
separate state. These measures precipitated a Sinhalese backlash. 
An apparently false rumor that Sinhalese policemen had died at 
the hands of Tamil terrorists, combined with other rumors of al- 
leged anti-Sinhalese statements made by Tamil politicians, sparked 
brutal communal rioting that engulfed the island within two weeks 
of the new government's inauguration. The rioting marked the first 
major outbreak of communal violence in the nineteen years since 
the riots of 1958. Casualties were many, especially among Tamils, 
both the Sri Lankan Tamils of Jaffna and the Indian Tamil plan- 
tation workers. The Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation Organization 
estimated the death toll at 300 persons. 

Constitution of 1978 

After coming to power, Jayewardene directed the rewriting of 
the constitution. The document that was produced, the new Con- 
stitution of 1978, drastically altered the nature of governance in 
Sri Lanka. It replaced the previous Westminster- style, parliamen- 
tary government with a new presidential system modeled after 
France, with a powerful chief executive. The president was to be 
elected by direct suffrage for a six-year term and was empowered 
to appoint, with parliamentary approval, the prime minister and 
to preside over cabinet meetings. Jayewardene became the first 
president under the new Constitution and assumed direct control 
of the government machinery and party. 

The new regime ushered in an era that did not auger well for 
the SLFP. Jayewardene' s UNP government accused former prime 
minister Bandaranaike of abusing her power while in office from 
1970 to 1977. In October 1980, Bandaranaike 's privilege to en- 
gage in politics was removed for a period of seven years, and the 
SLFP was forced to seek a new leader. After a long and divisive 
battle, the party chose her son, Anura. Anura Bandaranaike was 
soon thrust into the role of the keeper of his father's legacy, but 
he inherited a political party torn apart by factionalism and reduced 
to a minimal role in the Parliament. 

The 1978 Constitution included substantial concessions to Tamil 
sensitivities. Although TULF did not participate in framing the 
Constitution, it continued to sit in Parliament in the hope of 
negotiating a settlement to the Tamil problem. TULF also agreed 
to Jayewardene 's proposal of an all-party conference to resolve 
the island's ethnic problems. Jayewardene's UNP offered other 



53 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

concessions in a bid to secure peace. Sinhala remained the official 
language and the language of administration throughout Sri Lanka, 
but Tamil was given a new "national language" status. Tamil was 
to be used in a number of administrative and educational circum- 
stances. Jayewardene also eliminated a major Tamil grievance by 
abrogating the "standardization" policy of the United Front 
government, which had made university admission criteria for 
Tamils more difficult. In addition, he offered many top-level po- 
sitions, including that of minister of justice, to Tamil civil servants. 

While TULF, in conjunction with the UNP, pressed for the all- 
party conference, the Tamil Tigers escalated their terrorist attacks, 
which provoked Sinhalese backlash against Tamils and generally 
precluded any successful accommodation. In reaction to the as- 
sassination of a Jaffna police inspector, the Jayewardene govern- 
ment declared an emergency and dispatched troops, who were given 
an unrealistic six months to eradicate the terrorist threat. 

The government passed the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act in 1979. The act was enacted as a temporary meas- 
ure, but it later became permanent legislation. The International 
Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and other human 
rights organizations condemned the act as being incompatible with 
democratic traditions. Despite the act, the number of terrorist acts 
increased. Guerrillas began to hit targets of high symbolic value 
such as post offices and police outposts, provoking government 
counterattacks. As an increasing number of civilians were caught 
in the fighting, Tamil support widened for the "boys," as the guer- 
rillas began to be called. Other large, well-armed groups began 
to compete with LTTE. The better-known included the People's 
Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam, Tamil Eelam Libera- 
tion Army, and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization. Each 
of these groups had forces measured in the hundreds if not thou- 
sands. The government claimed that many of the terrorists were 
operating from training camps in India's Tamil Nadu State. The 
Indian government repeatedly denied this claim. With the level 
of violence mounting, the possibility of negotiation became increas- 
ingly distant. 

The Riots of 1981 

In June 1981 , local elections were held in the north to elect mem- 
bers of the newly established district development councils. TULF 
had decided to participate and work in the councils. In doing so, 
TULF continued to work toward autonomy for the Tamil areas. 
Extremists within the separatist movement, however, adamantly 
opposed working within the existing political framework. They 



54 



Historical Setting 



viewed participation in the elections as compromising the objec- 
tive of a separate state. Shortly before the elections, the leading 
candidate of the UNP was assassinated as he left a political rally. 
The sporadic communal violence that persisted over the following 
three months foreshadowed the devastating communal riots of 1983. 
When elections were held a few days later, concomitant charges 
of voting irregularities and mishandling of ballots created the na- 
tion's first election scandal since the introduction of universal 
suffrage fifty years earlier. 

Presidential Election of 1982 

TULF decided to boycott the 1982 presidential elections, partly 
in reaction to the harsh Prevention of Terrorism Act and partly 
in response to pressures exerted by Tamil extremists. Only 46 per- 
cent of the voters in Jaffna District turned out. In Sinhalese dis- 
tricts, 85 percent of voters turned out. Increasing violence by Tamil 
youths in the north and east of the island accompanied the call for 
a Tamil Eelam. The rising level of violence in 1983 led the govern- 
ment to pass a sixth amendment to the Constitution, which specif- 
ically banned talk of separatism. All sixteen TULF members of 
parliament were expelled for refusing to recite a loyalty oath, thus 
removing a critical channel for mediation. 

The Riots of July 1983 

In July 1983, the most savage communal riots in Sri Lanka's 
history erupted. Conservative government estimates put the death 
toll at 400— mostly Tamils. At least 150,000 Tamil fled the is- 
land. The riots began in retaliation for an ambush of an army patrol 
in the north that left thirteen Sinhalese soldiers dead. The army 
was reputed to have killed sixty Tamil civilians in Jaffna, but most 
of the violence occurred in Colombo, where Sinhalese mobs looked 
for Tamil shops to destroy. More than any previous ethnic riot 
on the island, the 1983 riots were marked by their highly organized 
mob violence. Sinhalese rioters in Colombo used voter lists con- 
taining home addresses to make precise attacks on the Tamil com- 
munity. From Colombo, the anti-Tamil violence fanned out to the 
entire island. The psychological effects of this violence on Sri Lan- 
ka's complex and divided society were still being assessed in the 
late 1980s. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the communal riot- 
ing, a self-evident truth was that the island's history, and the com- 
plexity of its society, had a portentous message for the present: 
Sinhalese and Tamil Sri Lankans were fated by history and geo- 
graphy to coexist in close proximity. This coexistence could be dis- 
cordant or amicable, and examples of both could be drawn from 



55 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Sri Lanka's history. It was a message, however, whose meaning 
was forgotten as the ethnic communities were drawn increasingly 
into a vortex of rancor and violence that made the restoration of 
harmony a persistently elusive goal for the Sri Lankan government. 

* * * 

Informative general histories of Sri Lanka include K.M. de 
Silva's A History of Sri Lanka, E.F.C. Ludowyk's A Short History of 
Ceylon, Zeylanicus's Ceylon, S. Arasaratnam's Ceylon, and Chan- 
dra Richard de Silva's Sri Lanka: A History. Source books on 
medieval history are Wilhelm Geiger's translations of the Pali 
chronicles, the Mahavamsa and Culavamsa, and the comprehensive 
The Early History of Ceylon by G.C. Mendis. Highly informative for 
the study of modern political events and ethnic disturbances are 
S.J. Tambiah's Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of 
Democracy, A. Jeyaratnam Wilson's Politics in Sri Lanka, and Govern- 
ment and Politics in South Asia by Craig Baxter, Yogendra K. Malik, 
Charles H. Kennedy, and Robert C. Oberst. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



56 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 



Woman bringing "ambula" (noon meal) to the field 



SRI LANKA LIES practically in the center of the Indian Ocean 
and thus has climatic and cultural links with three continents. 
Monsoon winds, driving against Sri Lanka's peaks, support lush 
vegetation on the southern half of the island, but the northern half 
is a dry zone. The winds affect human culture as well, having 
brought wave after wave of immigrants and merchants following 
the southerly trade routes. Outsiders found a wide range of eco- 
logical niches on the coast, on the plains, or in the mountains, and 
they built a remarkably variegated civilization. Merchants long have 
sought Sri Lanka as the source of pearls, jewels, spices, and tea. 
Visitors for centuries have marvelled at the beauty and great diver- 
sity of the island. 

The South Asian landmass to the north has strongly influenced 
Sri Lankan culture in the past and continues to do so. From an 
outlander's perspective, some of the main aspects of Sri Lankan 
society — language, caste, family structure — are regional variants 
of Indian civilization. From the perspective of the islander, however, 
the Indian influence is but the largest part of a continuing barrage 
of stimuli coming to Sri Lanka from all sides. The people of the 
island have absorbed these influences and built their own civili- 
zation. 

The Sinhalese (see Glossary), a distinct ethnic group speaking 
the Sinhala (see Glossary) language and practicing a variant of 
Theravada Buddhism (see Glossary), comprise the majority — 74 
percent — of the population, and their values dominate public life. 
There are, however, substantial minority groups. The Tamils, 
speaking the Tamil language and generally practicing Hinduism, 
comprise almost 18 percent of the population. Muslims, many of 
whom speak Tamil as their main language, make up 7 percent of 
the populace. Each of the main ethnic groups is subdivided into 
several major categories, depending on variables of religion or geog- 
raphy. There also are sizable Christian minorities among the 
Sinhalese and Tamil. People living in the central highland region 
of the country generally adhere more closely to their traditional 
ethnic customs than lowland dwellers. 

Caste creates other social divisions. The Goyigama (see Glos- 
sary) caste of the Sinhalese — traditionally associated with land 
cultivation — is dominant in population and public influence, but 
in the lowlands other castes based on commercial activities are in- 
fluential. The Tamil Vellala caste resembles the Goyigama in its 



59 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

dominance and traditional connection with agriculture, but it is 
completely separate from the Sinhalese caste hierarchy. Within their 
separate caste hierarchies, Sinhalese and Tamil communities are 
fragmented through customs that separate higher from lower orders. 
These include elaborate rules of etiquette and a nearly complete 
absence of intercaste marriages. Differences in wealth arising from 
the modern economic system have created, however, wide class 
cleavages that cut across boundaries of caste, religion, and language. 
Because of all these divisions, Sri Lankan society is complex, with 
numerous points of potential conflict. 

The population of Sri Lanka has grown considerably since in- 
dependence in 1948, and in the 1980s was increasing by approxi- 
mately 200,000 people or 1.37 percent each year. Because of this 
population pressure, the government has faced a major develop- 
ment problem as it has attempted to reconcile the divergent in- 
terests of caste, class, and ethnic groups while trying to ensure 
adequate food, education, health services, and career opportuni- 
ties for the rapidly expanding population. Politicians and officials 
have attempted to meet these needs through a form of welfare so- 
cialism, providing a level of support services that is comparatively 
high for a developing nation. Building on colonial foundations, Sri 
Lanka has created a comprehensive education system, including 
universities, that has produced one of the best-educated popula- 
tions in Asia. A free state-run health system provides basic care 
that has raised average life expectancy to the highest level in South 
Asia. Ambitious housing and sanitation plans, although incomplete, 
promised basic amenities to all citizens by the year 2000. In 1988 
the government addressed the nutritional deficiencies of the poor 
through a subsidized food stamp program and free nutrition pro- 
grams for children and mothers. 

The crucial problem facing Sri Lanka's plural society is whether 
it can evolve a form of socialism that will address the needs of all 
groups, or whether frustrated aspirations will engender further con- 
flict. In the field of education, for example, excellent accomplish- 
ments in elementary schooling have emerged alongside bitter 
competition for coveted places in the university system; this com- 
petition has fueled ethnic hatred between the Sinhalese and Tamil 
communities. In a land with limited resources, the benefits of so- 
cial welfare programs highlight the inadequacies of progress for 
some regional or ethnic groups. In these circumstances, caste, eth- 
nic, or religious differences become boundaries between warring 
parties, and a person's language or place of worship becomes a 
sign of political affiliation. The social organization of Sri Lanka 



60 



The Society and Its Environment 



is thus an important component of the politics and economy in the 
developing nation. 

The Physical Environment 

Geology 

More than 90 percent of Sri Lanka's surface lies on Precambrian 
strata, some of it dating back 2 billion years. The metamorphic 
rock surface was created by the transformation of ancient sediments 
under intense heat and pressure during mountain-building pro- 
cesses. The theory of plate tectonics suggests that these rocks and 
related rocks forming most of south India were part of a single 
southern landmass called Gondwanaland. Beginning about 200 mil- 
lion years ago, forces within the earth's mantle began to separate 
the lands of the Southern Hemisphere, and a crustal plate support- 
ing both India and Sri Lanka moved toward the northeast. About 
45 million years ago, the Indian plate collided with the Asian land- 
mass, raising the Himalayas in northern India, and continuing to 
advance slowly to the present time. Sri Lanka experiences few earth- 
quakes or major volcanic events because it rides on the center of 
the plate. 

The island contains relatively limited strata of sedimentation sur- 
rounding its ancient hills. Aside from recent deposits along river 
valleys, only two small fragments of Jurassic (140 to 190 million 
years ago) sediment occur in Puttalam District, while a more ex- 
tensive belt of Miocene (5 to 20 million years ago) limestone is found 
along the northwest coast, overlain in many areas by Pleistocene 
(1 million years ago) deposits (see fig. 1). The northwest coast is 
part of the deep Cauvery (Kaveri) River Basin of southeast India, 
which has been collecting sediments from the highlands of India 
and Sri Lanka since the breakup of Gondwanaland. 

Topography 

Extensive faulting and erosion over time have produced a wide 
range of topographic features, making Sri Lanka one of the most 
scenic places in the world. Three zones are distinguishable by ele- 
vation: the Central Highlands, the plains, and the coastal belt (see 
fig. 3). 

The south-central part of Sri Lanka — the rugged Central 
Highlands — is the heart of the country. The core of this area is 
a high plateau, running north-south for approximately sixty- 
five kilometers. This area includes some of Sri Lanka's highest 
mountains. (Pidurutalagala is the highest at 2,524 meters.) At the 
plateau's southern end, mountain ranges stretch 50 kilometers to 



61 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



■Tai'k -Hait 



guff 
of 

Mannar 



Colombo® \_J 



A 



® 


National capital 


• 


Populated place 


I 


Jaffna Peninsula 




Central Highlands 




Knuckles Massif 


IV 


Uva Basin 


V 


Hatton Plateau 


VI 


Sabaragamuwa Ridges 


VII 


Rakwana Hills 




20 30 40 Kilometers 


10 20 30 40 Miles 



'Bay 

of 
(BengaC 



7% 




Indian Ocean 



Figure 3. Topography and Drainage, 1988 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



the west toward Adams Peak (2,243 meters) and 50 kilometers to 
the east toward Namunakuli (2,036 meters). Flanking the high cen- 
tral ridges are two lower plateaus. On the west is the Hatton Plateau, 
a deeply dissected series of ridges sloping downward toward the 
north. On the east, the Uva Basin consists of rolling hills covered 
with grasses, traversed by some deep valleys and gorges. To the 
north, separated from the main body of mountains and plateaus 
by broad valleys, lies the Knuckles Massif: steep escarpments, deep 
gorges, and peaks rising to more than 1 ,800 meters. South of Adams 
Peak lie the parallel ridges of the Rakwana Hills, with several peaks 
over 1,400 meters. The land descends from the Central Highlands 
to a series of escarpments and ledges at 400 to 500 meters above 
sea level before sloping down toward the coastal plains. 

Most of the island's surface consists of plains between 30 and 
200 meters above sea level. In the southwest, ridges and valleys 
rise gradually to merge with the Central Highlands, giving a dis- 
sected appearance to the plain. Extensive erosion in this area has 
worn down the ridges and deposited rich soil for agriculture down- 
stream. In the southeast, a red, lateritic soil covers relatively level 
ground that is studded with bare, monolithic hills. The transition 
from the plain to the Central Highlands is abrupt in the southeast, 
and the mountains appear to rise up like a wall. In the east and 
the north, the plain is flat, dissected by long, narrow ridges of granite 
running from the Central Highlands. 

A coastal belt about thirty meters above sea level surrounds the 
island. Much of the coast consists of scenic sandy beaches indented 
by coastal lagoons. In the Jaffna Peninsula, limestone beds are ex- 
posed to the waves as low-lying cliffs in a few places. In the north- 
east and the southwest, where the coast cuts across the stratification 
of the crystalline rocks, rocky cliffs, bays, and offshore islands can 
be found; these conditions have created one of the world's best 
natural harbors at Trincomalee on the northeast coast, and a smaller 
rock harbor at Galle on the southwestern coast. 

Sri Lanka's rivers rise in the Central Highlands and flow in a 
radial pattern toward the sea. Most of these rivers are short. There 
are sixteen principal rivers longer than 100 kilometers in length, 
with twelve of them carrying about 75 percent of the mean river 
discharge in the entire country. The longest rivers are the Mahaweii 
Ganga (335 kilometers) and the Aruvi Aru (170 kilometers). In 
the highlands, river courses are frequently broken by discontinui- 
ties in the terrain, and where they encounter escarpments, numer- 
ous waterfalls and rapids have eroded a passage. Once they reach 
the plain, the rivers slow down and the waters meander across flood 
plains and deltas. The upper reaches of the rivers are wild and 



63 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

usually unnavigable, and the lower reaches are prone to seasonal 
flooding. Human intervention has altered the flows of some rivers 
in order to create hydroelectric, irrigation, and transportation 
projects. In the north, east, and southeast, the rivers feed numer- 
ous artificial lakes or reservoirs (tanks) that store water during the 
dry season. During the 1970s and 1980s, large-scale projects 
dammed the Mahaweli Ganga and neighboring streams to create 
large lakes along their courses (see Agriculture, ch. 3). Several 
hundred kilometers of canals, most of which were built by the Dutch 
in the eighteenth century, link inland waterways in the southwestern 
part of Sri Lanka. 

Climate 

Sri Lanka's position between 5° and 10° north latitude endows 
the country with a warm climate, moderated by ocean winds and 
considerable moisture. The mean temperature ranges from a low 
of 15.8°C in Nuwara Eliya in the Central Highlands (where frost 
may occur for several days in the winter) to a high of 29°C in Trin- 
comalee on the northeast coast (where temperatures may reach 
37°C). The average yearly temperature for the country as a whole 
ranges from 26°C to 28°C. Day and night temperatures may vary 
by 4° to 7°. January is the coolest month, causing people, espe- 
cially those in the highlands, to wear coats and sweaters. May, the 
hottest period, precedes the summer monsoon rains. 

The rainfall pattern is influenced by the monsoon winds of the 
Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal and is marked by four seasons. 
The first is from mid-May to October, when winds originate in 
the southwest, bringing moisture from the Indian Ocean. When 
these winds encounter the slopes of the Central Highlands, they 
unload heavy rains on the mountain slopes and the southwestern 
sector of the island. Some of the windward slopes receive up to 
250 centimeters of rain per month, but the leeward slopes in the 
east and northeast receive little rain. The second season occurs in 
October and November, the intermonsoonal months. During this 
season, periodic squalls occur and sometimes tropical cyclones bring 
overcast skies and rains to the southwest, northeast, and eastern 
parts of the island. During the third season, December to March, 
monsoon winds come from the northeast, bringing moisture from 
the Bay of Bengal. The northeastern slopes of the mountains may 
be inundated with up to 125 centimeters of rain during these 
months. Another intermonsoonal period occurs from March until 
mid-May, with light, variable winds and evening thundershowers. 

Humidity is typically higher in the southwest and mountainous 
areas and depends on the seasonal patterns of rainfall. At Colombo, 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 



for example, daytime humidity stays above 70 percent all year, 
rising to almost 90 percent during the monsoon season in June. 
Anuradhapura experiences a daytime low of 60 percent during the 
intermonsoonal month of March, but a high of 79 percent during 
the November and December rains. In the highlands, Kandy's day- 
time humidity usually ranges between 70 and 79 percent. 

Ecological Zones 

The pattern of life in Sri Lanka depends directly on the availa- 
bility of rainwater. The mountains and the southwestern part of 
the country, known as the "wet zone," receive ample rainfall (an 
annual average of 250 centimeters). Most of the southeast, east, 
and northern parts of the country comprise the "dry zone," which 
receives between 120 and 190 centimeters of rain annually. Much 
of the rain in these areas falls from October to January; during 
the rest of the year there is very little precipitation, and all living 
creatures must conserve precious moisture. The arid northwest and 
southeast coasts receive the least amount of rain — 60 to 120 cen- 
timeters per year — concentrated within the short period of the winter 
monsoon (see fig. 4). 

The natural vegetation of the dry zone is adapted to the annual 
change from flood to drought. The typical ground cover is scrub 
forest, interspersed with tough bushes and cactuses in the driest 
areas. Plants grow very fast from November to February when rain- 
fall is heavy, but stop growing during the hot season from March 
to August. Various adaptations to the dry conditions have devel- 
oped. To conserve water, trees have thick bark; most have tiny 
leaves, and some drop their leaves during this season. Also, the 
topmost branches of the tallest trees often interlace, forming a 
canopy against the hot sun and a barrier to the dry wind. When 
water is absent, the plains of the dry zone are dominated by browns 
and grays. When water becomes available, either during the wet 
season or through proximity to rivers and lakes, the vegetation ex- 
plodes into shades of green with a wide variety of beautiful flow- 
ers. Varieties of flowering acacias are well adapted to the arid 
conditions and flourish on the Jaffna Peninsula. Among the trees 
of the dry-land forests are some valuable species, such as satin- 
wood, ebony, ironwood, and mahogany. 

In the wet zone, the dominant vegetation of the lowlands is a 
tropical evergreen forest, with tall trees, broad foliage, and a dense 
undergrowth of vines and creepers. Subtropical evergreen forests 
resembling those of temperate climates flourish in the higher alti- 
tudes. Montane vegetation at the highest altitudes tends to be 
stunted and windswept. 



65 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Agro-Bio-Environmental Chart of Sri Lanka, Tokyo, Resources 
Council, Science and Technology Agency, 1977. 



Figure 4. Precipitation and Irrigation 
66 



The Society and Its Environment 

Forests at one time covered nearly the entire island, but by the 
late twentieth century lands classified as forests and forest reserves 
covered only one-fifth of the land. The southwestern interior con- 
tains the only large remnants of the original forests of the wet zone. 
The government has attempted to preserve sanctuaries for natu- 
ral vegetation and animal life, however. Ruhunu National Park 
in the southeast protects herds of elephant, deer, and peacocks, 
and Wilpattu National Park in the northwest preserves the habitats 
of many water birds, such as storks, pelicans, ibis, and spoonbills. 
During the Mahaweli Ganga Program of the 1970s and 1980s in 
northern Sri Lanka, the government set aside four areas of land 
totalling 190,000 hectares as national parks. 

Land Use and Settlement Patterns 

The dominant pattern of human settlement during the last 2,500 
years has consisted of village farming communities. Even in the 
1980s, the majority of people lived in small villages and worked 
at agricultural pursuits. Traditional farming techniques and life- 
styles revolve around two types of farming — "wet" and "dry" — 
depending upon the availability of water (see Agriculture, ch. 3). 

The typical settlement pattern in the rice-growing areas is a com- 
pact group of houses or neighborhood surrounding one or several 
religious centers that serve as the focus for communal activities. 
Sometimes the houses may be situated along a major road and in- 
clude a few shops, or the village may include several outlying ham- 
lets. The life-sustaining rice fields begin where the houses end and 
stretch into the distance. Some irrigated fields may include other 
cash crops, such as sugarcane, or groves of coconut trees. Palmyra 
trees grow on the borders of fields or along roads and paths. In- 
dividual houses also may have vegetable gardens in their com- 
pounds. During the rainy seasons and thereafter, when the fields 
are covered by growing crops, the village environment is intensely 
verdant. 

The nature of agricultural pursuits in Sri Lanka has changed 
over the centuries and has usually depended upon the availability 
of arable land and water resources. In earlier times, when villagers 
had access to plentiful forests that separated settlements from each 
other, slash-and-burn agriculture was a standard technique. As ex- 
panding population and commercial pressures reduced the amount 
of available forestland, however, slash-and-burn cultivation steadily 
declined in favor of permanent cultivation by private owners. Until 
the thirteenth century, the village farming communities were 
mainly on the northern plains around Anuradhapura and then 
Polonnaruwa, but they later shifted to the southwest (see Decline 



67 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

of the Sinhalese Kingdom, 1200-1500, ch. 1). In the 1980s, wide 
expanses of the northern and eastern plains were sparsely populated, 
with scattered villages each huddled around an artificial lake. The 
Jaffna Peninsula, although a dry area, is densely populated and in- 
tensively cultivated. The southwest contains most of the people, and 
villages are densely clustered with little unused land (see Popula- 
tion, this ch.). In the Central Highlands around Kandy, villagers 
faced with limited flat land have developed intricately terraced hill- 
sides where they grow rice. In the 1970s and 1980s, the wet culti- 
vation area was expanding rapidly, as the government implemented 
large-scale irrigation projects to restore the dry zone to agricultural 
productivity. In the 1980s, the area drained by the Mahaweli Ganga 
changed from a sparsely inhabited region to a wet rice area similar 
to the southwest. Through such projects, the government of Sri 
Lanka has planned to recreate in the dry zone the lush, irrigated 
landscape associated with the ancient Sinhalese civilization. 

Beginning in the sixteenth century and culminating during the 
British rule of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the planta- 
tion economy came to dominate large sections of the highlands. 
Plantation farming resulted in a drastic reduction in the natural 
forest cover and the substitution of domesticated crops, such as rub- 
ber, tea, or cinnamon. It also brought about a changed life-style, 
as the last hunting-and-gathering societies retreated into smaller 
areas and laborers moved into the highlands to work on planta- 
tions. Through the late twentieth century, workers on large plan- 
tations lived in villages of small houses or in "line rooms" 
containing ten to twelve units. The numerous plantations of small 
landholders frequently included attached hamlets of workers in ad- 
dition to the independent houses of the plantation owners. 

The coastal belt surrounding the island contains a different set- 
dement pattern that has evolved from older fishing villages. Separate 
fishing settlements expanded laterally along the coast, linked by 
a coastal highway and a railway. The mobility of the coastal popu- 
lation during colonial times and after independence led to an in- 
crease in the size and number of villages, as well as to the 
development of growing urban centers with outside contacts. In 
the 1980s, it was possible to drive for many kilometers along the 
southwest coast without finding a break in the string of villages 
and bazaar centers merging into each other and into towns. 

People 
Population 

During the early nineteenth century, the population of Sri Lanka 
was small and concentrated in the southwestern part of the island 
and in the Jaffna Peninsula in the north. The first official census, 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 



conducted by the British in 1871, recorded a total population of 
2.8 million. Between then and the 1980s, the population increased 
sixfold. Population growth until around 1900 was given impetus 
by considerable immigration from southern India, as the British 
brought in hundreds of thousands of Tamils to work the planta- 
tion economy. These immigrants accounted for an estimated 40 
to 70 percent of the population increase during the nineteenth cen- 
tury. Another significant factor in the growth of population after 
1900 was a decline in mortality rates (see Health, this ch.). The 
period of fastest growth was the decade after independence, when 
the annual rate of increase was 2.8 percent. The official total in 
the 1981 census was 14,846,750, and some projections suggested 
a total of 18 million by 1991 and between 20 and 21 million by 
2001. Furthermore, if the 1980s trends continue, the population 
will double in forty years (see table 2, Appendix). 

Although the increase in the number of people remained a major 
problem for Sri Lanka, there were indications in the 1980s that the 
country had moved beyond a period of uncontrolled population ex- 
pansion into a pattern similar to that of more industrialized nations. 
The crude fertility rate declined from 5.3 in 1953 — at the height 
of the postindependence baby boom — to 3.3 in 1981. Emigration, 
which outpaced immigration after 1953, also contributed to the 
decline in population growth. Between 1971 and 1981, for example, 
313,000 Tamil workers from the plantation areas emigrated to south 
India. Increased employment opportunities in the Arab nations also 
attracted a substantial annual flow of workers from Sri Lanka (a 
total of 57,000 in 1981 alone). The lowering of the population growth 
rate was accompanied by changes in the age distribution, with the 
older age-groups increasing, and by the concentration of people in 
urban areas. Those phenomena also accompanied lower population 
growth in Europe and the United States. 

Population is not uniformly spread but is concentrated within 
the wet zone and urban centers on the coast and the Jaffna Penin- 
sula. The country's mean population density — based on 1981 census 
data — was 230 persons per square kilometer, but in Colombo Dis- 
trict density was 2,605 persons per square kilometer. In contrast, 
the dry zone districts of Vavuniya, Mannar, Mullaittivu, and 
Moneragala had fewer than fifty-five persons per square kilometer. 
One reason for the unequal settlement pattern was the rainfall dis- 
tribution, which made it possible for the wet zones to support larger 
village farming populations. Another reason was the slow but steady 
concentration of people in urban centers during the twentieth cen- 
tury. The ratio of Sri Lankans living in cities increased from 11 
percent in 1871 to 15 percent in 1946 and 21.5 percent in 1981 
(see fig. 5). 



69 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 




The Society and Its Environment 



By 1985 a slowly declining crude birth rate hinted at a gradual 
aging of the population and changed requirements for social ser- 
vices (see table 3, Appendix). For the time being, however, there 
was considerable pressure for jobs, education, and welfare facili- 
ties from the large number of people who were raising families or 
pursuing careers. In the remaining decades of the century and be- 
yond there was likely to be greater pressure for housing and health 
care for an aging population. 

Urbanization has affected almost every area of the country since 
independence. Local market centers have grown into towns, and 
retail or service stores have cropped up even in small agricultural 
villages. The greatest growth in urban population, however, has 
occurred around a few large centers. In 1981 the urbanized popu- 
lation was 32.2 percent in Trincomalee District and 32.6 percent 
in Jaffna District, in contrast to the rural Moneragala District where 
only 2.2 percent of the people lived in towns. Colombo District, 
with 74.4 percent urban population, experienced the largest 
changes. Between 1881 and 1981, the city of Colombo increased 
its size from 25 to 37 square kilometers and its population from 
110,502 to 587,647. 

Since independence was granted in 1948, there have been four 
main trends in migration. First, every year more people move from 
rural areas to the cities. Second, the cities have changed from con- 
centrated centers to sprawling suburbs. During the 1970s, the city 
of Colombo actually lost population, mostly to neighboring cities 
in Colombo District. Part of the suburban growth has resulted from 
a planned strategy to reduce urban congestion. For example, a new 
parliamentary complex opened in Sri Jayewardenepura in the 
suburb of Kotte east of Colombo in 1982 (although Colombo is 
still considered the national capital). Much of the growth, however, 
has been the unplanned proliferation of slums inhabited by poor 
and unskilled masses and lacking public utilities or services. Third, 
government irrigation projects attracted many farmers from the 
wet zone to the pioneer settlements in the dry zone. During the 
decade ending in 1981, the highest rates of population increase oc- 
curred in the districts of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa, where 
the Mahaweli Ganga Program attracted immigrant farmers. 
Fourth, Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic struggles displaced many people 
during the 1970s and 1980s. During a Tamil repatriation program 
in the 1970s, large numbers of Tamil plantation workers left for 
India or moved out of the hill areas toward the north and the east. 
After the intensification of communal fighting in 1 983 , an estimated 
100,000 Tamil refugees fled to India, where they lived in refugee 
camps in Tamil Nadu State, and thousands more were relocated 



71 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

through refugee agencies in Sri Lanka (see The Tamil Insurgency, 
ch. 5). During the counterinsurgency operations of the Sri Lankan 
and Indian armies in 1987 and 1988, many residents of the Jaffna 
Peninsula fled their homes for temporary shelter in refugee camps 
(see The Armed Forces, ch. 5). 

As in South Asia as a whole — and in contrast to global patterns — 
Sri Lankan males outnumbered females in the mid-1980s. In Sri 
Lanka, for every 100 female births registered there were 104 males. 
In the past, the gender ratio of the general population was even 
more unequal — 113 men to 100 women in 1941. In part, this 
imbalance is attributed to the emigration of plantation workers, 
many of whom were men. Much of the change, however, may be 
due to a growing sensitivity to the health of women. Since 1963, 
the average female life expectancy has increased by seven years, 
while male life expectancy has risen by three years. 

Ethnic Groups 

The people of Sri Lanka are divided into ethnic groups whose 
conflicts have dominated public life since the nineteenth century. 
The two main characteristics that mark a person's ethnic heritage 
are language and religion, which intersect to create four major eth- 
nic groups — the Sinhalese, the Tamils, the Muslims, and the Bur- 
ghers (see fig. 6). Ethnic divisions are not based on race or physical 
appearance; some Sri Lankans claim to determine the ethnicity 
of a person by his facial characteristics or color, but in reality such 
premises are not provable. There is nothing in the languages or 
religious systems in Sri Lanka that officially promotes the social 
segregation of their adherents, but historical circumstances have 
favored one or more of the groups at different times, leading to 
hostility and competition for political and economic power. 

Sinhalese 

The Sinhalese are the largest ethnic group in the country, offi- 
cially comprising 1 1 million people or 74 percent of the popula- 
tion in 1981. They are distinguished primarily by their language, 
Sinhala, which is a member of the Indo-European linguistic group 
that includes Hindi and other north Indian tongues as well as most 
of the languages of Europe. It is likely that groups from north India 
introduced an early form of Sinhala when they migrated to the is- 
land around 500 B.C., bringing with them the agricultural econ- 
omy that has remained dominant to the twentieth century. From 
early times, however, Sinhala has included a large number of loan 
words and constructs from Tamil, and modern speech includes 
many expressions from European languages, especially English. 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Sinhalese claim to be descendants of Prince Vijaya and his 
band of immigrants from northern India, but it is probable that 
the original group of Sinhalese immigrants intermarried with 
indigenous inhabitants (see Ancient Legends and Chronicles, ch. 1). 
The Sinhalese gradually absorbed a wide variety of castes or tribal 
groups from the island and from southern India during the last 
2,500 years. 

The Buddhist religion reinforces the solidarity of the Sinhalese 
as an ethnic community. In 1988 approximately 93 percent of the 
Sinhala speakers were Buddhists, and 99.5 percent of the Buddhists 
in Sri Lanka spoke Sinhala. The most popular Sinhalese folklore, 
literature, and rituals teach children from an early age the unique- 
ness of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, the long relationship between Bud- 
dhism and the culture and politics of the island, and the importance 
of preserving this fragile cultural inheritance. Buddhist monks are 
accorded great respect and participate in services at the notable 
events in people's lives. To become a monk is a highly valued career 
goal for many young men. The neighboring Buddhist monastery 
or shrine is the center of cultural life for Sinhalese villagers (see 
Buddhism, this ch.). 

Their shared language and religion unite all ethnic Sinhalese, 
but there is a clear difference between the "Kandyan" and the 
"low-country" Sinhalese. Because the Kingdom of Kandy in the 
highlands remained independent until 1818, conservative cultural 
and social forms remained in force there. English education was 
less respected, and traditional Buddhist education remained a vital 
force in the preservation of Sinhalese culture. The former Kan- 
dyan nobility retained their social prestige, and caste divisions linked 
to occupational roles changed slowly. The plains and the coast of 
Sri Lanka, on the other hand, experienced great change under 400 
years of European rule. Substantial numbers of coastal people, 
especially among the Karava (see Glossary) caste, converted to 
Christianity through determined missionary efforts of the Portu- 
guese, Dutch, and British; 66 percent of the Roman Catholics and 
43 percent of the Protestants in the early 1980s were Sinhalese. 
Social mobility based on economic opportunity or service to the 
colonial governments allowed entire caste or kin groups to move 
up in the social hierarchy. The old conceptions of noble or servile 
status declined, and a new elite developed on the basis of its mem- 
bers' knowledge of European languages and civil administration. 
The Dutch legal system changed traditional family law. A wider, 
more cosmopolitan outlook differentiated the low-country Sinha- 
lese from the more "old fashioned" inhabitants of highlands (see 
Caste, this ch.). 



73 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 




Figure 6. Ethno linguistic Groups and Religions, 1988 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



Tamils 

The people collectively known as the Tamils (see Glossary), com- 
prising 2,700,000 persons or approximately 18 percent of the popu- 
lation in 1981, use the Tamil language as their native tongue. Tamil 
is one of the Dravidian (see Glossary) languages found almost ex- 
clusively in peninsular India. It existed in South Asia before the 
arrival of people speaking Indo-European languages in about 1 500 
B.C. Tamil literature of a high quality has survived for at least 
2,000 years in southern India, and although the Tamil language 
absorbed many words from northern Indian languages, in the late 
twentieth century it retained many forms of a purely Dravidian 
speech — a fact that is of considerable pride to its speakers. Tamil 
is spoken by at least 40 million people in the Indian state of Tamil 
Nadu (the "land of the Tamils"), and by millions more in neigh- 
boring states of southern India and among Tamil emigrants 
throughout the world. 

There was a constant stream of migration from southern India 
to Sri Lanka from prehistoric times. Once the Sinhalese controlled 
Sri Lanka, however, they viewed their own language and culture 
as native to the island, and in their eyes Tamil- speaking immigrants 
constituted a foreign ethnic community. Some of these immigrants 
appear to have abandoned Tamil for Sinhala and become part of 
the Sinhalese caste system. Most however, continued to speak Tamil 
and looked toward southern India as their cultural homeland. Their 
connections with Tamil Nadu received periodic reinforcement dur- 
ing struggles between the kings of Sri Lanka and southern India 
that peaked in the wars with the Chola (see Rise of Sinhalese and 
Tamil Ethnic Awareness, ch. 1). It is probable that the ancestors 
of many Tamil speakers entered the country as a result of the Chola 
conquest, for some personal names and some constructions used 
in Sri Lankan Tamil are reminiscent of the Chola period. 

The Tamil speakers in Sri Lanka are divided into two groups 
that have quite different origins and relationships to the country. 
The Sri Lankan Tamils trace their immigration to the distant past 
and are effectively a native minority. In 1981 they numbered 
1,886,872, or 12.7 percent of the population. The Indian Tamils 
are either immigrants or the descendants of immigrants who came 
under British sponsorship to Sri Lanka to work on plantations in 
the central highlands. In 1981 they numbered 818,656, or 5.5 per- 
cent of the population. Because they lived on plantation settlements, 
separate from other groups, including the Sri Lankan Tamils, the 
Indian Tamils have not become an integral part of society and 
indeed have been viewed by the Sinhalese as foreigners. The 

75 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

population of Indian Tamils has been shrinking through programs 
repatriating them to Tamil Nadu (see Independence, ch. 1). 

Ethnic Tamils are united to each other by their common reli- 
gious beliefs, and the Tamil language and culture. Some 80 per- 
cent of the Sri Lankan Tamils and 90 percent of the Indian Tamils 
are Hindus. They have little contact with Buddhism, and they wor- 
ship the Hindu pantheon of gods. Their religious myths, stories 
of saints, literature, and rituals are distinct from the cultural sources 
of the Sinhalese (see Hinduism, this ch.). The caste groups of the 
Tamils are also different from those of the Sinhalese, and they have 
their rationale in religious ideologies that the Sinhalese do not share. 
Religion and caste do, however, create divisions within the Tamil 
community. Most of the Indian Tamils are members of low Indian 
castes that are not respected by the upper- and middle-level castes 
of the Sri Lankan Tamils (see Caste, this ch.). Furthermore, a 
minority of the Tamils — 4.3 percent of the Sri Lankan Tamils and 
7.6 percent of the Indian Tamils — are converts to Christianity, with 
their own places of worship and separate cultural lives. In this way, 
the large Tamil minority in Sri Lanka is effectively separated from 
the mainstream Sinhalese culture and is fragmented into two major 
groups with their own Christian minorities. 

Muslims 

Muslims, who make up approximately 7 percent of the popula- 
tion, comprise a group of minorities practicing the religion of Islam. 
As in the case of the other ethnic groups, the Muslims have their 
own separate sites of worship, religious and cultural heroes, social 
circles, and even languages. The Muslim community is divided 
into three main sections — the Sri Lankan Moors, the Indian Moors, 
and the Malays, each with its own history and traditions. 

The Sri Lankan Moors make up 93 percent of the Muslim popu- 
lation and 7 percent of the total population of the country (1 ,046,926 
people in 1981). They trace their ancestry to Arab traders who 
moved to southern India and Sri Lanka some time between the 
eighth and fifteenth centuries, adopted the Tamil language that 
was the common language of Indian Ocean trade, and settled per- 
manently in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan Moors lived primarily in 
coastal trading and agricultural communities, preserving their 
Islamic cultural heritage while adopting many southern Asian cus- 
toms. During the period of Portuguese colonization, the Moors 
suffered from persecution, and many moved to the Central High- 
lands, where their descendants remain. The language of the Sri 
Lankan Moors is Tamil, or a type of "Arabic Tamil" that con- 
tains a large number of Arabic words. On the east coast, their family 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



lines are traced through women, as in kinship systems of the south- 
west Indian state of Kerala, but they govern themselves through 
Islamic law (see Family; Islam, this ch.). 

The Indian Moors are Muslims who trace their origins to im- 
migrants searching for business opportunities during the colonial 
period. Some of these people came to the country as far back as 
Portuguese times; others arrived during the British period from 
various parts of India. The Memon, originally from Sind (in 
modern Pakistan), first arrived in 1870; in the 1980s they num- 
bered only about 3,000. The Bohra and the Khoja came from north- 
western India (Gujarat State) after 1880; in the 1980s they 
collectively numbered fewer than 2,000. These groups tended to 
retain their own places of worship and the languages of their an- 
cestral homelands. 

The Malays originated in Southeast Asia. Their ancestors came 
to the country when both Sri Lanka and Indonesia were colonies 
of the Dutch. Most of the early Malay immigrants were soldiers, 
posted by the Dutch colonial administration to Sri Lanka, who 
decided to settle on the island. Other immigrants were convicts 
or members of noble houses from Indonesia who were exiled to 
Sri Lanka and who never left. The main source of a continuing 
Malay identity is their common Malay language {bahasa melayu), 
which includes numerous words absorbed from Sinhalese and 
Tamil, and is spoken at home. In the 1980s, the Malays comprised 
about 5 percent of the Muslim population in Sri Lanka. 

Burghers 

The term Burgher was applied during the period of Dutch rule 
to European nationals living in Sri Lanka. By extension it came 
to signify any permanent resident of the country who could trace 
ancestry back to Europe. Eventually it included both Dutch Bur- 
ghers and Portuguese Burghers. Always proud of their racial ori- 
gins, the Burghers further distanced themselves from the mass of 
Sri Lankan citizens by immersing themselves in European culture, 
speaking the language of the current European colonial govern- 
ment, and dominating the best colonial educational and adminis- 
trative positions. They have generally remained Christians and live 
in urban locations. Since independence, however, the Burgher com- 
munity has lost influence and in turn has been shrinking in size 
because of emigration. In 1981 the Burghers made up .3 percent 
(39,374 people) of the population. 

Veddah 

The Veddah (see Glossary) are the last descendants of the an- 
cient inhabitants of Sri Lanka, predating the arrival of the Sinhalese. 



77 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

They have long been viewed in the popular imagination as a link 
to the original hunting- and- gathering societies that gradually dis- 
appeared as the Sinhalese spread over the island. In the 1980s, 
Veddah lived in the eastern highlands, where some had been relo- 
cated as a result of the Mahaweli Ganga Program. They have not 
preserved their own language, and they resemble their poorer 
Sinhalese neighbors, living in small rural settlements. The Veddah 
have become more of a caste than a separate ethnic group, and 
they are generally accepted as equal in rank to the dominant 
Goyigama caste of the Sinhalese (see Caste, this ch.). 

Ethnic Group Relations 

The different ethnic groups are not evenly spread throughout 
the island, but live in concentrated areas, depending upon where 
they settled historically (see fig. 6). The Indian Tamils are heavily 
concentrated in the highland districts, especially in Nuwara Eliya, 
where they constitute almost half the population. This settlement 
pattern reflects their strong relationship with the plantation econ- 
omy for which they provided much of the unskilled labor. The Sri 
Lankan Tamils, on the other hand, make up more than 95 per- 
cent of the population in the Jaffna Peninsula, more than 70 per- 
cent of the population in Batticaloa District, and substantial 
minorities in other northern and eastern districts. This pattern 
reflects the historical dominance of Tamil kingdoms in the north- 
ern half of the island. The Muslims are not in the majority any- 
where, although they make up large minorities in Mannar District 
on the northwest coast and in the east coast districts; their stron- 
gest presence is in Amparai District, where they comprise 42 per- 
cent of the population. The Sinhalese exist in substantial numbers 
everywhere except in the Jaffna and Batticaloa districts, and in some 
southern districts they comprise almost the entire population. 
Colombo District approaches the closest to an ethnic melting pot, 
with a Sinhalese majority and substantial Tamil and Muslim 
minorities. Colombo is also home to most of the Burghers (72 per- 
cent) and Malays (65 percent). 

In many cases, the different ethnic communities live in separate 
villages or sections of villages, and in towns or cities they inhabit 
different neighborhoods. The fact that primary education is in either 
Tamil or Sinhala effectively segregates the children of the differ- 
ent communities at an early age. Business establishments run by, 
or catering to a specific ethnic group, tend to broadcast their eth- 
nicity by signs either in Sinhala or Tamil, each of which possesses 
its own distinctive script. Sports teams tend to include members 
of only one community, while Buddhist and Hindu religious services 



78 



Sinhalese man 
wearing sarong, circa 1910 
Courtesy Library of Congress 



Tamil nautch 
(dancing girl), circa 1910 
Courtesy Library of Congress 




79 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

are automatically limited to one ethnic group. Relatively few per- 
sons are fluent in both Tamil and Sinhala, and accents betray which 
native community a person belongs to very quickly. Countering 
the intense pressures favoring segregation, however, are official 
government policies that treat all citizens equally and numerous 
personal networks within neighborhoods and among individuals 
that link members of different ethnic groups and foster friendships. 

Ethnic segregation is reinforced by fears that ethnic majorities 
will try to dominate positions of influence and repress the religious, 
linguistic, or cultural systems of minorities. The Sinhalese are the 
overwhelming majority of residents within Sri Lanka, but they feel 
intimidated by the large Tamil population in nearby India; the com- 
bined Tamil populations of India and Sri Lanka outnumber the 
Sinhalese at least four to one. The recent memories of Tamil promi- 
nence in colonial and postcolonial administration, combined with 
a modern renaissance in Tamil consciousness in south India, are 
constant reminders of the potential power of the Tamil commun- 
ity. The Sinhalese feel quite isolated as the only group in the world 
speaking their language and professing their variant of Theravada 
Buddhism. The Tamils, on the other hand, are a minority within 
Sri Lanka. They cannot be sure of Indian support, and they ex- 
perience increasing restrictions on social mobility as the Sinhalese 
majority increases its hold on the government. Anti-Tamil riots 
and military actions in the 1980s alienated a large sector of the Tamil 
community. In the middle are the Muslims, who speak Tamil but 
whose religious and cultural systems are alien to both other ethnic 
groups. Muslim leaders increasingly seek to safeguard the cultural 
heritage of their own community by adopting a public stance of 
ethnic confrontation. 

Social Organization 

Caste 

Nature of Caste 

When the Portuguese began to trade extensively with South Asia, 
they quickly noticed a fundamental difference between South Asian 
societies and those of other world areas. In India and Sri Lanka, 
societies are broken up into a large number of groups who do not 
intermarry, who are ranked in relation to each other, and whose 
interactions are governed by a multitude of ritualized behaviors. 
The Portuguese called these groups casta, from which the English 
term caste is derived. In South Asia, they are described by the term 
jati, or birth. According to traditional culture, every person is born 
into a particular group that defines his or her unchangeable posi- 
tion within society. 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



One of the most basic concepts underlying caste is purity. On 
one level this idea translates into a concern for personal hygiene, 
but the concept ultimately refers to a psychic or spiritual purity 
that lies beyond the physical body. A religious interpretation 
associated with Indian thought asserts that personal salvation or 
enlightenment is the ultimate goal of life, and that the individual 
goes through many lives and experiences before attaining sufficient 
knowledge to transcend the material world. Those beings who have 
gone farther on this road to enlightenment have purified their cons- 
ciousness and regulate their lives in order to prevent more gross 
experiences from interfering with their progress toward salvation. 
Those groups of people whose life-styles are the purest are farthest 
along on the spiritual road and are most deserving of respect. These 
ideas about purity offer a rationale for dividing society into a large 
number of groups, ranked according to the purity of their life-styles 
or occupations. The persons in each group must be careful to 
preserve the relative purity of their own group and to avoid close 
contact with persons of lower purity; otherwise, they may sully or 
"pollute" themselves or the members of purer groups. 

The idea of psychic purity blends with a series of traditional 
notions about pure or polluting substances and about behaviors 
and rituals, resulting in a rich system that explains caste segrega- 
tion and modes of caste interaction. It is possible for people to trans- 
mit their qualities to others by touching them or by giving them 
objects. In extreme cases, even the shadow of a very low-caste indi- 
vidual can pollute an individual of the highest, priestly castes. If 
the physical contact is intimate or if people have manipulated cer- 
tain objects for a long time, the intensity of the transmitted quali- 
ties increases. Simple objects such as tools, for example, may change 
hands between persons of different caste without problem. Food, 
however, which actually enters and becomes part of a person's body, 
is a more serious matter. Cooked food, involving processing and 
longer periods of contact, is more problematic than uncooked food. 
There is thus a series of prohibitions on the sharing of food be- 
tween members of different castes. Members of higher castes may 
avoid taking food from members of lower castes, although lower- 
caste persons may not mind taking food from members of the higher 
orders. The most intimate contact is sexual because it involves the 
joining of two bodies and the transmission of the very substances 
that determine caste for life. Sexual contact between persons of 
different castes is discouraged, and intercaste marriage is rare. 
When intercaste sexual affairs do occur, they are almost always 
between men of higher caste and women of lower caste, for it is 
less polluting to send forth substances than to receive them. In the 



81 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



distant past, women who had sexual contact with men of lower castes 
were killed, and they would still be ostracized today in some vil- 
lages. When polluting contacts occur between members of differ- 
ent castes, personal purity may be restored by performing cleansing 
rituals. In general, these concepts of purity prevent partaking of 
meals together and intermarriage between different castes, regu- 
late intercaste relations through a wide variety of ritual behaviors, 
and preserve deep-seated social cleavages throughout Sri Lanka. 

There has been a strong tendency to link the position of differ- 
ent castes in the social hierarchy to their occupations. Groups who 
wash clothes or who process waste, thus coming in contact with 
undesirable substances from many persons, are typically given low 
status. In both Hindu and Buddhist thought, the destruction of 
life is very ignoble, because it extinguishes other beings struggling 
for consciousness and salvation. This idea has rationalized views 
of fishermen or leather workers, who kill animals, as low and im- 
pure groups. In many cases, however, the labeling of an occupa- 
tional group as a caste with a particular status has depended on 
historical developments rather than theories of purity. As the vil- 
lage farming economy spread over time, many tribal societies prob- 
ably changed from hunters and gatherers to low- status service castes, 
ranked below the landowning farmers. Many poor agricultural 
laborers in Sri Lanka remain members of low castes as well. Other 
immigrant groups came to Sri Lanka, fit into particular occupa- 
tional niches, and became known as castes with ranks linked to 
their primary occupations. Castes with members who accumulated 
wealth and power have tended to rise gradually in their relative 
positions, and it is not uncommon for members of rising caste 
groups to adopt vegetarianism or patronize religious institutions 
in an attempt to raise their public ritual status. 

Caste among the Sinhalese 

The dominant caste among the Sinhalese population is the 
Goyigama. Although the government keeps no official statistics on 
caste, it appears that the Goyigama comprise at least half the 
Sinhalese population. The traditional occupation of this caste is 
agriculture, and most members are still peasant farmers in villages 
almost everywhere in Sri Lanka. In traditional Sinhalese society, 
they monopolized the highest positions at royal courts and among 
the landowning elite. In the democratic society of the twentieth 
century, their members still dominate the political scene. In most 
villages they might be no richer than their non-Goyigama neigh- 
bors, but the richest landlord groups tend to be Goyigama, while 
the poorest agricultural laborers tend to include few Goyigama. 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



In the Central Highlands, some traditions of the Kingdom of 
Kandy survived after its collapse in 1818, preserved in unique forms 
of the caste system until the postindependence period. The most 
important feature of the old system was rajakariya, or the "king's 
work," which linked each caste to a specific occupation and 
demanded services for the court and religious institutions. The con- 
nection of caste and job is still stronger in the Central Highlands, 
and at events such as the Kandy Perahera, an annual festival honor- 
ing gods and the Buddha, the various castes still perform tradi- 
tional functions. The Goyigama in the highlands differ from those 
of the low country because they preserve divisions within the caste 
that derive from the official ranking of noble and commoner fami- 
lies in the old kingdom. Honorific titles hearkening back to ances- 
tral homes, manors (vasagama), or noble houses (gedard) still marked 
the pedigrees of the old aristocracy in the 1980s, and marriages 
between members of these families and common Goyigama were 
rare. In the low country, these subcastes within the Goyigama have 
faded away, and high status is marked by European titles and 
degrees rather than the older, feudal titles. 

There are still major differences between the caste structures of 
the highlands and those of the low country, although some service 
groups are common to both. The southwest coast is home to three 
major castes whose ancestors may have immigrated but who have 
become important actors in the Sinhalese social system: the Karava 
(fishermen), the Durava (toddy tappers — see Glossary), and the 
Salagama (cinnamon peelers). Originally of marginal or low sta- 
tus, these groups exploited their traditional occupations and their 
coastal positions to accumulate wealth and influence during the 
colonial period. By the late twentieth century, members of these 
castes had moved to all parts of the country, occupied high busi- 
ness and academic positions, and were generally accorded a caste 
rank equal to or slightly below the Goyigama. The highland interior 
is home to the Vahumpura, or traditional makers of jaggery (a sugar 
made from palm sap), who have spread throughout the country 
in a wide variety of occupations, especially agriculture. In the Kandy 
District of the highlands live the Batgam (or Padu), a low caste 
of agricultural laborers, and the Kinnara, who were traditionally 
segregated from other groups because of their menial status. Liv- 
ing in all areas are service groups, such as the Hena (Rada), tradi- 
tional washermen who still dominate the laundry trade; the Berava, 
traditional temple drummers who work as cultivators in many vil- 
lages; and the Navandanna (Acari), traditional artisans. In rural 
environments, the village blacksmith or washerman may still belong 
to the old occupational caste groups, but accelerating social mobility 



83 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



and the growing obsolescence of the old services are slowly erod- 
ing the link between caste and occupation. 

Caste among the Tamils 

The caste system of the Sri Lankan Tamils resembles the sys- 
tem of the Sinhalese, but the individual Tamil castes differ from 
the Sinhalese castes. The dominant Tamil caste, constituting well 
over 50 percent of the Tamil population, are the Vellala. Like the 
Goyigama, members are primarily cultivators. In the past, the 
Vellala formed the elite in the Jaffna kingdom and were the larger 
landlords; during the colonial period, they took advantage of new 
avenues for mobility and made up a large section of the educated, 
administrative middle class. In the 1980s, the Vellala still comprised 
a large portion of the Tamil urban middle class, although many 
well-off families retained interests in agricultural land. Below the 
Vellala, but still high in the Tamil caste system, are the Karaiya 
(see Glossary), whose original occupation was fishing. Like the Sin- 
halese Karava, they branched out into commercial ventures, rais- 
ing their economic and ritual position during the nineteenth century. 
The Chetti, a group of merchant castes, also have a high ritual 
position. In the middle of the caste hierarchy is a group of numer- 
ically small artisan castes, and at the bottom of the system are more 
numerous laboring castes, including the Palla, associated with 
agricultural work. 

The caste system of the Tamils is more closely tied to religious 
bases than the caste system of the Sinhalese. Caste among the Sri 
Lankan Tamils derives from the Brahman-dominated system of 
southern India. The Brahmans, a priestly caste, trace their ori- 
gins to the dawn of Indian civilization (ca. 1500 B.C.), and oc- 
cupy positions of the highest respect and purity because they 
typically preserve sacred texts and enact sacred rituals. Many con- 
servative Brahmans view the caste system and their high position 
within it as divinely ordained human institutions (see Hinduism, 
this ch.). Because they control avenues to salvation by officiating 
at temples and performing rituals in homes, their viewpoint has 
a large following among traditionally minded Hindus. The stan- 
dards of purity set forth by the Brahmanical view are so high that 
some caste groups, such as the Paraiyar (whose name came into 
English as "pariah"), have been "untouchable," barred from par- 
ticipation in the social functions or religious rituals of other Hin- 
dus. Untouchability also has been an excuse for extreme exploitation 
of lower-caste workers. 

Although Brahmans in Sri Lanka have always been a very small 
minority, the conservative Brahmanical world- view has remained 



84 



Elephants bathing in a jungle river 
Courtesy Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington 

strong among the Vellala and other high castes. Major changes 
have occurred, however, in the twentieth century. Ideas of equal- 
ity among all people, officially promoted by the government, have 
combined with higher levels of education among the Tamil elites 
to soften the old prejudices against the lowest castes. Organiza- 
tions of low-caste workers have engaged in successful militant strug- 
gles to open up employment, education, and Hindu temples for 
all groups, including former untouchables. 

The Indian Tamils are predominantly members of low castes 
from southern India, whose traditional occupations were agricul- 
tural labor and service for middle and high castes. Their low ritual 
status has reinforced their isolation from the Sinhalese and from 
the Sri Lankan Tamils. 

Caste Interactions in Daily Life 

The divisions between the castes are reaffirmed on a daily basis, 
especially in rural areas, by many forms of language and etiquette. 
Each caste uses different personal names and many use slightly 
different forms of speech, so it is often possible for people to deter- 
mine someone's caste as soon as the person begins speaking. Per- 
sons of lower rank behave politely by addressing their superiors 
with honorable formulas and by removing their headgear. A stan- 
dard furnishing in upper caste rural houses is a low stool (kolamba), 



85 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

provided so that members of lower castes may take a lower seat 
while visiting. Villages are divided into separate streets or neigh- 
borhoods according to caste, and the lowest orders may live in 
separate hamlets. In times past, low-caste persons of both sexes 
were prohibited from covering their upper bodies, riding in cars, 
or building large homes. These most offensive forms of discrimi- 
nation were eliminated by the twentieth century after extensive agi- 
tation. 

Outside the home, most social interactions take place without 
reference to caste. In villages, business offices, and factories, mem- 
bers of different groups work together, talking and joking freely, 
without feeling uncomfortable about their caste inequalities. The 
modern urban environment makes excessive concern about caste 
niceties impossible; all kinds of people squeeze onto buses with few 
worries about intimate personal contact. Employment, health, and 
educational opportunities are officially open to all, without prejudice 
based on caste. In urban slums, the general breakdown of social 
organization among the destitute allows a wide range of intercaste 
relationships. Despite the near invisibility of caste in public life, 
caste-based factions exist in all modern institutions, including 
political parties, and when it comes to marriage — the true test of 
adherence to ritual purity — the overwhelming majority of unions 
occur between members of the same caste. 

Family 

Among all ethnic and caste groups, the most important social 
unit is the nuclear family — husband, wife, and unmarried children. 
Even when economic need causes several families (Sinhala, ge; 
Tamil, kudumbam) or generations to live together, each wife will 
maintain her own cooking place and prepare food for her own hus- 
band as a sign of the individuality of the nuclear family. Among 
all sections of the population, however, relatives of both the wife 
and the husband form an important social network that supports 
the nuclear family and encompasses the majority of its important 
social relations. The kindred (pavula, in Sinhala) of an individual 
often constitute the people with whom it is possible to eat or marry. 
Because of these customs, local Sinhalese society is highly frag- 
mented, not only at the level of ethnic group or caste, but also at 
the level of the kindred. 

The kinship systems of Sri Lanka share with most of South Asia 
and the Middle East the institution of preferred cross-cousin mar- 
riage. This means that the most acceptable person for a young man 
to marry is the daughter of his father's sister. The most suitable 
partner for a young woman is the son of her mother's brother. 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



Parallel cousins — the son of the father's brother or the daughter 
of the mother's sister — tend to be improper marriage partners. 
There is a close and special relationship between children and their 
aunts or uncles, who may become their fathers-or mothers-in-law. 
Special kinship terminology exists in both Tamil and Sinhalese for 
relatives in preferred or prohibited marriage categories. In many 
villages, people spend their entire childhood with a clear knowledge 
of their future marriage plans and in close proximity to their future 
spouses. The ties between cross-cousins are so close in theory that 
persons marrying partners other than their cross-cousins may 
include a special ritual in their marriage ceremonies during which 
they receive permission from their cousins to marry an outsider. 
The system of cross-cousin marriage is ideally suited to maintain- 
ing the closed ritual purity of an extended kinship group and 
retaining control over property within a small circle of relatives. 

The vast majority of marriages in Sri Lanka are monogamous, 
that is, they involve one woman and one man. Unions between one 
man and more than one woman (polygyny) are neither illegal nor 
unknown, however, and wealthy men can take several wives if they 
can afford to support the families. Unions involving one woman 
and more than one man (polyandry) are also legal and possible. 

In the Kandyan region, descent and inheritance are traced 
through both spouses: both husband and wife possess their own 
property and may bequeath it in equal shares to their descendants. 
In the low country, where Dutch Roman Law is in effect, mar- 
riages create joint property between husband and wife, which on 
their death is divided among their heirs. On the east coast, Tamil 
Muslim families trace descent and inheritance through the mother, 
and men will typically reside with their in-laws. There is a prefer- 
ence for living near the husband's family in most areas of the coun- 
try, although a family with no sons may prefer that a son-in-law 
live nearby and manage their lands. Among all the variations of 
inheritance and descent, the husband is typically the manager of 
the nuclear family's property and represents his family in most pub- 
lic duties and functions. 

In the rural areas of Sri Lanka, traditional marriages did not 
require a wedding ceremony or legal registration of the union. The 
man and the woman simply started living together, with the con- 
sent of their parents (who were usually related to one another). 
This type of customary marriage still survives, although it has been 
declining in recent years. In 1946 about 30 percent of marriages 
in Sri Lanka were not registered, but in 1981 that figure had 
declined to 10 percent. Most such unions were concentrated along 
the north and east coasts and in the Central Highlands. Legal 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

divorce is easy to obtain, and divorces of customary marriages occur 
through mutual consent of the partners in consultation with their 
extended families. Most marriages, however, are quite stable be- 
cause of the considerable social pressure and support exerted by 
kindred of both the husband and the wife. In 1981 the divorce rate 
per 10,000 persons amounted to only 30.5. 

Most Sri Lankan families have small means and do not spend 
large sums on wedding parties. Among wealthier families in both 
the countryside and the cities, marriages occur more often between 
families that were not previously related, and more elaborate 
ceremonies take place. In such cases the bride may receive a sub- 
stantial dowry, determined beforehand during long negotiations 
between her family and her future in-laws. Preceding these well- 
publicized affairs are detailed discussions with matchmakers and 
astrologers who pick the most auspicious times for the marriage. 
Except for some of the well-educated urban elite, the parents arrange 
all marriages, although their children may meet future spouses and 
veto a particularly unattractive marriage . The average age at mar- 
riage has been increasing in recent years because of longer periods 
required for education and establishing a stable career. In 1981 
the average age of grooms was twenty-seven or twenty-eight, and 
the average age of brides was twenty-four. Betrothals arranged by 
parents could begin much earlier, and in rural areas marriages 
between persons in their early teens still occurred. Whatever the 
arrangements, however, marriage and the propagation of children 
were the desired state for all groups, and by age thirty-nine, 86 
percent of both sexes had married at least once. 

All ethnic groups in Sri Lanka preserve clear distinctions in the 
roles of the sexes. Women are responsible for cooking, raising chil- 
dren, and taking care of housework. In families relying on agricul- 
ture, women are in charge of weeding and help with the harvest, 
and among poor families women also perform full-time work for 
the more well-to-do. The man's job is to protect women and chil- 
dren and provide them with material support, and in this role men 
dominate all aspects of business and public life. At the center of 
the system are children, who mix freely until puberty and receive 
a great deal of affection from both sexes. As they enter their teens, 
children begin to adopt the adult roles that will keep them in separate 
worlds: girls help with household chores and boys work outside the 
home. Among the middle- and upper-income groups, however, 
education of children may last into their early twenties, and women 
may mix with males or even take on jobs that were in the past 
reserved for men. There has been a tendency to view the educa- 
tional qualifications of women as a means for obtaining favorable 



88 



Tamil woman and child 
Courtesy Susan J. Becker 

marriage alliances, and many middle-class women withdraw from 
the workplace after marriage. 

Religion 
Buddhism 

The Life and Message of the Buddha 

The founder of Buddhism was a man named Siddartha Gautama, 
a prince of the Sakya clan in what is now Nepal during the sixth 
century B.C. Popular stories of his life include many miraculous 
events: before his birth his mother experienced visions that fore- 
told his future greatness; when he was born, he could immediately 
walk and talk; wise men who encountered the child predicted that 
he would become either a great sage or a great emperor. Behind 
these legends is the tale of a young man reared in luxury, who began 
to question the meaning of life. At the age of thirty, he abandoned 
his home (including his beautiful wife and child) and wandered 
throughout northeast India as a beggar, searching for truth. 

Gautama studied under several religious teachers and became 
adept at techniques of meditation and self-imposed austerity. 
Finally, he sat down under a bo (pipal) tree and resolved not to 
move from that spot until he had achieved perfect enlightenment. 
He entered into deeper and deeper concentration, until he finally 



89 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

reached an understanding of the nature of existence and the pur- 
pose of life. He thus became the one who knows, the Buddha (from 
the verb budh, to know or understand). At first he debated whether 
other beings would be able to comprehend the knowledge that he 
had gained, but compassion moved him to bring his message to 
the world and lead others to enlightment. He spent the next fifty 
years traveling throughout northeast India, discussing his knowledge 
with all sorts of people. By the end of his life, his message and exam- 
ple had attracted large numbers of converts, from kings to beg- 
gars, from rich men to robbers. At his death around 483 B.C., 
he left behind a dedicated group of disciples who carried on his work. 

The Buddha summed up his message in Four Noble Truths that 
still form the core of Buddhist belief. The first truth is that life is 
suffering (dukkha). The material world, thoughts, emotions, and 
ideas are all transitory and do not express or contain any eternal 
truths. All beings repeatedly experience pain and loss as they pass 
through innumerable lives, never able to emerge from a conditioned 
existence (samsara) created through their own consciousness. The 
second truth describes the cause of suffering as attachment to the 
world and the products of one's own consciousness. This attach- 
ment, or craving for existence, causes beings to create mental views 
of the world and believe they are correct, to form relationships with 
other beings, to struggle and desire. Such efforts are in vain be- 
cause none of these strategies allows them to escape from their lim- 
ited, suffering world. The third truth says that the way to break 
the limiting trap of samsara is to stop attachment. Once one has 
concentrated awareness so intensely that all material and spiritual 
phenomena appear empty, without real substance, then existence 
becomes liberated and suffering ceases. The fourth truth is the Noble 
Eightfold Path of behavior, which roots out attachment and the 
conditioned view of the world and leads toward the state of en- 
lightenment (nibbana — nirvana, see Glossary) gained by the Bud- 
dha. The true follower of the Buddha rejects the world, becomes 
a full-time searcher after truth, and practices meditation that con- 
centrates awareness. 

The Buddhist Community 

In the absence of the Buddha, the custodian of his message is 
the assembly (sangha — see Glossary) of monks who carry on his 
work. The members of the Buddhist assembly practice the discipline 
(vinaya) set forth by the Buddha as a system of rules for a monastic 
order. The discipline calls for strict control over the senses and dedi- 
cated meditation by the individual monk (bhikku — see Glossary). 
Following the Buddha's example, the monk should spend the 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



morning begging for food from the lay community, then abstain 
from meals after noon. He should shave his head, wear orange (or 
yellow) robes, and own only his clothes and a begging bowl. He 
should avoid all sexual contact or any other forms of sensual pleas- 
ure. The bhikku should rest in one place for an extended period 
only during the rainy season, when groups of mendicants may stay 
together in communal houses (vihara). Elaborate rules evolved for 
admitting novices to the monastic community and conferring 
ordination on bhikku who passed through a period of initiation and 
training. The strict organization of the monastic order created a 
solid basis for the preservation of the Buddha's message and a read- 
ily adaptable institution that was transplanted in a variety of so- 
cial environments throughout Asia. 

Buddhism in Sri Lanka has its roots deep in one of the earliest 
variants of Buddhism that survives in the world today. The Sin- 
halese call their beliefs Theravada, or "the doctrine of the elders." 
Their tradition, frequently described as Hinayana (meaning "lesser 
vehicle"), preserves a clear understanding of the Buddha as a man 
who achieved enlightenment and developed monks (arhat) as 
accomplished followers of his teachings. This tradition differs from 
the more widespread Mahayana ("great vehicle"), which often 
treats the Buddha as a superhuman being and fills the universe 
with a pantheon of enlightened figures (bodhisattvas) who help 
others achieve enlightenment. In Sri Lanka, people do not offi- 
cially worship the Buddha, but show reverence to his memory. The 
most striking expressions of public reverence are dagoba or thupa 
(stupa), large mounds built over sites where relics of the Buddha 
or a great monk are buried. The dagoba in Sri Lanka preserve a 
spherical shape and a style of architectural embellishment that link 
them directly to the monuments originally erected over the Bud- 
dha's remains in ancient India. The traditions of the Sinhalese 
indicate that their oldest dagoba are at least 2,000 years old, from 
a period when genuine relics of the Buddha came to Sri Lanka. 
The conservative nature of Sinhalese Buddhism is strengthened 
through the preservation and living tradition of ancient scriptures 
in the Pali (see Glossary) language. A dialect related to Sanskrit, 
the classical language of India, Pali is probably close to the popu- 
lar language in northeastern India during the Buddha's time. The 
monks of Sri Lanka have kept alive an unbroken Pali transmis- 
sion of monastic rules, stories of the Buddha's life, and philosophical 
treatises that may constitute the oldest body of written Buddhist 
traditions. 

For people who do not become monks, the most effective method 
of progressing on the road to enlightenment is to accumulate merit 



91 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

(pin) through moral actions. One who performs duties faithfully 
in this world, who supports the monastic order, and who is com- 
passionate to other living beings may hope to achieve a higher birth 
in a future life, and from that position accumulate sufficient merit 
and knowledge to achieve enlightenment. Meritorious activities 
include social service, reverence of the Buddha at shrines or at 
dagoba, and pilgrimage to sacred places. Gifts to monks rank among 
the most beneficial merit-making activities. Lay devotees invite 
monks to major events, such as a death in the family or the dedi- 
cation of a building, and publicly give them food and provisions. 
In return, the monks perform pirit, the solemn recitation of Pali 
Buddhist scriptures. Although the average person may not under- 
stand a word of the ancient language, simply hearing the words 
and bestowing presents on the monks accumulates merit for the 
family or even for deceased family members. Some wealthy donors 
may hold gift-giving ceremonies simply for the public accumula- 
tion of merit. The monks thus perform important roles for the laity 
at times of crisis or accomplishment, and they serve as a focus for 
public philanthropy. 

Popular Sinhalese Religion 

There is no central religious authority in Theravada Buddhism, 
and the monastic community has divided into a number of orders 
with different styles of discipline or recruitment. The broad out- 
lines of the modern orders originated in the eighteenth century. 
By that time, monastic personnel came entirely from the upper levels 
of the Goyigama caste, and enjoyed easy lives as recipients of in- 
come from monastic estates worked by lower castes. The official 
line of monastic ordination had been broken, since monks at that 
time no longer knew the Pali tradition. In 1753 the Kandyan king 
fulfilled his duty as a protector of Buddhism by arranging for 
Theravada monks from Thailand to ordain Sinhalese novices. These 
initiates set up a reformed sect known as the Siyam Nikaya (the 
Siamese order), which invigorated the study and propagation of 
the ancient Sinhalese heritage. The order remained a purely 
Goyigama enclave. By the nineteenth century, members of rising 
low-country castes were unhappy with Goyigama monopoly over 
the sangha, and rich merchants arranged for Karava youths to 
receive ordination from Tha.i monks. These initiates formed a new 
sect called the Amarapura Nikaya, that subsequently split along 
caste lines. Disputes over doctrinal matters and the role of medi- 
tation led to the establishment of another order, the Ramanna 
Nikaya, in the late nineteenth century. In the 1980s, the Sinha- 
lese sangha of 20,000 monks fell into three major orders, subdivided 



92 



Like father, like son: two generations of Buddhist monks 

Courtesy Paige W. Thompson 

into "families": the Siyam Nikaya contained six divisions; the 
Amarapura Nikaya, twenty- three; and the Ramanna Nikaya, two. 
Each family maintained its own line of ordination traced back to 
great teachers and ultimately to the Buddha. Caste determined 
membership in many of the sects. 

The members of the Buddhist monastic community preserve the 
doctrinal purity of early Buddhism, but the lay community accepts 
a large body of other beliefs and religious rituals that are tolerated 
by the monks and integrated into Sinhalese religion. Many of the 
features of this popular religion come from Hinduism and from 
very old traditions of gods and demons. Sinhalese Buddhism is thus 
a syncretic fusion of various religious elements into a unique cul- 
tural system. 

There is a thin boundary between reverence for the Buddha's 
memory and worship of the Buddha as a god, and the unsophisti- 
cated layperson often crosses this line by worshiping him as a tran- 
scendent divine being. The relics of the Buddha, for example, have 
miraculous powers; the literature and folklore of the Sinhalese are 
full of tales recounting the amazing events surrounding relics. Dur- 
ing the construction of a Buddha image, the painting of the eyes 
is an especially important moment when the image becomes "alive" 
with power. At the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, where the Bud- 
dha's Tooth Relic is enshrined, rituals include elements from Hindu 



93 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

temple worship, such as feeding and clothing of the Buddha (see 
Hinduism, this ch.). In general, devotees believe that the Buddha's 
enlightenment makes him an all-powerful being, able to control 
time and space and all other supernatural beings. 

The Buddha is so pure and powerful that he does not intervene 
personally in the affairs of the world. That is the job of a pantheon 
of gods (deva) and demons (yakka) who control material and spiritual 
events. The Buddha never denied the existence of the gods or 
demons, but said that attention to these matters simply detracts 
from concentration on the path to enlightenment. The Sinhalese 
believe that the all-powerful Buddha has given a warrant {varan) 
to a variety of spiritual entities that allows them to regulate reality 
within set boundaries (sima). For help in matters of everyday life, 
the Sinhalese petition these spiritual entities rather than the Bud- 
dha. Near many dagoba, or shrines of the Buddha, there are separate 
shrines (devale) for powerful deities. After reverencing the Buddha, 
devotees present prayers and petitions to the gods for help with 
daily life. The shrines for the gods have their own priests (kapurala), 
who practice special rituals of purification that allow them to present 
offerings of food, flowers, or clothing to the gods. Propitiation of 
demons occurs far away from Buddhist shrines and involves spe- 
cial rituals featuring the assistance of exorcists. 

The popularity of different deities changes over time, as people 
come to see particular deities as more effective in solving their 
problems. The principal gods include Vishnu (also a Hindu god, 
identified by Buddhists as a bodhisattva, or "enlightened being," 
who helps others attain enlightenment), Natha, Vibhisana, Saman 
(the god of Adams Peak and its vicinity), and the goddess Pattini 
(originally an ordinary woman whose devotion to her husband, im- 
mortalized in poetry, elevated her to divine rank). During the twen- 
tieth century, the god Vibhisana has declined in popularity while 
the god Kataragama, named after his hometown in Moneragala 
District, has become extremely powerful. The annual Kataragama 
festival brings tens of thousands of worshipers to his small town, 
including Hindus who worship him as a manifestation of the god 
Murugan and Muslims who worship at the mosque there. This 
common devotion to sacred sites and sacred persons is one of the 
most important features of popular religion in Sri Lanka. 

Another example of this religious syncretism is the cult of Sri 
Lanka's leading oracle, Gale Bandara Deviyo, who originally was 
a Muslim prince slain by the Sinhalese to prevent his accession 
to the throne. He is revered by Buddhists and Muslims alike at 
his shrine in the town of Kurunegala (in Kurunegala District). As 
transportation and communication facilities have expanded in 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



modern Sri Lanka, there has been a big expansion of major pil- 
grimage sites that are jointly patronized by Sinhalese, Tamils, and 
Muslims, thus providing a commonality that may lead to closer 
cultural cooperation among competing ethnic groups. 

Buddhism and Politics 

Buddhism plays an eminent political role in Sri Lanka and serves 
as a unifying force for the Sinhalese majority . Although the monks 
must renounce worldliness, they of necessity maintain close rela- 
tionships with the lay community, whose members must supply 
them with food, shelter, and clothing. During the past century, 
as Sinhalese nationalism fueled lay devotion to Buddhism, there 
was a proliferation of lay support organizations, such as the All- 
Ceylon Buddhist Congress, the Colombo Buddhist Theosophical 
Society, the All-Ceylon Buddhist Women's Association, and the 
Young Men's Buddhist Association. The state has similarly retained 
close ties with the sangha. Since the time of Asoka, the first great 
Indian emperor (third century B.C.), the head of state has been 
seen by Buddhist thinkers as the official protector of Buddhism, 
the "turner of the wheel of the law" (see Historical Perspective, 
1802-1978, ch. 4). One of the recurring problems in the history 
of Sri Lanka has been a definition of the state as the official sup- 
porter of Buddhism, which in turn has been the religion of the ethnic 
Sinhalese. To be successful among the Sinhalese, a government 
must provide visible signs of its allegiance to the sangha by build- 
ing or maintaining dagoba, judging disputes among the orders of 
monks, and fostering education in the Pali Buddhist tradition. 

Individual monks and entire sects have involved themselves in 
party politics, but seldom do all families and orders unite behind 
a coherent policy. When they do unite, they are a potent political 
force. In 1956, for example, a rare union of monastic opinion gave 
crucial support to the election of the Sinhalese political leader Solo- 
mon West Ridgeway Diaz (S.W.R.D.) Bandaranaike (see Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party Rule, 1956-65, ch. 1). As of 1988, the sangha con- 
trolled extensive estates in the interior of Sri Lanka and retained 
an independent power base that, combined with high status in the 
eyes of the Sinhalese population, gave the Buddhist orders influence 
as molders of public opinion. Monks remained prominent at rallies 
and demonstrations promoting ethnic Sinhalese issues. 

Hinduism 

Whereas Buddhism claims a historical founder, a basic doctrine, 
and a formal monastic structure, Hinduism embraces a vast and 



95 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

varied body of religious belief, practice, and organization. In its 
widest sense, Hinduism encompasses all the religious and cultural 
systems originating in South Asia, and many Hindus actually accept 
the Buddha as an important sectarian teacher or as a rebel against 
or reformer of ancient Hindu culture. The medieval Arabs first 
used the term Hindu to describe the entire cultural complex east 
of the Sindhu, or Indus, River (in contemporary Pakistan). Hindu 
beliefs and practices in different regions claim descent from com- 
mon textual sources, while retaining their regional individuality. 
In Sri Lanka, Hinduism is closely related to the distinctive cul- 
tural systems of neighboring Tamil Nadu. 

Classical Hinduism includes as a central tenet of belief the con- 
cept of nonviolence (ahimsa), a concept that was of great impor- 
tance to the Buddha and to such reformers as Mahatma Gandhi 
some 2,500 years later. Veneration of pure life, especially of the 
cow, has come to be intimately associated with orthodox Hindu- 
ism of all sects. The cow is regarded as, among other things, the 
sacred embodiment of motherhood and fruitfulness. The deliber- 
ate killing of a cow is scarcely less terrible than the killing of a Brah- 
man. For the miscreant it results in immediate and irrevocable 
outcasting; even the accidental killing of a cow requires elaborate 
purification ceremonies. 

The earliest and most sacred sources of Hinduism are the Vedas, 
a compilation of hymns originating in northern India around 1 ,500 
B.C. They are the oldest surviving body of literature in South Asia, 
created by the culture of the Arya (the "noble" or "pure" ones) 
in northwest India. Composed in an archaic form of the Sanskrit 
language, the Vedas were sung by a caste of priests (Brahmans) 
during sacrifices for the ancient gods. Families of Brahmans have 
passed down the oral recitation of these hymns for thousands of 
years, and Brahman claims to high status ultimately rest on their 
association with Vedic hymns. The vast majority of Hindus know 
almost nothing of Sanskrit or the Vedas, but even in the late twen- 
tieth century Brahmans frequently officiate at important ceremo- 
nies such as weddings, reciting ancient hymns and making offerings 
into sacred flames. 

By the time of the Buddha, intellectual speculations gave rise 
to philosophical concepts that still influence all of South Asia. These 
speculations became books called Upanishads, originally written 
as commentaries on the Vedas but later viewed as sacred works 
in their own right. The Upanishads discuss brahman, an impersonal, 
eternal force that embodies all good and all knowledge. The in- 
dividual "soul," or atman, partakes of the same qualities as brah- 
man but remains immersed in ignorance. Action (karma — see 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



Glossary) is the cause of its ignorance; reason continually searches 
for meaning in the material world and in its own mental creations, 
instead of concentrating on brahman, the one true reality. The 
individual soul, immersed in action, migrates from life to life, until 
it achieves identity with brahman and is released. There is a close 
relationship between the Buddha's understanding of suffering and 
enlightenment, and the ideas of atman, karma, and brahman that 
became basic to Hindu philosophy. The Buddha, however, claimed 
that even the idea of the soul was a mental construct of no value, 
whereas Hindu thought has generally preserved a belief in the soul. 

As India became a major center of civilization with extensive 
political and economic systems, Hinduism became associated with 
new visions of the gods and worship in temples. Tamil Nadu was 
a major center of this transformation. By about A.D. 1000, the 
Tamils had reworked Brahmanical culture into a southern Indian 
type of devotional (bhakti) religion. This religion claimed to be based 
on the Vedas and the philosophy of the Upanishads, but its roots 
lay just as deep in strong attachments to local deities and a desire 
for salvation (moksha) through their intercession. 

Several gods predominate in the many myths, legends, and styles 
of worship. One of the main Hindu gods is Vishnu, often represent- 
ed as a divine king accompanied by his beautiful wife, Lakshmi, 
the bestower of wealth and good fortune. Besides presiding as a 
divine monarch, Vishnu periodically descends to earth, assuming 
a physical form to help beings attain salvation. Vishnu has ten main 
incarnations, two of which — Rama and Krishna — are particularly 
popular. Rama was a great hero, whose exploits in rescuing his 
wife from the demon king of Lanka are recounted in the epic 
Ramayana. Vishnu's most popular incarnation is Krishna, who com- 
bines in a single divine figure the mythic episodes of a warrior prince 
and a rustic cowherd god. As warrior, Krishna figures prominently 
in what is perhaps the single most important Hindu text, the 
Bhagavad Gita, where he stresses the importance of doing one's 
duty and devotion to god. As divine cowherd, Krishna served as 
an inspiration for a vast body of religious poetry in Sanskrit and 
the regional South Asian languages. From the eighth to the twelfth 
centuries, Tamil devotees of Vishnu (alvars) composed poetry in 
praise of the god. These Tamil poems, collected in anthologies, 
are still recited during worship and festivals for Vishnu. 

The second major Hindu deity, and by far the most important 
god among the Tamils in Sri Lanka, is Siva. He differs considera- 
bly from Vishnu. In many stories he reigns as a king, but often 
he appears as a religious ascetic, smeared with ashes, sitting on 
a tiger skin in the jungle, with a snake around his neck. He is the 



97 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



lord of animals. Although he is an ascetic, he is also a sexual figure, 
married to the beautiful Parvati (the daughter of the mountain), 
and his image is often a single rock shaped like a phallus (lingam). 
He is often a distant figure whose power is destructive, but para- 
doxically he is a henpecked husband who has to deal with family 
squabbles involving his sons. His devotees enjoy retelling his myths, 
but worshipers visualize him as a cosmic creator who will save his 
creatures when they have abandoned themselves totally to his love. 
One of the most powerful expressions of his creative role is the image 
of Nataraja, ''Lord of the Dance," who gracefully manifests the 
rhythm of the universe. Great Tamil devotees (nayanmar) of the early 
middle ages created a large collection of poems dedicated to Siva 
and his holiest shrines. These collections are still revered among 
the Tamils as sacred scriptures on the same plane as the Vedas. 

Female deities are very important among the Hindu Tamils. At 
temples for Siva or Vishnu there are separate shrines for the god 
and for his consort, and in many cases the shrine for the goddess 
(ammari) receives much more attention from worshipers. Hindu 
philosophy interprets the goddess as the Shakti, or cosmic energy, 
of the god in the world and therefore the most immediate creative 
or destructive force, to be thanked or placated. Many of the mani- 
festations of the goddess are capricious or violent, and she is often 
seen as a warrior who destroys demons on her own or whom Siva 
himself has to defeat in combat. As Mariamman, she used co bring 
smallpox, and she is still held responsible for diseases of the hot 
season. 

In addition to the main gods, there are a number of subordinate 
divine beings, who are often the most popular deities. Ganesha, 
or Pillaiyar or Ganapati, the elephant-headed son of Siva and Par- 
vati, is the patron of good fortune and is worshiped at the begin- 
ning of a religious service or a new venture, such as a business 
deal or even a short trip. Murugan, his brother, is a handsome 
young warrior who carries a spear and rides a peacock. He is wor- 
shiped near hills or mountains, and his devotees are known for fierce 
vows and austerity that may include self-mutilation. Every village 
has its own protective deities, often symbolized as warriors, who 
may have their own local stories and saints. 

Worship of the gods is known as puja. Worship can occur men- 
tally or in front of the most rudimentary representations, such as 
stones or trees. Most people assemble pictures or small statues of 
their favorite deities and create small shrines in their homes for 
daily services, and they make trips to local shrines to worship be- 
fore larger and more ornate statues. Public temples (Jcovil) consist 
of a central shrine containing images of the gods, with a surrounding 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



courtyard and an enclosing wall entered through ornately carved 
towers (gopuram). During worship, the images become the gods after 
special rituals are performed. Worshipers then offer them presents 
of food, clothing, and flowers as they would honored guests. The 
gifts are sanctified through contact with the gods, and worshipers 
may eat the sacred food or smear themselves with sacred ash in 
order to absorb the god's grace. In public temples, only consecrated 
priests (pujari) are allowed into the sanctum housing the god's image, 
and worshipers hand offerings to the priests for presentation to the 
god. Most of the time, worship of the gods is not congregational, 
but involves offerings by individuals or small family groups at home 
or through temple priests. During major festivals, however, hun- 
dreds or thousands of people may come together in noisy, packed 
crowds to worship at temples or to witness processions of the gods 
through public streets. 

Islam 

The religion of Islam began, like Buddhism, with the experience 
of a single man, but the religious environment of early Islam was 
the Judeo-Christian world of Arabia. Many of the basic premises 
and beliefs of Islam are thus quite different than those of Buddhism 
or Hinduism and more closely resemble the systems of Judaism 
or Christianity. During the last 1,000 years, however, Islam has 
played a major part in the cultures of South and Southeast Asia, 
including Sri Lanka. Islam in Sri Lanka has preserved the doc- 
trines derived from Arabia, while adapting to the social environ- 
ment of South Asia. 

During the early seventh century A.D., Muhammad experienced 
a series of messages from God in the city of Mecca, a trading center 
in western Arabia. He became a prophet, one of the line of bibli- 
cal prophets including Abraham, Moses, and Jesus Christ (in 
Arabic, Ibrahim, Musa, and Isa), and he conveyed to the people 
of Mecca the last and greatest of the revelations given by God to 
the world. The message was simple and powerful: "submission" 
(Islam) to the mercy of a single, all-powerful God (Allah). God 
exists for eternity, but out of love he created the world and mankind, 
endowing both men and women with immortal souls. Human be- 
ings have only one life, and when it ends their souls go to either 
heaven or hell according to their behavior on earth. Correct be- 
havior is known through the revelation of prophets inspired by God, 
and Muhammad is the last of these prophets. To believe in Islam, 
to become "one who submits" (a Muslim), one must accept the 
will of the one true God and the message of Muhammad, which 
is encapsulated in the shahada: "There is no God but God, and 



99 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Muhammad is His Prophet." His message is immortalized in the 
Quran, a series of revelations conveyed by the angel Gabriel, and 
in the hadith, the sayings and example of the prophet Muhammad. 

Muhammad described some of the most important actions neces- 
sary for a believer who wished to submit to God's love and will. 
In addition to commandments against lying, stealing, killing, and 
other crimes, the moral code includes prayer five times daily, fast- 
ing, giving alms to the poor, pilgrimage to Mecca if financially 
possible, abstention from gambling and wine, and dietary restric- 
tions similar to those of Judaism. The Prophet linked behavior to 
salvation so closely that bodies of Islamic law (sharia) grew up in 
order to interpret all human activity according to the spirit of the 
Quran. In practice, to be a Muslim requires not simply a belief 
in God and in Muhammad's status as the final prophet, but ac- 
ceptance of the rules of Islamic law and following them in one's 
own life. Islam thus encompasses a rich theology and moral sys- 
tem, and it also includes a distinctive body of laws and customs 
that distinguish Muslims from followers of other faiths. Islam is 
theoretically a democratic union of all believers without priests, 
but in practice scholars (ulama) learned in Islamic law interpret the 
Quran according to local conditions, legal officials (qazi) regulate 
Muslim life according to Islamic law, and local prayer leaders coor- 
dinate group recitation of prayers in mosques (masjid, or palli). 

By the fifteenth century, Arab traders dominated the trade routes 
through the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Some of them set- 
tled down along the coasts of India and Sri Lanka, married local 
women, and spoke Arabized Tamil rather than pure Arabic. Their 
families followed Islam and preserved the basic doctrines and Islamic 
law, while also adopting some local social customs (such as 
matrilineal and matrilocal families) that were not part of early 
Islamic society in the Arabian Peninsula. When the Portuguese 
took control in the sixteenth century, they persecuted the Muslim 
traders of the southwest coast, and many Muslims had to relocate 
in the Central Highlands or on the east coast (see European 
Encroachment and Dominance, 1500-1948, ch. 1). They retained 
their separate religious identity, but also adopted some aspects 
of popular religion. For example, pilgrimage sites, such as 
Kataragama, may be the same for Muslims as for Hindus or Bud- 
dhists, although Muslims will worship at mosques rather than rever- 
ence the Buddha or worship Hindu gods (see Buddhism, this ch.). 

The growth in ethnic consciousness during the last two centu- 
ries has affected the Muslim community of Sri Lanka. Muslim 
revivalism has included an interest in the Arabic roots of the com- 
munity, increased emphasis on the study of Arabic as the basis for 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



understanding the Quran, and an emphasis on separate schools 
for Muslim children. Whether there should be an independent 
Islamic law for Muslims, preserving the distinct moral culture 
passed down from Muhammad, is a continuing issue. On a num- 
ber of occasions, agitation has developed over attempts by the Sri 
Lankan government to regulate Muslim marriage and inheritance. 
In order to prevent further alienation of the Muslim community, 
in the 1980s the government handled its dealings with Muslims 
through a Muslim Religious and Cultural Affairs Department. 

Christianity 

According to Christian traditions, the Apostle Thomas was active 
in Sri Lanka as well as southern India during the first century A.D. 
Small Christian communities existed on the coasts of Sri Lanka 
during the succeeding centuries, flourishing on the edges of the 
Indian Ocean trade routes as Islam did in later times. Christianity 
made significant inroads only after the fifteenth century, as aggres- 
sive Portuguese missionary efforts led to many conversions, espe- 
cially among the Karava and other low-country castes. When the 
Dutch took control of Sri Lanka, they encouraged their own mis- 
sionaries of the Dutch Reformed Church. Under their patronage, 
21 percent of the population in the low country was officially Chris- 
tian by 1722. The British, in turn, allowed Anglican and other Pro- 
testant missionaries to proselytize. 

The relative number of Christians in Sri Lanka has declined 
steadily since the end of colonial rule. In 1900 a reported 378,859 
people, or 10.6 percent of the population, were officially Christi- 
ans. Although in 1980, the number of Christians had increased 
to 1,283,600, the percentage of Christians in the total population 
had declined to approximately 8 percent. This decline occurred 
primarily because the non-Christian population expanded at a faster 
rate. Emigration abroad, conversions of some Christians to Bud- 
dhism and fewer conversions to Christianity among Buddhists, Hin- 
dus, or Muslims also were reasons for the decline. In the 1980s, 
Christians still were concentrated heavily in the low country in the 
southwest. They comprised 30 percent of the population in 
Colombo. 

Some 88 percent of the Christians were Roman Catholics who 
traced their religious heritage directly to the Portuguese. The 
Roman Catholic Church has a well-established organization that 
encompasses the entire island. In 1985 there were 9 dioceses com- 
prising 313 parishes, 682 priests, and 15 bishops (including two 
archbishops and a cardinal). The remainder of Christians were 
almost evenly split between the Anglican Church of Ceylon (with 



101 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

two dioceses) and other Protestant faiths. The Dutch Reformed 
Church, now the Presbytery of Ceylon, consisted mostly of Bur- 
ghers, and its numbers were shrinking because of emigration. Other 
Christian communities — Congregationalists, Methodists, and 
Baptists — were small in number. Since the 1970s, there has been 
a movement of all Protestant Churches to join together in a united 
Church of Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese community, however, has 
strenuously opposed this movement. 

Social Services 
Education 

Traditional and Colonial Systems 

The education system of Sri Lanka until colonial times primar- 
ily was designed for a small elite in a society with relatively low 
technology. The vast majority of the population was illiterate or 
semiliterate. Among the Sinhalese, learning was the job of Bud- 
dhist monks. At the village level, literate monks would teach 
privileged students in the pansal, or temple school. The curricu- 
lum there, still taught to young children, included the Sinhala 
alphabet and memorization of elementary Buddhist literature — 
the Nam potha (Book of Names) of Buddhist shrines, the Magul lakuna 
(Book of Auspicious Symbols on the Buddha's body), and classic 
stories of the Buddha's life. The pursuit of higher education typi- 
cally was reserved for men who became monks and took place at 
universities (pirivena) dedicated almost exclusively to memorization 
and commentary on the Pali scriptures. Among the Tamil popu- 
lation, village schools, which were located near temples, were run 
by literate Brahmans or educated Vellalas (see Glossary). Techni- 
cal training was highly developed for students of the arts (such as 
architecture or sculpture); for engineers, who applied geometry to 
problems of irrigation; and for craftsmen in various trades. This 
training, however, was generally the preserve of closed corpora- 
tions, castes, or families. Knowledge was often passed down from 
fathers to sons. 

Although colonization brought European-style education to Sri 
Lanka, especially to prepare students for positions in the colonial 
administrations, few women went to school and most people re- 
mained uneducated. During the sixteenth century, Portuguese mis- 
sionaries established up to 100 schools designed to foster a Roman 
Catholic culture among the growing Christian community in the 
low country. When the Dutch took over in 1656, they set up a well- 
organized system of primary schools to support the missionary 
efforts of the Dutch Reformed Church. By 1760 they had 130 



102 



Sinhalese twins near 
Hikkaduwa 
Courtesy 
Paige W. Thompson 



schools with an attendance of nearly 65,000 students. The British 
takeover led to the closing of many Dutch schools and a short-term 
contraction of European- style education in the low country. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, government-funded schools and Christian 
schools were again expanding; in 1870, however, their combined 
student bodies had fewer than 20,000 students. Because they were 
educated in English, the graduates of the European- style schools, 
a large portion of them Christians from the low country in the 
southwest, went on to fill lower and middle-level positions in the 
colonial administration. Apart from the European-style schools, 
education continued through the traditional system in Tamil and 
Sinhala. 

In 1870 a series of events revolutionized the education system 
in Sri Lanka. The government began to expand the number of 
state-run schools and instituted a program of grants for private 
schools that met official standards. Medical and law colleges were 
established in Colombo. There was a big increase in the number 
of students (which totalled more than 200,000 by 1900), but the 
lopsided development that had characterized the early nineteenth 
century became even more apparent by the early twentieth century. 
Private schools taught in English, which offered the best road for 
advancement, were dominated by Christian organizations, remained 
concentrated in the southwest, and attracted a disproportionate 
number of Christian and Tamil students. Although institutions that 



103 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



used Tamil and Sinhala continued to function as elementary schools, 
secondary institutions that taught exclusively in English attracted 
an elite male clientele destined for administrative positions. The 
education of women lagged behind; by 1921 the female literacy 
rate among the Christians was 50 percent, among the Buddhists 
17 percent, among the Hindus 10 percent, and among the Mus- 
lims only 6 percent. 

The colonial pattern began to change in the 1930s, after legisla- 
tive reforms placed the Ministry of Education under the control 
of elected representatives. The government directly controlled an 
ever-larger proportion of schools (about 60 percent by 1947) and 
teacher-training colleges. As part of a policy to promote universal 
literacy, education became free in government schools, elemen- 
tary and technical schools were set up in rural areas, and vernacu- 
lar education received official encouragement. In 1942 with the 
establishment of the University of Ceylon, free education was avail- 
able from kindergarten through the university level. When indepen- 
dence came in 1948, Sri Lanka had a well-developed education 
infrastructure. Although still hampered by gross ethnic, geographic, 
and gender inequalities, it formed the basis for a modern system. 

The Modern Education System 

Since independence in 1948, the government has made educa- 
tion one of its highest priorities, a policy that has yielded excellent 
results (see table 4, Appendix). Within a period of less than 40 years, 
the number of schools in Sri Lanka increased by over 50 percent, 
the number of students increased more than 300 percent, and the 
number of teachers increased by more than 400 percent. Growth 
has been especially rapid in secondary schools, which in 1985 taught 
1.2 million students, or one-third of the student population. 
Teachers made up the largest government work force outside the 
plantation industry. The literate population has grown correspond- 
ingly, and by the mid-1980s over 90 percent of the population was 
officially literate (87 percent for those above ten years of age), with 
near universal literacy among the younger population. This is by 
far the most impressive progress in South Asia and places Sri Lanka 
close to the leaders in education among developing nations. 

The government has taken an ever larger role in education. Be- 
cause private institutions no longer receive grants from the govern- 
ment, they are forced to charge fees while competing with free 
state-run schools. The percentage of students in the state system 
has grown constantly, and by the 1980s, 99 percent of female stu- 
dents and 93 percent of male students at the primary school level 
were being trained in government-run schools. The government 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



did not have a monopoly over education because Buddhist pansala 
and pirivena, Muslim schools, and Christian schools still thrived 
(the Roman Catholic Church alone operated several hundred in- 
stitutions from kindergarten to secondary level, teaching over 80,000 
children). The education system of the state, however, had an over- 
whelming influence on the majority of the population, especially 
the Sinhalese. 

The state has tried to change the language of instruction in its 
primary and secondary schools from English to Tamil or Sinhala. 
By the 1960s, the vernacular languages were the primary medium 
in all government secondary schools. In the 1980s, English re- 
mained, however, an important key to advancement in technical 
and professional careers, and there was still competition among 
well-to-do families to place members in private English-language 
programs in urban areas. Ethnic minorities long associated with 
European-style education still formed a large percentage of the 
English-speaking elite. In the 1980s, for example, almost 80 per- 
cent of the Burghers knew English, while among the Sinhalese the 
English-speakers comprised only 12 percent. 

Children from age five to ten attend primary school; from age 
eleven to fifteen they attend junior secondary school (terminating 
in Ordinary Level Examination); and from age sixteen to seven- 
teen they attend senior secondary school (terminating in the 
Advanced Level Examination). Those who qualify can go on to 
the university system, which is totally state-run. In the late 1980s, 
there were 8 universities and 1 university college with over 18,000 
students in 28 faculties, plus 2,000 graduate and certificate stu- 
dents. The university system included the University of Peradeniya, 
about six kilometers from Kandy, formed between 1940 and 1960; 
the universities of Vidyalankara and Vidyodaya, formed in the 
1950s and 1960s from restructured pirivena; the College of Advanced 
Technology in Katubedda, Colombo District, formed in the 1960s; 
the Colombo campus of the University of Ceylon, created in 1967; 
the University of Ruhunu (1979); and Batticaloa University Col- 
lege (1981). There was also the Buddhist and Pali University of 
Sri Lanka, established in Colombo in 1982. 

Among the major problems still facing the educational system 
in the late 1980s were a serious dropout rate in the primary grades 
and a continuing bias toward urban environments at the expense 
of the countryside. The median level of educational attainment in 
Sri Lanka was somewhere between grades 5 and 9, and almost 40 
percent of the students dropped out of school after 9 years. The 
reasons were not hard to discern in a primarily agricultural soci- 
ety, where many young people were more urgently needed in the 



105 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

fields or at home than in school once they had achieved an opera- 
tional level of literacy and arithmetic skills. Many urban youth from 
low-income backgrounds also dropped out at an early age. This 
pattern provided two-thirds of the students with an education 
through grade 5 but less than 10 percent of the population with 
a high school diploma and less than 1 percent with a college degree. 
Despite government efforts in the 1980s to expand opportunities 
for youth from rural areas and more sparsely inhabited districts, 
the pressures for early dropout were more pressing in precisely those 
areas where illiteracy was most prevalent. In Colombo, for exam- 
ple, the overall literacy rate was 94 percent in 1988, while in 
Amparai District it was only 75 percent. Rural schools were more 
widely scattered, with poor facilities and inadequate equipment, 
especially in the sciences. Teachers preferred not to work in the 
countryside, and many rural schools did not even go up to the level 
of twelfth grade. 

The most dynamic field in education during the 1970s and 1980s 
was technical training. In the late 1980s, the Ministry of Higher 
Education operated a network of twenty- seven technical colleges 
and affiliated institutes throughout the country. Courses led to 
national diplomas in accountancy, commerce, technology, agricul- 
ture, business studies, economics, and manufacture. Other govern- 
ment institutions, including the Railway, Survey, and Irrigation 
Departments, ran their own specialized training institutes. The 
Ministry of Labour had three vocational and craft training insti- 
tutes. The number of students in all state-run technical institutes 
by the mid-1980s was 22,000. In addition, the government oper- 
ated schools of agriculture in four locations, as well as practical 
farm schools in each district. A continuing problem in all fields 
of technical education was extreme gender differentiation in job 
training; women tended to enroll in home economics and teach- 
ing courses rather than in scientific disciplines. 

Education and Ethnic Conflict 

During the first fifteen years after independence, students sought 
a university degree primarily to qualify for service in government, 
which remained by far the major employer of administrative skills. 
Liberal arts, leading to the bachelor of arts degree, was the preferred 
area of study as a preparation for administrative positions. Because 
the university exams were conducted in English — the language of 
the elite — the potential pool of university applicants was relatively 
small, and only 30 percent of all applicants were admitted. By the 
mid-1960s, the examinations were conducted in Sinhala and Tamil, 
opening the universities to a larger body of applicants, many of 



106 



Sinhalese boy with flowers 
Courtesy 
Paige W. Thompson 

whom were trained in the vernacular languages in state-run secon- 
dary schools. At the same time, university expansion slowed down 
because of lack of funds, and it became impossible to admit the 
increasing numbers of qualified candidates; by 1965 only 20 per- 
cent of applicants were admitted, and by 1969 only 11 percent. 
Those students who did manage to enter the university followed 
the traditional road to a bachelor's degree, until neither the govern- 
ment nor private enterprises could absorb the glut of graduates. 
In this way, the direction of educational expansion by the late 1960s 
led to two major problems surrounding the university system: the 
growing difficulty of admissions and the growing irrelevance of a 
liberal arts education to employment. The big losers were mem- 
bers of the Sinhalese community, who were finally able to obtain 
high school or university degrees, but who found further advance- 
ment difficult. Frustrated aspirations lay behind the participation 
of many students in the abortive uprising by the People's Libera- 
tion Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna — J VP) in 1971 (see 
Independence, ch. 1). 

During the colonial period and the two decades after indepen- 
dence, the Sri Lankan Tamil community — both Hindu and 
Christian — outstripped the Sinhalese community in the relative per- 
centage of students in secondary schools and university bachelor 
of arts degree programs. As the government increasingly fell into 
the hands of the Sinhalese, however, possibilities for government 



107 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

service declined for Tamil students. Tamil secondary schools then 
used their strength in science curriculums to prepare their students 
in science and medicine, and by the 1960s Tamils dominated the 
university student bodies in those fields. Thus, at precisely the time 
when Sinhalese bachelor of arts candidates found their careers 
thwarted by changes in the job market, Tamil science students were 
embarking on lucrative professional careers. Sinhalese agitation 
aimed at decreasing the numbers of Tamil students in science and 
medical faculties became a major political issue. 

Overt political favoritism did not eliminate the dominance of well- 
trained Tamil students until 1974, when the government instituted 
a district quota system of science admissions. When each district 
in the country had a number of reserved slots for its students, the 
Sinhalese community benefited because it dominated a majority 
of districts. Tamil admissions ratios remained higher than the per- 
centage of Tamils in the population, but declined precipitously from 
previous levels. In the 1980s, 60 percent of university admissions 
were allocated according to district quotas, with the remaining 40 
percent awarded on the basis of individual merit. This system 
guaranteed opportunity for all ethnic groups in rough approxima- 
tion to their population throughout the country. 

Although the admissions controversy and the quota system re- 
sulted in a more equitable distribution of opportunities for Sri 
Lankans in general, they damaged the prospects of many excel- 
lent Tamil students coming out of secondary schools. The educa- 
tion policies of the government were perceived by educated 
members of the Tamil community as blatant discrimination. Many 
Tamil youths reacted to the blockage of their educational prospects 
by supporting the Tamil United Liberation Front and other seces- 
sionist cells (see The Political Party System, ch. 4; The Tamil In- 
surgency, ch. 5). Large-scale improvements in education had, 
paradoxically, contributed to ethnic conflict. 

Health 

Sri Lanka has one of the most effective health systems among 
developing nations. The crude death rate in the early 1980s was 
6 per 1,000, down from 13 per 1,000 in 1948 and an estimated 
19 per 1,000 in 1871. The infant mortality rate registered a simi- 
lar decline, from 50 deaths per 1,000 births in 1970 to 34 deaths 
per 1,000 births in the early 1980s. These figures placed Sri Lanka 
statistically among the top five Asian countries. Improvements in 
health were largely responsible for raising the average life span in 
the 1980s to sixty-eight years. 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



Traditional medicine {ayurveda — see Glossary) is an important 
part of the health system in Sri Lanka. The basis of traditional medi- 
cine is the theory of "three humors" (tridhatu), corresponding to 
elements of the universe that make up the human body: a> ap- 
pears as wind, fire as bile, and water as phlegm. Imbalances among 
the humors (the "three ills," or tridosha) cause various diseases. 
The chief causes of the imbalances are excesses of heat or cold. 
Treatment of disease requires an infusion of hot or cold substances 
in order to reestablish a balance in the body. The definition of ' 'hot' ' 
or "cold" rests on culturally defined norms and lists in ancient 
textbooks. For example, milk products and rice cooked in milk are 
cool substances, while certain meats are hot, regardless of temper- 
ature. Treatment may also involve a variety of herbal remedies 
made according to lore handed down from ancient times. Archaeo- 
logical work at ancient monastic sites has revealed the antiquity 
of the traditional medical system; for example, excavations have 
revealed large tubs used to immerse the bodies of sick persons in 
healing solutions. Literate monks, skilled in ayurveda, were impor- 
tant sources of medical knowledge in former times. Village-level 
traditional physicians also remained active until the mid-twentieth 
century. In the late 1980s, as part of a free state medical system, 
government agencies operated health clinics specializing in ayurve- 
da, employed over 12,000 ayurvedic physicians, and supported several 
training and research institutes in traditional medicine. 

Western- style medical practices have been responsible for most 
of the improvements in health in Sri Lanka during the twentieth 
century. Health care facilities and staff and public health programs 
geared to combat infectious disease are the most crucial areas where 
development has taken place. The state maintains a system of free 
hospitals, dispensaries, and maternity services. In 1985 there were 
more than 3,000 doctors trained in Western medicine, about 8,600 
nurses, 490 hospitals, and 338 central dispensaries. Maternity ser- 
vices were especially effective in reaching into rural areas; less than 
3 percent of deliveries took place without the assistance of at least 
a paramedic or a trained midwife, and 63 percent of deliveries oc- 
curred in health institutions — higher rates than in any other South 
Asian nation. As is the case for all services in Sri Lanka, the most 
complete hospital facilities and highest concentration of physicians 
were in urban areas, while many rural and estate areas were served 
by dispensaries and paramedics. The emergency transport of 
patients, especially in the countryside, was still at a rudimentary 
level. Some progress has been made in controlling infectious dis- 
eases. Smallpox has been eliminated, and the state has been cooper- 
ating with United Nations agencies in programs to eradicate 



109 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

malaria. In 1985 Sri Lanka spent 258 rupees (for value of rupee — 
see Glossary) per person to fight the disease. Although the num- 
ber of malaria cases and fatalities has declined, in 1985 more than 
100,000 persons contracted the disease. 

Sri Lanka had little exposure to Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS) during the 1980s. As late as 1986, no Sri Lankan 
citizens had contracted the disease at home, but by early 1988 six 
cases had been diagnosed, including those of foreigners and of Sri 
Lankan citizens who had traveled abroad. Government regulations 
in the late 1980s required immediate expulsion of any foreigner 
diagnosed as an AIDS carrier, and by 1988 the government had 
deported at least one foreign AIDS victim. Government ministers 
have participated in international forums dealing with the problem, 
and the government formed a National Committee on AIDS 
Prevention in 1988. 

Mortality rates in the late 1980s highlighted the gap that remained 
between the urban and rural sectors and the long way good medi- 
cal care still had to go to reach the whole population. Over 40 per- 
cent of the deaths in urban areas were traced to heart or circulatory 
diseases, a trend that resembled the pattern in developed nations. 
Cancer, on the other hand, accounted for only about 6 percent of 
deaths, a pattern that did not resemble that of developed nations. 
Instead, intestinal infections, tuberculosis, and parasitic diseases 
accounted for 20 percent of urban deaths and over 12 percent of 
rural deaths annually. The leading causes of death in rural environ- 
ments were listed as ' 'ill-defined conditions" or "senility," reflect- 
ing the rather poor diagnostic capabilities of rural health personnel. 
Observers agreed that considerable work needed to be done to 
reduce infectious diseases throughout the country and to improve 
skilled medical outreach to rural communities. 

Living Conditions 

In the late 1980s, vast differences remained in the wealth and 
life- styles of citizens in Sri Lanka. In urban areas, such as Colombo, 
entire neighborhoods consisted of beautiful houses owned by well- 
off administrators and businessmen. This elite enjoyed facilities 
and opportunities on a par with those of middle- and upper-middle- 
class residents of Europe or North America. In the countryside, 
families that controlled more extensive farms lived a rustic but 
healthy life, with excellent access to food, shelter, clothing, and 
opportunities for education and employment. In contrast, at lower 
levels in the class pyramid, the vast majority of the population expe- 
rienced a much lower standard of living and range of opportuni- 
ties. A sizable minority in both the cities and rural villages led a 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



marginal existence, with inadequate food and facilities and poor 
chances for upward mobility. 

Intervention by successive governments has had marginal suc- 
cess in decreasing the differences between income groups. In the 
rural sector, legislation has mandated a ceiling on private land- 
ownership and has nationalized plantations, but these programs 
have provided extra land to relatively few people (see Agriculture, 
ch. 3). Although resettlement programs have benefitted hundreds 
of thousands of people, they have not kept pace with population 
growth. In rural environments, most people remained peasants with 
smallholdings, agricultural laborers working for small wages on the 
lands of others, or landless plantation workers. Migration to the 
cities often did not lead to a great improvement in people's life- 
styles because most immigrants had little education and few skills. 
As a result, urban slums have proliferated; by the 1980s almost 
half the people in greater Colombo were living in slums and shan- 
ties. Because economic growth has not kept pace with these popu- 
lation changes, double-digit unemployment continued with the 
poorest sections of the urban and rural population suffering the 
most. A hard-core mass of poor and underemployed people, total- 
ling between 20 and 25 percent of the population, remained the 
biggest challenge for the government. 

Cramped and insufficient housing detracted from the quality of 
life in Sri Lanka. In the 1980s, most housing units in Sri Lanka 
were small: 33 percent had only one room, 33 percent two rooms, 
and 20 percent three rooms. More than five persons lived in the 
average housing unit, with an overcrowding rate (three or more 
persons per room) of 40 percent. In urban areas, permanent struc- 
tures with brick walls, tiled roofs, and cement floors constituted 
70 percent of houses, but in the countryside permanent houses made 
up only 24 percent of the units. The rural figures included a large 
number of village dwellings built of such materials as thatch, mud, 
and timber, designed according to traditional styles with inner court- 
yards, or verandas, and providing ample room for living and sleep- 
ing in the generally warm climate. The rates of overcrowding were 
declining in the 1980s, as the government sponsored intensive pro- 
grams for increasing access to permanent housing. 

Many of the infectious diseases that caused high mortality in Sri 
Lanka were water-borne, and improvements in water facilities oc- 
cupied a high priority in government welfare programs of the 1 980s 
and planning for the 1990s. In urban areas, about half the drink- 
ing water was piped and half came from wells, while in the coun- 
tryside 85 percent of the water came from wells and 10 percent 
from unprotected, open sources. Almost one- third of the well water 



111 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

was also unprotected against backflows that could cause leakage 
of sewage. Only about one out of three houses had toilets. With 
help from United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United 
States Agency for International Development (AID), Britain, the 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and the Nether- 
lands, the government of Sri Lanka set a goal of clean, piped water 
and sewage facilities for the entire urban population and for at least 
half the rural population by 1990. Observers doubted, however, 
that this goal could be reached in the northern and eastern dis- 
tricts torn by ethnic conflict. 

Food was another major issue. Beginning in the 1940s, the 
government ran a food subsidy program that paid farmers a mini- 
mum price for their crops and also operated a rationing system 
that allowed people to obtain rice at a guaranteed low price. The 
importance of this program to the people was dramatically demon- 
strated in 1953, when the state's attempt to reduce subsidies led 
to food riots and the fall of the government (see United National 
Party ' 'Majority" Rule, 1948-56, ch. 1). Since 1979 when the sub- 
sidy program was abolished, the government has operated a food 
stamp scheme that allows people in lower-income brackets to ob- 
tain free rice, wheat flour, sugar, milk powder, condensed milk, 
dried fish, and kerosene for cooking. This program has reached 
almost half the population, accounting for approximately 7 percent 
of the state budget. The government also operated supplementary 
feeding programs, including a School Biscuit Programme designed 
to reach malnourished children and a Thriposha Programme to 
provide for 600,000 needy infants, preschool children, and preg- 
nant mothers. (Thriposha is a precooked, protein-fortified cereal food 
supplement.) 

Despite government intervention in the food market, malnutri- 
tion continued to be a problem among the poor, the bottom 60 
percent of the population who earned less than 30 percent of the 
national income. As in so many other sectors, the problem remained 
worse in rural areas, although urban slums possessed their own 
share of misery. In Colombo city and district, 1 or 2 percent of 
preschool children experienced severe symptoms of malnutrition, 
while the rate was 3 or 4 percent in Puttalam District. Mild forms 
of malnourishment, resulting in some stunted growth, affected 
around 33 percent of the young children in Colombo but up to 
50 percent in rural Vavuniya or Puttalam districts. Malnutrition 
also affected adults: one out of three agricultural laborers consumed 
less than 80 percent of recommended calories daily. This problem 
became worse after the inflation of the early 1980s that reduced 
the real value of food stamps by up to 50 percent (see Finance, 



112 




113 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

ch. 3). Observers doubted that poverty and malnutrition would 
be alleviated during the 1980s or early 1990s, while the country 
experienced economic uncertainty and the government was forced 
to spend more on security matters (see The Defense Budget, ch. 5). 

* * * 

An excellent short survey of Sri Lanka's geology, topography, 
and climate is found in Sri Lanka: A Survey, edited by K.M. de Sil- 
va. A more detailed study is J.W. Herath's Mineral Resources of Sri 
Lanka. 

The authoritative source for population statistics is Population and 
Housing, 1981: General Report published by the Sri Lanka Ministry 
of Plan Implementation. Beginning with basic population data, the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka's Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka 
also includes useful data on health, education, and welfare. Basic 
texts for ethnic, caste, and family topics are Caste in Modern Ceylon 
by Bruce Ryan and Under the Bo Tree by Nur Yalman. Michael 
Robert's more recent Caste Conflict and Elite Formation concentrates 
on the dominant low-country castes. Muslims of Sri Lanka, edited 
by M.A.M. Shukri, is a collection of essays dealing with the his- 
tory and culture of the different groups within the Muslim com- 
munity. 

Heinz Bechert, Hans Dieter-Evers, Richard Gombrich, and 
Gananath Obeyesekere are major figures in the study of Sinhalese 
religion. Bechert and Gombrich have edited The World of Buddhism, 
with contributors discussing all world areas; the sections on Indian 
and Sinhalese Buddhism are excellent introductions. Gombrich' s 
Precept and Practice is a scholarly investigation of popular Sinhalese 
religion and its relationship to Buddhist doctrines. For the basic 
ideas of Hinduism, Thomas J. Hopkins's The Hindu Religious Tra- 
dition is useful. Kamil Zvelebil's The Smile of Murugan and Hymns 
of the Tamil Saivite Saints by F. Kingsbury and G.E. Phillips pro- 
vide more detailed information on Tamil Hindu traditions. Expo- 
sitions of the basic doctrines of Islam are found in H.A.R. Gibb's 
Mohammedanism and Fazlur Rahman's Islam. 

Education in Colonial Ceylon by Ranjit Ruberu describes the 
precolonial and colonial education systems. Chandra Richard de 
Silva and Daya de Silva give a detailed description of the postin- 
dependence education system in Education in Sri Lanka. The rela- 
tionship between education and ethnic conflict are discussed in 
chapters by K.M. de Silva and Chandra Richard de Silva in From 
Independence to Statehood: Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and 
Asian States. Health and welfare conditions, and government 



114 



The Society and Its Environment 



programs addressing them, are summarized in Piyasiri Wick- 
ramasekara's long article in Strategies for Alleviating Poverty in Rural 
Asia. A more detailed study of rural conditions is Rachel Kurian's 
Women Workers in the Sri Lanka Plantation Sector. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



115 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Economic activity in Sri Lanka: rubber tapper, tea picker, 
rice cultivator, and handicraft worker 



THE DOMINANT SECTOR of the Sri Lankan economy histor- 
ically has been wet rice (paddy) cultivation. Its importance in an- 
cient times is demonstrated by the extensive irrigation works 
constructed in the north-central region of the island in the first 
millennium A.D. In the thirteenth century, the civilization based 
on these reservoirs began to decline, and population shifted to the 
wet zone of the southern and southwestern areas, where irrigation 
was less necessary to grow rice. Cinnamon and other spices which 
were valuable in the European market became important export 
commodities in the sixteenth century, when Europeans, first the 
Portuguese and then the Dutch, established control over the coastal 
areas of the island. 

Commercial agriculture came to dominate the economy during 
the British period (1796-1948). Extensive coffee plantations were 
established in the mid-nineteenth century. Coffee failed when a 
leaf disease ravaged it in the 1870s and 1880s, but it was quickly 
replaced by the important commercial crops of tea, rubber, and 
coconut. Although wet rice cultivation remained important, Sri 
Lanka had to import more than one-half of the rice it needed dur- 
ing the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because of the 
land and labor devoted to the commercial crops. At independence 
in 1948, almost all of the islands' foreign exchange earnings were 
derived from commercial agriculture. 

The fundamental economic problem since the 1950s has been 
the declining terms of trade. The proceeds from the traditional 
agricultural exports of tea, rubber, and coconut have had less and 
less value in the international marketplace. Beginning in the early 
1960s, governments responded by intervening directly in the largely 
free-market economy inherited from the colonial period. Imports 
and exports were tightly regulated, and the state sector was ex- 
panded, especially in manufacturing and transportation. This trend 
accelerated between 1970 and 1977, when a coalition headed by 
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party nationalized the larger plantations 
and imposed direct controls over internal trade. 

The United National Party (UNP) contested the 1977 general 
election with a platform calling for less regulation of the economy. 
After its electoral victory, the new UNP government made some 
effort to dismantle the state sector in agriculture and manufactur- 
ing. At the same time, it encouraged private enterprise, welcomed 
foreign investment and slackened import controls. It also shifted 



119 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

spending away from subsidies and social welfare to investment in 
the nation's infrastructure, most notably a massive irrigation 
project, the Mahaweli Ganga Program, which was expected to make 
Sri Lanka self-sufficient in rice and generate enough hydroelectric 
power to fill the nation's requirements. These policies resulted in 
higher rates of economic growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
but at the cost of a mounting external debt. Foreign aid from the 
United States, Western Europe, Japan, and international organi- 
zations kept the economy afloat. 

Sri Lanka's economy became more diverse in the 1970s and 
1980s, and in 1986 textiles surpassed tea for the first time as the 
country's single largest export. Nonetheless, the performance of 
the traditional agricultural exports remained essential to the coun- 
try's economic health. Other important sources of foreign exchange 
included remittances from Sri Lankans working overseas, foreign 
aid, and tourism. 

Nature of the Economy 

Sri Lanka's economic prospects in early 1988 were linked at least 
in part to the political and security situation. If political violence 
could be brought under control, the government had commitments 
from foreign investors and donors to finance a reconstruction pro- 
gram that would ensure economic growth in the short term. If the 
violence were to continue, the diversion of resources into defense 
and the negative impact on tourism and foreign investment ap- 
peared likely to result in economic stagnation. 

Structure of the Economy 

Agriculture, both subsistence and commercial, has played a 
dominant role in Sri Lanka's economy for many centuries. The 
Portuguese and Dutch, who ruled the coastal regions of the island 
from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, were primar- 
ily interested in profiting from cinnamon and other spices (see 
European Encroachment and Dominance, 1500-1948; The Dutch, 
ch. 1). Trade with India, Sri Lanka's nearest neighbor, was also 
important during this period. Sri Lanka exported pearls, areca nuts, 
shells, elephants, and coconuts, and in return received rice and 
textiles. 

The island's economy began to assume its modern form in the 
1830s and 1840s, when coffee plantations were established in the 
Central Highlands. Coffee soon became the dominant force in the 
economy, its proceeds paying for increasingly large imports of food, 
especially rice. When coffee fell victim to a leaf disease in the 1870s, 
it was quickly replaced by tea, which soon covered more land than 



120 



The Economy 



had coffee at its height. Coconut plantations also expanded rap- 
idly in the late nineteenth century, followed by rubber, another 
cash crop introduced in the 1890s. Stimulated by demand gener- 
ated by the development of the automobile industry in Western 
Europe and North America, rubber soon passed coconuts in im- 
portance. These three products — tea, coconuts, and rubber — 
provided the export earnings that enabled Sri Lanka to import food, 
textiles, and other consumer goods in the first half of the twentieth 
century. At independence in 1948, they generated over 90 percent 
of export proceeds. 

Wet rice was grown extensively as a subsistence crop throughout 
the colonial period. In the nineteenth century, most of it was con- 
sumed in the villages where it was grown, but in the final decades 
of British rule the internal market in rice expanded. Nonetheless, 
more than half of the rice consumed was imported, and the island 
depended on the proceeds of plantation crops for its food supply. 

The economy gradually became more diverse after the late 1950s, 
partly as a result of government policies that encouraged this trend. 
The main reason successive administrations tried to reduce the coun- 
try' s dependence on tea, rubber, and coconuts was the long-term 
decline in their value relative to the cost of imports. Even when Sri 
Lanka increased the production of its major cash crops, the amount 
of imports that could be bought with their proceeds declined. 

Much of the diversification of the economy, especially in the 1960s 
and the early 1970s, took the form of import substitution, produc- 
ing for the local market goods that the island could no longer afford 
to import. Sri Lanka also had some success in diversifying exports 
after 1970. The proportion of exports linked to the three traditional 
cash crops fell from over 90 percent in the late 1960s to 71 percent 
in 1974 and 42 percent in 1986. Textiles, which made up only 0.7 
percent of exports in 1974, accounted for over 28 percent in 1986 
(see table 5, Appendix A). 

In 1986 agriculture, forestry, and fishing made up 27.7 percent 
of the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary), down from 39.4 
percent in 1975 (see table 6, Appendix A). In 1986 wholesale and 
retail trade accounted for 19.9 percent of GNP, and manufactur- 
ing for 15.6 percent. Transport, storage, and communications stood 
at 11.2 percent of GNP, and construction at 7.7 percent. The rela- 
tive importance of the various sectors of the economy was fairly 
stable during the 1980s. 

Role of Government 

The role of government in the economy during the final decades 
of British colonial rule was considerable. The plantation economy 



121 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

required extensive infrastructure; the colonial state developed and 
owned railroad, electrical, postal, telegraphic, telephone, and water 
supply services. Quasi- state financial institutions served the colony's 
commercial needs, and during World War II the government set 
up production units for plywood, quinine, drugs, leather, coir, 
paper, ceramics, acetic acid, glass, and steel. Welfare policies also 
began during colonial rule, including a network for free and sub- 
sidized rice and flour established in 1942. Free education, relief 
for the poor, and subsidized medical care were introduced in the 
late British period. Moreover, after 1935 the government took an 
active role in the planning and subsidizing of colonization schemes. 
This policy was designed to remove landless peasants from heavily 
populated areas to newly irrigated tracts in the dry zone. 

Economic policy since independence is divided into two peri- 
ods. During the first, which lasted from 1948 to 1977, government 
intervention was often seen as the solution to economic problems. 
The expansion of government participation in the economy was 
fairly steady, resulting in a tightly regulated system. This trend 
was especially marked during the period of S.R.D. Bandaranaike's 
second government, from 1970 to 1977, when the state came to 
dominate international trade and payments; the plantation, finan- 
cial, and industrial manufacturing sectors; and the major trade 
unions outside the plantation sector. It also played a major role 
in the domestic wholesale and retail trade. 

The trend toward greater government involvement was largely 
a response to the deteriorating terms of trade. The plantation econ- 
omy had financed social programs such as subsidized food in the 
late colonial period, but when the value of exports declined after 
1957, the economy's capacity to support these programs was 
strained. When the foreign exchange reserves of the early 1950s 
dwindled, import-substituting industrialization was seen as a so- 
lution. Because the private sector viewed industrial development 
as risky, the government took up the slack. When balance of pay- 
ment deficits became chronic, some nationalizations were justified 
by the need to stem the drain of foreign exchange. Similar con- 
cerns led to the tighter regulation of private business and the es- 
tablishment of state-owned trading corporations. When there were 
shortages of necessities, governments expanded state control over 
their distribution in order to make them available at low prices. 

The 1977 elections were largely a referendum on the perceived 
failures of the closed economy. The UNP, which supported a 
deregulated, open economy, won decisively. The new government 
rejected the economic policies that had evolved over the previous 
twenty years. Some observers believed that the economy had been 



122 



Villagers and cart in rural Sri Lanka, circa 1910 
Courtesy Library of Congress 

shackled by excessive regulation, an excess of consumption expen- 
diture over investment, and wasteful state enterprises. Under the 
UNP, market forces were to play a greater role in allocating 
resources, and state enterprises were to compete with the private 
sector (see The United National Party Returns to Power, ch. 1). 

The main elements of the new policy were investment incen- 
tives for foreign and domestic capital, a shift in the composition 
of public spending from subsidies to infrastructure investment, and 
a liberalized international trade policy designed to encourage export- 
led growth. Employment creation was a central objective, both 
through encouragement of domestic and foreign capital investment, 
and through an ambitious public works program, including the 
Accelerated Mahaweli Program, which aimed to bring new land 
under irrigation and substantially increase hydroelectric generat- 
ing capacity (see Government Policies, this ch.). Two other poli- 
cies that sought to create employment were the establishment of 
investment promotion zones (free trade zones) and extensive 
government investment in housing. 

The role of government during the decade after 1977 remained 
significant; the public investment program, for instance, was im- 
plemented on a greater scale than anything attempted previously, 
and in early 1988 the state remained heavily involved in many areas 
of economic activity. But while the government increased its efforts 



123 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

to develop the nation's infrastructure, it reduced its role in regu- 
lation, commerce, and production. Its initiatives received the en- 
thusiastic support of the international development community. 
As a result, Sri Lanka received generous amounts of foreign aid 
to finance its post- 197 7 development program. This foreign as- 
sistance was integral to the government's economic strategy. Be- 
cause budget deficits were large even before 1977, external financial 
resources were necessary to pay for the increased spending on in- 
frastructure and to make up for the revenue lost as a result of the 
tax incentives given business. Similarly, relaxing import controls 
put pressure on the balance of payments, which could be relieved 
only with the help of foreign aid. 

Development Planning 

During the early years of independence, successive governments 
placed little emphasis on development planning, in part because 
the immediate economic problems appeared to be manageable. The 
National Planning Council was established in 1956 as part of the 
Ministry of Finance. Between 1957 and 1959, the council and the 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka invited a number of foreign economists 
to visit Sri Lanka and offer the government both their diagnoses 
of the country's economic problems and their prescriptions for the 
planning and implementation of recommended remedies. These 
studies provided many of the rationales for economic policies and 
planning in the 1960s. 

In 1959 the National Planning Council issued a Ten-Year Plan, 
the most ambitious analysis of the economy and projection of plan- 
ning that had yet been officially published. This plan sought to 
increase the role of industry in the economy. Unfortunately, its 
forecasts were based on faulty projections of population and labor 
force growth rates. Moreover, attempts to implement it collided 
with the exchange and price crunch of 1961 and 1962, and the plan 
became increasingly out of touch with the changing economic sit- 
uation. 

A new Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs (no longer 
in existence) was established in 1965. The ministry decided not 
to draft another single long-term plan involving a five- or ten-year 
period. Instead, it drew up a number of separate, detailed, well- 
integrated, five-year plans involving different ministries. The 
government targeted agriculture, especially wet rice, as the area 
in which growth could best be achieved. 

The UNP government that came to power in 1970 shifted toward 
a more formal and comprehensive state direction of the economy. 
The Five-Year Plan for 1972-76 had two principal aspects. First, 



124 



The Economy 



it sought to remove disparities in incomes and living standards. 
Second, the plan sought to promote economic growth and to reduce 
unemployment. It envisioned rapid growth in agriculture, not only 
in the traditional crops of wet rice, tea, rubber, and coconut, but 
in such minor crops as sunflower, manioc, cotton, cashew, pine- 
apple, and cocoa. Like the Ten-Year Plan of 1959, this plan proved 
to be based on overly optimistic assumptions, and it soon ceased 
to exercise influence on the government's economic policy. In 1975 
it was replaced by a Two-Year Plan that placed even greater em- 
phasis on agricultural growth and less on industrial development. 

After 1977 the government continued to accept the principle of 
state direction of economic activity, but in contrast to the 1970-77 
period the government encouraged the private sector to partici- 
pate in the economy. Its first Five-Year Plan (1978-83) included 
an ambitious public investment program to be financed largely by 
overseas grants and loans. Its immediate objective was to reduce 
unemployment, which had risen during the tenure of the previous 
government. 

A series of five-year rolling investment plans was set in motion 
by the Ministry of Finance and Planning in the 1980s. The plan 
for the 1986-90 period envisaged investment of Rs268 billion (for 
value of the rupee — see Glossary) with the emphasis on infrastruc- 
ture projects such as roads, irrigation, ports, airports, telecommu- 
nications, and plantations. Of this total, 50 percent was to be spent 
by the state sector. Foreign sources were to supply Rs69 billion. 
The target annual average growth for the gross domestic product 
(GDP — see Glossary) was 4.5 percent, a decrease from the 5.2 per- 
cent envisaged by the plan for the 1985-89 period and the 6 per- 
cent actually achieved between 1977 and 1984. 

The Economy in the Late 1980s 

Growth in GDP was estimated at 3 percent in 1987, down from 
4.3 percent in 1986, and the lowest level in a decade (see table 7, 
Appendix A). By 1987 it was clear that the ongoing civil unrest 
was causing serious economic difficulties, mainly because rapidly 
increasing defense outlays forced the government to cut back cap- 
ital expenditure and to run a large budgetary deficit. Concern over 
the decline in foreign investment and extensive damage to infra- 
structure mounted as sectors such as tourism, transportation, and 
wet rice farming suffered production losses directly related to the 
decline in security. 

By early 1988, the ethnic conflict had resulted in extensive 
property damage. Infrastructure damage in Northern and Eastern 
provinces was estimated at Rs7.5 billion in August 1987 and was 



125 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

expected to be revised upwards to include the widespread destruc- 
tion in the Jaffna Peninsula (see fig. 1). In the predominantly Sin- 
halese areas, riots against the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord caused 
damage to government property estimated at Rs4.8 billion (see For- 
eign Relations, ch. 4). 

In early 1988, future economic prospects were closely linked to 
the security situation (see Primary Threats to National Security, 
ch. 5). Late the previous year, the government succeeded in ob- 
taining commitments from foreign nations and international 
organizations to finance an extensive reconstruction program for 
the 1988-90 period (see Foreign Aid, this ch.). If there were a 
pronounced ebb in the political violence plaguing the island na- 
tion, it would be probable that the official target of Rs80 billion 
foreign aid over this three-year period would be reached. Aid on 
this scale, which would be a substantial increase on the already 
generous levels received, would not only enable the rebuilding of 
infrastructure destroyed by the violence but also fuel growth and 
allow the large trade and budget deficits to continue. Accordingly, 
the 1988 budget foresaw a sharp decline in defense spending and 
an increase in capital expenditure. These economic plans, however, 
depended on a peaceful solution to the country's political problems. 
If political violence escalated in subsequent years, not only would 
the government have to shift its spending back to defense, but some 
of the expected foreign aid probably would be suspended, 

Agriculture 

Agriculture — including forestry and fishing — accounted for over 
46 percent of exports, over 40 percent of the labor force, and around 
28 percent of the GNP in 1986. The dominant crops were paddy, 
tea, rubber, and coconut. In the late 1980s, the government- 
sponsored Accelerated Mahaweli Program irrigation project opened 
a large amount of new land for paddy cultivation in the dry zone 
of the eastern part of the island (see fig. 7). In contrast, the amount 
of land devoted to tea, coconut, and rubber remained stable in the 
forty years after independence. Land reforms implemented in the 
1970s affected mainly these three crops. Little land was distributed 
to small farmers; instead it was assumed by various government 
agencies. As a result, most tea and a substantial proportion of rubber 
production was placed under direct state control. 

Changing Patterns 

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, agriculture has been 
dominated by the four principal crops: rice, tea, rubber, and coco- 
nut. Most tea and rubber were exported, whereas almost all rice 



126 



The Economy 



was for internal use. The coconut crop was sold on both domestic 
and international markets. The importance of other crops increased 
in the 1970s and 1980s, but no single crop emerged to challenge 
the four traditional mainstays. 

Tea, rubber, and to a lesser extent, coconut are grown on plan- 
tations established in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Before the plantations existed, villagers carried out three main types 
of cultivation. The valley bottoms and lowlands were occupied by 
rice paddies. These paddies were surrounded by a belt of residen- 
tial gardens permanently cultivated with fruit trees and vegetables. 
The gardens in turn were surrounded by forests, parts of which 
were temporarily cleared for slash-and-burn cultivation, known as 
chena (see Glossary). Various grains and vegetables were grown on 
chena lands. The forests were also used for hunting, grazing for vil- 
lage cattle, gathering wild fruit, and timber. In some villages, es- 
pecially in the dry zone, there was little rice cultivation, and people 
depended on the gardens and forests for their livelihood (see Land 
Use and Settlement Patterns, ch. 2). 

Under legislation passed in 1840, the title of most forestland was 
vested in the government. In order to stimulate the production of 
export crops, the colonial administration sold large tracts to per- 
sons who wished to develop plantations. At first most buyers were 
British, but by the end of the nineteenth century many middle- 
class Sri Lankans had also acquired crown land and converted it 
to plantation use. The early coffee and tea plantations were often 
situated at high elevations, some distance from the nearest Sinha- 
lese villages, but as time went on more estates were developed on 
land contiguous to villages. The precise impact of the plantations 
on village society remains controversial, but it is widely believed 
in Sri Lanka that the standard of living of villagers suffered as they 
lost use of the forestland. 

Although the large coffee, tea, and rubber plantations relied 
mainly on Tamil migrants from southern India for their perma- 
nent labor supply, Sinhalese villagers were employed in the initial 
clearing of the forests, and some performed casual daily labor on 
the plantations in seasons when there was little work in the villages. 
The coconut plantations, being spatially closer to villages, employed 
considerable Sinhalese labor. 

By the early twentieth century, there was no longer much land 
suitable for the expansion of cultivation in the wet zone, and in the 
1930s the focus of agricultural development shifted from the wet zone 
to the dry zone and from plantation crops to rice. There was ample 
uncultivated land in the dry zone of the north-central region, but 
three major obstacles had to be overcome — the prevalence of malaria, 



127 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 




Source: Based on information from Asoka Bandarage, "Women and Capitalist Develop- 
ment in Sri Lanka, 1977-87," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 20, April-June 
1988, 58; and Abhaya Attanayake, et al., Mahaweli Saga: Challenge and Response, 
Colombo, 1985, 55. 



Figure 7. Accelerated Mahaweli Program, 1988 

the lack of a reliable supply of water to carry out rice cultivation, 
and the absence of farmers to cultivate the soil. The first of these 
problems was solved by the success of the antimalarial campaigns 
of the 1940s. The others were tackled by government policies that 
sought to restore and build irrigation works and resettle peasants 
from the wet zone in the newly irrigated areas. In the 1980s, the 
pace of this program was quickened by the Accelerated Mahaweli 
Program (see Government Policies, this ch.). 

The most important change in agriculture in the forty years after 
independence was the increase in rice production. This increase 
resulted from better yields and the enlarged amount of land under 
cultivation. In contrast, with the exception of rubber in the 1950s 



128 



The Economy 



and 1960s, the principal export crops showed only modest gains 
in productivity, and the amount of land devoted to tea and rubber 
fell. After around 1970, there was growth in the production of other 
crops, including onions, chilies, sugar, soybeans, cinnamon, carda- 
mom, pepper, cloves, and nutmeg. 

Fishing, a traditional industry in coastal waters, accounted for 
2.1 percent of GNP in 1986. Government efforts to offer incen- 
tives for modernization had little impact. The civil disturbances 
of the 1980s badly affected the industry. Before 1983 the northern 
region produced nearly 25 percent of the fish catch and around 
55 percent of cured fish, but in the mid-1980s fishing was not pos- 
sible there for long periods. The value of the fish catch off the north- 
ern coast fell from Rs495 million in 1981 to Rs52 million in 1986. 
Production off the southern and western coasts and from inland 
fisheries grew during this period, but not enough to prevent a 
decline in the island's total catch. In 1987 the government an- 
nounced plans to provide funds for investment in fishing in the 
North and East, but implementation was likely to depend on im- 
proved security in these areas. 

Land Use 

Although there have been periodic agricultural censuses, they 
were limited in purpose and did not provide an overall picture of 
land use. In 1961 , however, a survey of the use of the island's phys- 
ical resources was compiled based on a 1956 aerial photographic 
survey of the entire country. The survey indicated that, of the coun- 
try's total area of nearly 66 million hectares, 29 percent was under 
permanent cultivation, just over 15 percent under chena cultiva- 
tion, 44 percent under forest cover, and about 6 percent under var- 
ious types of grasses. Nearly 33,000 hectares consisted of swamp 
and marshlands, and about 63,000 hectares, or 1 percent, unused 
land. Just over 3 percent of the island's surface was covered by 
water. Of the total area, approximately 23 percent was in the wet 
zone, about 63 percent in the dry zone, and the balance lay in an 
area that the survey labeled "intermediate," as it had characteris- 
tics of both zones. 

Of the land under permanent cultivation in 1961 , which included 
cropland, land under plantation, and homestead gardens, the sur- 
vey indicated that some 75 percent was in the wet and intermedi- 
ate zones and about 25 percent was in the dry zone. Chena 
cultivation, on the other hand, was predominantly in the dry zone, 
as were the grass, scrub, and forestlands. Although forest covered 
almost half the country, only about 0.2 percent and 3.1 percent 
of the forests were characterized as of high and intermediate yield, 



129 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

respectively. The study further indicated that approximately 70 per- 
cent of the land in the wet zone was under permanent cultivation, 
whereas in the dry zone under 12 percent was being cultivated on 
a permanent basis. 

Since 1961 irrigation has enabled a much greater proportion of 
land in the dry zone to be cultivated and in 1978 it was estimated 
that nearly one-third of the country's dry-zone area was under per- 
manent cultivation (see fig. 8). This proportion increased in the 
1980s, when lands irrigated by the Accelerated Mahaweli Program 
were added to the total. As a result, the proportion of forestland 
declined and was estimated at just under 40 percent in 1987. 

Although the forests had few high-yield timber stands, many areas 
suffered from deforestation because of the heavy demand for fire- 
wood in the 1980s. In 1987 it was estimated that 94 percent of house- 
holds used firewood for cooking. Scarcities of firewood led to price 
increases well above the general level of inflation in the 1980s. 

Government Policies 

Government support for farmers takes several forms, including 
the provision of credit for producers, the setting of minimum prices 
for agricultural produce, the building of irrigation works, and the 
encouragement of internal migration to newly irrigated areas. Since 
the late colonial period, the government has played a growing role 
in the provision of credit to smallholders on favorable terms. Until 
1986 the main instrument of this policy was the subvention of 
cooperative societies. Agricultural credit took three forms: short- 
term loans to farmers for the purchase of seeds and fertilizers; 
medium-term loans, intended for the purchase of machinery; and 
long-term loans for capital expenditure on storage, transport, and 
rice-milling apparatus. The long-term loans were not available for 
individual farmers, but were used by the cooperative societies to 
acquire infrastructural facilities. 

The actual performance of credit provision through cooperatives 
generally fell short of expectations. Institutional credit did not dis- 
place the older sources of credit, such as the village moneylender, 
friends, and relatives. The inability to repay loans, procedural 
difficulties, and the existence of unpaid loans already taken from 
the cooperatives were some reasons given by farmers for prefer- 
ring noninstitutional credit sources. Another problem with the credit 
furnished by cooperatives was the high rate of default. This rate 
may have been attributable partly to real difficulties in repayment, 
but it also was the result of a widely held impression that govern- 
ment loans were a form of social welfare and that it was not neces- 
sary to repay them. 



130 



The Economy 



The New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme implemented 
in 1986 sought to increase the flow of credit to smallholders. The 
Central Bank guaranteed up to 50 percent of each loan in the event 
of losses incurred by banks lending under the program, and eligi- 
ble farmers received a line of credit for three years. Loans were 
automatically rescheduled at concessional rates when crops were 
damaged by events beyond the farmer's control. In 1986 cultiva- 
tion loans under this program amounted to nearly Rs257 million, 
about 74 percent for paddy and the rest for other food crops. 

Another important policy was the Guaranteed Price Scheme, 
which came into effect in 1942. Under this program the govern- 
ment agreed to purchase rice and some other produce at set prices. 
The intention was to support the farmer's standard of living. For 
a period in the early 1970s, when the island was threatened by food 
shortages, the government ordered peasants to market all of their 
rice through this scheme and at times set the price at a level lower 
than that of the free market. This policy had the effect of reducing 
the incentive to grow rice. The program lost some of its impetus 
in the 1980s. In 1986 the government set the price below the free- 
market rate for most of the year. As a result of the policy, pur- 
chases under the program accounted for only about 6 percent of 
the rice crop, mostly from districts where private traders were un- 
willing to operate because of the poor security situation. 

Since the 1930s, governments have promoted irrigation works 
and colonization projects in the dry zone in an attempt to increase 
rice production and reduce land pressure and unemployment in 
the more densely settled wet zone. The lack of infrastructure and 
the prevalence of malaria hampered these programs in the early 
years. After the near eradication of malaria, increased government 
investment in infrastructure and enhanced financial support for 
migrants made the new lands more desirable. Between 1946 and 
1971, the proportion of the population living in the dry zone in- 
creased from 12 to 19 percent (see Population, ch. 2). 

At the end of 1968, about 352,000 hectares were under irriga- 
tion for rice cultivation; some 178,000 hectares under major storage 
reservoirs and barrages, and approximately 174,000 hectares in 
minor irrigation projects. In the 1970s and 1980s, governments 
pursued major irrigation programs, most notably the Mahaweli 
Ganga Program, which was lent added impetus and became the 
Accelerated Mahaweli Program in 1978. The increasing size of the 
Mahaweli project dwarfed its earlier endeavors. According to the 
plan, approximately 593,000 hectares of previously arid land would 
be brought under irrigation by 1992. In 1986 some 76,000 hec- 
tares of new land were under cultivation as a result of this project. 



131 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 




Figure 8. Agriculture and Land Use, 1988 



132 



The Economy 



Other long-standing government policies designed to help farmers 
included subsidies for fertilizer, seed paddy, and other inputs. 
Government efforts also partly contributed to the adoption of im- 
proved cultivation practices and high-yielding seed varieties in pad- 
dy farming in the 1960s. 

Land Tenure 

Modern land tenure policy dates from the Land Development 
Ordinance of 1935, which forbade the transfer of crown lands for 
purposes of cultivation except to enlarge the landholdings of near- 
landless or landless peasants. The intent of this ordinance was to 
help small farmers whose livelihood was seen to be at risk from 
the exploitation of rich peasants and urban landowners. 

In 1958 the Paddy Lands Bill was enacted, mainly to benefit 
the tenant farmers of some 160,000 hectares of paddy land. The 
bill purported to assist tenants to purchase the land they worked, 
to protect them against eviction, and to establish a rent ceiling at 
around 25 percent of the crop. It also established cultivation com- 
mittees, composed of rice farmers, to assume general responsibil- 
ity for rice cultivation in their respective areas, including the 
direction and control of minor irrigation projects. Shortcomings 
in the law and official indifference in enforcing the act hampered 
its effectiveness, and many observers termed it a failure. In some 
regions tenants who tried to pay the lower, official rents were suc- 
cessfully evicted by landlords, and the old rents, often about 50 
percent of the produce, remained in force. In the 1980s, however, 
the rent ceiling of 25 percent was effective in most districts. 

The Land Reform Law of 1972 imposed a ceiling of twenty hect- 
ares on privately owned land and sought to distribute lands in ex- 
cess of the ceiling for the benefit of landless peasants. Because both 
land owned by public companies and paddy lands under ten hect- 
ares in extent were exempted from the ceiling, a considerable area 
that would otherwise have been available for distribution did not 
come under the purview of the legislation. Between 1972 and 1974, 
the Land Reform Commission took over nearly 228,000 hectares, 
one-third of which was forest and most of the rest planted with tea, 
rubber, or coconut. Few rice paddies were affected because nearly 
95 percent of them were below the ceiling limit. Very little of the 
land acquired by the government was transferred to individuals. 
Most was turned over to various government agencies or to cooper- 
ative organizations, such as the Up-Country Co-operative Estates 
Development Board. 

The Land Reform Law of 1972 applied only to holdings of in- 
dividuals. It left untouched the plantations owned by joint-stock 



133 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

companies, many of them British. In 1975 the Land Reform 
(Amendment) Law brought these estates under state control. Over 
169,000 hectares comprising 395 estates were taken over under this 
legislation. Most of this land was planted with tea and rubber. As 
a result, about two-thirds of land cultivated with tea was placed 
in the state sector. The respective proportions for rubber and coco- 
nut were 32 and 10 percent. The government paid some compen- 
sation to the owners of land taken over under both the 1972 and 
1975 laws. In early 1988, the state-owned plantations were managed 
by one of two types of entities, the Janatha Estates Development 
Board, or the Sri Lanka State Plantation Corporation. 

Cropping Pattern 

Rice cultivation has increased markedly since independence, 
although in the late 1980s yields remained well below those of the 
major rice-producing countries. Much of the improvement came 
in the late 1970s and 1980s. Rice remained a smallholder's crop, 
and production techniques varied according to region. In some vil- 
lages, it was still sown by hand, with harvesting and threshing often 
engaging the entire family, plus all available friends and relatives. 

Because no completely perennial sources of water exist, there 
was uncertainty regarding the adequacy of the supply each year. 
In the wet zone, flooding and waterlogging was experienced in the 
1980s, whereas in the dry zone even the irrigated areas were sub- 
ject to the possibility of insufficient water. In the mid- and up- 
country wet zone areas, most fields were sown twice a year in the 
1980s; in the dry zone most holdings were sown only once; and 
in the low-country wet zone the amount of flooding or waterlog- 
ging determined whether to plant once or twice. The maha (greater 
monsoon — see Glossary) crops are sown between August and 
October and harvested five or six months later; the yala (lesser 
monsoon — see Glossary) crops sown between April and May and 
harvested about four or five months later. 

Despite some increases in productivity, rice output was disap- 
pointing in the 1960s and early 1970s. Greater incentives to farm- 
ers after 1977 contributed to increases in production. Both the area 
under cultivation and the yield increased steadily between 1980 
and 1985, when annual output reached 2.7 million tons, compared 
to an annual output of around 1.4 million tons in the early 1970s. 
In 1986 unfavorable weather and security difficulties led to a slight 
decline in production. A severe drought affected the crop in 1987, 
when output was estimated at only 2.1 million tons. 

Tea is Sri Lanka's largest export crop. Only China and India 
produce more tea. The plants, originally imported from Assam in 



134 




Gemstone prospector near Ratnapura 
Courtesy Paige W. Thompson 

India, are grown in the wet zone at low, middle, and high alti- 
tudes, and produce a high-grade black tea. The higher altitudes 
produce the best tea, and terracing is used to eke out the limited 
area of upper altitude land. Tea cultivation is meticulous and time 
consuming, requiring the constant and skilled attention of two or 
three workers per hectare. Because of this requirement, tea is most 



135 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

efficiently grown on estates, based on large capital investment and 
having a highly organized and disciplined management and labor 
supply. 

Because working and living on estates was not attractive to Sin- 
halese peasants, the labor supply for the tea industry from its in- 
ception was provided by Indian Tamil immigrants who lived on 
the estates. Since independence the number of Sinhalese workers 
has increased, but in the late 1980s Tamils still dominated this sector 
(see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). 

The performance of the tea industry was disappointing in the 
1970s and early 1980s, because of poor producer prices and low 
productivity. Tea production was 211 million kilograms in 1986, 
down from 220 million kilograms in 1969. The fundamental 
problem of the tea estates was the advanced age of the tea bushes. 
In 1987 their average age was around sixty years and only 15 per- 
cent of the total area under tea had been replanted with high- 
yielding varieties. Replanting had been neglected in the 1960s and 
1970s partly because low tea prices and high export duties meant 
that profit margins were not high enough to make it a profitable 
enterprise. Between 1972 and 1974, the growing risk of nationali- 
zation also discouraged investment. 

Rubber continues to be an important export crop in the late 
1980s. It thrives under plantation conditions in the wet zone, 
although a significant proportion of the crop is produced by small- 
holders. Although rubber yields improved greatly in the first twenty 
years after independence, both the output and area planted with 
rubber declined in the 1980s. Output fell from 156 million kilo- 
grams in 1978 to 125 million kilograms in 1982. Improved prices 
caused production levels to recover to about 138 million kilograms 
in 1986. 

Despite the importance of rubber, a large number of rubber plan- 
tations suffer from old age and neglect. The government offered 
incentives to encourage replanting and improve maintenance proce- 
dures. Nevertheless, the area replanted in 1986 was 12 percent less 
than in 1985. This drop in replanting resulted from a shortage of 
seeds and the reluctance of farmers to retire land from production 
at a time of relatively attractive prices. In early 1988, however, 
the short- and medium-term outlook for world rubber prices was 
considered good. 

Most of the coconut production was sold in the domestic mar- 
ket, which consumed about 1 .4 billion nuts in the mid-1980s. Most 
of the rest of the crop, usually between 2 billion and 3 billion nuts, 
was exported as copra, coconut oil, and desiccated coconut. Local 
uses for coconut include timber for construction, leaves for thatch 



136 



The Economy 



and siding, coir for rope and rough textiles, and toddy and arrack 
for alcoholic beverages. 

Coconut output fluctuates depending on weather conditions, fer- 
tilizer application, and producer prices. In the 1980s, smallholders 
dominated its production, which was concentrated in Colombo and 
Kurunegala districts and around the city of Chilaw in Puttalam 
District. Because of a drought in 1983, production suffered a set- 
back during 1984 and fell to 1.9 billion nuts, its lowest level since 
1977. The recovery during 1985 was impressive, leading to the 
record production of almost 3 billion nuts. This level was itself sur- 
passed in 1986, when production rose a further 3 percent. But the 
average export price fell by 45 percent in 1985 and by 56 percent 
in 1986. In 1986 the farm gate price probably fell below the cost 
of production, and in early 1988 it appeared that fluctuations in 
the world price of coconut products would remain a problem for 
the foreseeable future. The 1987 drought was expected to reduce 
coconut production by at least 20 percent in both 1987 and 1988. 
Like tea and rubber, the coconut sector suffered from inadequate 
replanting. Consequently, a large proportion of the trees were old 
and past optimum productivity levels. 

The importance of crops other than tea, rubber, and coconut in- 
creased after 1970, and in 1986 they accounted for around 51 per- 
cent of agricultural output. There was a substantial increase in minor 
food crops, including soybeans, chilies, and onions, all of which are 
grown as subsidiary crops on land irrigated by the Mahaweli project. 
In the 1960s and earlier, vegetables were imported from India in 
large quantities, but in the 1980s the island's import requirements 
were much smaller. Spices, including cloves, nutmeg, cardamom, 
and pepper, also registered large gains in the 1970s and 1980s. A 
large proportion of the spice output was being exported in the 1980s. 
Other crops of importance included corn, millet, sweet potatoes, 
cassava, dry beans, sesame seed, and tobacco. A wide variety of 
tropical fruits, including mangoes, pineapples, plantains, and 
papayas, also were grown; most were consumed in the domestic mar- 
ket. Sugar output increased in the early 1980s, although in 1986 
it still accounted for only 11 percent of the domestic consumption. 
The expansion in sugar took place despite the problems of the state- 
run sugar mills and their associated sugar lands in Eastern Province, 
which have been disrupted by civil strife. Two new mills in Western 
Province accounted for the increase in production, and in early 1988 
the outlook for further expansion was good. 

Industry 

Industry, including manufacturing, mining, energy, transpor- 
tation, and construction, accounted for around 38 percent of GNP 



137 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

in 1986. The most important products included refined oil, tex- 
tiles, gems, and processed agricultural products. Construction and 
tourism both grew rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but 
contracted after the onset of ethnic violence in 1983. State-owned 
corporations accounted for over 50 percent of total industrial out- 
put. An investment promotion zone was established in 1979 with 
the goal of attracting foreign capital; textile factories accounted for 
a large proportion of investment there in its early years. The is- 
land's electricity supply was mainly fueled by hydropower (see 
Energy, this ch.). 

Changing Patterns 

Sri Lanka developed little industry under British rule, relying 
instead on the proceeds from agricultural exports to buy manufac- 
tured goods from other countries. Most industry during the colonial 
period involved processing the principal export commodities: tea, 
rubber, and coconut. Although these sectors remained important, 
in the 1980s there was a much greater variety of industrial estab- 
lishments, including a steel mill, an oil refinery, and textile factories. 

Industrial diversification began in the 1960s with the produc- 
tion of consumer goods for the domestic market. This trend was 
a consequence of government measures aimed at saving foreign 
exchange, which made it difficult to import many items that had 
previously been obtained from overseas. Heavy industries were es- 
tablished in the late 1960s, mostly in the state sector. During the 
1970-77 period the state assumed an even greater role in manufac- 
turing, but after the economic reforms of 1977 the government at- 
tempted to improve prospects for the private sector. The fastest 
growing individual sector in the 1980s was textiles, which made 
up approximately 29 percent of industrial production in 1986. The 
textiles, clothing, and leather products sector became the largest 
foreign exchange earner in 1986. Over 80 percent of the manufac- 
turing capacity was concentrated in Western Province, particularly 
in and around Colombo. 

Industrial Policies 

The enactment of the State Industrial Corporations Act of 1957 
provided for the reconstitution of existing state enterprises as well 
as the establishment of new corporations to promote the develop- 
ment of large-scale and basic industries. The period 1958 to 1963 
witnessed the first phase in the rapid growth of state industrial cor- 
porations. By 1963 fourteen such corporations were engaged in such 
fields as textiles, cement, sugar, paper, chemicals, edible oils and 
fats, ceramics, mineral sands, plywood, and leather. By 1974 there 



138 



A rubber tapper's child 

Courtesy \ 
Paige W. Thompson '£ 



were twenty-five state corporations, including such major under- 
takings as a steel mill and an oil refinery. 

Despite the 1977 policy shift in favor of the private sector, in 
early 1988 government-controlled enterprises continued to play a 
major role in industry. State-owned corporations accounted for 
nearly 60 percent of total industrial output. The most important 
public company was the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, which ac- 
counted for about 55 percent of all public-sector production. 

From the beginning, many industrial corporations in the state 
sector were troubled by such problems as management inefficiency, 
technical deficiencies in planning, overstaffing, and defective pricing 
policies. These difficulties contributed in many undertakings to poor 
economic results. Moreover, public sector enterprises were asso- 
ciated with objectives that reflected both growth and welfare con- 
siderations for the economy as a whole. They became the chief 
instruments furthering state ownership and social control in the 
economy, and they were expected to promote capital formation and 
long-term development. At times they were also looked upon chiefly 
as major sources of employment and enterprises providing goods 
and services to the public at relatively low prices. As a result, a 
number of the state industrial corporations have lost money. In 
1987 the debts of state-owned corporations were Rsl9 billion, of 
which Rsl5 billion were owed to foreign sources and Rs4 billion 
to the two state-owned banks. 



139 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

The liberalization of the economy in 1977 was largely prompted 
by the perceived inefficiency of the public sector, not by any ideo- 
logical commitment to free enterprise. As a result, the government 
let private enterprise compete with the state corporations but took 
few steps to dismantle the state sector. Instead, it attempted to im- 
prove its efficiency. One major state venture, the National Milk 
Board, was dissolved in 1986, however. It had been established 
in 1953, but had never succeeded in developing the milk industry. 
In 1987 it was reported that consideration was being given to trans- 
ferring to private control several state-run industrial enterprises. 
These included the four government textile mills, the State Dis- 
tilleries Corporation, the National Paper Corporation, the Mineral 
Sands Corporation, Paranthan Chemicals, Sri Lanka Tyre, and 
Union Motors. In early 1988, however, doubts remained about 
the extent of the government's commitment to this program. 
Although the plan to sell the textile mills was expected to be im- 
plemented within two years, some of the government's economic 
advisers reportedly were urging the government to proceed cau- 
tiously in its privatization policy, in view of the limited capital mar- 
kets, the concentration of private wealth, and the weak regulatory 
framework. 

Manufacturing 

The share of manufacturing in the economy declined from 21 
to 15 percent of GDP between 1977 and 1986. This fall is some- 
what misleading because it resulted in large part from the rapid 
growth in the service sector and the decline in output of the state- 
owned Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. The latter accounted for 
as much as one-third of the value of manufactured goods in some 
years and thus strongly affected aggregate manufacturing statis- 
tics. These statistics fluctuated along with changes in the value of 
the output of the oil refinery, which in turn varied with oil price 
levels and the extent of plant closings for maintenance. Some 
manufacturing sectors grew rapidly during this period. 

Manufacturing was dominated for most of the twentieth cen- 
tury by the processing of agricultural produce for both the export 
and domestic markets. The most important industries were engaged 
in preparing and packaging for outside markets the principal ex- 
port commodities — tea, rubber, and coconuts — for which Sri Lanka 
is noted. Such preparation generally involved low technology, com- 
paratively modest capital investment on machinery, and uncom- 
plicated, sequential procedures. Tea leaves, for example, follow 
a four-part process of withering, rolling (to extract bitter juices), 



140 



The Economy 



fermentation, and heating (or roasting), before being packed in 
chests for export. 

The processing of coconut and of rubber also were important 
industries, although their ratio in proportion to all manufacturing 
fell in the 1970s and early 1980s. The processing of the latter two 
commercial crops generally involved refining the basic commodi- 
ties into a range of semi-finished products to be used in manufac- 
turing finished goods at home or abroad. Coconuts, for example, 
are transformed into copra, desiccated coconut, coconut oil, fiber, 
poonac (a meal extract), and toddy. Copra and desiccated coconut 
are used as oils or as ingredients in food such as margarine; coco- 
nut oil is used to make soap; coconut fibers such as coir are used 
to make yarn, rope, or fishnets, while poonac is used as food for 
livestock. The coconut palm flower is also used in the production 
of alcoholic beverages. 

Rubber is also processed in various ways, including latex or scrap 
crepe and ribbed or smoked sheet, which together account for much 
of Sri Lanka's export of this commodity. Processing methods for 
rubber are outdated, however, and Western consumer countries 
have protested against the hardness, high moisture content, and 
inconsistent quality of the Sri Lankan product. 

Manufacturing received a boost in the early 1960s when import 
controls, which were the result of shortages in foreign exchange, 
made it difficult for consumers to obtain or afford foreign products. 
The result was a protected and profitable ready-made home market. 
This situation led to an expansion of both private-and public-sector 
manufacturing, with the private sector concentrating on consumer 
goods. These new enterprises, however, depended heavily on im- 
ported raw materials, and when the country's balance of payments 
difficulties became even more serious in the early 1970s, industry 
suffered from the lack of foreign exchange. In 1974 it was estimated 
that only 40 percent of the capacity of the industrial sector was used. 
After the 1977 liberalization, raw materials were more freely 
available, and in 1986 capacity utilization was estimated at 78 
percent. 

In 1978 the government established the Greater Colombo Eco- 
nomic Commission primarily to serve as the authority for the free 
trade zones to be set up near the capital. The first investment pro- 
motion zone consisted of a large tract that was established in 1979 
at Katunayaka, near the Bandaranaike International Airport. A 
second zone was inaugurated in 1986 at Biyagama, in Colombo 
District. Foreign companies that built factories in the zones received 
generous tax concessions. The commission succeeded in attract- 
ing some foreign investment, especially from Hong Kong and other 



141 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Asian countries. At the end of 1985, a total of 1 19 enterprises had 
signed agreements with the commission, but only 7 were signed 
in 1986, when there were 72 units in production. The total num- 
ber of people employed was nearly 42,000. Gross export earnings 
from the investment promotion zones in 1986 were around Rs5.5 
billion, up 43 percent from 1985. Foreign investments outside the 
free trade zones were coordinated by the Foreign Investment 
Advisory Committee. 

The principal change in manufacturing in the 1 980s was the rapid 
growth of the textile sector, from 10.5 percent of output in 1980 
to 29.2 percent in 1986 (see table 8, Appendix A). In the mid-1980s, 
the government was attempting to diversify foreign investment away 
from textiles. Most textile factories were located in the investment 
promotion zones (see fig. 9). 

During the July 1983 riots, 152 factories were destroyed, but 
there was little long-term effect. Some observers expressed the view 
that the equipment destroyed was inefficient, and that moderni- 
zation was long overdue. 

Construction 

Total expenditure for construction was estimated at 7.7 percent 
of GDP in 1986. The sector was given a boost by the ambitious 
public investment program of the government that came to power 
in 1977. Between 1977 and 1980, construction expanded at an an- 
nual rate of 20 percent in real terms. It stagnated in the 1980s as 
the number of new projects dwindled and the early ones were com- 
pleted. 

The largest construction project of the post- 1977 period was the 
Mahaweli irrigation program. Conceived in the 1960s as the 
Mahaweli Ganga Program, the project originally was expected to 
bring approximately 364,000 additional hectares of land under irri- 
gation and to provide an extra 540 megawatts of hydroelectric power 
to the national grid. Completion of the program was to require 
thirty years. Construction of the first two dams was completed in 
1977 and opened about 53,000 hectares of new land to irrigation 
in a general area south of the old capital of Anuradhapura in the 
dry zone. When the United National Party swept into power in 
1977, the project was given renewed impetus and renamed the 
Accelerated Mahaweli Program. Construction work was undertaken 
at five new sites between 1979 and 1982, with the intent of increas- 
ing the hectares under irrigation and generating an extra 450 
megawatts of hydroelectric power for the national grid. By the end 
of 1987, new dams and reservoirs had been completed at Kotmale, 
Randenigala, Maduru Oya, and Victoria. The operational power 



142 



The Economy 



stations at Randenigala and Victoria together generated 330 
megawatts of power, with an additional 147 megawatts expected 
when the Kotmale station came on line. All construction related 
to the Accelerated Mahaweli Program was scheduled for comple- 
tion by 1989. The total cost of the entire project was estimated at 
US$1.4 to 2 billion. 

The Urban Development Authority was established in 1978 to 
promote integrated planning and development of important urban 
locations. Its responsibilities have included the new parliamentary 
buildings and the reconstruction of St. John's fish market in 
Colombo. Total expenditure of the Urban Development Authority 
was Rs529 million in 1986, well under its annual budget in the 
early 1980s. The Million Houses Program was established in 1984 
to coordinate both public and private housing construction. In early 
1988 the government's policy was to subsidize private housing 
rather than undertake extensive public housing programs. 

Mining 

Mining is carried out in both the public and private sectors. The 
most valuable products are precious and semiprecious stones, in- 
cluding sapphires, rubies, cats' eyes, topaz, garnets, and moon- 
stones. Official exchange earnings from gems were negligible in 
the first two decades after independence because most of the out- 
put was smuggled out of the country. The setting up of a publicly 
owned State Gem Corporation in 1971 and export incentives for 
those exporting through legal channels brought a marked improve- 
ment. In 1986 legal exports were valued at Rs755 million, but many 
observers believed that a considerable quantity was still being ex- 
ported illegally. In the late 1980s, Japan remained the most im- 
portant market for Sri Lanka's gems. The Moors traditionally have 
played an important role in the industry (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). 

Graphite also is of commercial significance. Almost the entire 
output is exported as crude graphite (plumbago). Ilmenite, a min- 
eral sand used in the manufacture of paint and the fortification 
of metals, also is exported. Salt is produced by evaporation for the 
domestic market. Thorium deposits have been reported in 
Sabaragamuwa Province and in the beach sands of the northeast 
and southwest coasts. Exploration also has disclosed the presence 
of apatite (source of phosphate), dolomite (fertilizer component) 
and small pockets of economically extractable iron ore. 

Energy 

Over 70 percent of the island's total energy consumption was 
satisfied by firewood, agricultural residues, and animal waste, 



143 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



^Kankesanturai 




Galle 



National capital • Populated place 



MINING 



Graphite 
Mineral sand 
Iron ore 

Gem-bearing area 



ELECTRIC POWER 



Hydro 

Thermal 

Diesel 



(I Petroleu 
9 Steel mill 
& Cement 
§ Textiles 
& Mineral sands 



INDUSTRY 

refining •« Fish processing 
jfc Ship repair 



processing 



40 Kilometers 



Rairoad equipment 
and repair 

Plywood 

Tires 

Sawmill 



Figure 9. Industry, Mining, and Power, 1988 



144 



The Economy 



mostly for household use. The country had no coal or petroleum 
deposits, and the only other indigenous energy source was 
hydropower. 

In 1927 the Department of Government Electrical Undertak- 
ings, now called the Ceylon Electricity Board, took over the trans- 
mission of electricity throughout the country. Hydroelectric power 
came into use in 1951 with the commissioning of the Laksapana 
project in Central Province. Demand for power increased from ap- 
proximately 20 megawatts in 1951 to nearly 73 megawatts in 1963, 
about 90 percent of which was met from hydroelectric sources. In 
the 1970s, the island increasingly came to rely on imported oil for 
the generation of electricity, but new hydroelectric capacity from 
the Mahaweli project in the 1980s reduced the importance of oil. 
In 1986 total installed capacity was 1,010 megawatts, of which 74 
percent was from hydropower. 

In early 1988, it appeared that the Mahaweli project would solve 
Sri Lanka's electricity supply problem for the foreseeable future. 
This integrated power generation and irrigation project started con- 
tributing to power supplies in 1984 when the first two phases of 
the Victoria Dam were completed, adding 140 megawatts to in- 
stalled power capacity. In April 1985, the final stage of the Victoria 
Dam increased capacity by 70 megawatts. A slightly greater ca- 
pacity was expected to result in the late 1980s. 

United States and British-owned oil companies in Sri Lanka were 
nationalized in 1963, and since then the importing, refining, and 
distributing of all oil products has been the responsibility of the 
Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, the state oil company. Its oil 
refinery started production in 1969. The main products in 1986 
were fuel oil (559,497 tons), heavy diesel (60,995 tons), auto diesel 
(406,569 tons), kerosene (153,692 tons), and gasoline (123,089 
tons). 

Transportation 

In 1987 the road network extended 74,954 kilometers, of which 
25,504 were maintained by the Ministry of Highways and the re- 
mainder by local governments (see fig. 10). During 1984 the govern- 
ment embarked on a five-year road maintenance program at an 
estimated cost of Rs5 billion, to be financed by loans from the World 
Bank (see Glossary) and the Asian Development Bank, together 
with a grant from Japan. The total number of registered motor 
vehicles in 1986 was about 478,000. 

Road haulage is handled by private companies; some businesses 
also have their own trucking operations. After 1978 container trans- 
port became an important mode of freight haulage for exports 



145 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 




^ Kankesanturai 
<i/p Karainagar 



Mullaittivu 



Dhanushkodi 



Pulmoddai 



Trincomalee 



Anuradhapura 

Kalpitiya n 



N 

A 





National capital 




District capital 


• 


Populated place 




Road 


1 1 1 


Railroad 


+ 


Airport 


J, 


Major port 


20 


40 Kilometers 





20 40 Mites 




Matara 



Indian Ocean 



Figure 10. Transportation System, 1988 



146 



The Economy 



produced in the investment promotion zones. Intercity haulage is 
carried out by trucks. Bullock carts remained important in rural 
and suburban areas in the 1980s. 

The Ceylon Transport Board had the sole responsibility for 
providing public passenger road transport from 1957 to 1978. Fares 
were heavily subsidized, but overcrowding was severe. In 1978 pri- 
vate buses were again allowed to operate, and the Sri Lanka Trans- 
port Board and nine regional transport boards replaced the Ceylon 
Transport Board. The Sri Lanka Transport Board had responsi- 
bility for overall transport policy, budgeting, and production plan- 
ning, whereas the regional boards were responsible for the operation 
of regular regional and interregional bus services. In 1986 the 
revenue-cost ratio of the regional boards was 89 percent. Private 
road transport expanded rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
but as in the state sector, there was some contraction in the 
mid-1980s as a result of the declining security in the northern and 
eastern parts of the country. In 1986 the private sector accounted 
for about half of the passenger-kilometers. Many buses in both the 
state and private sectors were in poor condition. 

The island's first railroad line, from Colombo to Kandy, was 
opened in 1867, and in the 1980s Sri Lanka Railways had 1,944 
kilometers of railroad track. In early 1988, service in Northern and 
Eastern provinces had been irregular for several years. The net- 
work's passenger-kilometers amounted to 1.9 billion in 1986, about 
38 percent less than its total in 1982. Freight services, on the other 
hand, remained fairly steady in the mid-1980s. The railroads have 
been operated at a loss since independence. 

Three ports can accommodate deep water vessels: Colombo, 
Trincomalee, and Galle. Colombo was by far the most important. 
In 1985 it handled nearly 3 million tons of cargo compared with 
about 600,000 jointly handled by the other two ports. In 1986 the 
Ceylon Petroleum Corporation began a project to build a single- 
point buoy mooring 9.6 kilometers offshore from Colombo port. 
When completed, this project will greatly reduce the costs of dis- 
charging crude oil to the refinery near Colombo. 

In 1971 Sri Lanka launched its own merchant fleet. The state- 
owned Sri Lanka Shipping Corporation purchased its first vessel, 
a 14,000-ton freighter, in March 1971. By 1981 the corporation 
owned eight ships, including a 20,000 deadweight ton tanker. In 
1987 the firm began to replace its aging fleet. 

Colombo is a stopping place on international air routes between 
Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. The first stage of a redevelop- 
ment plan for the Bandaranaike International Airport at Katunaya- 
ka was completed in October 1986 with the opening of a new 



147 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

runway, built at a cost of Rs517 million. Some foreign airlines 
reduced or suspended services in the mid-1980s because of declin- 
ing traffic due to the security situation. 

Air Lanka, the nation's flag carrier, was established in 1980, 
and in early 1988 it connected Sri Lanka with Europe, the Middle 
East, and South and Southeast Asia. It was 60 percent government 
owned. In 1987 a presidential commission set up to inquire into 
the airline's financial affairs accused former members of the airline's 
board of subordinating the company's development to their pri- 
vate gain. Taking into account the realizable value of its assets and 
other costs associated with a forced sale, estimated cumulative losses 
up to the end of the fiscal year 1986 were Rs7.7 billion, or about 
Rsl.3 billion for each year of operation. In early 1988, a foreign 
airline was reportedly being sought to manage Air Lanka and turn 
it into a viable enterprise. 

Telecommunications 

In 1988 Sri Lanka's domestic and international telecommuni- 
cations services were operated by the Posts and Telecommunications 
Department, of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. 
Communications with most countries were available through tele- 
phone and telex services; an international direct dialing service was 
introduced in 1980 and by 1987 was in operation in most parts 
of the country. Advances in the telecommunications field, however, 
had not kept pace with the growth in the economic sector occur- 
ring since the 1970s. In the 1980s, the quality and availability of 
telecommunications services in Sri Lanka was average compared 
to other Asian countries, but poor compared to other parts of the 
world. With approximately 106,500 telephones in use in 1986, the 
telephone network was extremely overloaded, the exchanges nearing 
or exceeding capacity levels. Line congestion and long waiting lists 
for telephone connections were common. Telephone lines were con- 
centrated in urban areas, with over 60 percent located in the 
Colombo area, which houses only 5 percent of Sri Lanka's popu- 
lation. Direct dialing was available within Colombo and to some 
major towns, but operator assistance was necessary for other con- 
nections, which often led to long delays. 

The Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation operated radio services, 
and the Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation and the Independent 
Television Network operated television services in the 1980s. In 
1987 almost 700 hours of weekly radio programming were broad- 
cast domestically in Sinhala, Tamil, and English. Programs were 
transmitted internationally via a shortwave station at Ekala, and 
domestically through twenty-four medium-wave stations and FM 



148 



The Economy 



stations located in five cities throughout Sri Lanka (see table 9, 
Appendix A). Over 2 million radio sets were in use in the 
mid-1980s. Foreign service broadcasts to Asia, Europe, Africa, and 
the Middle East were transmitted from Ekala in eight languages 
(English, Hindi, Kannada, Malayalam, Nepali, Sinhala, Tamil, 
and Telugu). Independent foreign broadcasts transmitting programs 
from Sri Lanka included the Deutsche Welle station at Trincomalee, 
and Voice of America radio station at Colombo, and the religious 
stations of Trans- World Radio and Adventist Radio. 

Television transmissions began in 1979 and by 1986 there were 
some 350,000 receivers in place. Programs were broadcast over 
three channels in Sinhala, English, and Tamil for four hours daily 
via the main transmitter at Pidurutalagala, Nuwara Eliya District, 
and two relay stations at Kokkaville in northern Batticaloa Dis- 
trict and Kandy. The Independent Television Network broadcast 
over one channel from the station at Wickramasinghapura. 

International telecommunication services were provided mainly 
by the Padukka satellite station and the South East Asia-Middle 
East- Western Europe submarine cable system. The earth station, 
commissioned in 1975, continued to provide international telephone 
and television services via the Indian Ocean Region INTELSAT 
satellite. The submarine cable station located at Colombo was com- 
missioned in 1984. It extended from Singapore to France via six 
countries (Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
and Italy) and provided Sri Lanka with international telephone com- 
munications. 

Sri Lanka was planning to invest Rs2.5 billion in telecommuni- 
cations in the late 1980s. The advances were slated in the telephone 
network and other telecommunications services. 

Labor 

The formally employed population of Sri Lanka in the late 1980s 
was shifting gradually from agriculture to manufacturing, trade, 
and service employment. Nevertheless, over 40 percent of the work 
force remained agricultural in early 1988; most of these workers 
were smallholders, tenants, and plantation workers. The labor force 
growing most rapidly in the early and mid-1980s was in the ser- 
vice sector. 

Characteristics and Occupational Distribution 

A precise breakdown of the labor force and movement within 
it was not possible in the late 1980s because the official statis- 
tics were not reliable. Early censuses, taken when the island was 
a British colony, compiled long lists of occupations with little 



149 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

comparability from one census to the next. The postindependence 
censuses also suffer from inconsistencies. They show a decline in 
the proportion of the work force engaged in agriculture, hunting, 
forestry, and fishing from 52 percent in 1953 to just over 45 per- 
cent in 1981 . The proportion of the work force engaged in manufac- 
turing remained steady over the same period, at 10 percent. The 
largest increase was in services, including commerce, banking, and 
finance. The proportion of workers in this category rose from 11.2 
percent in 1953 to 15.7 percent in 1981. There was also an increase 
in construction, from 1.9 percent to just over 3 percent. Trans- 
port, storage, and communications increased from 3.5 percent to 
4.8 percent over the same period. All such figures should be re- 
garded as tentative and subject to revision. 

Demographic and educational changes after independence altered 
the composition of the work force as much as economic develop- 
ment. Rapid population growth brought additional workers into 
the job market every year and lowered the average worker's age. 
The growth of the economy was too limited to provide opportuni- 
ties for the new workers. Similarly, the extension of education quali- 
fied many thousands of youths for jobs that did not exist. This fact 
has been particularly true for women, who in the 1980s made up 
about 25 percent of the labor force despite equal access to education. 

Government Labor Policies 

During the nineteenth century, labor legislation dealt with the 
large plantations, and more general labor laws were passed only 
in the closing years of colonial rule. In 1941 the government enacted 
the Wages Boards Ordinance, the first comprehensive piece of legis- 
lation regarding the payment of wages, the regulation of working 
hours, and sick and annual leave; the ordinance also empowered 
the government to establish wages boards for any trade. The boards 
are composed of an equal number of representatives of workers 
and employers and three appointees proposed by the commissioner 
of labor. 

Ordinances of 1942 and 1946 required all factories to be registered 
and established minimum standards for health and safety. The laws 
also gave the commissioner the right to send inspectors to the fac- 
tories and to judge whether a plant was meeting minimum stan- 
dards. The Shops and Offices Employees Act of 1954 extended the 
provisions of the factories legislation to small shops. 

The Maternity Benefits Ordinance, as amended in 1957, enti- 
tled a woman who worked in a factory, mine, or estate to full com- 
pensation for a period of two weeks before her confinement and 
for six weeks afterward. The employee must have worked for the 



150 



The Economy 



employer 150 days before her confinement to be eligible to receive 
the benefits. 

The Employees Provident Fund, established in 1958, provided 
a national retirement program for the private sector. The Provi- 
dent Fund required an employer to contribute 6 percent of total 
earnings and an employee to contribute 4 percent of earnings ex- 
clusive of overtime pay. Participation in this plan grew quickly, 
and in the 1980s most salaried workers in the formal sectors of the 
economy were members. Government employees had their own 
pension plans. 

Although legislation protecting the health and welfare of work- 
ers was extensive, enforcement was inconsistent. The government 
departments charged with enforcement were chronically under- 
funded in the late 1980s. Moreover, many labor regulations were 
suspended in the investment promotion zones. Most labor legisla- 
tion also did not apply to rice farming and other economic activi- 
ties carried out informally. 

Working Conditions 

Working conditions varied greatly according to the type and size 
of employment activity in the 1980s. The Factories Ordinance of 
1942 established guidelines for industrial safety and sanitation and 
made each factory liable to government inspection. Because this 
ordinance and other similar legislation has not been enforced con- 
sistently, workers frequently protested their working conditions. 
In the 1980s, strikes and boycotts often took place because of 
inadequate meals at factories that had their own lunchrooms or 
because of the lack of other facilities. 

The Factories Ordinance prohibited work for women between 
9:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. In the years after independence, a fur- 
ther series of laws restricted the employment of women and chil- 
dren to designated time periods and places. A 1957 law, for example 
limited working time for women to nine hours. Other laws pro- 
hibited women and children from working underground, in mines, 
for example. 

Unemployment has been a problem since the 1960s, especially 
for young people, but the statistics available in 1988 were not very 
reliable. Observers estimated that unemployment increased from 
around 12 percent of the labor force in the early 1960s to 24 per- 
cent in the mid-1970s. Unemployment fell back to around 12 per- 
cent in the first few years after the economic liberalization that began 
in November 1977, but it was again on the increase in the mid- 
1980s. According to official data, in 1987 the labor force consisted 
of around 6.2 million persons, of whom 5.4 million, or 87 percent, 



151 




152 




Victoria Dam approaches completion, Accelerated Mahaweli Program 
Courtesy Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington 



153 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

were gainfully employed, but these figures understated unemploy- 
ment, which the Ministry of Finance estimated at 18 percent in 
late 1987. All of these figures excluded persons said to be under- 
employed or partially employed, conditions that were prevalent in 
the rice-farming sector and in some of the urban-based service 
activities. The extent of labor underutilization, was believed to be 
much greater than indicated by the statistics for unemployment. 

In the mid-1980s, sectors, such as tourism, that were sensitive 
to the security situation suffered job losses (see Tourism, this ch.). 
Migration to the Middle East, which also provided jobs in the early 
1980s, was also on the decline, although still of substantial impor- 
tance. In 1987 observers estimated that 100,000 Sri Lankans worked 
and lived in the Middle East — particularly in the small oil-rich states 
of the Arabian Peninsula, where wages for comparable work were 
much higher than in Sri Lanka. 

A representative index showing changes in the general level of 
wages was not available in the late 1980s. Wages were low com- 
pared with those paid in developed countries, even in the unionized 
sectors, and incomes were unevenly distributed. Some indication 
of wage movements can be gained from the indices of minimum 
wage rates. These more than doubled between 1978 and 1986, but 
inflation probably kept their value little changed in real terms. The 
only price index, the Colombo Consumer Price Index, was based 
on data gathered in Colombo and was widely believed to under- 
state inflationary increases, especially for the lower wage earners. 
It recorded an increase of 8 percent in 1986. Although this rate 
was considerably higher than the 1 . 5 percent increase recorded in 
1985, it was low compared to the two-digit rates that prevailed dur- 
ing the 1978-84 period. 

Low wages in the formal sector were partially offset by overtime 
payments, increments, bonuses, and other incentive programs, 
which often added considerable supplements to salaries. A five- 
day work week was standard in the 1980s. Sri Lanka had a large 
number of public holidays; twenty-four were celebrated in 1985. 
These included twelve full moon days, which are of religious sig- 
nificance to Buddhists. 

Labor Relations 

The labor movement was large and politically active in the 1980s, 
although it suffered a loss of influence after 1977. Urban strikes 
began in the 1890s and increased in number after World War I. 
The first major labor organization, the Ceylon Labour Union, was 
formed in 1922. In the 1930s, the legislature passed a series of laws, 
including the Trade Union Ordinance of 1935, to regulate the 



154 



The Economy 



unions. This law made it mandatory for trade unions to register 
with the government and to keep political and labor funds separate. 
After World War II, the unions represented a large proportion of 
the labor force, especially in Colombo and on the large plantations. 
The leadership of nearly all trade unions has come from the English- 
educated elite. 

Union membership in 1988 was subject to fluctuations because 
of competition among unions affiliated with different political parties 
and because of personal rivalries among union leaders, as well as 
a fairly rapid turnover of unions. The unions have traditionally 
been strong in the state sector, especially rail and road transport, 
the ports, and the government clerical service. In 1983 observers 
estimated that about 1.8 million workers, or just under one-third 
of the gainfully employed labor force, were union members. Mem- 
bership was fragmented into over 1 ,000 unions. Many of the unor- 
ganized workers were small farmers and rural laborers. 

Before 1977 many unions were affiliated with the Marxist par- 
ties, especially the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja (Ceylon Equal 
Society Party), but in the late 1970s and early 1980s the influence 
of the Jatika Sevaka Sangamaya (National Employees' Union), 
which was affiliated with the ruling UNP, increased greatly, and 
it became the single largest trade union. This organization was 
especially strong in the state sector, and it had a reputation for in- 
timidation, violence, and discrimination against Tamils. Another 
important trade union was the Ceylon Workers' Congress, which 
represented a large proportion of the Indian Tamil estate workers. 
After 1977 it was politically allied with the government, but it 
nonetheless used the political turmoil after 1983 to bargain for better 
working conditions. 

Labor disputes were arbitrated through a variety of state agen- 
cies, but these agencies have not prevented frequent and costly 
strikes. Plantation strikes have been most common, involving as 
many as 477,000 workers (in 1949) and as many as 1.12 million 
lost workdays (in 1966). In the remainder of the private sector, 
the most turbulent period was in 1962 and 1963, when over 1.28 
million workdays were lost by strikes. In 1970 new highs were 
reached, with 143 strikes and the loss of 1.31 million workdays. 
In the mid-1970s, when many trade unions pledged not to strike 
in return for substantial concessions, the number of nonplantation 
strikes fell dramatically, although plantation strikes increased. Since 
1977 the unions in the nonplantation sectors have been in appar- 
ent decline, in part because of changes in the nature of the work 
force. Most employees of the new textile factories in the free trade 
zone were young, unmarried women doing shift work, who did 



155 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

not expect to be employed there for more than a few years and 
who were little interested in joining a union. Similarly, employees 
in the import and tourist industries, sectors that grew in the years 
after 1977, had not been successfully organized. 

Trade 

Sri Lanka's economy continues to be heavily dependent on for- 
eign trade. Historically, the island has exported cash crops in order 
to import food to feed its population. Although the production of 
rice, the staple food crop, increased rapidly in the late 1970s and 
1980s, in early 1988 the island remained short of self-sufficiency 
in food. Trade policy since independence has been dominated by 
the deteriorating terms of trade. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, 
the amount of imports that could be bought with a given amount 
of the traditional exports has declined. Governments responded 
in the 1960s and 1970s with strict controls over imports, foreign 
exchange, and some aspects of internal trade. When the economy 
was liberalized in 1977, many of these regulations were swept away. 
One result has been a large increase in the foreign trade deficit 
and the external debt. 

Internal Trade 

An overall measure of the size and shape of the internal market 
was provided by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka's breakdown of 
national income according to expenditures by the several sectors 
of the economy. In 1986 gross domestic expenditure was estimated 
at Rs200.3 billion. About Rsl39.4 billion represented private con- 
sumption; Rsl8.5 billion was for government consumption; and 
Rs42.3 billion went into fixed capital investment, of which almost 
Rs33 billion was in the state sector. The aggregate of private sec- 
tor expenditures constituted just over 74 percent of total outlays. 

No detailed information was available concerning consumer out- 
lays in the late 1980s. Earlier surveys indicated that many families 
devoted about 50 percent of their total expenditure to food. Some 
government policies in the 1960s and the early 1970s kept inequal- 
ities of consumption relatively low. These measures included the 
subsidizing and rationing of essential goods, restrictions on imports 
of luxury goods, and heavy income taxes. The easing of many of 
these policies after the economy was liberalized in 1977 resulted 
in higher food prices and a flood of imported luxury items. 
According to the Consumer Finance and Socio-Economic Survey 
carried out by the Central Bank in 1978 and 1979, the poorest 10 
percent of the population controlled 1.2 percent of total personal 



156 



The Economy 



income, while the richest 10 percent had 39 percent of personal 
income. 

Traditionally, the state has played an important role in retail 
trade. The government-controlled Co-operative Wholesale Estab- 
lishment, which was created during World War II to handle the 
import and distribution of foodstuffs, had monopolies over the sale 
of imported sugar, canned fish, cement, hardware, and other 
products at various times in the 1960s and early 1970s. The mo- 
nopolies were broken up after 1977, when government policy shifted 
toward promoting competition. In 1986 however, there still were 
8,644 cooperatives serving as retail outlets. As in the past, they 
relied heavily on the distribution of basic consumer items such as 
rice, flour, and sugar under the food stamps scheme (see Budget- 
ary Process, Revenues, and Expenditures, this ch.). They also 
helped overcome shortages of essential goods in areas where secu- 
rity difficulties made private business unwilling to operate. In 1986 
their turnover was about Rsl.l billion. 

The ten state trading corporations in existence in early 1988 were 
expected to be commercially competitive with the private sector. 
Most were organized around specific commodities, such as build- 
ing materials, fertilizer, paddy, textiles, gems, and drugs. Their 
total turnover was around Rs5.6 billion in 1986, down from Rs6.3 
billion in 1985. 

Importers and wholesalers had their own warehouses, most of 
them in Colombo, but some in the provinces. For the most part, 
wholesalers did not actively engage in trying to sell their wares, 
but left it to retailers to take the initiative. Markup margins varied 
widely. Inasmuch as traders were not generally in a position to 
obtain credit from institutional sources, sales tended to be on a cash 
basis, although the larger wholesalers did extend limited amounts 
of credit. 

External Trade 

Sri Lanka's balance of trade has been in a chronic state of deficit 
since 1957; the only year between 1957 and 1987 when there was 
a surplus was 1977 (see table 10, Appendix A). Although the ability 
to pay for imports has generally declined because of the long-term 
relative fall in the prices of tea, rubber, and coconut, the demand 
for imports has been fueled by population growth and rising ex- 
pectations. The resulting shortage of foreign exchange has been 
the greatest problem in the economy during the period since 
independence. For most of the 1960s and 1970s, the government 
imposed strict import and exchange controls in an attempt to con- 
trol these deficits. After 1977 the deficits were allowed to grow and 



157 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

were financed by increased foreign support and heavy borrow- 
ing. 

Few nations have experienced so drastic and long-term a deteri- 
oration in terms of trade as did Sri Lanka from the mid-1950s to 
the mid-1970s. As a result, the volume of imports fell, at first 
through severe restriction of luxury items, such as automobiles and 
spirits. But the structure of the economy limited the amount by 
which imports could be cut. Levels of food, medicines, spare parts, 
and fertilizer could not easily be reduced without damaging the 
economy or the population's welfare. The gap was met by bor- 
rowing, and debt service obligations further reduced import ca- 
pacity. Although the volume of exports was nearly 18 percent more 
in 1975 than in 1960, the proceeds from these exports had a pur- 
chasing power worth only 37 percent of the smaller volume of 
exports in 1960. 

Although the general trend in the terms of trade was against Sri 
Lanka between 1955 and 1988, there were occasional exceptions. 
The terms of trade showed a 35 percent improvement in 1976 over 
1975, and 31 percent in 1977 over 1976, when tea prices experienced 
an unprecedented rise of 80 percent. From 1979 to 1982, however, 
the terms of trade again turned sharply against Sri Lanka, reach- 
ing record lows in 1981 and 1982. Between 1983 and 1987, the 
terms of trade hovered near the level for 1981, with the exception 
of 1984, when an increase in the price of tea produced a temporarily 
more favorable position. 

After the liberalization of the economy in 1977, the trade deficit 
widened enormously as the import bill soared under the influence 
of the government's development program. Exports, however, re- 
mained largely static. The trade deficit thus expanded year by year 
and reached nearly Rs20.5 billion in 1982, equal to 22.4 percent 
of GDP. In 1983, as a result of good agricultural production, the 
deficit was held to the same level as in 1982. The following year, 
1984, the deficit was cut to Rsl0.2 billion as a result of exception- 
ally high tea prices. This gain was not sustained in 1985, when 
the trade deficit rose to Rsl7.8 billion. In 1986, despite a static 
level of imports attributable primarily to the decline of world oil 
prices, the trade deficit again widened, to around Rs20.5 billion. 
Sharply reduced earnings from tea were only partly offset by im- 
proved exports of manufactured goods, especially textiles. Prelimi- 
nary figures for 1987 showed a record trade deficit. 

Sri Lanka's major export earnings were derived from a small 
number of commodities (see table 5, Appendix A). In 1986 tex- 
tiles overtook tea for the first time as the leading export. Textile 
exports were worth around Rs9.6 billion, compared to under Rs9.3 



158 



A dam of the Accelerated Mahaweli Program 
Courtesy Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington 

billion for tea. Rubber exports, which have declined since the 1970s, 
were worth Rs2.6 billion in 1986. Coconut products accounted for 
Rs2.4 billion, fuel oil products for Rs2.3 billion, and gems for over 
Rsl.6 billion. Other exports, including agricultural produce, 
graphite, and manufactured goods, were valued at around Rs7.8 
billion. This breakdown reflects a substantial diversification of 
exports away from tea and rubber in the 1970s and 1980s, but in 
early 1988 the fluctuations in the world prices of these commodi- 
ties continued to be an important factor not only in the island's 
export earnings but in the health of the economy as a whole. 

Oil accounted for about 25 percent of the value of imports in 
the early and mid-1980s, but dropped to 11.5 percent in 1986 when 
its price fell sharply and additional hydroelectric power became 
available from the Accelerated Mahaweli project. Some of the out- 
put of Sri Lanka's single oil refinery was then reexported. Other 
significant imports included machinery and equipment, chemicals, 
motor vehicles, clothing, paper, and sugar. Rice imports declined 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s; by 1985 Sri Lanka was close to 
self-sufficiency in years with good weather. In 1986 rice accounted 
for only 1.9 percent of imports. 

The United States was the most important foreign market, 
accounting in 1986 for approximately 26 percent of the island's 
exports, mostly in the form of textiles and tea. The Federal Republic 



159 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

of Germany (West Germany), Britain, and Japan also were im- 
portant markets in the 1980s, although no single country other than 
the United States took more than 8 percent of exports in 1986. The 
leading source of imports was Japan, which accounted for over 17 
percent in 1986. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, the 
United States, Britain, China, and West Germany also were im- 
portant sources of imports. In the 1960s and 1970s, about 50 per- 
cent of rubber exports went to China in return for rice on favorable 
terms, but after around 1980 Sri Lanka no longer needed to im- 
port large quantities of rice. Higher oil prices led to an increasing 
proportion of imports coming from the Middle East; this was paid 
for in part with increased exports of tea to this region. 

Although the island's balance of payments position was closely 
related to the balance of trade, foreign aid and remittances from 
Sri Lankans employed overseas made the balance of payments more 
favorable than the balance of trade. As a result, Sri Lanka occa- 
sionally ran a small balance of payments surplus in the 1960s and 
1970s, and again in 1984, when the economy benefited from high 
tea prices. In 1986 Sri Lanka had a balance of payments deficit 
of US$406 million, down from US$556 million in 1985. The main 
factor was the trade deficit of US$750.2 million. Private transfers, 
mostly remittances, amounted to US$294.5 million, about half of 
which were from the Middle East. Official transfers, including aid 
from governments and international organizations, accounted for 
US$181.2 million. Sri Lanka's services account ran a deficit. Ex- 
ports of services, including earnings from tourism, were US$378.1 
million, while imports in this sector, including interest payments 
on foreign loans, amounted to US$509.6 million. 

Foreign Exchange System 

In 1948 Sri Lanka had an essentially open-door policy on im- 
ports and an optimistic outlook for its foreign trade relations, but 
deterioration in the value of the country's export earnings led in 
1953 to the Exchange Control Act, which placed some restrictions 
on the movement of foreign currency. In 1961, in response to 
balance of payments problems, a rigorous system of exchange con- 
trols was introduced. Licenses that acted as exchange permits were 
issued by the controller of imports and exports. All imports and 
exports were subject to these regulations, and foreign exchange en- 
tering the country, whether by way of exports, invisibles, or the 
movements of capital, had to be surrendered to the exchange con- 
trol authorities. Only imports of goods classified as essential were 
permitted. The list of such items became smaller during the 1960s 
because of the increasing scarcity of foreign exchange and the 



160 



The Economy 



availability of new items through local production. In the early 
1970s, only imports of the barest minimum of foodstuffs, drugs, 
textiles, raw materials, and capital goods were allowed. 

From 1970 to 1977, Sri Lanka had a dual exchange rate system 
in addition to exchange and import controls. Under the system, 
imports of indispensable items — such as food and drugs — were 
allowed at the official rate, while all other imports were subject to 
a higher rate. Foreign exchange earned from tea, rubber, and coco- 
nut was converted into rupees at the official exchange rate, while 
earnings from all other exports were given the benefit of the higher 
rate. 

In November 1977, the exchange rate system was liberalized as 
part of the new government's economic reforms. The dual rate sys- 
tem was abolished, and the rupee was set free to float in response 
to international developments and the balance of payments posi- 
tion. The immediate effect of this measure was a devaluation of 
around 50 percent; after this time, the rupee continued to fall gradu- 
ally against the major international currencies. In December 1987, 
US$1 equalled Rs32.32 compared with Rsl9.3 six years earlier. 

External Debt 

The balance of payments deficits after the late 1950s led to a 
large foreign debt, most of which was accumulated after 1978. Rapid 
increases in the external debt, by comparison with the domestic 
debt, presented a double burden. Additions to the domestic debt 
involved only the problem of finding, through taxation, savings, 
or other means, the necessary additional local currency to meet 
the additional charges on the interest and amortization payments 
on the new debt. Increases in the foreign debt, however, required 
not only the same local currency to meet the enlarged budget item 
but also additional foreign currencies with which to transfer abroad 
the increased interest and amortization payments. This situation 
forced either a reduction in imports or still further borrowing 
abroad. 

Governments addressed the balance of payments deficits in the 
1960s by imposing direct controls that restricted imports. Even so 
they were unable to avoid increases in the foreign debt, which rose 
from around US$62 million in 1960 to US$231 million in 1969 
and US$380 million in 1974. After the 1977 liberalization of the 
economy, import restrictions were loosened and foreign credit be- 
came much more readily available. The total external debt, includ- 
ing short-term loans and trade credits, was estimated to be just 
under US$4 billion at the end of 1986. Medium-and long-term debt 
of the government represented about 75 percent of this amount. 



161 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Another 7 percent was owed by government corporations. Debt 
service payments on all foreign loans were US$410 million in 1986, 
up from US$342 million in 1985. Total debt service payments as 
a ratio of export earnings from goods and services increased from 
21 percent in 1985 to 26.7 percent in 1986. 

Finance 

After the early years of independence, the government consis- 
tently ran a budgetary deficit, which in the 1980s amounted to 15 
percent of GDP. Foreign aid, which increased substantially after 
1977, financed over 50 percent of the deficit in the 1980s and was 
essential for the health of the economy. Historically, a relatively 
high proportion of government expenditure was on social welfare 
programs, including health, education, and subsidized food, but 
after 1977 the importance of these programs, although still sub- 
stantial by regional standards, declined. Banking and credit were 
dominated by government-controlled institutions, but the impor- 
tance of the private sector in financial services was increasing. 

Budgetary Process, Revenues, and Expenditures 

The budget is announced annually in the budgetary speech of 
the finance minister, which is normally made in November. This 
speech reviews the economic situation of the current fiscal year, 
which corresponds to the calendar year, previews the government's 
expenditure program for the next year, and sets forth any proposed 
changes in taxation. Sometimes adverse public reaction, or pres- 
sure from members of parliament within the ruling party, forces 
changes in the measures announced in the finance minister's speech, 
but once formally introduced in parliament, the budget proposals 
are normally passed intact. All money bills must be introduced by 
a minister acting on behalf of the government. Opposition mem- 
bers may propose amendments to reduce expenditure under a 
specific head, but the success of such a motion would be a major 
defeat for the government and would probably cause its resigna- 
tion. No amendments concerning taxes or to increase expenditure 
are allowed. Supplementary provisions are often presented by the 
government during the year. The government's finances are moni- 
tored by an auditor-general appointed by the president. 

The colonial administration was heavily dependent on indirect 
taxes, especially import and export duties. Some changes in the 
structure of the revenue system were set in motion by the report 
of the Taxation Inquiry Commission, which was published in 1968. 
At that time, the tax system proper (exclusive of such items as fees, 
charges, and sales) of the central government consisted of various 



162 



The Economy 



separate revenue sources: personal income taxes, corporate income 
taxes, wealth (luxury) tax, business turnover tax, import and ex- 
port duties, resale of automobiles tax, and the levy on the transfer 
of property to nonnationals. The system was characterized by high 
taxes on major exports, by a miscellaneous collection of import 
taxes, and by high rates of income taxation. The income tax on 
corporations was 50 percent, and the top marginal rate on indi- 
viduals was 80 percent, with rapid rates of progression. The wealth 
tax on individuals was also high. 

The Taxation Inquiry Commission concluded that, for steady 
revenue flow, dependence should be placed on a broad-based set 
of consumption taxes, with differential rates to minimize the regres- 
sive tendency inherent in the consumption tax. This was recom- 
mended on a strictly pragmatic basis because both incomes and 
exports were already being taxed almost to their limit. There was 
thus no alternative to more and higher import duties and excises 
to secure the necessary additional revenue. Because the commis- 
sion believed that taxable imports would in the future be replaced 
by domestically produced substitutes, it argued that consumption 
taxes would increasingly have to bear the brunt of the search for 
new revenue. The commission also advised the government to raise 
the exemptions, lower the top rates, and ease the progression rate 
on income, wealth, and gift taxes; to raise the excise taxes on 
tobacco, arrack, beer, and domestically consumed tea; and to in- 
crease the coverage and reduce the exemptions of the turnover tax. 
Most of these recommendations were implemented soon after the 
publication of this report. 

In 1975 sales and turnover taxes raised almost 30 percent of the 
government's revenue, and income taxes and tariffs each raised 
about 15 percent. A little over a decade later, in 1986, the impor- 
tance of the sales taxes and tariffs had increased, but income taxes 
raised a smaller proportion of the revenue than earlier (see table 
1 1 , Appendix A). In 1986 the general sales and turnover tax raised 
15.4 percent of revenue, and selective sales taxes, which were 
primarily imposed on tobacco and liquor, raised 10.7 percent. 
Import duties accounted for 24. 1 percent and export duties for only 
3.8 percent. Income taxes raised 11.5 percent of state funds in 
1986, over two-thirds of which came from corporate sources. Studies 
carried out in the 1970s, both before and after the liberalization 
of the economy, indicated that the tax system as a whole operated 
in a progressive manner. Almost 25 percent of the government's 
revenue in 1986 came from nontax sources, mainly interest, profits, 
dividends, and other receipts from government-owned enter- 
prises. 



163 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

In 1988 the maximum rate of personal income tax was 40 per- 
cent and the ceiling on both income and wealth tax was 50 percent 
of a person's income. The 1988 budget reflected a cut in the highest 
level of import duty from 100 to 60 percent. A large proportion 
of revenue from business came from the established forms of eco- 
nomic activity because new industries, such as tourism and the free 
trade zone factories, had preferential tax treatment. 

No postindependence government has attempted to change, as 
a matter of policy, the proportion of the nation's GDP that it takes 
in revenue. This proportion generally hovered at just over 20 per- 
cent between 1950 and 1983. Annual variations derived more from 
external factors than from changes in government policy. Revenue 
from export duties on tea, rubber, and coconut, for instance, varies 
according to the price of these commodities on the international 
market. In 1984 when the price of tea rose temporarily, the govern- 
ment increased the export duty in order to gain a share of the wind- 
fall profits, and total revenue rose to 24.5 percent of GDP. In 1987 
government revenue was only slightly below this level because of 
tax increases brought about by increased fiscal pressures, largely 
the product of higher defense allocations and the heavy foreign 
debt. 

Government expenditure has consistently exceeded revenue, 
often by a considerable margin. From 1960 to 1977, expenditure 
was about 28 percent of GDP. After 1977 it increased, mainly as 
a result of investment in infrastructure. Between 1978 and 1987, 
the government spent around 38 percent of GDP. Of the nearly 
Rs70 billion spent in 1986, about half was classified as recurrent 
expenditure, and half as capital expenditure. 

Governments have used expenditure as a tool of social policy. 
In comparison with other Third World countries, Sri Lanka has 
a long tradition of public spending on health, education, and other 
social services. These programs have contributed at least in part 
to the nation's very high levels of literacy and life expectancy rela- 
tive to its per capita income (see Social Services, ch. 2). In the period 
between 1960 and 1977, about 9.5 percent of GDP, or one-third 
of the government's budget, was devoted to such programs. 

After the liberalization of the economy in 1977, there were reduc- 
tions in some social programs. In June 1978 the long-established 
system of rice rationing, which provided free and subsidized rice 
to nearly the entire population, was replaced by a food stamp pro- 
gram that covered only about 50 percent of the population. The 
value of the stamps was not indexed in order to keep place with 
inflation, and as a result the program's cost fell from 14 percent 
of government expenditure in 1979 to 7 percent in 1981 and 2.6 



164 



Offshore fishermen on their perches near Galle 
Courtesy Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington 

percent in 1986. Although there was a drop in the standard of living 
for the very poor, in early 1988 the food stamp program continued 
to provide a safety net more effective than programs existing in 
other parts of South Asia. Overall, social services, education, and 
welfare accounted for just under 15 percent of government spend- 
ing in 1986. 



165 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 
Foreign Aid 

Foreign aid was essential in preventing acute foreign exchange 
shortages after 1977. It accounted for around 9 percent of GDP 
from 1978 to 1986. Aid has been of two types: outright grants and 
loans on concessionary terms. The annual level of grants grew 
from US$21.9 million in 1978 to US$178 million in 1986. Most 
of this money was tied to specific projects, such as the Accelerated 
Mahaweli Program. Both grant aid and concessionary loans come 
from Western Europe, the United States, Japan, and internation- 
al organizations. Project loans amounted to US$351.2 million in 
1986, and nonproject loans were US$77.1 million. 

Most foreign aid to Sri Lanka was pledged at the meetings of 
the Aid Sri Lanka Consortium, which was organized by the World 
Bank on behalf of the major donor countries. The Sri Lankan 
government sent the World Bank an annual request outlining its 
needs. The member donors then met to consider these requests 
and coordinate their aid policies. The World Bank and most aid 
donors strongly supported the liberalization of the economy dur- 
ing the decade after 1977; indeed, at times they have urged the 
government to carry its free market policies further. 

A special meeting of the consortium in December 1987 pledged 
US$493 million above its normal aid commitments toward a three- 
year reconstruction program. Much of this money was targeted 
for specific projects in Northern and Eastern provinces. Observ- 
ers believed that if there were a peaceful solution to the nation's 
political problems, total foreign aid would reach US$2.7 billion 
in the years 1988 to 1990. 

Fiscal Administration 

In the 1960-77 period, budget deficits averaged about 8 percent 
of GDP. After 1977 increases in expenditures were not matched by 
corresponding increases in revenues, and the result was a rapid in- 
crease in the public debt. The budget deficit averaged 15 percent 
of GDP from 1978 to 1986. It temporarily dropped to 10.3 percent 
of GDP in 1984 when high tea prices caused increased revenue, but 
in both 1985 and 1986 it was close to 16 percent. The 1986 deficit 
of Rs28.1 billion was financed by Rs3.8 billion in foreign grants, 
Rsl2.1 billion in foreign loans, and Rsll.5 billion domestic bor- 
rowing from banking and other sources. Foreign loans and grants 
financed about 50 percent of the budget deficits in the 1980s. 

The public debt was about Rsl50 billion at the end of 1986, and 
the total interest payments by the government in 1986 were Rs9.3 



166 



The Economy 



billion, or 5.2 percent of GDP. About 45 percent of the public debt 
was owed to domestic sources. Medium- and long-term debts ac- 
counted for 56 percent of the domestic debt, and short-term loans 
made up the balance. In 1986 rupee securities sold to the pension 
funds and the National Savings Bank accounts were the principal 
instrument of the domestic medium- and long-term debt. Domes- 
tic short-term financing was raised primarily through treasury bills. 
The majority of the foreign debt was negotiated at concessional 
terms (see External Debt, this ch.). In 1986 a total of Rsl2 billion 
in new foreign loans was contracted, of which Rs9.9 billion were 
for specific projects. Repayments of earlier loans amounted to just 
over Rs3 billion. The accumulated foreign debt tended to increase 
annually in rupee terms in the 1980s because of the steady depreci- 
ation of the rupee in relation to the currencies of the lending nations. 

Monetary Process 

The Central Bank of Sri Lanka, which started operations in 1950, 
stood at the apex of the country's financial framework in 1988. 
The bank administered the exchange control system, implemented 
monetary policy, and regulated the money supply through such 
means as open market transactions, interest rate changes, and 
changes in the minimum reserve requirements of the commercial 
banks. 

The private sector relied almost entirely on the banks for credit. 
In early 1988, the commercial banking system consisted of twenty- 
six banks: six Sri Lankan banks and twenty-two foreign banks. Two 
of the Sri Lankan banks — the Bank of Ceylon and the People's 
Bank — were state banks. These institutions dominated commer- 
cial banking, holding nearly 80 percent of total deposits. The profita- 
bility of these banks, like that of many other state enterprises, had 
been hindered by politicians using them to secure employment for 
their supporters. Recovering loans due from public corporations 
has also been a problem for these banks. 

The four private Sri Lankan banks in 1988 were the Hatton 
National Bank, the Commercial Bank of Ceylon, the Investment 
and Credit Bank, and the Agro-Commercial Bank. The last two 
of these banks began operations in 1987, the first local banks 
founded after the liberalization of the economy in 1977. 

Until 1979 the presence of foreign banks consisted of three Brit- 
ish banks (Grindlays Bank, Chartered Bank, and the Bank of Hong 
Kong and Shanghai), three Indian banks (State Bank of India, 
Indian Bank, and Indian Overseas Bank), and one Pakistani bank 
(Habib Bank). In 1979, for the first time in many years, foreign 
banks were allowed to open branches, and many American and 



167 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

European institutions took advantage of this policy. Newcomers 
included the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, Banque 
Indosuez, Citibank, American Express, Overseas Trust Bank, Bank 
of Oman, Bank of America, European Asian Bank, Algemene Bank 
Nederland, Chase Manhattan, Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank, Bank 
of the Middle East, and Bankers' Trust Company. The initial cap- 
ital requirement, which had been set at RslO million in 1979, was 
increased in 1982 to Rs50 million. The Bank of America ended 
its activities in Sri Lanka at the end of 1986. 

Although the arrival of foreign banks increased the level of com- 
petition and led to new facilities, the overall impact on the credit 
supply remained marginal in early 1988. Credit to the rural sector 
and small firms was still tight and was channeled mainly by the 
two state banks. 

Interest rate policy in the 1980s encouraged high rates in order 
to combat inflation and encourage a higher flow of savings to bridge 
the gap between new investment and total domestic savings. At 
the end of 1986, treasury bills paid 1 1 percent and interbank loans 
cost between 12 percent and 12.75 percent. Loans and bank over- 
drafts were charged between 12 and 30 percent. 

The Central Bank announced a deposit insurance program for 
small depositors in June 1987, but none of the commercial banks 
had joined at the end of the year. Only deposits of private individ- 
uals up to a value of Rs 100, 000 could be insured. Government, 
interbank, and local government deposits were not eligible. Banks 
that joined would pay four Sri Lankan cents for every RslOO to 
the Central Bank. The Central Bank hopes that the confidence 
created by the program will offset the extra costs to the banks. 

In late 1987, the Central Bank offered the commercial banks a 
number of incentives to join the insurance scheme, including lower- 
ing their reserve requirement to a flat rate of 10 percent. In 1987 
the ratio was 18 percent on checking account deposits, 14 percent 
on fixed-term deposits, and 10 percent on other deposits. 

The stock market, which was established in December 1985, was 
a minor source of capital. At the end of 1986, it quoted 173 com- 
panies having a total market capitalization of around Rsl4 billion. 
Share transactions averaged Rs2.5 million a week. In 1987 legis- 
lation established a securities council to regulate the stock exchange. 
The proposed council was to be empowered to grant licenses to 
stockbrokers, set up a fund to compensate investors who suffered 
losses resulting from the failure of a licensed dealer to meet con- 
tractual obligations, and suspend or cancel the trading of securities 
for the protection of investors. The intent of this legislation was 



168 




Coastal fishing fleet north of Colombo 
Courtesy Embassy of Sri Lanka, Washington 

to create confidence in the stock market in the hope that it would 
attract more investors. 

Tourism 

In 1966 the government established the Ceylon Tourist Board, 
vesting in it the responsibility for invigorating the tourist indus- 
try. The board, operating as an autonomous corporation, was 
charged with promotional as well as organizational responsibili- 
ties. Most provisions for tourists were in the private sector, but 
the board had facilities in areas where private ones were considered 
inadequate. 

Tourism expanded rapidly after 1966. The main attractions are 
the beach resorts of the southwestern coastal region, but many 
tourists also visit the ancient cities of the dry zone, the historic city 
of Kandy, and the mountainous region dominated by tea planta- 
tions. Between 1976 and 1982, the number of tourist arrivals in- 
creased at an annual rate of almost 24 percent, reaching a peak 
of 407,230 before declining to 337,342 arrivals in 1983 as a result 
of the Tamil insurgency. More than half the arrivals were from 
Western Europe. 

Serious civil disturbances starting in July 1983 and the subse- 
quent violence badly affected tourism. Total arrivals were 230,106 
in 1986, down 43 percent from 1982. To ease the plight of the 



169 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

industry, the government provided various concessions to hotels, 
such as the rescheduling of loans and the reduction of the turnover 
tax from 10 percent to 5 percent. The Ceylon Tourist Board also 
undertook a crash promotion program in an attempt to restore the 
island's image in world tourist markets. Tourist arrivals in the first 
six months of 1987, however, showed a decline of 23 percent com- 
pared with the same period the previous year. In early 1988, the 
outlook was for further contraction. 

In 1988 it remained unclear whether the policies of economic 
liberalization Sri Lanka has pursued since 1977 would succeed in 
their principal goals of employment, wealth creation, and economic 
diversification. Although increased rice production, the growth of 
textile manufacturing, and an improved infrastructure were suc- 
cesses that could be attributed to the post- 197 7 policies, these gains 
came at the cost of a mounting foreign and domestic debt and declin- 
ing living standards for the poor. In the mid-1980s, the declining 
security situation began to have an increasingly negative impact 
on the economy, and in early 1988 economic prospects for the 1990s 
appeared to be linked at least in part to a resolution of the ethnic 
conflict. 

* * * 

The most current and easily accessible sources on the Sri Lankan 
economy are two publications of the Economist Intelligence Unit 
in London: Country Profile: Sri Lanka, an annual survey of the econ- 
omy; and Country Report: Sri Lanka, a quarterly publication that in- 
cludes the latest economic information. For agriculture, the annual 
South Asia: Situation and Outlook Report, published by the Economic 
Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, is also 
useful and makes use of detailed information found in two annual 
publications of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the Annual Report 
of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and the Review of the Economy. 

No book-length general survey of the Sri Lankan economy ap- 
peared in the decade after the change of economic direction in 1977, 
and the earlier works, although valuable for historical background, 
are out of date. The various essays in Sri Lanka: A Survey edited 
by K. M. de Silva portray the course of the economy from indepen- 
dence to the mid-1970s. A critical analysis of the post- 1977 eco- 
nomic policies is Ronald Herring's "Economic Liberalization 
Policies in Sri Lanka: International Pressures, Constraints and Sup- 
ports." A more favorable evaluation of these policies is by Surjit S. 
Bhalla and Paul Glewwe, "Growth and Equity in Developing 
Countries: A Reinterpretation of the Sri Lankan Experience." 



170 



The Economy 

This reference should be read in conjunction with the rebuttals by 
Paul Isenman and Graham Pyatt in World Bank Economic Review. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography). 



171 




I 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Parliament building at Sri Jayewardenepura, in Kotte 



IN THE YEARS following Sri Lanka's attainment of indepen- 
dence on February 4, 1948, the country's political system appeared 
to be the very model of a parliamentary democracy. The country 
stood virtually alone among its South and Southeast Asian neigh- 
bors in possessing a viable two-party system in which the conser- 
vative United National Party (UNP) and the left-of-center Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP) alternated with each other in power after 
fairly contested elections. Respect for legal institutions and the in- 
dependence of the judiciary were well established. Sri Lanka's mili- 
tary, never sizable, refrained from intervening in politics, and the 
country's leadership pursued generally moderate policies in its re- 
lations with other states. Although per capita income was low com- 
pared to that of India and other South Asian countries, over the 
decades successive governments invested heavily in health, educa- 
tional, and other social service facilities. As a result, standards of 
health and literacy were high and seemed to provide a firm foun- 
dation for democracy and political stability. 

Sri Lanka was, however, heir to cultural and historical tradi- 
tions at variance with its constitutionally defined parliamentary 
political institutions. Family and caste played major roles in de- 
termining the leadership of the major parties and the ebb and flow 
of political patronage. But ethnicity and religion were the most im- 
portant and politically relevant determinants in this traditionally 
diverse society. After 1948 and especially after passage of the Official 
Language Act, popularly known as the "Sinhala Only" bill, in 
1956, the Sri Lankan Tamil community, which was largely Hindu, 
came to feel that its political interests were being ignored and be- 
littled by the mainstream political parties led by Buddhist Sinha- 
lese. The feeling of grievance festered during the 1970s in the wave 
of preferential policies that favored Sinhalese applicants for univer- 
sity positions and government jobs. Abandonment of the idea of 
a secular state — the 1972 constitution guaranteed "the foremost 
place" for the Buddhist religion of the Sinhalese — further aroused 
Tamil alienation. Conversely, the Sinhalese, who regarded the 
Tamils as an economically and educationally privileged group, were 
determined to secure what they considered "majority rights," in- 
cluding freedom from alleged economic exploitation by Tamils. 
They also feared that the Sri Lankan Tamils could be a "fifth 
column" for the much larger Tamil population in neighboring 
India. From the Buddhist Sinhalese perspective, it was they, living 



175 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

in a "sea" of Hindu Tamils, who were the true minority, not the 
Sri Lankan Tamils. 

In a sense, the effectiveness of democratic institutions in con- 
veying the viewpoints of middle class and working-class Sinhalese, 
electorally a majority of voters, promoted ethnic polarization. Poli- 
ticians such as S. W.R.D. and Sirimavo Bandaranaike effectively 
used appeals to Sinhalese chauvinism to unseat their UNP oppo- 
nents. Neither the UNP nor the SLFP parties dared make conces- 
sions to the Tamils for fear of alienating the majority Sinhalese. 
Thus the UNP government of Junius Richard (J. R.) Jayewardene, 
which came to power in July 1977, was as determined as the earlier 
SLFP governments not to yield to Tamil demands for language 
parity and regional autonomy. By the early 1980s, armed groups 
of young Tamil extremists, committed to establishing an indepen- 
dent Tamil Eelam, or state, were well established in Tamil-majority 
areas in the northern and eastern parts of the country or operat- 
ing out of bases in India's Tamil Nadu State. 

In July 1977, Jayewardene won an unprecedented majority in 
the national legislature, gaining 140 out of 168 seats. In 1978 a 
new Constitution, the third in Sri Lanka's postindependence his- 
tory, was promulgated providing for a strong presidency. Jaye- 
wardene became the first chief executive under the new system. 
Some observers interpreted controversial amendments to the Con- 
stitution, such as the extension of the life of Parliament for another 
six years, passed in December 1982, as an illegitimate manipula- 
tion of the legal political process designed to give the UNP a virtu- 
ally uncontested monopoly of political power. In terms of the ethnic 
crisis, an August 1983 amendment outlawing the advocacy of 
separatism, which resulted in the expulsion of members of the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF) from Parliament, was most fate- 
ful. Against a background of escalating communal violence, it 
deprived Sri Lankan Tamils of political representation. 

July 1983 was a turning point in the worsening ethnic crisis. Anti- 
Tamil riots in Colombo and other cities, prompted by the killing 
of thirteen Sinhalese soldiers by Tamil Tiger guerrillas in the north, 
resulted in hundreds and perhaps as many as 2,000 deaths. The 
government was unprepared for the scale of violence and faced accu- 
sations of sublime unconcern for the Tamils' welfare, while for- 
eign observers told of the active connivance of government figures 
in mob violence. The inability or unwillingness of President Jaye- 
wardene and the UNP to forge a workable settlement of ethnic issues 
brought India, which had immense interests of its own in the mat- 
ter, directly into the crisis. According to the Indian press, under 
the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi India unofficially 



176 



Government and Politics 



permitted the establishment of training camps for the Sri Lankan 
Tamil insurgents in the state of Tamil Nadu. With the assump- 
tion of power by Gandhi's son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi, New 
Delhi adopted a more even-handed approach and sought to medi- 
ate the escalating crisis in Sri Lanka by bringing government and 
Tamil insurgent negotiators together for talks. Eventually, the New 
Delhi government went further and came down squarely on the 
side of Colombo with the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord 
of July 29, 1987. The pact committed New Delhi to the deploy- 
ment of a peacekeeping force on the island, as asked by the Sri 
Lankan government, and made the Indian government the prin- 
cipal guarantor of a solution to the ethnic crisis. 

The accord was designed to meet Sri Lankan Tamil demands 
for self-determination through the merging of the Northern and 
Eastern provinces and the devolution of substantial executive, legis- 
lative, and judicial powers. Tamil was made an official language, 
on a par with Sinhala. A cease-fire was arranged, and the Libera- 
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and other guerrilla groups 
surrendered some but not all of their arms. Many doubted that 
the accord, which the guerrillas had not played a role in formulat- 
ing and the LTTE opposed, would bring lasting peace. By 
mid- 1988, the Indian Army, in a series of hard-fought engagements 
that had caused it several hundred casualties, generally cleared the 
Jaffna Peninsula in Northern Province of Tamil guerrillas. The 
Indian Peacekeeping Force established a semipermanent garrison, 
and a measure of tranquility returned to the area. In Eastern 
Province, the Indian Peacekeeping Force had less success in sup- 
pressing the insurgents and the situation remained precarious. 
Bands of Tamil guerrillas remained at large, surfacing apparently 
at will to initiate violent incidents that led to an unremitting loss 
of life among innocent civilians, Sinhalese and Tamil, as well as 
among military personnel of both the Sri Lankan and Indian armed 
forces. In the predominantly Sinhalese, southern fringe of the is- 
land, the Jayewardene government faced escalating violence at the 
hands of Sinhalese militants who opposed the Indo-Sri Lankan Ac- 
cord as a sellout to the Tamil extremists. 

Politics and Society 

Race, Religion, and Politics 

Like other nations in the South Asia region, Sri Lanka has a 
diverse population. Various communities profess four of the world's 
major religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity. 
The major ethnic groups include not only the Sinhalese and the 



177 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Sri Lankan Tamils, who compose 74 and 12.6 percent of the popu- 
lation, respectively, but also Indian Tamils (5.5 percent of the popu- 
lation) who view themselves as separate from the Sri Lankan 
Tamils, as well as "Moors" or Muslims (7.1 percent), "Burghers" 
and other people of mixed European and Sri Lankan descent (0.4 
percent), Malays (0.4 percent), and tiny percentages of others in- 
cluding the aboriginal Veddahs, who are considered to be the is- 
land's original inhabitants (see People, ch. 2). 

The society also possesses a caste system similar to that of India's. 
Caste in Sri Lanka is politically important for two reasons. First, 
members of the national political elite tend to be members of the 
higher status castes. Since independence the overwhelming majority 
of the prime ministers and the one president have been members 
of the Sinhalese Goyigama (cultivator) caste. Also, voters tend to 
support people of their own caste, though caste identification rarely 
becomes a campaign issue because electoral districts tend to be 
homogeneous in terms of caste and the major parties generally put 
up candidates of that caste. 

Among Sinhalese, there is also a historically significant distinc- 
tion between people who live in the coastal and lowland areas and 
those who live in the mountainous central part of the island, the 
area that constituted the Kingdom of Kandy before its conquest 
by the British in the early nineteenth century. During the British 
colonial period and to a lesser extent in independent Sri Lanka, 
the two groups, which possess somewhat different cultures and ways 
of life, frequently perceived their interests to be divergent. During 
the 1920s, for example, the Kandyan National Assembly advocated 
a federal state in which the Kandyan community would be guaran- 
teed regional autonomy (see European Encroachment and 
Dominance, 1500-1948, ch. 1). 

Apart from religion, ethnicity, and caste, there are social differ- 
ences that emerged as a result of British colonialism. Despite a his- 
tory of popular support for Marxist parties, especially the Trotskyite 
Ceylon Equal Society Party (Lanka Sama Samaja Party — LSSP), 
economically based classes in the European sense are poorly devel- 
oped in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, well-defined elite groups, including 
families with planter, merchant, and professional backgrounds, con- 
tinued to be important in the late 1980s despite the redistributive 
policies of recent governments. Marks of their special status in- 
cluded not only wealth but education in the island's most presti- 
gious schools or overseas, fluency in English, and a higher degree 
of Westernization than among other Sri Lankans. In a 1985 sur- 
vey of government party parliamentarians since 1970, political 
scientist Robert Oberst discovered not only that there was a 



178 



Government and Politics 



disproportionate number of graduates of a handful of elite schools 
among UNP and SLFP legislators, but also that elite secondary 
school graduates were more likely to assume ministerial posts and 
play a central role in the passage of bills than nonelite school gradu- 
ates. Nonelite graduates tended to be backbenchers with limited 
influence. 

In a society as diverse as Sri Lanka's, social divisions have had 
a direct and weighty impact on politics. In the late 1980s, the eth- 
nically, linguistically, and religiously based antagonism of the Sin- 
halese and Sri Lankan Tamils overshadowed all other social 
divisions: the civil war that resulted, especially since mid- 1983, 
seemed to bode a permanent division of the country. Yet in the 
routine operation of day-to-day politics, allegiances based on family, 
caste, or region also continued to be of major importance. 

As in India, matters of religion, ethnicity, region, and language 
have become public rather than private issues. Persons have typi- 
cally viewed personal advancement not only in terms of individual 
initiative but also in terms of the fortunes of their ethnic, caste, 
or religious community. In India, however, there are so many differ- 
ent groups, spread out over the country like a vast mosaic, that 
no single group has been strong enough to seriously destabilize the 
national-level political system. Dissident movements, such as the 
Sikh militants in the northwestern Indian state of Punjab have 
tended to be limited to a single region. India's ruling party, Con- 
gress (I), preserved national unity by forming electoral coalitions 
with disparate groups such as high-caste Hindus, Muslims, and 
untouchables and balancing them off against other groups loyal 
to opposition parties. 

In Sri Lanka, however, both the nature of diversity and the at- 
titude of the government have been different. Within the island's 
much smaller geographical area, politics have become polarized 
because the politically prominent groups are few in number and 
clearly defined in terms of language, custom, religion, and geo- 
graphical region. Successive governments moreover, have never 
attempted to adopt an impartial role in relation to ethnic rivalries. 

Concrete economic and social equity- issues have played a major 
role in the ethnic antagonisms of Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan 
Tamils since independence. Ethnic rivalry, however, draws upon 
older and deeper roots. Each community views itself as possessing 
a unique and superior culture, based on religion, language, and 
race. The integrity of this culture is perceived to be threatened by 
the encroachments of the other group. Both Sinhalese and Tamils, 
occupying relatively well-defined geographical areas (the Sri Lankan 
Tamils in the Northern Province and parts of the Eastern Province, 



179 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

but with vulnerable enclaves in large cities; and the Sinhalese in 
the central and southern parts of the island), regard themselves 
as besieged minorities. The Sinhalese perceive themselves as the 
only group of "Aryans" and Buddhists in an overwhelmingly 
Dravidian and Hindu region (including the populous state of Tamil 
Nadu and other parts of southern India), while the Tamils see them- 
selves as an endangered minority on the island itself. During the 
1980s, this state of mutual paranoia, sharpened the ethnic bound- 
aries of both groups and intensified economic and social conflicts. 

The Sinhalese: Racial Uniqueness and Politicized Buddhism 

Many Sinhalese view themselves as a "chosen people." The 
Mahavamsa, an epic piece of "mythohistory" composed by Bud- 
dhist monks around the fifth century A.D., traces the origins of 
the Sinhalese to the regions of northern and eastern India inhabited 
in ancient times by Aryan peoples. Evidence to back this claim in- 
cludes not only their language, which is related to the languages 
of northern India including Sanskrit, but the supposedly "fairer" 
complexions of the Sinhalese compared to their Dravidian neigh- 
bors. The Mahavamsa depicts the history of Sri Lanka as a bitter 
struggle between the Sinhalese and darker-skinned Dravidian in- 
truders from the mainland (see Origins, ch. 1). In the eyes of 
Sinhalese chauvinists, this struggle for survival continues to the 
present day. 

Religion has defined Sinhalese identity over the centuries far more 
than race. Buddhism was brought to Sri Lanka around the third 
century B.C. by missionaries sent by Indian emperor Asoka and 
was fervently adopted by the Sinhalese king, Devanampiya Tissa 
(250-C.210 B.C.). The Theravada school of Buddhism was estab- 
lished after a great council of monks and scholars was held on Sri 
Lanka in 88-77 B.C. to codify the Pali scriptures. The faith was 
later transmitted by Sri Lankan monks to Southeast Asian coun- 
tries such as Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia. Sinhalese Buddhists 
regard Theravada (or Hinayana) Buddhism as the purest form of 
their religion, unencumbered by the superstitions and false beliefs 
that allegedly contaminate the Mahayana sects of Buddhism found 
in East Asia (see Religion, ch. 2). 

Anthropologist S.J. Tambiah, himself a Sri Lankan Tamil whose 
family includes both Hindus and converts to Christianity, argues 
that in both traditional and contemporary Sinhalese Buddhism the 
religion's original message of universalism, compassion, and non- 
violence was eclipsed by a narrower appeal to nationalism and race: 
"the Sinhalese chronicles. . . in postulating the unity of nation and 
religion constitute a profound transformation of the Asokan message 



180 



Government and Politics 



of dharma (rule by righteousness and nonviolence) in a multireli- 
gious society of Buddhists, Jains, adherents of Brahmanical values, 
and others." This was clearly evident, he argues, in the Mahavamsa, 
which describes King Dutthagamani's heroic defense of Buddhism 
against invaders from southern India in the second century B.C. 
as a holy war. Tambiah, a specialist in Southeast Asian Buddhism, 
asserts that Buddhism in contemporary Sri Lanka has lost its ethi- 
cal and philosophical bearings ("the substantive contents which 
make Buddhism a great religion and a source of a rich civiliza- 
tion") and has become either a set of ritualized devotions, under- 
taken by believers to obtain worldly good fortune, or an aggressive 
political movement that attracts the poorest classes of Sinhalese. 

Politicized Buddhism in its modern form emerged in the open- 
ing years of the twentieth century when adherents of the religion, 
deploring the social evils of alcoholism, organized a temperance 
movement and criticized the colonial government for keeping 
taverns open as a source of tax revenue. The campaign was, im- 
plicitly, anti-Western and anti-Christian. With the passing of the 
colonial order, Buddhist activism was increasingly preoccupied with 
Sinhalese "majority rights," including the "Sinhala Only" lan- 
guage policy backed by SLFP leader S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (who 
was assassinated by a Buddhist monk on September 26, 1959), and 
the agitation to give Buddhism special status in the 1972 constitu- 
tion. But the equation of nation and religion also meant that any 
issue involving the welfare of the Sinhalese community, including 
issues of social equity, were fair game for activist monks and their 
supporters. 

Thus, in 1986 leaders of the sangha (the community of Buddhist 
monks) joined with former Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike 
to establish the Movement for Defense of the Nation to deter Presi- 
dent J. R. Jayewardene from making significant concessions to the 
Tamils. One Buddhist leader, the Venerable Palipane Chandan- 
anda, head of one of the major orders of monks, was labelled "Sri 
Lanka's Khomeini" both for his extremism and his predilection 
for getting involved in political issues. Lower-ranking monks also 
were frequent hardliners on the ethnic issue. A survey of monks 
taken during 1983 and 1984 by Nathan Katz, a Western student 
of Buddhism, revealed that 75 percent of his respondents refused 
to acknowledge that any Tamil grievances were legitimate. Many 
commented that the Tamils were an unjustly privileged minor- 
ity and "it is the Sinhalese who have the grievances." Because of 
the tremendous prestige and influence of Buddhist monks among 
Sinhalese villagers and the poorest, least Westernized urban 
classes, the government in the late 1980s could not ignore the 



181 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

monks' point of view, which could be summarized in a 1985 com- 
ment by Chandananda to the Far Eastern Economic Review: "They 
[the Tamils] are saying that they have lived here for 1,000 years. 
But they are complete outsiders from India who have been living 
here temporarily." 

Tamil Exclusivism 

The Sri Lankan Tamil community itself boasts an impressive 
mythology of cultural and religious uniqueness and superiority. 
This is particularly true of dominant-caste Vellala Tamils living 
in the Jaffna Peninsula, who regard their Tamil cousins living in 
India and the Indian Tamil residents of Sri Lanka, as well as the 
Sinhalese, as their less civilized inferiors (thus undermining, to some 
extent, the rationale behind Sinhalese fears of engulfment by the 
two Tamil communities). According to anthropologist Bruce 
Pfaffenberger, the Vellala Tamils place great importance on the 
correct observation of Hindu rituals, the chastity of their women, 
and the need to maintain precisely the hierarchical distinctions of 
caste. Pfaffenberger notes that the Vellala regard the Jaffna Penin- 
sula as their natu, or country, and that states ruled by their kings 
existed there from the thirteenth century until the sixteenth-century 
arrival of the Portuguese. Although not all Sri Lankan Tamils were 
members of the Vellala caste, its members dominated local com- 
mercial and educational elites, and its values had strong influence 
on Tamils of other castes. 

The 1978 Constitution and Government Institutions 

Sri Lanka has benefited from the traditions of the rule of law 
and constitutional government that emerged during 150 years of 
British colonial rule. At least until the early 1970s, these tradi- 
tions fostered the development of a political system characterized 
by broad popular participation in the political process, generally 
strict observance of legal guarantees of human and civil rights, 
and an orderly succession of elected governments without the in- 
tervention, as has occurred in several neighboring states, of the 
military. By the early 1980s, however, many observers feared for 
the future of Sri Lanka's democratic institutions. Some observers 
contended that constitutional government, rather than curbing 
the arbitrary use of political power, seemed itself to be shaped 
by aggressively narrow sectarian interests whose manipulation of 
the constitutional amendment process excluded large numbers of 
persons from politics and contributed to ethnic polarization and 
violence. 



182 



Government and Politics 



Historical Perspective, 1802-1978 

After the Dutch ceded the island's maritime provinces to the Brit- 
ish in 1802, these areas became Britain's first crown colony. The 
conquest and subjugation of the inland Kingdom of Kandy in 
1815-18 brought the entire island under British control. Crown 
colony status meant that the island's affairs were administered by 
the Colonial Office in London, rather than by the East India Com- 
pany that governed India until 1857. Even after the Indian 
Empire — ruled by a viceroy appointed by the British monarch — 
was established following the Indian Mutiny of 1857, Ceylon (as 
Sri Lanka was then called) was not included within its authority. 
The principal features of government and administration during 
the first century of British rule were a strong executive — the colonial 
governor — and a council of official and unofficial members who 
first served in a solely advisory capacity but were gradually granted 
legislative powers. An institution of central importance was the Cey- 
lon Civil Service. In the early years, it was staffed primarily by 
British and other European personnel but then, increasingly and 
almost exclusively, by Sri Lankans. 

A major turning point in the island's political development was 
implementation in 1931 of comprehensive reforms recommended 
by a royal commission headed by the Earl of Donoughmore. The 
most salient feature of the so-called Donoughmore Constitution, 
which attempted to reconcile British colonial control of the execu- 
tive with Sri Lankan aspirations for self-government, was adop- 
tion of universal adult suffrage. This was, at that time, a bold 
experiment in representative government. Before 1931, only 4 per- 
cent of the male population, defined by property and educational 
qualifications, could vote. When elections to the legislature were 
held in 1932, the colony became the first polity in Asia to recog- 
nize women's suffrage. (Japan had adult male suffrage in 1925, 
but universal adult suffrage came only after World War II. The 
Philippines, a United States colony, achieved it in 1938.) 

Toward the close of World War II, a second royal commission, 
headed by Lord Soulbury, was sent to Sri Lanka in order to con- 
sult with local leaders on the drafting of a new constitution. In its 
general contours, the Soulbury Constitution, approved in 1946, 
became the basic document of Ceylon's government when the coun- 
try achieved independence on February 4, 1948. It established a 
parliamentary system modelled on that of Britain and quite simi- 
lar to the constitution adopted by India in 1949. Like Britain and 
unlike India with its federal arrangement of states, independent 
Ceylon was, and in the late 1980s remained, a unitary state. The 



183 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

constitution established a parliament headed by the British monarch 
(represented by the governor general) and two houses, the Senate 
and the House of Representatives. The latter, like the House of 
Commons in Britain, had the preponderant role in legislation. The 
majority party or party coalition in the popularly elected House 
of Representatives designated the prime minister. Executive power, 
formally vested in the monarch (in the person of his or her represen- 
tative, the governor general), was in actuality exercised by the prime 
minister and his or her cabinet. 

The second constitution, adopted in 1972, represented an at- 
tempt on the part of the SLFP-led United Front coalition, which 
had been elected in May 1970, to create new political institutions 
that allegedly reflected indigenous values more perfectly than the 
1946 constitution. It abolished the Senate and established a 
unicameral National State Assembly. The assembly was defined 
as the embodiment of the power of the state, and provisions in the 
constitution denied the judiciary the authority to challenge its enact- 
ments. In addition, the constitution changed the formal name of 
the country from Dominion of Ceylon to Republic of Sri Lanka. 
In a controversial measure, the United Front-dominated assem- 
bly gave itself two additional years in power beyond its constitu- 
tionally defined five-year term (elections were originally scheduled 
for 1975). Judicial curbs on the executive were also greatly re- 
stricted. Through the exercise of a wide range of emergency and 
special powers, the government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike exer- 
cised strict control over the political system. 

Aside from the issue of authoritarianism, two extremely con- 
troversial aspects of the 1972 constitution were the abandonment 
of the idea of a secular state, which had been incorporated into 
the 1946 constitution, and designation of Sinhala as the sole na- 
tional language. Although the constitution did not make Sri Lanka 
a Buddhist state, it declared that "the Republic of Sri Lanka shall 
give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be 
the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism while assuring 
to all religions the rights secured by Section 18 (i)(d) [religious free- 
dom]." Tamils, a predominately Hindu minority, resented the spe- 
cial status given to Buddhism and the nonrecognition of a role for 
their language in national life. 

In the July 1977 general election, the UNP was swept into power. 
The new ruling party, led by Jayewardehe, won 140 out of 168 
seats in the assembly and thus was in a position to initiate sub- 
stantial revisions of the 1972 constitution. This process it proceeded 
to undertake by passing the Second Amendment, which established 
the office of executive president in October 1977. Jayewardene 



184 



Government and Politics 



assumed the presidency on February 4, 1978. In November 1977, 
the UNP and the major opposition parties, with the conspicuous 
absence of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), convened 
a select committee to draft further revisions. After conducting a 
survey on the opinions of various Sri Lankan citizens, it concluded 
that changes embodied in the Second Amendment were not suffi- 
cient to promote substantial reform and recommended that a new 
constitution be drafted. The new document was adopted by the 
National State Assembly in mid- August 1978, and went into ef- 
fect on September 7, 1978. Under its provisions, the legislature 
chosen in the July 1977 general election was designated the coun- 
try's new Parliament. 

Government Institutions 

The 1978 Constitution changed the country's formal name from 
the Republic of Sri Lanka to the Democratic Socialist Republic 
of Sri Lanka and established a presidential form of government 
similar to that operating in France under the Fifth Republic. The 
document contains 172 articles divided into 24 chapters. Like the 
1972 constitution, it recognizes the special status of the Buddhist 
religion (assuring it, again, "foremost place" while guaranteeing 
the freedom of other religious communities). It differs from its 
predecessor, however, in granting "national" status to the Tamil 
as well as Sinhala language although only Sinhala is recognized 
as the "official" language. The language provisions permit the use 
of Tamil in administrative business in Northern and Eastern 
provinces and allow applicants for government employment to use 
either Tamil or Sinhala in the examination process (though 
knowledge of Sinhala might be required subsequent to induction 
into the civil service). In February 1983, Jayewardene announced 
that English would be recognized as a third national language. 

The Constitution recognizes and guarantees a broad range of 
fundamental rights including: freedom of thought and conscience; 
religious freedom; freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion, sex, or caste; freedom of speech; basic legal protection 
including freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention; freedom to 
engage in any lawful occupation; and freedom of movement and 
travel. These rights are guaranteed to stateless persons resident in 
Sri Lanka for ten years following promulgation of the Constitu- 
tion. Exercise of the fundamental rights, however, can be restricted 
in situations where national security is at risk or when the other- 
wise legal actions of persons (such as speech or publication) detract 
from racial or religious harmony or endanger "public health and 
morality." 



185 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

The Constitution contains a section devoted to directive princi- 
ples of state policy. These encompass a broad range of policy goals, 
including the establishment of a "democratic socialist society" and 
a just distribution of wealth; economic development; and the rais- 
ing of cultural and educational standards. The directive principles 
also include a commitment to decentralizing the country's adminis- 
tration and promoting national unity by eliminating all forms of 
discrimination. The duties of citizens (including the fostering of 
national unity) are also enumerated. 

Amendment of the Constitution requires the vote of two-thirds 
of Parliament. In addition, measures that affect "the independent, 
unitary, and democratic nature of the state," the Buddhist religion, 
fundamental rights, or the length of the term of office of president 
or Parliament must be approved by a popular referendum. Bills 
judged "inconsistent with the Constitution" cannot become law 
unless two-thirds of Parliament approve, but such bills can be 
repealed by a simple majority vote. 

With its five-sixths majority in Parliament following the July 1977 
general election, the UNP government of Jayewardene was able 
to pass a number of controversial constitutional amendments over 
the objections of the opposition. Some political commentators have 
suggested that such measures as the Fourth Amendment (Decem- 
ber 1982), which extended the life of Parliament for six years, or 
the Sixth Amendment (August 1983), which obliged members of 
Parliament to renounce support for separatism, were designed not 
to strengthen democratic institutions but to prolong the UNP's mo- 
nopoly of power. 

Presidency and Parliament 

The most important national office is that of the president, who 
is defined in the Constitution as head of state, chief executive, and 
commander in chief of the armed forces. Although governmental 
institutions are divided in the customary way between the execu- 
tive, legislative, and judicial branches, the president's powers as 
chief executive are formidable compared to those of the legislature. 
Thus, it cannot be said that the Constitution provides the political 
system with the benefits of a genuine separation of powers. 

With Parliament's approval, the president appoints the prime 
minister and in consultation with the prime minister chooses the 
members of the cabinet. It is the chief executive, rather than the 
prime minister, who presides over the cabinet's deliberations, and 
who may assume any ministerial portfolio. The president also has 
the authority to dissolve Parliament at any time and call for new 
elections. The president cannot exercise this power, however, if 



186 



Government and Politics 



the legislature has been in power for less than a year and does not 
consent to the dissolution, or if it is considering a resolution to im- 
peach the president. 

A striking feature of the governmental system is the huge size 
of cabinets. The Constitution designates twenty-eight minister-level 
portfolios, including two (the ministries of defense and plan im- 
plementation) held by the president. Additional ministers, however, 
may be appointed to take responsibility for special areas, such as 
the prevention of terrorism. District ministers, who play a major 
role in local government, are also designated. Including deputy 
ministers, a cabinet at one time may have more than eighty mem- 
bers chosen from the parliamentary ranks of the ruling party. In 
the late 1980s, ministerial rank and the resources made available 
through access to budgetary funds were, for individual legislators, 
an invaluable source of patronage and local level influence. 

The president can announce a national referendum to seek popu- 
lar approval of proposals of pressing national importance, includ- 
ing bills that have been rejected by Parliament. Other presidential 
prerogatives include declarations of war and peace, the granting 
of pardons, and the exercise of broad emergency powers. In the 
event of a public emergency, the president can invoke the power 
to enact measures without the consent of Parliament. The legisla- 
ture, however, must convene no more than ten days after the chief 
executive's proclamation of an emergency. If a majority of the legis- 
lature fails to approve the state of emergency after two weeks, it 
automatically lapses; it lapses after ninety days if a simple major- 
ity of the members of Parliament do not approve its continuation. 

The president is popularly elected for a term of six years. He 
or she may serve no more than two consecutive six-year terms. 
The Constitution stipulates, however, that the term of a chief execu- 
tive who assumes office other than through a normal presidential 
election will not be counted as one of the two. Whether this means 
that Jayewardene's first term from 1977 to 1982, which began with 
his election as prime minister in the 1977 general election, would 
be counted toward the two-term total was unclear. The Third 
Amendment to the Constitution, approved in 1982, allows the presi- 
dent to hold a presidential election at any time following his fourth 
year in office. 

The Constitution states that the president is responsible to Parlia- 
ment and can be impeached by the legislature if that body approves 
the measure by a two-thirds vote and the Supreme Court also calls 
for his or her removal from office. Grounds for impeachment in- 
clude mental or physical incapacitation, moral offenses, abuses of 
power, bribery, treason, and blatant violations of the Constitution. 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

The prime minister assumes the responsibilities of the president 
if the incumbent is disabled or is overseas. Parliament chooses a 
new president if the incumbent dies or leaves office before the end 
of his or her term. 

During the mid-1980s, the powers vested by the Constitution 
in the chief executive, the unprecedented majority that the UNP 
won in the July 1977 election, the 1982 postponement of a new 
general election until 1989, and a strong tradition of party discipline 
provided Jayewardene virtually unchallenged control over Parlia- 
ment. The Constitution gives the legislature a term of six years. 
But in November 1982, Jayewardene, elected the previous month 
to a second six-year presidential term, announced his decision to 
hold a popular referendum on a constitutional amendment, the 
fourth, which would extend the life of Parliament from six to twelve 
years (a general election was due by August 1983). As justifica- 
tion for the amendment, he cited both his popular mandate (he 
won 52.9 percent of the votes cast in the October 1982 presiden- 
tial election compared to 39.1 percent for his nearest opponent) 
and the threat posed by an "anti-democratic, violent and Naxa- 
lite group" associated with the opposition SLFP that allegedly 
planned to seize power and "[tear] up all constitutional proce- 
dures." (The term "Naxalite" refers to a leftist, revolutionary and 
violent movement that emerged in India during the 1960s.) After 
approval by Parliament and the Supreme Court, the amendment 
was supported by a narrow 54.7 percent of the voters on Decem- 
ber 22, 1982. The fact that the referendum took place during a 
state of emergency and that there were widespread reports of voter 
fraud and intimidation caused many to doubt the legitimacy of this 
procedural exercise. Observers noted, however, that members of 
the opposition were allowed to express their opinions freely prior 
to the December 22 vote and were given access to the media, in- 
cluding television. The Constitution stipulates that when the next 
general election is held, the number of members of Parliament shall 
be increased from 168 to 196. 

Local Government 

Because Sri Lanka is a unitary rather than a federal state, local 
government institutions have had a very limited role in the politi- 
cal process. The country traditionally has been divided into nine 
provinces, which had played an important administrative role dur- 
ing the British colonial era. The principal local government sub- 
divisions since the early 1980s have been the twenty-four 
administrative districts (see fig. 1). Before 1981 each district con- 
tained administrative offices representing most national-level 



188 



Government and Politics 



ministries and known collectively as kachcheri (government offices). 
Two officers of major significance at the district level were the 
government agent and the district minister. Government agents, 
appointed by the central government, traced their origins to the 
colonial era, but the office of district minister, which was filled by 
individuals concurrently serving as members of Parliament, was 
created after 1978. Because of the district ministers' access to cen- 
tral government funds for patronage purposes, they tended to 
diminish the power and influence of the government agents. 

In 1981 the kachcheri system and the subdistrict system of elec- 
tive village and town councils were replaced by district develop- 
ment councils and subdistrict-level units known as pradeshiya 
mandalaya (divisional council) and gramodaya mandalaya (village coun- 
cil) (see fig. 11). The councils were created largely to satisfy minority 
aspirations for local self-government and were designed to exer- 
cise a significant measure of autonomy, especially — as the name 
implies — in the area of economic planning and development. 
Although the district development councils served in the late 1980s 
as conduits for central government funds, they also had been 
granted the authority to collect taxes and manage their own bud- 
gets and were given responsibility for educational and cultural activ- 
ities within their spheres of jurisdiction. Each district council 
consisted of some members appointed by the central government 
and others elected by local constituents for four-year terms on the 
basis of proportional representation. Their deliberations were 
presided over by the district ministers who were, as mentioned, 
members of Parliament (they did not in all cases represent in Parlia- 
ment the district in which they exercised this function); govern- 
ment agents served as council secretaries. 

The subdistrict-level mandalaya, or councils, were designed to pro- 
mote village-level democracy and provide support for district de- 
velopment council programs. The changes implemented in 1981 
affected the 75 percent of the population living in rural areas. 
Twelve municipal and thirty-eight urban councils continued to func- 
tion in urban areas in the late 1980s. 

Electoral System 

In the late 1980s, popular elections were held, in principle at 
regular intervals, for the office of president, members of Parlia- 
ment, and positions on local government bodies such as municipal 
and urban councils, district development councils, and the man- 
dalaya. The Constitution grants the right to vote to all citizens aged 
eighteen years and over who are of sound mind and have not been 
convicted of major crimes. All qualified voters have the right to 
run for Parliament unless they are members of the armed forces, 



189 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



PRESIDENT 



NATIONAL LEVEL 



Prime Minister 
Cabinet 



Parliament 



PROVINCIAL LEVEL 



Provincial 




Councils * 





DISTRICT LEVEL 



District 
Development 
Councils 



SUBDISTRICT LEVEL 



Pradeshiya 
Mandalaya 




Municipal/Urban 
Councils 





VILLAGE LEVEL 



Gramodaya 




Mandalaya 





VOTERS 



* Chart reflects measures pertaining to provincial autonomy, adopted by the end 
of 1987, subsequent to the July 29, 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. 



Figure 11. The Structure of Government, 1987 



police, or certain branches of the civil service, hold other positions 
that might result in a conflict of interest, or have been convicted 
of bribery while serving in a previous term in Parliament within 
the past seven years. The qualifications for running for president 
are similar, though there is a minimum age requirement of thirty. 



190 



Government and Politics 



The president is chosen by a simple majority vote. In the elec- 
tion of October 20, 1982, the country was divided into twenty-two 
election districts (the Constitution provides for a maximum of 
twenty-four electoral districts). Citizens could mark their ballots 
for a maximum of three presidential candidates in order of prefer- 
ence. Under this "single transferable vote system," if no candi- 
date received more than half the votes, all but the two candidates 
with the largest percentages of the total votes cast would be elimi- 
nated. Persons who voted their top preference for a candidate who 
had been eliminated would have their second or third preferences 
counted if they had chosen one of the top two vote-getters. In the 
1982 balloting, six candidates contested the presidency but it was 
reported that only a small number of voters indicated a second or 
third preference on their ballots. 

The 1946 and 1972 constitutions provided for the election of 
members of Parliament (or, between 1972 and 1978, the National 
State Assembly) from single-member constituencies similar to those 
found in Britain. Consequently, relatively small changes in the per- 
centage of voters supporting a given party caused large variations 
in the number of seats that party won in Parliament, and majority 
parties were over-represented in terms of their percentage of the 
popular vote. For example, in the 1965 general election, the UNP 
won 39.3 percent of the vote and secured 66 out of 151 seats in 
Parliament; its share of the vote in the 1970 election dropped 1.4 
percent to 37.9 percent, but it won only 17 seats. The 1978 Con- 
stitution replaced the single-member constituencies with a system 
of proportional representation in which the number of candidates 
returned from a single electoral district is determined on the basis 
of population. Although this system creates a closer correspondence 
between vote percentages and parliamentary representation, the 
equitable nature of proportional representation is diluted by a con- 
stitutional provision that grants the party with the largest percen- 
tage of votes in each district a "bonus" seat in addition to those 
gained through proportional representation. 

The Constitution stated that by-elections to fill vacancies in Parlia- 
ment before a general election were not necessary because the po- 
litical parties themselves could appoint successors. On February 20, 
1983, however, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment, the 
fifth, which provides for by-elections if the incumbent party fails 
to nominate a successor within thirty days of the seat becoming va- 
cant. On May 18, 1983, by-elections for eighteen seats were held. 

Judiciary 

Although Sri Lanka's colonial heritage fostered a tradition of 
judicial freedoms, this autonomy has been compromised since 



191 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

independence by constitutional changes designed to limit the courts' 
control over the president and by the chief executive's power to 
declare states of emergency. Also, Parliament's willingness to 
approve legislation, such as the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
vested the government in the late 1980s with broad powers to deal 
with subversives, or those deemed subversive, in an essentially 
extralegal manner. Observers in the late 1980s reported that the 
act facilitated widespread abuses of power, including the systematic 
torture of detainees, because it recognized the admissibility as evi- 
dence of confessions to the police not made in the presence of a 
magistrate. 

Under the Constitution, the highest court is the Supreme Court, 
headed by a chief justice and between six and ten associate justices. 
Supreme and High Court justices are appointed by the president. 
Superior Court justices can be removed on grounds of incompe- 
tence or misdemeanor by a majority of Parliament, whereas High 
Court justices can be removed only by a judicial service commis- 
sion consisting of Supreme Court justices. The Supreme Court has 
the power of judicial review; it can determine whether an act of 
Parliament is consistent with the principles of the Constitution and 
whether a referendum must be taken on a proposal, such as the 
1982 extension of Parliament's life by six years. It is also the final 
court of appeal for all criminal or civil cases. 

Civil Service 

The civil service in Sri Lanka was established during the colonial 
period and in the late 1980s continued to operate in accordance 
with well-established British precedents. It was hierarchical in struc- 
ture. At the apex of the hierarchy was a well-defined elite, the Sri 
Lanka Administrative Service, which was composed of talented men 
and women chosen by competitive examination. They were well- 
educated generalists, expected to take a broad perspective in their 
work in contrast to specialist personnel operating on the lower ranks 
of the hierarchy. They enjoyed tremendous prestige. Because 
government employment on practically all levels offered economic 
security as well as status, competition for civil service and other 
government positions remained intense. One of the most impor- 
tant sources of Tamil disaffection from the Sinhalese-dominated 
political system has been their perception that government service 
opportunities for members of their community were decreasing. 
This view is borne out by statistics: in the administrative service, 
the number of Tamil officeholders declined from 11.1 percent of 
the total during the 1970-77 period to only 5.7 percent during the 
1978-81 period. Spokesmen for the Sinhalese majority have asserted 



192 



Government and Politics 



that the British traditionally favored the employment of Tamils over 
Sinhalese in the colonial bureaucracy and that the declining Tamil 
percentages reflected an equitable redressing of the balance. The 
percentage during 1978-81, however, was substantially lower than 
Sri Lankan Tamils' percentage of the total population (12.6 per- 
cent in 1985). 

Especially since the early 1970s, the civil service has been sub- 
ject to intense political pressures. Under the British-style 1946 con- 
stitution, the highest-ranking appointed officials in the government 
were the secretaries attached to each ministry. But after the adop- 
tion of the 1972 constitution, secretaries have been political ap- 
pointees. This change and the dynamics of patron-client politics 
have compromised both the bureaucracy's claim of political neu- 
trality and the quality of its staff. The power of patronage means 
that each member of Parliament has jobs, ranging from profes- 
sional positions like school teachers or engineers, to clerkships and 
menial labor, which the members can distribute freely to follow- 
ers. The eclipse of Tamil influence in Parliament has meant that 
such benefits were not generally available to the Tamil community. 

In the late 1980s, about 25 percent of all employment in Sri Lanka 
was in the public sector. In addition to the civil service, this propor- 
tion included the police, the armed forces, and public corporations, 
which continued to dominate the economy despite J aye war dene's 
liberalization policies since 1977 (see Nature of the Economy, ch. 3). 

The Political Party System 

One of the most striking features of the political system in the 
more than four decades since independence has been the existence 
of viable and generally stable political parties. In the general elec- 
tions held between 1952 and 1977, a two-party system emerged 
in which the UNP and the SLFP alternately secured majorities and 
formed governments. Observers noted, however, that one major 
failure of the two-party system was the unwillingness or inability 
of the UNP and the SLFP to recruit substantial support among 
Tamils. As a result, this minority was largely excluded from party 
politics. 

On the basis of ethnicity, three types of parties could be defined 
in the late 1980s: Sinhalese-backed parties including the UNP, the 
SLFP, Marxist parties, such as the Lanka Sama Samaja Party 
(LSSP) and the Communist Party of Sri Lanka, and the numeri- 
cally insignificant splinter groups; a largely inoperative Tamil party 
system composed of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF); 
and other minority-oriented parties, such as the Ceylon Workers' 
Congress which enjoyed the support of the Indian Tamils, and the 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Sri Lanka Muslim Congress. The situation was complicated by 
the fact that extremist groups, such as the Sinhalese-based Peo- 
ple's Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna — J VP) in 
southern Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers based in the Northern 
and Eastern provinces, challenged the legal parties for popular sup- 
port. By the late 1980s, both the intransigence of the Jayewardene 
government and the use of intimidation tactics by extremists in 
Jaffna District and parts of Eastern Province dramatically reduced 
popular backing among Tamils for the relatively moderate TULF. 

The political party system was also weakened by the determina- 
tion of the UNP leadership to retain a solid parliamentary major- 
ity through the use of constitutional amendments (see Government 
Institutions, this ch.). During the 1980s, various UNP measures 
undermined the balance between the two major parties that had 
been an important factor behind the political stability of the years 
between 1952 and 1977. The extension of the life of Parliament 
until 1989 and the passage of the amendment prohibiting the ad- 
vocacy of separatism, which resulted in the expulsion of TULF 
members from Parliament, created new political grievances. The 
Jayewardene government's decision to deprive SLFP leader 
Sirimavo Bandaranaike of her civil rights for seven years for alleged 
abuses of power in October 1980 also weakened the two-party sys- 
tem because it deprived the SLFP of its popular leader. 

Despite drastic constitutional changes since 1972, the party sys- 
tem's British heritage is readily apparent in the clear distinction 
made between government and opposition legislators in Parliament 
(sitting, as in Westminster, on opposite benches) and provisions 
in the 1978 Constitution to prevent defections from one party to 
another, previously a common practice. Backbenchers are expected 
to follow the initiatives of party leaders and can be punished with 
expulsion from the party for failing to observe party discipline. 

Sinhalese Parties 

The UNP 

The UNP was established in 1946 by prominent nationalist lead- 
ers such as Don Stephen Senanayake, who became the country's 
first prime minister, and S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, who broke with 
Senanayake in 1951, establishing the SLFP. The UNP, originally 
a collection of disparate and jealous factions, was organized to com- 
pete in the first general elections in 1947 against leftist parties on 
the platform of communal harmony, parliamentary democracy, 
and anticommunism. Between 1946 and the early 1970s, the UNP 
was organized around power personalities and politically influential 



194 



Government and Politics 



families rather than a consistent ideology or a strong party organi- 
zation. In its early years it was known as the "uncle-nephew party" 
because of the blood ties between its major leaders. When the first 
prime minister, Don Stephen Senanayake, died in March 1952, 
he was succeeded by his son, Dudley. In September 1953, Sir John 
Kotelawala, Dudley Senanayake 's uncle, assumed the leadership 
of the UNP government and remained in power until April 1956. 
In the March 1965 general election, Dudley Senanayake again be- 
came prime minister at the head of a UNP government. In 1970 
leadership of the party passed to a distant relative, Junius Richard 
(J. R.) Jayewardene. A prominent activist in the preindependence 
Ceylon National Congress who was elected to the colonial era legis- 
lature in 1943, Jayewardene departed from the personality- 
dominated UNP status quo. Instead, he established a strong party 
organization and recruited members of the younger generation, 
traditionally attracted to the leftist parties, to fill UNP party ranks. 

In keeping both with the privileged background of its leader- 
ship and the need to provide the electorate with a clear-cut alter- 
native to the leftist orientation of the SLFP and other groups, the 
UNP has remained, since independence, a party of the moderate 
right. Despite the constitutional adoption of the term "Democratic 
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka" as the country's formal name, 
the ruling party's policies under Jayewardene have included com- 
prehensive economic liberalization designed to stimulate growth 
of a market economy, encouragement of foreign investment, a par- 
tial dismantling of the country's elaborate welfare state institutions, 
and closer and friendlier relations with the United States and other 
Western countries. Because the UNP's popular support is firmly 
anchored in the Sinhalese-majority regions of central, southern, 
and western Sri Lanka, it has had to compromise with rising grass- 
roots sentiment against the Tamil minority as ethnic polarities in- 
tensified during the 1980s. Historically, however, it is less closely 
identified with Sinhalese chauvinism than its major rival, the SLFP. 

The Sri Lanka Freedom Party 

In 1951 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike led his faction, the Sinhala 
Maha Sabha, out of the ruling UNP and established the SLFP. 
Bandaranaike had organized the Sinhala Maha Sabha in 1937 in 
order to promote Sinhalese culture and community interests. Since 
the 1950s, SLFP platforms have reflected the earlier organization's 
emphasis on appealing to the sentiments of the Sinhalese masses 
in rural areas. To this basis has been added the antiestablishment 
appeal of nonrevolutionary socialism. On the sensitive issue of lan- 
guage, the party originally espoused the use of both Sinhala and 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Tamil as national languages, but in the mid-1950s it adopted a 
"Sinhala only" policy. As the champion of the Buddhist religion, 
the SLFP has customarily relied upon the socially and politically 
influential Buddhist clergy, the sangha, to carry its message to the 
Sinhalese villages. 

Another important constituency has been the Sinhalese middle 
class, whose members have resented alleged Tamil domination of 
the professions, commerce, and the civil service since the British 
colonial era. In contrast to the free market orientation of the UNP, 
the SLFP's policies have included economic self- sufficiency, na- 
tionalization of major enterprises, creation of a comprehensive wel- 
fare state, redistribution of wealth, and a nonaligned foreign policy 
that favored close ties with socialist countries. It has, however, re- 
fused to embrace Marxism as its guiding ideology. 

Like the UNP, the SLFP has been a "family party." S. W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike was assassinated in 1959. After a brief and some- 
what chaotic interregnum, his widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, was 
chosen as party leader. In the July 1960 general election, the party 
won 75 out of 151 parliamentary seats, and in a coalition with 
Marxist parties, Mrs. Banaranaike became the world's first 
democratically elected female head of government. Although she 
was obliged to step down from party leadership after her civil rights 
were taken away in October 1980 on charges of corruption and 
abuse of power, she resumed leadership of the SLFP following a 
government pardon granted on January 1, 1986. 

In 1977 six members of the SLFP left the party and formed a 
new group, the People's Democratic Party (PDP — Mahajana 
Prajathanthra). A second group, the Sri Lanka People's Party 
(SLPP — Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya), was formed in 1984 by 
a daughter of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Chandrika Kumaratunge, 
and her husband Vijay Kumaratunge. They claimed that the origi- 
nal SLFP, under the leadership of Sirimavo Bandaranaike 's son, 
Anura, was excessively right wing and had become an instrument 
of the Jayewardene government. Although Sirimavo Bandaranaike 
reentered politics and assumed a leadership position within the 
SLFP after her 1986 pardon, Anura Bandaranaike remained leader 
of the parliamentary opposition. Neither the PDP nor the SLPP 
had representation in Parliament in 1988. 

During the late 1980s, the SLFP and the breakaway SLPP re- 
mained split on the sensitive issue of negotiations with Tamil 
separatists. The former opposed the granting of significant con- 
cessions to the militants while the latter joined the UNP in sup- 
porting them. In 1986 Sirimavo Bandaranaike and politically active 
members of the Buddhist leadership established the Movement for 



196 



Government and Politics 

Defense of the Nation in order to campaign against proposed grants 
of regional autonomy to the Tamils. 

The Marxist Parties 

In the late 1980s, Sri Lanka had two long-established Marxist 
parties. The Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) was founded in 
1935 and remained in the late 1980s one of the very few Marxist- 
Leninist parties in the world to associate itself with the revolution- 
ary doctrines of Leon Trotsky. This connection made it attractive 
to independent-minded Marxists who resented ideological subser- 
vience to Moscow and who aspired to adapt Marxism to Sri Lankan 
conditions. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the LSSP func- 
tioned as the primary opposition party, but its fortunes declined 
after the emergence of the non-Marxist SLFP. Like the SLPP, the 
LSSP joined with the ruling UNP in the mid-1980s to support a 
negotiated settlement with Tamil militants but in 1 988 did not have 
members in Parliament. The New Equal Society Party (Nava Sama 
Samaja Party — NSSP) was in 1987 a breakaway faction of the 
LSSP. 

The Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL) was established in 
1943 and continued in the late 1980s to follow the direction of the 
Soviet Union on matters of ideology. Banned briefly in July 1983 
along with the JVP and the NSSP, in 1987 it had limited popular 
support. 

The People's United Front 

The People's United Front (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna — MEP) 
was a small party founded by veteran leftist Dinesh P. R. Guna- 
wardene that since the early 1950s has attracted Sinhalese support 
with appeals to militant Buddhist and Sinhala chauvinist sentiments. 
In 1956 it formed a coalition on the left with the SLFP and Marxist 
parties, but in a shift to the right four years later joined forces with 
the UNP. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, it maintained 
a formal association with the JVP, originally a Maoist group that 
was responsible for a bloody uprising in 1971 but operated as a 
legal political party between 1977 and 1983. 

Tamil United Liberation Front 

With very few exceptions, Sri Lankan Tamils have tended to 
support their own parties and candidates rather than vote for the 
UNP, SLFP, or the Marxist parties. In the July 1977 general elec- 
tion, for example, only 9 percent of the voters in the Tamil-majority 
Northern Province supported the two major parties (the UNP, 
less closely associated with Sinhalese chauvinism from the Tamil 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

viewpoint than the SLFP, won 8 of the 9 percent). In the years 
following independence, the most important Tamil party was the 
Tamil Congress, led by G.G. Ponnambalam, one of the major 
figures in the independence movement. A breakaway group led 
by another figure, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, founded a second party, 
the Federal Party, which began to make inroads into the Tamil 
Congress' constituency by advancing proposals for a federal state 
structure that would grant Tamils substantial autonomy. 

In the early 1970s, several Tamil political groups, including the 
Tamil Congress and the Federal Party, formed the Tamil United 
Front (TUF). With the group's adoption in 1976 of a demand for 
an independent state, a "secular, socialist state of Tamil Eelam," 
it changed its name to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). 
In the general election of July 1977, TULF won eighteen seats in 
the legislature, including all fourteen seats contested in the Jaffna 
Peninsula. In October 1983, all the TULF legislators, numbering 
sixteen at the time, forfeited their seats in Parliament for refusing 
to swear an oath unconditionally renouncing support for a separate 
state in accordance with the Sixth Amendment to the Constitu- 
tion. In an atmosphere of intensifying ethnic violence and polari- 
zation, their resignations deprived Sri Lankan Tamils of a role in 
the legal political process and increased tremendously the appeal 
of extremist groups such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(see Tamil Militant Groups, this ch.). But in December 1985, the 
TULF leadership softened its position and proposed that an 
autonomous Tamil State could be established within the Sri Lankan 
constitutional framework in a manner similar to the federal states 
of India. 

Other Parties 

The Ceylon Workers' Congress, headed in 1988 by 
Suvumyamoorthy Thondaman, originally joined with other Tamil 
groups to form TULF, but withdrew from the party after the July 
1977 general election, when Jayewardene offered Thondaman a 
post in the UNP cabinet. In the late 1980s, the Ceylon Workers' 
Congress, with one representative, Thondaman, in Parliament, 
continued to cooperate with the ruling party. This was politically 
feasible because its principal supporters, Indian Tamils located for 
the most part in the central part of the country, were unrespon- 
sive to the Sri Lankan Tamils' call for an independent state in the 
north. In December 1986, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, based 
in the Eastern Province, announced its determination to become 
a national political party. 



198 



Government and Politics 



Electoral Performance 

In general elections between 1952 and 1977, the two major parties 
have alternately secured majorities: the SLFP in 1956, July 1960 
(elections were held in both March and July 1960), and 1970; and 
the UNP in 1952, March 1960, 1965, and 1977. To govern effec- 
tively, each party has formed coalitions with smaller groups. The 
two major parties, however, have together gained a progressively 
larger percentage of the popular vote at the expense of the smaller 
groups: from 59.5 percent of the total vote in 1952 to 80.6 percent 
in 1977 (see table 12, Appendix A). In the July 1977 general elec- 
tion, the UNP, benefiting from widespread public disaffection with 
the leftist policies of the SLFP, won the largest majority in his- 
tory: 50.9 percent of the popular vote and 140 out of 168 seats con- 
tested. The SLFP's parliamentary representation dropped 
dramatically from 91 to 8 seats, though it garnered 29.7 percent 
of the vote. With its eighteen seats, the TULF became the prin- 
cipal opposition party. Two seats were won by the Ceylon Work- 
ers' Congress and an independent. The two Marxist parties, the 
LSSP and the CPSL, failed to win representation. Parliamentary 
elections have typically included a large number of independent 
candidates, but the number elected has steadily declined since 1947. 
In July 1977, there were 295 independents running without party 
affiliation, but only 1 secured a parliamentary seat. 

By-elections for eighteen parliamentary seats that became va- 
cant after the resignation of UNP members were held in May 1983 
in tandem with local government elections. These were conducted 
under the system of proportional representation outlined in the Con- 
stitution. The UNP won fourteen of the contests, the SLFP won 
three, and the People's United Front won one. Further by-elections 
were held during the 1984-86 period. 

Sri Lanka has had only one presidential election since promulga- 
tion of the 1978 Constitution. This occurred on October 20, 1982. Six 
candidates participated. The deeply divided SLFP, deprived of its 
most popular leader, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, put up Hector Kob- 
bekaduwa, an obscure candidate who had served as minister of agri- 
culture in a SLFP government. Kobbekaduwa won 39. 1 percent of 
the vote, compared to the incumbent Jayewardene's 52.9 percent. 
The four other candidates, who together won only 8. 1 percent of the 
vote, represented the JVP, LSSP, NSSP, and the Tamil Congress. 

The Emergence of Extremist Groups 

During the 1980s, extremist groups operating within both Tamil 
and Sinhalese communities were a grave threat to political stability 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

and democratic institutions. Like Northern Ireland and Lebanon, 
Sri Lanka had become a country in which the vicious cycle of 
escalating violence had become so deeply entrenched that prospects 
for a peaceful resolution of social and political problems seemed 
remote. Extremism was generationally as well as ethnically based: 
many youth, seeing a future of diminished opportunities, had lit- 
tle faith in established political and social institutions and were 
increasingly attracted to radical solutions and the example of move- 
ments abroad like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 

Perhaps surprisingly, the first major extremist movement in 
postindependence history was Sinhalese and Buddhist rather than 
Tamil and Hindu. The J VP, an ultra-leftist organization estab- 
lished in the late 1960s by Rohana Wijeweera, attracted the sup- 
port of students and poor Sinhalese youth in rural areas. In April 
1971, the J VP led an armed uprising that resulted in the death 
of thousands of the rebels at the hands of the security forces (one 
estimate is 10,000 fatalities). The historian, K.M. de Silva, calls 
the 1971 JVP insurrection "perhaps the biggest revolt by young 
people in any part of the world in recorded history, the first in- 
stance of tension between generations becoming military conflict 
on a national scale." Although it suppressed the poorly organized 
revolt with little difficulty, the Bandaranaike government was visibly 
shaken by the experience. Fears of future unrest within the Sinha- 
lese community undoubtedly made it reluctant, in a "zero-sum" 
economy and society, to grant significant concessions to minorities. 

Although the JVP was recognized as a legal political party in 
1977 and Wijeweera ran as a presidential candidate in the October 

1982 election, it was banned by the government after the summer 

1983 anti-Tamil riots in Colombo and went underground. By the 
late 1980s, it was again active in Sinhalese-majority areas of the 
country. The JVP cadres organized student protests at Sri Lanka's 
universities, resulting in the temporary closure of six of them, and 
led sporadic attacks against government installations, such as a raid 
on an army camp near Kandy in 1987 to capture automatic 
weapons. But they were also suspected of establishing links with 
Tamil militant groups, especially the Eelam Revolutionary Organi- 
zation of Students (EROS). Government intelligence analysts be- 
lieved that the JVP, in tandem with EROS, was attempting to 
organize a leftist movement among Indian Tamils in the Central 
Highlands (see fig. 3). This was a disturbing development since 
the Indian Tamils had traditionally been docile and politically 
apathetic. 

In 1987 a splinter group of the JVP, known as the Deshapremi 
Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV — Patriotic Liberation Organization), 



200 



Government and Politics 



emerged. The DJV threatened to assassinate members of Parlia- 
ment who approved the conditions of the July 29, 1987 Indo-Sri 
Lankan Accord, which it described as a "treacherous sell-out to 
Tamil separatists and Indian expansionists" and said that it would 
take the lives not only of parliamentarians who approved it but 
also of their families (see The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, ch. 5). 

Tamil Alienation 

Moderate as well as militant Sri Lankan Tamils have regarded 
the policies of successive Sinhalese governments in Colombo with 
suspicion and resentment since at least the mid-1950s, when the 
"Sinhala Only" language policy was adopted (see Emergence of 
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, ch. 1). Although limited compromises 
designed to appease Tamil sentiment were adopted, such as the 
1959 Tamil Language Special Provision Act and the 1978 Consti- 
tution's granting of national language status to Tamil, the overall 
position of the minority community has deteriorated since Sri Lanka 
became an independent state. Pressured by militant elements within 
the Sinhalese community, the UNP and SLFP political leadership 
has repeatedly failed to take advantage of opportunities to achieve 
accords with the Tamils that could have laid the foundations for 
ethnic understanding and harmony. For example, in 1957 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike reached an agreement with Tamil Fed- 
eral Party leader Chelvanayakam that would have granted regional 
autonomy to Tamil-majority areas and recognized Tamil as a lan- 
guage of administration in those areas. The pact, however, was 
never honored by Bandaranaike or his widow. Tambiah called it 
"a great opportunity, fatefully missed, to settle the Tamil issue 
for all time." Three decades later, after thousands of people in both 
ethnic communities had met violent deaths, a similar accord was 
reached, but only with the intervention of India. 

Several issues provided the focus for Sri Lankan Tamil aliena- 
tion and widespread support, particularly within the younger gener- 
ation, for extremist movements. Among the issues was the language 
problem, which was only partially resolved by the 1978 Constitu- 
tion's conferral of national language status on Tamil. Sinhala still 
remained the higher-status "official language," and inductees into 
the civil service were expected to acquire proficiency in it. Other 
areas of disagreement concerned preference given to Sinhalese 
applicants for university admissions and public employment, and 
allegations of government encouragement of Sinhalese settlement 
in Tamil-majority areas. 

Until 1970 university admissions were determined solely by aca- 
demic qualifications. Because of the generally higher educational 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

standards of Tamils, their percentage of university enrollments sub- 
stantially exceeded their percentage of the general population. In 
1969 for example, 50 percent of the students in the country's facul- 
ties of medicine and 48 percent of all engineering students were 
Tamil. During the 1970s, however, the government implemented 
a preferential admissions system known as the "policy of standardi- 
zation." This was a geographically based criterion, but because 
the two ethnic communities tended to be regionally segregated, such 
a policy increased Sinhalese enrollments. The scheme established 
quotas for 70 percent of university places on the basis of revenue 
districts; this included a special allotment of 15 percent of all open- 
ings reserved for educationally underprivileged districts, which were 
predominantly Sinhalese. Only 30 percent of openings were allot- 
ted nationwide on merit considerations alone. By the early 1980s, 
the policy had proven a statistical success: in 1983 only 22 percent 
of medical students and 28 percent of engineering students were 
Tamils. 

The limiting of educational opportunities for Tamils was reflected 
in declining percentages of Tamils in the skilled and professional 
areas of government service. State-employed Tamil physicians 
declined from 35 percent in the 1966-70 period to 30 percent in 
1978-79; engineers from a 38 percent average in the 1971-77 period 
to 25 percent in 1978-79; and clerical workers from an 11 percent 
average in 1970-77 to a little more than 5 percent in 1978-79. By 
1980 the percentage of Tamil employees in the public sector, ex- 
cluding public corporations, was roughly equivalent to their per- 
centage of the population, or 12 percent. 

Political factors played a role in the decline in the number of 
Tamils in public service. Under the so-called chit system, which 
became pervasive when Sirimavo Bandaranaike was in power dur- 
ing the 1970s, the influence of a parliamentarian was needed to 
secure a government job (the chit being a memorandum written 
by the legislator to inform personnel authorities of the preferred 
candidate). The Jayewardene government made the machinery of 
patronage still more overt by giving each legislator "job banks" 
of lower level positions to be distributed to their followers. The ex- 
panding role of patronage on all levels of the civil service had two 
implications for Tamils: first, merit qualifications that would have 
benefited educated Tamils were sacrificed to patron-client politics; 
second, the patronage system provided Tamils with little or no ac- 
cess to public employment because their political representatives, 
especially after the 1977 general election, had very limited influence. 

Government-sponsored settlement of Sinhalese in the northern 
or eastern parts of the island, traditionally considered to be Tamil 



202 



Government and Politics 



regions, has been perhaps the most immediate cause of intercom- 
munal violence. There was, for example, an official plan in the 
mid-1980s to settle 30,000 Sinhalese in the dry zone of Northern 
Province, giving each settler land and funds to build a house and 
each community armed protection in the form of rifles and machine 
guns. Tamil spokesmen accused the government of promoting a 
new form of "colonialism," but the Jayewardene government 
asserted that no part of the island could legitimately be considered 
an ethnic homeland and thus closed to settlement from outside. 
Settlement schemes were popular with the poorer and less fortunate 
classes of Sinhalese. 

Indian Tamils, poorer and less educated than their Sri Lankan 
Tamil cousins, since independence have endured an equally precar- 
ious situation. Although agreements with India largely resolved 
the issue of their nationality, 100,000 Indian Tamils remained state- 
less in the late 1980s. Those holding Sri Lankan citizenship and 
remaining loyal to Thondaman's progovernment Ceylon Workers' 
Congress were largely indifferent to Sri Lankan Tamils' militant 
demands for an independent state, but endemic poverty among 
plantation workers and occasional harsh treatment at the hands 
of the police and Sinhalese civilians made the people more recep- 
tive to leftist ideology and threatened the traditional tranquility of 
the inland hill country. 

Tamil Militant Groups 

The de facto policies of preference that the Sri Lankan govern- 
ment adopted in order to assist the Sinhalese community in such 
areas as education and public employment affected most severely 
middle class Tamil youth, who found it more difficult during the 
1970s and 1980s to enter a university or secure employment than 
had their older brothers and sisters. Individuals belonging to this 
younger generation, often referred to by other Tamils as "the 
boys," formed the core of an extremist movement that had be- 
come, by the late 1980s, one of the world's most violent. By the 
end of 1987, they fought not only the Sri Lankan security forces 
but also the armed might of the (Indian Peacekeeping Force) and 
terrorized both Sinhalese and Tamil civilians with acts of random 
violence. They also fought among each other with equal if not 
greater brutality (see The Tamil Insurgency, ch. 5). 

In a sense, the militant movement was not only a revolt against 
the Sinhalese-dominated status quo but also an expression of in- 
tergenerational tensions in a highly traditional society where obe- 
dience to parental authority had long been sacrosanct. Militant 
youth criticized their elders for indecisiveness at a time when they 



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Sri Lanka; A Country Study 

felt the existence of their ethnic community clearly was in danger. 
The movement also reflected caste differences and rivalries. The 
membership of the largest and most important extremist group, 
for example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was 
generally drawn from the Karava or fisherman caste, while in- 
dividuals belonging to the elite Vellala caste were found in con- 
siderable numbers in a rival group, the People's Liberation 
Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE, also PLOT). 

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged in 1972 
when Tamil youth espousing an independent Tamil state estab- 
lished a group called the Tamil New Tigers. At that time, the idea 
of secession was still considered radical by most Tamil leaders, 
though the TULF embraced it four years later. An incident of ap- 
parently unprovoked police brutality in 1974 started the LTTE on 
its career of insurgency. In January of that year, the World Tamil 
Research Conference, bringing delegates from many different coun- 
tries, was held in Jaffna. Police seeing large crowds milling around 
the meeting hall attacked them ferociously. Nine persons were killed 
and many more injured. The incident was viewed by youthful mili- 
tants not only as a provocative act of violence but as a deliberate 
insult to Tamil culture. It was, according to one Tamil spokes- 
man, "a direct challenge to their manhood." The Tigers' first act 
as an insurgent movement was to assassinate the progovern- 
ment mayor of Jaffna in 1975. Subsequently they went under- 
ground. As extremist movements in other countries have done, the 
LTTE apparently established contacts with similar groups, such 
as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, trained with 
Palestinians in Libya and Lebanon, and ran its own secret train- 
ing camps in India's Tamil Nadu State. In 1988 Velupillai Prab- 
hakaran, its undisputed military and political leader, and A.S. 
Balasingham, its ideological spokesman, were the LTTE's most 
important figures. 

The Tamil militants' choice of the tiger as their symbol reflected 
not only the ferocity of that animal but a deliberate contrast with 
the lion (singha), which traditionally has been a symbol of the 
Sinhalese people and is depicted in the Sri Lankan flag. 

Ideologically, LTTE theoreticians at times resorted to Marxist 
rhetoric to characterize their struggle. Overall, the creation of an 
independent Tamil state, irrespective of ideology, remained the 
movement's only goal. In pursuit of this objective, the LTTE 
seemed more wedded to direct and violent action than formula- 
tion of principles on which the independent state would operate. 



204 



Government and Politics 



LTTE leader Prabhakaran maintained friendly, though watch- 
ful, relations with the chief minister of India's Tamil Nadu State, 
M.G. Ramachandran, until the latter's death in 1987. Until India's 
intervention in 1987, he could count upon at least the moral sup- 
port of Ramachandran' s political party, the All-India Anna Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). Some of the LTTE's militant 
rivals maintained ties with the Tamil Nadu opposition party, the 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, which was headed by Ramachan- 
dran 's bitter rival, M. Karunaidhi. 

Other Tamil Groups 

Observers in the late 1980s counted at least thirty separate guer- 
rilla groups of which five, including the LTTE, were the most im- 
portant (see The Tamil Insurgency, ch. 5). The other four major 
groups were the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front 
(EPRLF), led by K. Padmanabha, the Tamil Eelam Liberation 
Organization (TELO), led by Sri Sabaratnam until he was killed 
by the LTTE assassins in May 1986, the Eelam Revolutionary 
Organization of Students (EROS), led by V. Balakumar, and the 
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), 
headed by Uma Maheswaran. These groups differed significantly 
in terms of strategies and ideologies. EROS was said to prefer acts 
of economic sabotage. In March 1985, the LTTE, EPRLF, TELO, 
and EROS formed a united front organization, the Eelam National 
Liberation Front (ENLF). PLOTE, probably the most genuinely 
Marxist-Leninist of the five major guerrilla groups, remained out- 
side the coalition. By mid- 1986, ENLF had become largely inoper- 
ative after the LTTE quit, although the other groups sought to 
form a front without its participation. 

The Liberation Tigers proceeded to devour their rivals during 
1986 and 1987. TELO was decimated in 1986 by repeated LTTE 
attacks. During 1987 the Tigers battled not only Indian troops but 
members of PLOTE and the EPRLF. 

The year 1983 can be regarded as a psychological turning point 
in the ethnic crisis. The brutal anti-Tamil riots of July in Colombo 
and other towns, and the government's apparent lack of concern 
for Tamil safety and welfare seemed to rule out a peaceful resolu- 
tion of differences between Tamils and Sinhalese. The riots were 
touched off by the July 23 killing of thirteen Sinhalese soldiers by 
LTTE guerrillas on the Jaffna Peninsula. According to Tambiah, 
the mutilated corpses were brought to Colombo by their comrades 
and displayed at a cemetery as an example of the Tigers' barbarism. 
In an explosion of rage, local Sinhalese began attacks on Tamils 
and their property that spread out from Colombo District to other 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

districts and resulted in at least 400 casualties (the official figure) 
and perhaps as many as 2,000 (an estimate by Tamil sources). Fifty- 
three Tamil prisoners were killed under questionable circumstances 
at the Welikade Prison outside Colombo. Damage to property, in- 
cluding Tamil-owned shops and factories, was initially estimated 
at the equivalent of US$150 million, probably a low figure. 

The authorities, seemingly paralyzed during the bloody days of 
July 24 to July 31, did little or nothing to protect the victims of 
mob violence. Curfews were not enforced by security personnel 
even though they were required under a nationwide state of emer- 
gency in effect since the May by-elections. Jayewardene withdrew 
to his presidential residence, heavily guarded by government troops, 
and issued a statement after the riots that "the time has come to 
accede to the clamor and the national respect of the Sinhala Peo- 
ple," that expressed little sympathy for the sufferings of the Tamils. 

There was ample evidence, reported in the Indian and Western 
media, that the violence was more a carefully planned program 
than a totally spontaneous expression of popular indignation. Ac- 
cording to a report in the New Delhi publication, India Today, "the 
mobs were armed with voters' lists, and detailed addresses of every 
Tamil-owned shop, house, or factory, and their attacks were very 
precise." Other sources mentioned the central role played by 
Minister of Industry and Scientific Affairs Cyril Mathew in provid- 
ing personnel for the violence and the ease with which the mobs 
found transportation, including government vehicles, to move from 
place to place. 

According to political scientist James Manor, the eagerness of 
powerful politicians such as Mathew to stir up ethnic trouble 
stemmed at least in part from factional struggles within the ruling 
UNP. Mathew reportedly used the riots to compromise the aging 
and seemingly indecisive Jayewardene and undermine support for 
the chief executive's all-but-designated successor, Prime Minister 
Ranasinghe Premadasa. According to India Today reporting in Au- 
gust 1983, five UNP factional groups, including Mathew' s and 
Premadasa' s, competed for influence. With deep reservoirs of anti- 
Tamil sentiment among poorer Sinhalese to draw upon, Mathew 
could not be ignored in any post-Jayewardene political arrange- 
ment within the UNP. His schemes, however, ultimately backfired. 
In December 1984, Mathew was obliged to resign from the cabi- 
net for opposing negotiations between the government and the 
Tamils on regional autonomy, and he subsequently faced expul- 
sion from the party. 

The 1983 violence had a caste as well as ethnic dimension. 
Mathew was a leader of the Vahumpura caste. This group has a 



206 



Government and Politics 



lower status than the politically dominant Goyigama caste but com- 
prises more than one-third of the Sinhalese population. Tradition- 
ally, Vahumpura occupations included the making of jaggery 
(brown sugar derived from palm sap) and domestic service in higher 
caste households. Nevertheless, they trace their descent from the 
attendants of Mahinda, the brother or son of the Indian emperor 
Asoka, who came to Sri Lanka as a Buddhist missionary in the 
third century B.C. and thus claimed an esteemed status among 
Sinhalese Buddhists. The Vahumpura also had been actively in- 
volved in commerce, but in the 1970s and early 1980s they were 
forced out of the business by their Sinhalese Karava and Tamil 
competitors. The resultant decline in their fortunes was a source 
of much resentment toward the other groups. 

Some observers speculated that the LTTE had moderated to a 
slight degree its attacks against government forces in the north, 
because of the presence of Tamil "hostages" in Colombo and other 
Sinhalese-majority urban areas, but that the July 1983 riots removed 
such inhibitions. The vicious cycle of violence intensified as attacks 
by the LTTE and other groups against troops brought harsh retali- 
ation against Tamil civilians, especially in the Jaffna Peninsula. 
Reports issued by Amnesty International, the London-based human 
rights group, told of random seizures, tortures, and executions of 
hundreds of young Tamil men by the armed forces in Northern 
and Eastern provinces. These actions forced the great majority of 
Sri Lankan Tamils, whatever their point of view on the goals or 
methods of the guerrillas, into the arms of the extremists. In the 
words of one observer, the Tamil population in the north was "visi- 
bly afraid of the Tigers, but they disliked the [Sri Lankan] Army 
even more. " As the civil war intensified, government troops were 
besieged inside the seventeenth- century Jaffna Fort, and most areas 
of Jaffna City and the surrounding countryside were under Tiger 
control. The government ordered serial bombings of the city. Thou- 
sands of Tamils sought refuge from government attacks across the 
Palk Strait in India's Tamil Nadu State. As indignation among 
Tamils in India grew over the atrocities, Colombo was filled with 
rumors of an impending Indian invasion that would have resulted 
in a permanent division of the island. 

The 1984 All Party Conference 

In January 1984, the J aye war dene government convened an All 
Party Conference to seek a resolution of the communal issue. Par- 
ticipants included the UNP, the SLFP, the TULF, and five smaller 
groups. The major issue under discussion was devolution. The 
government proposed the granting of autonomy to the country's 



207 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



districts through the creation of district councils and other changes 
in local government. Also, the government proposed establishment 
of a second house of Parliament, a council of state, whose mem- 
bers would include the chairmen and vice chairmen of the district 
councils and which would have both legislative and advisory roles. 
The Tamil spokesmen rejected these proposals. One reason was 
that they did not allow for special links between Northern and 
Eastern provinces. No compromise was reached and the confer- 
ence broke up on December 21, 1984 and was not resumed, as 
had been planned, in 1985. Even if the All Party Conference had 
reached an agreement on devolution, it was unlikely that it could 
have been implemented because the SLFP and the Mahajana 
Eksath Peramuna had withdrawn from the negotiations. The 
proposals also were denounced by militant Sinhalese groups, such 
as politically active Buddhist monks, who viewed them as a sellout 
to the Tamils. 

India's Perspective 

By the close of 1984, it was becoming clear that the parties within 
Sri Lanka were incapable of reaching a workable compromise on 
their own. The new Congress (I), I for Indira Gandhi, govern- 
ment of Rajiv Gandhi in India assumed an active mediation role 
at the request of the government of Sri Lanka. Gandhi's own in- 
terest in containing the ethnic crisis was self-evident. Thousands 
of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees were fleeing to Tamil Nadu State, 
which was also a sanctuary for most of the militant groups and the 
now disenfranchised TULF (the number of Tamil refugees was 
more than 100,000 in early 1987). Local politicians, particularly 
Tamil Nadu's chief minister, M.G. Ramachandran, demanded 
initiatives on the part of New Delhi to halt the violence. Ramachan- 
dran 's AIADMK was one of the few southern regional parties 
friendly to Gandhi's Congress (I). An appearance of insensitivity 
to Tamil suffering on the part of New Delhi might cost it the sup- 
port of the AIADMK or strengthen the hand of the Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam, the state's major opposition party. 

At the same time, Gandhi, whose predecessor as prime minister 
(his mother) had been assassinated by Sikh extremists on Oc- 
tober 31, 1984, had no desire to encourage separatist forces within 
his own ethnically and religiously divided country by sponsoring 
separatist sentiments in Sri Lanka. New Delhi wished to rein in 
the Tigers without appearing to be too enthusiastic a backer of 
Jayewardene's government. 

A third problem for Gandhi was strategic. As the ethnic crisis 
deepened, the Jayewardene government sought increasing military 



208 



Parliament, Colombo 
Courtesy Doranne Jacobson 



aid from countries of which India was suspicious or which seemed 
to challenge New Delhi's primacy in the Indian Ocean region. 
China, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), 
and South Africa supplied Sri Lanka with arms. Israel operated 
a special interest section in the United States Embassy in Colombo, 
and Israeli experts provided training in counterinsurgency and land 
settlement strategies. Retired members of Britain's Special Air Ser- 
vice also trained Sri Lankan military personnel. India also feared 
that the United States naval forces might establish an Indian Ocean 
base at the strategic port of Trincomalee ("another Diego Garcia" 
charged India). The most ominous foreign presence, however, was 
Pakistan's. In March- April 1985, Jayewardene made an official 
visit to Islamabad to confer with President Mohammed Zia ul Haq 
and other top Pakistani officials. According to Indian sources, Sri 
Lankan forces were trained by Pakistani advisers both in Sri Lanka 
and Pakistan. Gandhi, like his mother before him, referred to Sri 
Lanka's inclusion within a "Washington-Islamabad-Beijing axis." 

The Eastern Province Question 

Indian pressure was apparently a major factor in persuading the 
four major guerrilla groups included within the Eelam National 
Liberation Front (the LTTE, TELO, EROS, and EPRLF) and 
the Tamil political party, TULF, to hold talks with a government 



209 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

delegation headed by the president's brother, Hector Jay ewardene. 
The meetings were convened in July and August 1985 in Thimpu, 
capital of Bhutan. Jayewardene advanced a proposal involving, as 
in the 1984 All Party Conference, the granting of autonomy to dis- 
trict councils. He also proposed the creation of a separate legisla- 
ture for the Tamil-majority northern region of the island. The Tamil 
groups made four demands: recognition of the Tamils as a distinct 
national group, the creation of a Tamil state (Eelam) from North- 
ern and Eastern provinces, the right of self-determination for the 
Tamil "nation," and full citizenship rights for all Tamils resident 
in Sri Lanka. The government rejected the first three on the grounds 
that they amounted to separatism, which was prohibited by the 
Constitution and the talks broke off abruptly on August 18, 1985, 
when Tamil delegates accused the armed forces of continuing to 
perpetrate atrocities against Tamil civilians. The fourth demand, 
for granting Sri Lankan citizenship to 96,000 Indian Tamils, was 
met in January 1986. 

In December 1985, TULF broke ranks with the militants and 
announced support for a Tamil-majority federal state remaining 
within Sri Lanka with the devolution of substantial executive, legis- 
lative, and judicial powers. The government, however, objected 
to the controversial joining of Eastern Province with Northern 
Province in the proposed federal unit. Although Northern Province 
clearly had a Tamil majority and limited economic potential, the 
position in Eastern Province was ambiguous: 58 percent of its popu- 
lation was either Sinhalese or Muslim. Although Eastern Province 
Muslims spoke Tamil, the great majority were descended from Arab 
settlers. Also, Eastern Province contained large areas of fertile and 
economically exploitable land and the strategic port of Trincomalee. 
Although a second All Party Conference was held in June 1986, 
neither TULF nor the militants participated. Talks in Colombo 
between TULF and the government were snagged on the issue of 
the status of Eastern Province. 

The Eastern Province issue brought the Muslims into the negoti- 
ations not only because they viewed themselves as a community 
quite separate from both the Tamils and Sinhalese but also because 
there had been communal violence involving Tamils and Muslims 
in Eastern Province during the 1980s, and the latter were not en- 
thusiastic about being included in a separate, Tamil-dominated 
state. According to the leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, 
M. Ashraff, "we are a community being oppressed both by the 
Sinhalese and the Tamils." Some younger Muslims expressed sym- 
pathy for the LTTE, but the leadership of the community wanted 



210 



Government and Politics 



the government to grant them some kind of autonomous status 
separate from any settlement with the Tamils. 

By late 1986, Jayewardene's government found itself tied down 
by conflicting communal interests that included not only the Sri 
Lankan Tamils and Muslims but Sinhalese who rallied behind the 
nationalist appeal of Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Movement for 
Defense of the Nation. Against a background of unremitting vio- 
lence that included bloody Tamil terrorist bombings in Colombo, 
the status of Eastern Province remained a major stumbling block. 
Given the stalemate, India's participation loomed larger in any for- 
mula that had a chance of achieving peace. 

In November 1986, Sri Lankan and Indian leaders conferred 
at the annual summit meeting of the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Bangalore, India. They out- 
lined a settlement that included provincial councils for Northern 
and Eastern provinces and special provisions for Eastern Province 
that would entail the establishment of local councils for Sinhalese 
in Trincomalee, Tamils in Batticaloa District, and Muslims in the 
southern district of Amparai. This arrangement was scrapped in 
the face of Tamil opposition. On December 17-19, 1986, Presi- 
dent Jayewardene met cabinet-level Indian officials in Colombo 
and agreed to another set of proposals, described as a "beginning 
point for further negotiations," which conceded the possible merger 
of Northern and Eastern provinces and the joining of Sinhalese- 
majority areas of Amparai District to the inland province of Uva. 
This proposal, too, was scrapped, because of the objections of 
Amparai Muslims. 

By early 1987, India had grown impatient with the lack of 
progress on an accord and threatened to end its mediating role. 
A still more serious problem was the apparent determination of 
the Sri Lankan government to use military means to solve the cri- 
sis. In late May, a large-scale offensive, dubbed Operation Liber- 
ation, was launched against the LTTE in the Jaffna Peninsula. The 
offensive caused considerable hardship among local civilians. Indian 
efforts to bring relief supplies by boat were rebuffed by the Sri 
Lankan Navy on June 3, 1987, but an airdrop of supplies by the 
Indian Air Force took place the next day. Sri Lanka labelled this 
action a "naked violation" of its territorial integrity. 

By July 1987, however, Jayewardene — weary of the bloodletting 
and sincere in his desire for a peaceful solution — and Prime Minister 
Gandhi, perceiving that he could not afford an indefinite prolon- 
gation of the crisis, had groped to within reach of a viable accord. 
In a July 1 letter, Gandhi urged Jayewardene to come up with some 
"new ideas" on a settlement. On July 16, Jayewardene, his cabinet, 



211 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

and the Indian high commissioner in Colombo, Jyotindra Nath 
Dixit, conferred on an "improved version" of the December 19, 
1986, proposals which were sent two days later to New Delhi and 
subsequently formed the basis for the July 29, 1987, Indo-Sri 
Lankan Accord. 

The major task for Gandhi, acting as middleman, was to draw 
the Tamil militants into the settlement. On July 28, after a last 
minute meeting with the Indian prime minister, LTTE leader 
Prabhakaran announced his support for the accord. In an inter- 
view with India Today, he reconciled this decision with the long- 
standing LTTE demand for an independent state by citing the 
accord's recognition of the Northern and Eastern provinces' sta- 
tus as places of "historical habitation of Tamil-speaking people." 
But Prabhakaran also noted that he had not been a party to the 
accord and doubted that it would bring lasting peace. The four 
other major guerilla groups also gave their backing to the pact on 
July 28, though they expressed concern about its "deficiencies." 

On July 30, 1987, Gandhi arrived in Colombo to sign a com- 
prehensive settlement that had, as its main points the turn in of 
weapons by militant groups, a merger of Northern and Eastern 
provinces to create a single administrative unit; nationwide elec- 
tions for eight (instead of the former nine) provincial councils be- 
fore December 31, 1987 (not held until 1988); recognition of both 
Tamil and English as official (rather than national) languages on 
an equal status with Sinhala; amnesty for Tamil guerrillas and de- 
tainees; a cease-fire; return of Sri Lankan security forces to their 
barracks; the disbanding of Sinhalese militia units (who had ac- 
quired a reputation of viciousness toward Tamil civilians); and a 
referendum for Eastern Province, originally scheduled for Decem- 
ber 31 , 1988 but postponed until January 1990, to decide whether 
the merger of Northern and Eastern provinces should be perma- 
nent. India agreed to assist implementation of the accord by post- 
ing a peacekeeping force in the northern part of Sri Lanka 
(subsequently known as the Indian Peacekeeping Force) and helping 
to oversee the surrender of arms by Tamil militants, to be accom- 
plished by August 3, 1987 (see Foreign Military Presence, ch. 5). 
New Delhi would also oblige Tamil militants to abandon their bases 
in Tamil Nadu State and assist the Sri Lankan Navy in patrolling 
the waters of the Palk Strait. 

Rather predictably, the accord sparked the ire of the Sinhalese 
population. Gandhi was physically attacked by a rifle- wielding sailor 
while reviewing an honor guard in Colombo on July 30. Demon- 
strations against the accord in Colombo and other places resulted 
in nearly forty deaths. At the same time, the pact caused a cabinet 



212 



Government and Politics 



crisis. Several factions within the UNP opposed the merger of 
Northern and Eastern provinces and the alleged surrender of Sri 
Lankan independence to India. The opponents included Prime 
Minister Ramasinghe Premadasa, Minister of Defense and National 
Security Lalith Athulathmudali, and several other cabinet mem- 
bers. Premadasa signalled his displeasure by not attending the offi- 
cial functions held for Gandhi in Colombo on July 29 and 30. As 
the fighting in the north subsided following the cease-fire, however, 
so did the cabinet crisis. 

Optimism over the accord soon turned to disappointment when 
the LTTE refused to turn in its weapons and hostilities flared up 
again, this time between the LTTE and the Indian Peacekeeping 
Force. By October 1987, approximately 20,000 Indian troops were 
engaged in pitched battles with between 2,000 and 3,000 LTTE 
guerrillas. The fighting represented a major loss of face for New 
Delhi. India had promised Sri Lanka that the Tigers would be com- 
pletely disarmed, but it was apparent that the militants had sur- 
rendered only a fraction of their arsenal in August. In the face of 
mounting Indian military and Tamil civilian casualties, pessimists 
on the subcontinent speculated whether the accord signalled the 
beginning of India's "Vietnam" or "Afghanistan." In Colombo, 
SLFP leader Anura Bandaranaike declared that "the Indian Army 
is like the Trojan Horse. We accepted them and expected them 
to bring peace, and they then started watching as our people were 
butchered .... They have come here to stay. They won't take 
the President's orders." 

Jayewardene, who survived a grenade attack in the Parliament 
building on August 18, 1987, was faced with the daunting task of 
obtaining the legislature's approval of the radical political changes 
outlined in the July 29 accord. Provincial autonomy was embod- 
ied in the Thirteenth Amendment to the 1978 Constitution, which 
the Supreme Court, in a five to four ruling, declared would not 
need to be submitted to a popular referendum if minor changes 
were made. Against the background of the J VP-instigated terror- 
ist attacks in Sinhalese-majority areas and assassination threats 
against members of Parliament who approved the amendment, it 
was passed by 136 to 11, or substantially more than the required 
two-thirds majority. Few observers believed, however, that the es- 
tablishment of new provincial political institutions would bring last- 
ing peace to this strife-torn country. 

Foreign Relations 

The two most important factors in Sri Lanka's foreign relations 
since 1948 have been a commitment in principle to nonalignment 



213 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

and the necessity of preserving satisfactory relations with India 
without sacrificing independence. India had almost fifty times Sri 
Lanka's land area and population and forty times its gross national 
product in the late 1980s. Its point of view could not be ignored, 
but neither the country's political leaders nor the person in the street 
(especially if he or she were Sinhalese) wanted the island to be- 
come an appendage to India's regional power ambitions. The 
July 29, 1987, Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and the involvement of 
a large number of Indian troops in the northeast, however, seemed 
to many if not most Sri Lankans to be an unacceptable compromise 
of national independence. 

Sri Lanka's first prime minister, Don Stephen Senanayake, had 
committed the country to a "middle path" of nonalignment to avoid 
entanglement in superpower rivalries (see Independence, ch. 1). 
But nonalignment has had its modulations in the decades since in- 
dependence. UNP governments were generally friendlier to the 
West than those formed by the left-leaning SLFP. Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike deeply distrusted Washington's intentions and culti- 
vated close and friendly relations with China in the early 1960s, 
a time when that country was vocally committed to the worldwide 
export of "wars of national liberation." Jayewardene gave Sri 
Lanka's foreign policy a decidedly Western orientation after he 
came to power in July 1977. This change was motivated largely 
by the desire to secure aid and investment in order to promote his 
government's economic liberalization program. At the same time, 
Sri Lanka shared with Western nations apprehensions concerning 
India's apparent determination to make the Indian Ocean region 
an Indian sphere of influence and its preservation of close ties with 
Moscow. 

Although the 1972 constitution declared the nation a republic 
and ended its dominion status within the Commonwealth of Na- 
tions, Sri Lanka, like India, remained a Commonwealth member 
in the later 1980s. The country also belonged, like other South Asian 
states, to the seven-member South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC), a group formed in the early 1980s to 
deliberate on regional problems. SAARC provided a context in 
which South Asian states other than India could discuss the Sri 
Lankan ethnic issue. But few observers regarded SAARC 's role 
in any resolution of the crisis as anything more than peripheral. 
Some observers interpreted Sri Lanka's unsuccessful bid in 1982 
to gain membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as an attempt to put a little comfortable distance between 
itself and India. The application was rejected, ostensibly on geo- 
graphic grounds. 



214 



Government and Politics 



Relations with Western States 

Ties with the United States in the late 1980s were based on a 
common democratic tradition, a mutual appreciation of the vir- 
tues of economic liberalization and market-oriented reforms, United 
States participation in major development projects such as the 
Accelerated Mahaweli Ganga Program, and seemingly convergent 
security interests in the Indian Ocean. The existence of a Voice 
of America relay facility on the island, used to transmit broadcasts 
within the South Asia region, was part of Washington-Colombo ties. 

Large numbers of educated Sri Lankans, both Sinhalese and 
Tamil, lived in the United States, Britain, and Western Europe 
during the 1970s and 1980s. Overseas Tamils played a role in pub- 
licizing the plight of their countrymen in host country media and 
provided the militant movement with some financial support. An 
increasing number of Western countries expressed criticism of 
human rights violations by the government. For example, Nor- 
way halted all aid to Sri Lankan government bodies in June 1987 
to protest abuses. The plight of Tamil refugees was highlighted 
in August 1986 when two lifeboats carrying 155 Sri Lankan Tamils 
were rescued off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada. It appeared 
that the Tamils had fled West Germany after being denied refu- 
gee status by the Bonn government and had been cast adrift from 
a West German-owned freighter (the Canadian government gave 
them one-year work permits and promised to consider applications 
for refugee status). At the same time, the fund-raising activities 
of many sympathizers in the West, including refugees, were not 
entirely within legal bounds. In January 1986, the Swiss govern- 
ment arrested seventy Tamil refugees on charges of selling heroin. 

The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and Foreign Relations 

In an exchange of executive letters coinciding with the July 29, 
1987, accord, President Jayewardene gave assurances to Gandhi 
that the port of Trincomalee would not be used by foreign powers, 
including the United States, and that agreements with the United 
States to upgrade the Voice of America facility and with Israel and 
Pakistan to provide military security would be reconsidered. 

Indications in early 1988 were that although New Delhi wanted 
to avoid accusations that it was turning a formerly independent 
country into a client state, India was determined to prevent Sri 
Lanka from developing closer ties with unfriendly or potentially 
unfriendly foreign powers, such as Pakistan, Israel, and the United 
States. The India Today correspondent quoted a senior Indian 
military officer as asserting that "Pakistan's military involvement 



215 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

in Sri Lanka ended on July 29, 1987." But other observers won- 
dered whether India, by cutting the Gordian knot of the Sri Lankan 
ethnic crisis and hoping at the same time to thwart Pakistan's am- 
bitions, was finally exercising its full potential as one of the world's 
major nations or was being drawn into a military nightmare that 
would bring costs in men and money but few rewards. 

* * * 

S.J. Tambiah's Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and The Dismantling 
of a Democracy gives a critical account of both the ideological and 
socioeconomic bases of the ethnic crisis and forcefully argues that 
the Sinhalese-majority government bears a major responsibility for 
the violence and for the erosion of democratic institutions. A book 
by Craig Baxter et al., Government and Politics in South Asia, pro- 
vides a detached but useful overview of Sri Lankan society, politi- 
cal dynamics, and governmental institutions. Janice Jiggins's Caste 
and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese, 1947-1976 provides analy- 
sis of the pre-Jayewardene era, giving an excellent description of 
the often neglected factor of caste in politics. On the evolution of 
political institutions and attitudes from the very earliest times to 
the 1970s, see K.M. de Silva's A History of Sri Lanka. 

The biweekly India Today and the weekly Far Eastern Economic 
Review provide good coverage of the latest political developments. 
Articles on Sri Lanka are also frequently published in Asian Sur- 
vey, Pacific Affairs, and journals covering comparative politics, such 
as the Political Science Quarterly. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



216 



Chapter 5. National Security 




Sri Lankan soldiers 



Sri LANKA HAS since earliest times been within the security 
orbit of its massive northern neighbor. Successive waves of inva- 
sion from the kingdoms of ancient India brought the majority of 
the Tamil and Sinhalese inhabitants to the island, while the over- 
whelming military power to the north historically has been the 
dominant external threat. In its distant past, Sri Lanka on a few 
occasions was able to project military power beyond its own shores 
to participate in the struggles of south India. For most of its his- 
tory, however, and for all of the twentieth century, Sri Lanka's 
security posture has been a defensive one, responding with a greater 
or lesser degree of internal unity to the threats of the outside world. 
Together with India, Sri Lanka was swept along in the regional 
conflicts of world powers, undergoing domination in turn by the 
Portuguese, Dutch, and British. 

Since independence in 1948, the nation has attempted to balance 
an external policy of nonalignment with an increasing reliance on 
Western development aid and an institutional affinity to British 
political and legal systems. While retaining membership in the Com- 
monwealth, Sri Lanka reclaimed military bases granted to the Brit- 
ish under a 1947 defense agreement and has attempted to insure 
its security by maintaining good ties with both the Western and 
communist worlds. Within the South Asian region, India continues 
to play a dominant role in Sri Lankan strategic consciousness and 
is perceived as the primary long-term external threat. 

New Delhi's role in Sri Lankan national security has been fur- 
ther complicated by the direct involvement of Indian troops in the 
island nation's internal ethnic conflict in the late 1980s. Although 
this conflict is sometimes traced back to the mythical prehistory 
of ancient Sri Lanka, it emerged on the modern scene with the 
resurgence of Sinhalese nationalism in the 1950s, and by the early 
1980s it constituted the single most serious threat to the nation's 
security. In addition to occasional outbreaks of large-scale civil vio- 
lence between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities, the govern- 
ment has been faced with subversion and armed attacks from a 
changing array of terrorist organizations representing both Sinhalese 
and Tamil interests. 

The armed forces were slow in responding to this threat. At the 
time of independence, Sri Lanka had only a small, volunteer reserve 
force led primarily by British officers. After the establishment of 
the Royal Ceylon Army, Navy, and Air Force in the years following 



219 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

independence, the country continued to rely on volunteers to pro- 
vide for its security; its small armed forces served mainly to assist 
the police in the maintenance of public order. Two major events 
in the 1970s and 1980s forced the government to break with this 
past practice and to give a higher priority to defense issues. The 
first was the 1971 insurrection by the People's Liberation Front 
(Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna — JVP) that caught the army largely 
unprepared and forced the government to rely on foreign military 
assistance to restore order. The second event, the communal riot- 
ing of July 1983, left thousands of Tamil civilians dead and fueled 
a Tamil insurgency strong enough to wrest control of the Jaffna 
Peninsula from the Sri Lankan government. Faced with these 
challenges, the government made important changes in the struc- 
ture and size of the armed forces. It instituted a national draft in 
1985, intensified its recruitment and training efforts, and devoted 
a greater percentage of the budget to its growing military needs. 

In spite of these improvements, the Sri Lankan government found 
itself unable to deal with the military, political, and fiscal pressures 
caused by the Tamil insurgency. In July 1987, President Junius R. 
Jayewardene and Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi signed an 
accord providing a political solution to the conflict and allowing 
Indian peacekeeping troops to enforce the cease-fire and laying 
down of arms in the Northern Province. Continuing conflict on 
the terms of the accord led to a resumption of fighting in Septem- 
ber 1987, with the Indian troops participating as active combat- 
ants in support of the Sri Lankan government. By December 1987, 
the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) had increased to 30,000 
troops, and Sinhalese political groups expressed a growing impa- 
tience at the extended presence of Indian forces. Although these 
troops were purportedly fighting on behalf of the Sri Lankan gov- 
ernment, many Sinhalese still viewed them with grave suspicion 
and saw their continued presence as a challenge to Sri Lankan 
sovereignty. 

Like the Sri Lankan armed forces, the national police experienced 
major changes as a result of the deterioration of public order in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Previously an unarmed force organized 
along British lines, the police force was greatly expanded and pro- 
vided with a variety of firearms in the wake of the 1971 uprising. 
The Tamil insurgency in the Northern and Eastern provinces 
prompted the creation of the Special Task Force, a police field force 
that played a major role in anti-insurgent operations in the 1980s. 
At the same time, the regular police force was supplemented by 
the formation of a local militia known as Home Guards. 



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National Security 



The challenge of both Sinhalese and Tamil insurgent movements 
also brought substantial change to the criminal justice system. After 
an initial liberalization in the wake of the 1977 elections, the United 
National Party (UNP) government moved to expand the powers 
of the police, the armed forces, and the courts at the expense of 
civil liberties. Through emergency regulations and a variety of anti- 
terrorist provisions, the government imposed temporary restric- 
tions on the fundamental freedoms embodied in the Constitution. 

Primary Threats to National Security 

The most immediate threats to Sri Lankan national security in 
1988 were internal rather than external. The Tamil insurgency was 
the most severe of these, involving a changing number of heavily 
armed terrorist groups that carried out attacks on military and 
civilian targets throughout the island and, for most of 1986, actu- 
ally controlled the Jaffna Peninsula (see fig. 1). A second source 
of instability came from leftist nationalist Sinhalese groups opposed 
to Tamil autonomy. The chief among these, the J VP, launched 
a short-lived insurrection in 1971 that came close to toppling the 
government of Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike. After a period of 
open participation in the political system, the J VP resumed its vio- 
lent antigovernment activities in the 1980s, and expanded its fol- 
lowing considerably at the time of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 
July 1987. The government also faced a growing problem of civil 
violence that seriously threatened the democratic process. This un- 
rest stemmed not only from the continuing ethnic conflict but also 
from a general economic malaise that increasingly prevented young 
men from playing productive roles in society (see Labor, ch. 3). 
The problem of a restless, unemployed youth, although separate 
from the ethnic difficulties, was instrumental in providing a fertile 
recruiting ground for extremists in search of a following. 

Throughout the 1980s, external threats to the nation's security 
were long term rather than immediate and tended to involve the 
rivalry between regional and world superpowers for influence over 
the Indian Ocean. The port of Trincomalee, one of the best natural 
harbors in the world, has long been attractive to foreign nations 
interested in Indian Ocean bases. India has expressed a determi- 
nation to prevent either the United States or the Soviet Union from 
establishing a naval presence there, and the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord 
helped confirm the Indian claim of regional leadership. 

The Tamil Insurgency 

Political and economic conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamil 
communities was a problem of growing urgency in the years 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

following independence. In the face of an expanding Sinhalese eth- 
nic nationalism, Tamil groups initially expressed their grievances 
through legally constituted political channels, participating in 
parliamentary debate through the Tamil Congress and the Fed- 
eral Party. In the early 1970s, however, a number of events worked 
to create a new sense of alienation, especially among Tamil youths, 
and a new desire to seek redress through extralegal means. In 1970 
the Ministry of Education introduced quotas for university admis- 
sion that effectively reduced the number of places available for Tamil 
students. As a result, a contingent of young, educated Tamils was 
cut off from the traditional path to advancement and set loose on 
an economy ill-prepared to accommodate them. 

Tamil interests received another blow in 1971 when the Constit- 
uent Assembly met to draft a new constitution. Federal Party 
delegates to the assembly proposed that the new republic be designed 
along federal lines to insure a large degree of autonomy for Tamil 
areas. In addition, the Tamils hoped to remove the special status 
that had been granted to the Sinhala language and Buddhism. The 
Constituent Assembly not only rejected both of these proposals, 
but even denied the minimal protection to minorities that had been 
guaranteed under the Soulbury Constitution of 1946. The Tamil 
delegates responded by walking out of the assembly. 

The neglect of Tamil interests in the Constituent Assembly and 
the enactment of the new constitution in 1972 marked a turning 
point in Tamil political participation. The older generation of Tamil 
leaders had been discredited: their activity in the political process 
had accomplished little, and the Marxist J VP insurrection of 1971 
had set a new model for political activism (see The Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna, this ch.). Two new groups emerged as an 
expression of the growing alienation and frustration in the Tamil 
community. The first, the Tamil United Front, was a coalition of 
Tamil interest groups and legal parties united by an urgent call 
for Tamil autonomy. The group espoused nonviolent means to 
achieve its goals — demonstrations, strikes, and roadblocks — and 
yet it offered tacit support to other, more confrontational tactics. 
The second of the new groups, the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), aban- 
doned the political process altogether and geared itself for violence. 
The TNT was founded in 1972 by Velupillai Prabhakaran, an 
eighteen-year-old school dropout who was the son of a minor 
government official. Both the name and the emblem of the new 
group included the tiger, the traditional symbol of the ancient Tamil 
kingdoms and one that clearly opposed the lion symbol of Sinha- 
lese nationalism. Despite this obvious ethnic affiliation, the TNT 



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publicly espoused a Marxist ideology and claimed to represent the 
oppressed of all ethnic groups. 

In July 1975, the TNT gained wide public attention with the 
assassination of the Tamil mayor of Jaffna, who had ordered the 
police to open fire on a Tamil rights demonstration outside city 
hall. Except for this act of violence, the activities of the TNT in 
this period are largely undocumented, and little evidence exists of 
widespread public support for its violent methods. Moreover, the 
prospects for a political solution had improved by 1976; the general 
elections scheduled for 1977 offered hope that the fiercely pro- 
Sinhalese Bandaranaike government could be ousted and replaced 
by the more moderate United National Party. At the local level, 
the Tamil United Liberation Front, a political party spawned by 
the Tamil United Front, launched a major campaign for a separate 
state in Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern provinces. 

The victory of the United National Party and the emergence of 
the Tamil United Liberation Front as the leader of the parliamen- 
tary opposition seemed to give substance to those political hopes. 
With the enactment of a new constitution, however, it became clear 
that no major party could turn its back on Sinhalese nationalism. 
In the Constitution of 1978, as in the previous one, Sinhala re- 
mained the sole official language, Buddhism retained "the fore- 
most place" under law, and federal autonomy was denied the Tamil 
areas. The political disillusionment that emerged in the early 1970s 
increased after the 1977 elections and gained added impetus after 
the anti-Tamil riots of 1981 and 1983. A progressive radicaliza- 
tion of the Tamil population led to a growth in the size and level 
of activity of militant groups, and the insurgency emerged as a grow- 
ing threat to the power of the government. 

Insurgent Groups 

The largest and most influential of the Tamil insurgent groups 
was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Eelam is the original 
Tamil name for Sri Lanka). Founded in 1972 as the Tamil New 
Tigers, the group changed its name in 1976 as it accelerated its 
violent campaign for Tamil independence. The growth of the in- 
surgency in the late 1970s brought with it an increasing fragmen- 
tation as personal, caste, and tactical differences divided the original 
movement. One of the earliest groups to break away was the Peo- 
ple's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (known variously 
as PLOT or PLOTE). The group was formed in 1981 by Uma 
Maheswaran, a disgruntled member of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who had major disagreements with LTTE 
leader Prabhakaran. The new group claimed to represent a purer 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

form of Marxist orthodoxy. Although ideological disputes may have 
been involved in the split, caste also seems to have played an im- 
portant role; LTTE members were largely from Karaiya and low- 
caste urban backgrounds, whereas PLOT contained mostly Vellala, 
a high-caste rural group (see Caste, ch. 2). 

A host of other groups emerged in the early 1980s. Like the 
LTTE, most of these organizations espoused a Marxist ideology 
that appeared prominently in their publications but seemed to play 
only a minor role in their activities and indoctrination. Chief among 
these new groups were the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization 
(TELO), the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front, the 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Army, the Tamil Eelam Army, and the 
Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS). Known 
collectively as "Tigers" or simply "the boys," these groups oper- 
ated in changing patterns of competition and cooperation, form- 
ing a variety of coalitions (such as the Eelam National Liberation 
Front and the Three Stars). Through a series of armed attacks, 
the LTTE eliminated TELO, a major rival, and by late 1986 had 
established itself as the dominant, if not the sole, spokesman of the 
Tamil insurgency. 

Financial and technical support for the Tamil movement came 
from a variety of domestic and foreign sources. Internally, the 
Tigers relied on "taxes" either willingly donated or extorted from 
the local populace which were supplemented by a number of bank 
robberies. External support came from Tamils overseas, most nota- 
bly in southern India, North America, and Western Europe. Many 
of the insurgent groups maintained headquarters and training 
facilities in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where the state govern- 
ment and a predominantly Tamil population were sympathetic to 
their insurgent brethren in Sri Lanka. Official Indian support was 
curtailed sharply, however, following the signing of the Indo-Sri 
Lankan Accord in July 1987. There were also unconfirmed reports 
that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had provided 
training at its installations in the Middle East. 

Major Incidents of the Insurgency 

After the assassination of Jaffna's mayor in 1975, the militant 
groups accelerated their campaign of violence and destabilization. 
Their early targets included policemen, soldiers, and a number of 
Tamil politicians who were seen as collaborators with the Sinhalese- 
dominated government. The attacks were sporadic, relying largely 
on hit-and-run tactics. 

In July 1983, the LTTE ambushed a military convoy in North- 
ern Province, killing thirteen soldiers. The attack sparked off a 



224 



National Security 



conflagration of communal violence in which approximately 350 
Tamils were killed and as many as 100,000 were forced to flee their 
homes. Indiscriminate violence by Sinhalese mobs and members 
of the security forces led to insecurity and alienation among the 
Tamil population, and support for the insurgency grew dramati- 
cally. The year 1984 was marked by a substantial increase in ter- 
rorist attacks, and the militants turned increasingly against civilian 
targets. Major incidents included an armed attack against civilians 
in the ancient Sinhalese city of Anuradhapura (May 1985 — 146 
dead); the detonation of a bomb aboard an Air Lanka jet at the 
Bandaranaike International Airport (May 1986 — 20 dead); and a 
massive explosion at the Pettah bus station in Colombo during rush 
hour (April 1987—110 dead). 

As the Tamil movement grew and obtained more weapons, it 
changed tactics. A full-fledged insurgency that could confront the 
armed forces replaced the isolated terrorist incidents that had charac- 
terized the early period. By early 1986, the LTTE had won vir- 
tual control of the Jaffna Peninsula, confining the army to military 
bases and taking over the day-to-day administration of the city of 
Jaffna. In January 1987, the Tigers attempted to formalize their 
authority over the peninsula by establishing an "Eelam Secre- 
tariat." LTTE leaders claimed that this was intended simply to 
consolidate functions that the insurgents were already performing, 
i.e., collecting taxes and operating basic public services. Nonethe- 
less, the government interpreted this move as a unilateral declara- 
tion of independence and thus a challenge to governmental 
authority. 

In response, the government launched a major offensive against 
Jaffna in May and June 1987. The security forces succeeded in 
destroying major insurgent bases and regaining control of most 
of the peninsula, but at the cost of growing political pressure from 
India. Reports of army brutality and high civilian casualties among 
the Tamil population made the offensive increasingly unaccepta- 
ble to the Indian government, which had its own substantial Tamil 
minority to worry about. In early June, Indian Air Force planes 
invaded Sri Lankan airspace to drop relief supplies into embattled 
Tamil areas, sending a message to the Sri Lankan government that 
the offensive would not be allowed to continue. Within a week, 
the Sri Lankan government announced the successful completion 
of its campaign. 

On July 29, 1987, President Jayewardene signed an accord with 
India designed to bring an end to the more than ten years of vio- 
lence between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil minor- 
ity. The accord provided for the disarming of militant groups under 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

the supervision of the Indian Peacekeeping Force and the grant- 
ing of limited autonomy to the primarily Tamil regions in North- 
ern and Eastern provinces. The terms of the accord provoked 
immediate criticism from a number of directions. For Sinhalese 
nationalists, including several high-level officials in Jayewardene's 
government, the agreement was a threat to the unitary nature of 
Sri Lanka, virtually sanctioning a separate Tamil nation within 
the island. Tamil militants questioned the basic validity of the 
accord; although prime participants in the conflict, they had not 
been included in the negotiations leading to the accord, and their 
later accession had been secured under extreme pressure from the 
Indian government. For the wider community of Tamils and Sin- 
halese, the presence of Indian troops, even in a peacekeeping role, 
represented an unacceptable compromise of sovereignty. 

These criticisms became increasingly acute when, in October 
1987, the Tamil militants and the Indian-Sri Lankan forces ac- 
cused each other of violating the accord, and the fighting resumed. 
Indian forces were expanded from an initial 3,000 troops to more 
than 70,000, and the Indian Peacekeeping Force launched a major 
assault that succeeded in taking Jaffna in late October (see For- 
eign Military Presence, this ch.). Most of the insurgents managed 
to escape and, according to press reports, regrouped in Mannar 
in Northern Province and in Batticaloa and other areas of Eastern 
Province. Weakened and cut off from their original bases and 
sources of supply, the Tigers were no longer able to conduct posi- 
tional warfare against the security forces, but they claimed that 
they would continue their struggle through terrorist attacks. 

The intervention of Indian forces in the north allowed the Sri 
Lankan Army to concentrate on another crisis that was develop- 
ing in the south; Sinhalese nationalist opposition to the Indo-Sri 
Lankan Accord had turned violent, breaking out in strikes and street 
demonstrations. In the midst of this disorder, an old Sinhalese ex- 
tremist organization was gaining in support and threatened to 
launch its second bid for power. 

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 

The leftist Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna drew world- 
wide attention when it launched an insurrection against the Ban- 
daranaike government in April 1971 . Although the insurgents were 
young, poorly armed, and inadequately trained, they succeeded 
in seizing and holding major areas in Southern and Central 
provinces before they were defeated by the security forces. Their 
attempt to seize power created a major crisis for the government 



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National Security 



and forced a fundamental reassessment of the nation's security 
needs. 

The movement was started in the late 1960s by Rohana 
Wijeweera, the son of a businessman from the seaport of Tangalla, 
Hambantota District. An excellent student, Wijeweera had been 
forced to give up his studies for financial reasons. Through friends 
of his father, a member of the Ceylon Communist Party, Wijeweera 
successfully applied for a scholarship in the Soviet Union, and in 
1960 at the age of seventeen, he went to Moscow to study medi- 
cine at Patrice Lumumba University. While in Moscow, he studied 
Marxist ideology but, because of his openly expressed sympathies 
for Maoist revolutionary theory, he was denied a visa to return 
to the Soviet Union after a brief trip home in 1964. Over the next 
several years, he participated in the pro-Beijing branch of the Ceylon 
Communist Party, but he was increasingly at odds with party lead- 
ers and impatient with its lack of revolutionary purpose. His suc- 
cess in working with youth groups and his popularity as a public 
speaker led him to organize his own movement in 1967. Initially 
identified simply as the New Left, this group drew on students and 
unemployed youths from rural areas, most of them in the sixteen- 
to-twenty-five age-group. Many of these new recruits were mem- 
bers of lower castes (Karava and Durava) who felt that their 
economic interests had been neglected by the nation's leftist coali- 
tions. The standard program of indoctrination, the so-called Five 
Lectures, included discussions of Indian imperialism, the grow- 
ing economic crisis, the failure of the island's communist and 
socialist parties, and the need for a sudden, violent seizure of power. 

Between 1967 and 1970, the group expanded rapidly, gaining 
control of the student socialist movement at a number of major 
university campuses and winning recruits and sympathizers within 
the armed forces. Some of these latter supporters actually provided 
sketches of police stations, airports, and military facilities that were 
important to the initial success of the revolt. In order to draw the 
newer members more tightly into the organization and to prepare 
them for a coming confrontation, Wijeweera opened "education 
camps" in several remote areas along the south and southwestern 
coasts. These camps provided training in Marxism-Leninism and 
in basic military skills. 

While developing secret cells and regional commands, 
Wijeweera' s group also began to take a more public role during 
the elections of 1970. His cadres campaigned openly for the United 
Front of Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike, but at the same time they 
distributed posters and pamphlets promising violent rebellion if Ban- 
daranaike did not address the interests of the proletariat. In a 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

manifesto issued during this period, the group used the name 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna for the first time. Because of the sub- 
versive tone of these publications, the United National Party govern- 
ment had Wijeweera detained during the elections, but the 
victorious Bandaranaike ordered his release in July 1970. In the 
politically tolerant atmosphere of the next few months, as the new 
government attempted to win over a wide variety of unorthodox 
leftist groups, the J VP intensified both the public campaign and 
the private preparations for a revolt. Although their group was rela- 
tively small, the members hoped to immobilize the government 
by selective kidnapping and sudden, simultaneous strikes against 
the security forces throughout the island. Some of the necessary 
weapons had been bought with funds supplied by the members. 
For the most part, however, they relied on raids against police sta- 
tions and army camps to secure weapons, and they manufactured 
their own bombs. 

The discovery of several JVP bomb factories gave the govern- 
ment its first evidence that the group's public threats were to be 
taken seriously. In March 1971, after an accidental explosion in 
one of these factories, the police found fifty-eight bombs in a hut 
in Nelundeniya, Kegalla District. Shortly afterward, Wijeweera 
was arrested and sent to Jaffna Prison, where he remained through- 
out the revolt. In response to his arrest and the growing pres- 
sure of police investigations, other JVP leaders decided to act im- 
mediately, and they agreed to begin the uprising at 11:00 P.M. 
on April 5. 

The planning for the countrywide insurrection was hasty and 
poorly coordinated; some of the district leaders were not informed 
until the morning of the uprising. After one premature attack, secu- 
rity forces throughout the island were put on alert and a number 
of JVP leaders went into hiding without bothering to inform their 
subordinates of the changed circumstances. In spite of this confu- 
sion, rebel groups armed with shotguns, bombs, and Molotov cock- 
tails launched simultaneous attacks against seventy-four police 
stations around the island and cut power to major urban areas. 
The attacks were most successful in the south. By April 10, the 
rebels had taken control of Matara District and the city of 
Ambalangoda in Galle District and came close to capturing the 
remaining areas of Southern Province. 

The new government was ill prepared for the crisis that con- 
fronted it. Although there had been some warning that an attack 
was imminent, Bandaranaike was caught off guard by the scale 
of the uprising and was forced to call on India to provide basic 
security functions. Indian frigates patrolled the coast and Indian 



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National Security 



troops guarded Bandaranaike International Airport at Katunayaka 
while Indian Air Force helicopters assisted the counteroffensive. 
Sri Lanka's all-volunteer army had no combat experience since 
World War II and no training in counterinsurgency warfare. 
Although the police were able to defend some areas unassisted, in 
many places the government deployed personnel from all three ser- 
vices in a ground force capacity. Royal Ceylon Air Force helicop- 
ters delivered relief supplies to beleaguered police stations while 
combined service patrols drove the insurgents out of urban areas 
and into the countryside. 

After two weeks of fighting, the government regained control 
of all but a few remote areas. In both human and political terms, 
the cost of the victory was high: an estimated 10,000 insurgents — 
many of them in their teens — died in the conflict, and the army 
was widely perceived to have used excessive force. In order to win 
over an alienated population and to prevent a prolonged conflict, 
Bandaranaike offered amnesties in May and June 1971, and only 
the top leaders were actually imprisoned. Wijeweera, who was 
already in detention at the time of the uprising, was given a twenty- 
year sentence and the J VP was proscribed. 

Under the six years of emergency rule that followed the upris- 
ing, the J VP remained dormant. After the victory of the United 
National Party in the 1977 elections, however, the new govern- 
ment attempted to broaden its mandate with a period of political 
tolerance. Wijeweera was freed, the ban was lifted, and the J VP 
entered the arena of legal political competition. As a candidate in 
the 1982 presidential elections, Wijeweera finished fourth, with 
more than 250,000 votes (as compared with Jayewardene's 3.2 mil- 
lion). During this period, and especially as the Tamil conflict to 
the north became more intense, there was a marked shift in the 
ideology and goals of the JVP. Initially Marxist in orientation, and 
claiming to represent the oppressed of both the Tamil and Sinha- 
lese communities, the group emerged increasingly as a Sinhalese 
nationalist organization opposing any compromise with the Tamil 
insurgency. This new orientation became explicit in the anti-Tamil 
riots of July 1983. Because of its role in inciting violence, the JVP 
was once again banned and its leadership went underground. 

The group's activities intensified in the second half of 1987 in 
the wake of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. The prospect of Tamil 
autonomy in the north together with the presence of Indian troops 
stirred up a wave of Sinhalese nationalism and a sudden growth 
of antigovernment violence. During 1987 a new group emerged 
that was an offshoot of the JVP — the Patriotic Liberation Organi- 
zation (Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya — DJV). The DJV claimed 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

responsibility for the August 1987 assassination attempts against 
the president and prime minister. In addition, the group launched 
a campaign of intimidation against the ruling party, killing more 
than seventy members of Parliament between July and November. 

Along with the group's renewed violence came a renewed fear 
of infiltration of the armed forces. Following the successful raid 
of the Pallekelle army camp in May 1987, the government con- 
ducted an investigation that resulted in the discharge of thirty- seven 
soldiers suspected of having links with the JVP. In order to pre- 
vent a repetition of the 1971 uprising, the government considered 
lifting the ban on the JVP in early 1988 and permitting the group 
to participate again in the political arena. With Wijeweera still 
underground, however, the JVP had no clear leadership at the time, 
and it was uncertain whether it had the cohesion to mount any 
coordinated offensive, either military or political, against the 
government. 

The Armed Forces 

The armed forces of Sri Lanka bear the clear imprint of the Brit- 
ish institutions and traditions that shaped them. The army was 
initially formed as a volunteer force to supplement the British mili- 
tary presence in the late nineteenth century, and British leader- 
ship of Sri Lankan troops continued through World War II. Even 
after independence, Britain continued to play a major role in train- 
ing, equipping, and symbolically leading of the Sri Lankan armed 
forces. 

During the 1970s and 1980s, the armed forces were greatly ex- 
panded and regularized in an attempt to cope with the growing 
problems of domestic instability. Despite these efforts, the mili- 
tary still lacked both the strength and the training to handle the 
crises that confronted the nation, and on two occasions the Sri 
Lankan government asked India to send in troops to restore inter- 
nal order. 

Because of their limited size and the pressing demands of inter- 
nal security, the military forces have not been deployed overseas. 
Rare exceptions have been the dispatch of small military observer 
groups, in connection with international peacekeeping efforts, such 
as the United Nations force on the Indo-Pakistani border in 1966. 
In their largely domestic mission of internal defense, the armed 
forces resemble the paramilitary and police forces of larger nations. 
Since independence, their role has gradually expanded to in- 
clude counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, controlling illegal 
immigration and smuggling, protecting vital institutions and 



230 



National Security 



government officials, and providing emergency relief during na- 
tional disasters. 

Historical Background 

Ancient Military Traditions 

Warfare plays a central role in the historical traditions of Sri 
Lanka. The two great literary works of this early period — the 
Mahavamsa and the Culavamsa — relate in great detail the battles and 
campaigns of the ancient kingdoms (see Ancient Legends and 
Chronicles, ch. 1). For most of Sri Lanka's history, these conflicts 
were confined to the island and its coastal waters as the various 
kingdoms battled with each other or attempted to repel new waves 
of immigrants and invaders from the mainland. In the twelfth cen- 
tury, however, Parakramabahu I was able to unify the island and 
assemble a military force strong enough to engage in conflicts over- 
seas. In 1164 he sent a naval force to Burma to retaliate for the 
poor treatment his envoys had received. In another expedition, to 
southern India, his army took part in a succession struggle for the 
Pandyan throne. 

Thirteenth-century manuscripts tell of "four-fold" armies in 
which divisions of elephants, chariots, cavalry, and infantry con- 
fronted each other in battle. Troops in this period were raised by 
local levies among ordinary citizens, while special corps of "moon- 
light archers" and mace-bearers were given extended training. For- 
eign mercenaries played an important role in these armies, with 
Indians (Tamils, Keralas, and Rajputs) especially prominent. 

The Armed Forces under British Rule 

Centuries of colonial rule by the Portuguese, Dutch, and Brit- 
ish interrupted Sri Lanka's martial traditions (see European 
Encroachment and Dominance, 1500-1948, ch. 1). The kingdoms 
of Jaffna, Kotte, and Kandy, divided by bitter rivalries, were un- 
able to mount a unified opposition to the colonial powers, and one 
by one, the native armies fell to the superior force of the invaders. 
The British defeat of the Kingdom of Kandy in 1815-18 marked 
the end of an independent Sri Lankan military force. The institu- 
tion of colonial rule, however, soon created the need for a native, 
military force to maintain order. To fill this need, the colonial 
government raised a contingent of light infantry named the Ceylon 
Rifles. The force was composed largely of Malay soldiers under 
British officers, and was the only formation of regular, full-time 
troops established in Sri Lanka during the colonial period. As such, 
its existence was brief, and when the maintenance of the unit became 



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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

too costly, it was disbanded. From 1873 until independence, the 
island's entire indigenous force consisted of a volunteer reservist 
army. 

The first component of this new army, the Ceylon Light Infan- 
try Volunteers, was established in 1881 by proclamation of the lieu- 
tenant governor. Like the Ceylon Rifles, the new volunteer force 
was commanded by British officers, while the ranks were filled out 
largely with Burghers, a highly Westernized group that adapted 
well to the demands of volunteer service (see Ethnic Groups, ch. 2). 
A mounted infantry company was added in 1892, and in 1900 this 
contingent was called to South Africa to assist the British army in 
the Boer War. 

In 1910 the volunteer corps was redesignated as the Ceylon 
Defence Force. Although Sri Lankan units were not deployed out- 
side the island in either of the world wars, individual soldiers served 
in the British and British Indian armies. In World War II, the Brit- 
ish crown took direct control of the island's armed forces from the 
colonial government. During this period, the Ceylon Light Infantry 
grew from 1 battalion to 5 battalions, while the total number of 
troops in uniform increased to 12,000. Most of these were engaged 
in maintenance and transport functions. Their most direct con- 
tact with the war came in April 1942 when the Japanese launched 
an air attack on Colombo. 

The Armed Forces after Independence 

The advent of independence and dominion status in 1948 brought 
with it a series of changes in the designation and legal basis for 
the armed forces. In 1949 the legislature passed a bill authorizing 
the creation of the Royal Ceylon Army, Royal Ceylon Navy, and 
Royal Ceylon Air Force. The army was formed in October of that 
year, and the navy and air force were established in 1950 and 1951 , 
respectively. These developments brought substantial changes at 
the highest levels of command, establishing an independent mili- 
tary force in the hands of an indigenous government for the first 
time in more than 100 years. At the level of individual units, 
however, the military order established by the British remained 
largely unchanged; the officers who took over as the force com- 
manders had received their training under the British and, in many 
cases, in military academies in Britain. The basic structure of the 
colonial forces was retained, as were the symbolic trappings — the 
flags, banners, and regimental ceremonies (the Duke of Gloucester 
continued to serve as the honorary colonel of the Light Infantry 
until 1972). 



232 




Dutch fort, Galle 
Courtesy Doranne Jacob son 

In the early years following independence, military affairs 
received a relatively low priority; external security was guaranteed 
by a mutual security arrangement with Britain, while the function 
of internal security was usually left to the police. In this period, 
the armed forces served a largely ceremonial function, providing 
honor guards for state visits and occasionally helping to maintain 
public order. From 1949 to 1955, military expenses took up be- 
tween 1 and 4 percent of the national budget (as compared with 
20 percent for India and 35 to 40 percent for Pakistan in the same 
period), and the regular forces comprised only about 3,000 officers 
and enlisted personnel. (This represented a significant drop from 
the wartime high of 12,000, some of whom had been transferred 
into the reserve forces). 

Even without sophisticated weaponry and training, this token 
military force was able to conduct the immigration-control and anti- 
smuggling operations that formed the bulk of its security missions 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Growing ethnic tensions after 1956 spawned 
a number of public disturbances in which the army was called to 
aid the civil powers, but these were largely local and small-scale 
events that offered no opportunity for traditional military opera- 
tions. When the leftist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna made its bid 
for power in April 1971, it confronted an army totally without 
combat experience and lacking the training necessary to deal with 



233 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

a large-scale insurgency (see The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, 
this ch.). 

In the wake of the 1971 insurrection, the government began to 
cope with some of the more glaring deficiencies of the armed forces. 
It immediately initiated a campaign to increase the size of each 
of the three services. In addition, the troops were reorganized to 
reflect the new concern with internal subversion; in 1972 the army 
was divided into area commands, and individual battalions were 
reinforced with larger rifle companies and additional support com- 
panies. Training in this period tended to focus on counterinsur- 
gency and jungle warfare. At the same time, because of the army's 
greater operational commitments, collective training was suspended 
entirely for a year, and then resumed only at the platoon level. 

Despite these reforms, the armed forces were once again unpre- 
pared for the outbreak of ethnic and political violence that shook 
the nation in 1983 (see The United National Party Returns to 
Power, ch. 1). This time, the military leadership was faced with 
a more complex set of problems, for the conflict threw into ques- 
tion not only the force's readiness, but also its reliability as a 
defender of public order. In responding to the anti-Tamil rioting 
that broke out in July 1983, the army was widely accused of fail- 
ing to restrain the Sinhalese mobs and of actively participating in 
acts of intimidation, arson, and murder against the civilian popu- 
lation. A 1983 report issued by the International Commission of 
Jurists documents instances of army soldiers "going on the ram- 
page," burning Tamil homes, and indiscriminately killing civilians 
in retaliation for Tamil militant attacks on army patrols. 

Such reports played a major role in exacerbating the ethnic con- 
flict and in fostering support for the Tamil Tigers among the Tamil 
civilian population. The perception of the armed forces as the eth- 
nic army of Sinhalese nationalism stemmed from a number of 
sources. First, beginning in the early 1960s, the government adopted 
a military recruitment program that deliberately favored Sinha- 
lese candidates (see Structure and Administration of the Armed 
Forces, this ch.). A force that had originally contained a dispropor- 
tionately high number of minorities (especially Tamils and Bur- 
ghers) came to be more than 95 percent Sinhalese by the early 1980s. 
Furthermore, the role of political and military leaders during the 
1983 rioting suggested that the anti-Tamil violence of the security 
forces was receiving sympathy, if not outright support, at high 
levels. For several days after the rioting began, President Jaye- 
wardene refrained from any public condemnation of the violence. 
When he did finally speak out, it was to denounce the Tamil 
insurgents and the forces of separatism. Military leaders were 



234 



National Security 



similarly slow to call to account those soldiers responsible for 
atrocities. 

In the face of a growing Tamil insurgency, the armed forces re- 
mained seriously understrength. The army's fighting force nomi- 
nally consisted of five regiments, each consisting of one regular 
and two volunteer battalions. In fact, only one of these regiments 
had the full complement of volunteers, and these recruits were 
poorly trained and equipped. The regular forces themselves were 
below nominal staffing levels, and navy and air force personnel 
were frequently deployed to fill up the infantry ranks. Understaff- 
ing similarly plagued the signal, armored, and engineering units 
and hampered their support missions. 

New and unaccustomed functions also impeded the Sri Lankan 
troop performance response. With the sudden growth of the Tamil 
separatist movement in the early 1980s, the role of the armed forces 
evolved from civil patrol to antiterrorism and eventually to coun- 
terinsurgency. The army and the Special Task Force of the police 
played the central role in these operations, launching attacks against 
suspected Tamil insurgent bases and rounding up Tamil men for 
questioning. The navy assisted with coastal patrols to interdict arms 
shipments from south India, and the air force was involved in trans- 
port and supply. Despite the creation of the Joint Operations Com- 
mand in 1985, the coordination of anti-insurgent operations 
continued to be poor. During this period, the government failed 
to provide an effective strategy for isolating the insurgents and secur- 
ing the Tamil civilian population. 

By 1986 the insurgent movement had gained enough support 
to seize control of the entire Jaffna Peninsula. For more than a 
year, the armed forces in the area were confined to short ventures 
in the immediate vicinity of their base camps. Finally, spurred on 
by the threatened formation of a Tamil "Eelam Secretariat," the 
government launched an assault to regain the peninsula (see The 
Tamil Insurgency, this ch.). The offensive was preceded by a two- 
month fuel embargo to limit the mobility of the insurgents. Then, 
in May 1987, the armed forces began "Operation Liberation," 
a coordinated land, sea, and air attack involving 3,000 troops, the 
largest single force ever deployed by the Sri Lankan government. 
While air force helicopter gunships and fighter-bombers targeted 
known rebel strongholds, the army, under cover of artillery shell- 
ing, moved out of its camps in armored vehicles and expanded its 
area of operations. The task force gradually eliminated major Tamil 
bases along the northern coast with the assistance of gunfire from 
Sri Lankan naval vessels, and by the first week of June, succeeded 
in driving most of the insurgents into the city of Jaffna. 



235 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Because an assault on Jaffna itself would involve large-scale urban 
fighting that would cause numerous civilian casualties, the Indian 
government interposed its objections to the forthcoming offensive. 
Faced with a threat of Indian armed intervention on behalf of the 
insurgents, the Sri Lankan government declared a successful end 
to the operation. The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord that followed pro- 
vided for Indian troops to supervise the disarming of the insur- 
gents in the north, and the Sri Lankan armed forces accordingly 
took up positions in the southern and eastern parts of the island. 
When Tamils resumed armed assaults in September 1987, the secu- 
rity forces returned to the antiterrorist activities that had been their 
primary function before 1985. 

Structure and Administration of the Armed Forces 

The armed forces consist of the Sri Lankan Army, Navy, and 
Air Force. As stipulated in the 1978 Constitution, the president 
of Sri Lanka is the commander in chief of the armed forces and 
has the sole authority to declare war and peace. Under the presi- 
dent, the formal chain of command includes the prime minister, 
the minister of defense, and the individual service commanders. 
In order to consolidate control over the armed forces, Jayewardene 
also assumed the portfolio of minister of defense when he took office 
in 1977. In March 1984, the additional position of minister of in- 
ternal security was created in response to the ethnic turmoil of the 
previous summer. Its incumbent was primarily responsible for the 
coordination of government efforts in the eradication of Tamil 
extremist violence and reported directly to the president. On the 
operational level, the government created a Joint Operations Com- 
mand in 1985 to coordinate the anti-insurgent and antiterrorist 
activities of the army, navy, air force, and police. This council was 
chaired by the president and included, among others, the prime 
minister, the minister of internal security, the three service com- 
manders, the inspector general of police, the director of the Na- 
tional Intelligence Bureau, and the general officer commanding 
joint operations. 

The Army 

The Sri Lankan Army is the oldest and largest of the nation's 
three armed services. It was established as the Royal Ceylon Army 
in 1949, and was renamed when Sri Lanka became a republic in 
1972. The commander of the army exercises direct operational con- 
trol over the force. In early 1988, the government announced a 
major reorganization of the army, creating several high-level posts 
to accommodate the new structure. Under this revised chain of 



236 



National Security 



command, the commander of the army (upgraded from lieutenant 
general to general) will be assisted by a deputy commander (a lieu- 
tenant general) and a chief of staff (a major general). Apart from 
the Colombo District, which will be under the direct authority of 
Army Headquarters, the island will be divided into two area com- 
mands and twenty-one sectors. Each area command is scheduled 
to have 12,000 troops under the authority of a major general, with 
a brigadier as chief of staff. When the reorganization is completed, 
each sector will have a full battalion of troops dedicated to its 
defense. 

Like the Indian Army, the Sri Lankan Army has largely retained 
the British-style regimental system that it inherited upon indepen- 
dence. The individual regiments (such as the Sri Lanka Light 
Infantry and the Sinha Regiment) operated independently and 
recruited their own members. Officers tended to remain in a sin- 
gle battalion throughout their careers. The infantry battalion, the 
basic unit of organization in field operations, included five com- 
panies of four platoons each. Incomplete reports suggest that a typi- 
cal platoon had three squads (sections) of ten personnel each. In 
addition to the basic infantry forces, a commando regiment was 
established in 1986. Support for the infantry was provided by two 
reconnaissance regiments (one regular, one reserve), two field 
artillery regiments (one regular, one reserve), one antiaircraft 
regiment, one field engineering regiment, one engineering plant 
regiment, one signals battalion, a medical corps, and a variety of 
logistics units. 

In late 1987, the army had a total estimated strength of up to 
40,000 troops, about evenly divided between regular army per- 
sonnel and reservists on active duty. The approximately 20,000 
regular army troops represented a significant increase over the 1983 
strength of only 12,000. Aggressive recruitment campaigns follow- 
ing the 1983 riots raised this number to 16,000 by early 1985. 

After the 1971 uprising, the army expanded its range of weapons 
from the original stock of World War II-era British Lee Enfield 
rifles and 4. 2 -inch heavy mortars. New sources of weaponry in the 
mid-to-late 1970s included the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and 
China, countries with which the left-leaning Bandaranaike govern- 
ment had the closest ties. China continued to be an important source 
into the 1980s, and was joined by Australia, Italy, South Africa, 
Israel, and the United States. New equipment included 85mm field 
guns, light trucks, and armored personnel carriers. Chinese copies 
of Soviet small arms were the basic weapons used by the infantry. 
Of particular note were the Type 56 semiautomatic rifle (based 
on the Soviet AK), the Type 69 rocket launcher (like the Soviet 



237 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

RPG-7), and the Type 56 light machine gun, a copy of the Soviet 
7.62mm RPD. 

Despite the rapid acquisition of trucks and armored personnel 
carriers, individual units of the army had no transportation capa- 
bility of their own, and most patrols were carried out on foot. 
Helicopters were available only for special operations, and most 
troop transport was by ordinary buses or minibuses. This situa- 
tion frequently left troops vulnerable to mines, and many of the 
army's casualties occurred in this fashion, rather than in face-to- 
face combat with the insurgents. Because of the small geographi- 
cal area within which the forces were deployed, long supply lines 
were not necessary, and individual units frequently made their own 
decisions about what rations to carry on a given operation. 

Most training is provided at the Army Training Centre in 
Diyatalawa, Badulla District, Uva Province. The center encom- 
passes three separate facilities: the Sri Lankan Military Academy, 
the Non-Commissioned Officers' School, and the Recruit Train- 
ing School. The Military Academy was founded in 1981 and ab- 
sorbed the earlier Officers' Cadet School and the Officers' Study 
Center. In the late 1980s, it was providing training in tactics and 
administration, and its graduates were commissioned as officers 
in the regular forces. The officer cadets' course lasted ninety weeks 
and prepared cadets to serve as platoon commanders. It included 
military and academic subjects as well as physical training, and 
placed a special emphasis on fostering leadership qualities and an 
understanding of the role of the officer as a servant of the state. 
Because of an extreme shortage of officers at the lower levels, a 
short commission course was developed to speed the training 
process. Cadets in this course received fifty-six weeks of training 
and committed themselves to five years of service with the option 
of continuing their careers in the military. The Army Training 
Centre handled approximately 300 recruits at a time and, in 1982, 
reportedly trained 18 officers. Additional training is provided by 
individual field units. 

Cadet training was offered at the Sir John Kotelawala Defence 
Academy established in 1981 in Ratmalana, fourteen kilometers 
south of Colombo. (The academy was named after the nation's 
third prime minister.) Each year, the academy admits fifty cadets 
(ages seventeen to nineteen) for a three-year program of academic 
work and basic training. Graduates continue their studies at a regu- 
lar university before taking up a full-time career in the military 
services. 

With the limited capacity of indigenous training facilities, the 
armed forces have relied extensively on foreign military training. 



238 



National Security 



The British played a central role in the early years following in- 
dependence and have continued to be an important source of mili- 
tary expertise. Other sources have included Pakistan, Australia, 
Malaysia, and the United States. In addition, in an agreement 
reached in 1984, Israeli security personnel (reportedly from Shin 
Bet, the Israeli counterespionage and internal security organiza- 
tion) went to Sri Lanka to train army officers in counterinsurgency 
techniques (see Foreign Military Relations, this ch.). 

The Navy 

The Sri Lankan Navy, originally established in December 1950 
as the Royal Ceylon Navy, is the smallest of the nation's armed 
services. It consists of a regular and a volunteer force, each with 
its own reserve component. The navy is under the direct opera- 
tional control of a service commander who is equal in authority 
to the army and air force commanders. The force is divided into 
three Naval Area Commands — Northern, Eastern, and Western — 
with a fourth (Southern Command) to be established at a later date. 
The navy maintains major bases in Colombo and Trincomalee, 
with secondary bases at Karainagar (Jaffna District), Welisara 
(Colombo District), Tangalla (Hambantota District), and Kalpitiya 
(Puttalam District). 

The navy's primary mission is to prevent illegal immigration 
and smuggling across the Palk Strait, the narrow body of water 
that separates the island from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. With 
the growth of the Tamil separatist movement in the late 1970s, 
the strait became a major conduit for armaments and insurgents 
traveling from training bases in south India, and the naval mis- 
sion was therefore expanded to include counterinsurgency patrols. 

In the late 1980s, the navy had an approximate total strength 
of 4,000, including active reservists. By 1985 estimates, the regu- 
lar force contained 243 officers and 3,072 ratings, and the Volun- 
teer Naval Force had 64 officers and 427 men, a substantial increase 
over the 1977 figures (200 officers, 2,400 ratings). 

In late 1987, the navy had a fleet of approximately seventy ves- 
sels, more than half of them coastal patrol craft. Building on an 
original fleet of mostly British ships, the government took aggres- 
sive steps to expand its sources of supply and at the same time de- 
velop a domestic shipbuilding industry sufficient to meet national 
defense needs. As a result, the Colombo dockyards began produc- 
tion of the 40- ton Pradeepa coastal patrol craft in 1980, followed 
by the 330-ton Jayasagara large patrol craft. The original fleet of 
six Sooraya fast attack craft (the Chinese Shanghai-II, bought in 
1972 and 1975) was supplemented in 1985 with six Israeli Super 



239 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



Dvora craft, and eight more were reportedly on order. One seri- 
ous gap in the fleet was the lack of shallow-draft vessels suitable 
for surveying purposes. Palk Strait, although relatively narrow, 
is infamously difficult to navigate because of the large number of 
uncharted coral reefs. 

A cumbersome bureaucratic structure prevented the navy from 
fully carrying out the basic elements of its intended mission. 
Although the fleet inventory improved steadily, logistical support 
to naval vessels was a continuing problem that resulted in poor 
performance and low morale throughout the service. The materiel 
procurement process was reportedly complex and inefficient, and 
spare parts for foreign-made vessels were frequently in short sup- 
ply. Even where the necessary parts were available, poorly trained 
maintenance personnel were not always able to repair breakdowns, 
and inadequate administrative support compounded the difficulties. 

Full maintenance facilities were available at the Colombo dock- 
yard, where dry-dock equipment was expanded to allow construc- 
tion of large patrol vessels in the 1980s. In addition, the base in 
Trincomalee was fitted out to perform slipway repairs. At both 
facilities, a shortage of qualified maintenance personnel continued 
to hamper effective repair work. 

General training for officers and ratings was being provided at 
the Naval and Maritime Academy in Trincomalee in the 1980s. 
The academy was established in 1967, and offered a fifteen-month 
basic course in navigation, seamanship, and engineering. Seamen 
were given practical training on commercial cargo ships. For post- 
graduate technical training, recruits were sent overseas, mainly to 
India, Pakistan, Australia, the United States, and Britain. 

The Air Force 

The Sri Lankan Air Force is the youngest of the three armed 
services. Founded in 1951 as the Royal Ceylon Air Force, it relied 
totally on the British Royal Air Force for its earliest equipment, 
training, and leadership. The service was led by a force commander 
and its operational headquarters were located in Ratmalana, south 
of Colombo. The air force operates major air bases at Katunayaka 
in Colombo District and China Bay (Trincomalee), with a secon- 
dary base in Jaffna. 

In 1988 the air force was divided into four functionally defined 
squadrons, with a variety of support units: Number One (Flight 
Training School) Squadron, China Bay Air Base; Number Two 
(Transport) Squadron, Katunayaka Air Base; Number Three 
(Navigation) Squadron, China Bay Air Base; and Number Four 
(Helicopter) Squadron, Katunayaka Air Base. Support units 



240 



National Security 



included an electronic engineering division, an aeronautical divi- 
sion, and administrative, operations, medical, logistics, and pro- 
curement units. In addition, the force operated two antiaircraft gun 
battery sections and a small Air Force Security Force. 

In its early years, the air force was engaged primarily in immigra- 
tion patrol, with occasional assistance in emergency relief. Dur- 
ing the insurgency of 1971, the air force played a major role in 
restoring internal order; in addition to providing transport of am- 
munition, food, and troops, it participated in assaults against in- 
surgent strongholds. Following the ethnic rioting of 1983, the air 
force was placed on permanent active status and participated in 
counterinsurgent activities in Northern Province. Because of a se- 
vere shortage of hard currency for military expenditures in the wake 
of the 1971 uprising, the Number Four (Helicopter) Squadron be- 
gan operating commercial transportation services for foreign tourists 
under the name of Helitours. In 1987 the air force had a total 
strength of 3,700 personnel, including active reserves. The force 
had grown gradually during its early years, reaching a little over 
1,000 officers and recruits in the 1960s. Rapid growth began in 
the mid-1980s, when the ethnic disturbances drew the service into 
a major, long-term security role. Between 1983 and 1987, the force 
grew by nearly 50 percent. 

The air force had a fleet of approximately eighty aircraft, of which 
sixty-four were reported to be operational in early 1988. The earliest 
aircraft — small transport airplanes and trainers — were provided by 
the British and were supplemented in the late 1960s with United 
States Bell helicopters. During the 1971 insurgency, the left-leaning 
Bandaranaike government turned to the Soviet Union for more 
sophisticated weaponry, and received five MiG-17 F fighter bom- 
bers, a MiG-15UTI Midget trainer, and two Ka-26 helicopters. 
The British also assisted with five BAC Jet Provosts. By the early 
1980s, the Provosts and all of the Soviet aircraft had been taken 
out of active service and were relegated to long-term storage, leaving 
the air force without any bomber capability. 

After the 1983 riots, the government worked rapidly to expand 
the inventory, relying largely on sources in Italy, Britain, and the 
United States. Because of tight budget constraints, the air force 
was compelled to refit a number of noncombat aircraft for mili- 
tary uses in counterinsurgency operations against Tamil separatists. 
Central in the government's security efforts were six SIAI-Marchetti 
SF-260 turboprop trainers which were used for rocket attacks and 
strafing. Additionally, the air force, with the help of Heli Orient 
of Singapore, equipped twelve Bell 212 and 412 helicopters to serve 
as gunships and as transport vehicles for commando assault 



241 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

operations. Government forces reportedly also used helicopters on 
"bombing" missions; frequently operating without conventional 
bombs, air force troops reportedly dropped hand grenades stuffed 
in wine glasses so that the lever would not be released until the 
glass shattered on the ground. A more effective bombing capabil- 
ity was provided by a small fleet of Chinese Yun-12 turboprop trans- 
port aircraft. These were equipped with bomb racks that had been 
fitted to carry up to 1,000 kilograms of fragmentation and anti- 
personnel bombs. Transport, training, and surveying functions 
were carried out by a variety of Cessna and DeHavilland aircraft. 

As in the other services, a shortage of spare parts plagued main- 
tenance efforts, forcing the service to send a number of aircraft 
to Singapore and elsewhere for repairs. After the purchase of equip- 
ment from Canada in 1986, the air force gained the capability to 
make structural repairs on its fleet of Bell helicopters, several of 
which had been damaged in operations against the Tamil insur- 
gents. Maintenance of electronic equipment was performed at the 
communications station at Ekala, in the north of Colombo District. 

Under the auspices of the British Royal Air Force, flight train- 
ing was first offered to Ceylon Air Force pilots at Katunayaka Air 
Base in 1952. In addition, a number of recruits received flight train- 
ing at the Royal Air Force college in Cranwell, England. After the 
British withdrew from Sri Lankan military facilities in 1967, the 
Number One (Flight Training School) Squadron was established 
at the China Bay Air Base in Trincomalee. With the increase in 
insurgent activities in the mid-1980s, the air force stepped up its 
training activities, bringing in foreign pilots to assist in the helicopter 
training program. 

Officer training is provided at the Air Force Academy at the 
China Bay Air Base. The academy offers a two-year program of 
basic flight training and a variety of specialized courses. Air traffic 
controllers receive schooling at special facilities in Colombo, and 
weapons familiarity training is conducted in conjunction with the 
other services at the Army Training Centre in Diyatalawa. In 
addition, approximately twenty-five officers a year receive advanced 
training abroad, most commonly in Britain and India. 

Conditions of Service 

The regular forces of the army, navy, and air force were recruited 
by voluntary enlistment (see fig. 12). Despite the influence of Bud- 
dhist pacifist traditions, the prestige of government service and the 
possibility of a stable income have insured a sufficient flow of new 
recruits into the three services even prior to the establishment of 
a national draft in 1985. As a result of stringent Sinhala language 



242 



National Security 



requirements, noncommissioned (NCO) ranks of all services were 
virtually all Sinhalese. In the army, regular enlisted personnel were 
required to sign contracts that were renewable after the fifth and 
twelfth years of service. Renewal was contingent on the receipt of 
good performance ratings. After twenty-two years of service, in- 
dividuals became eligible for pensions, and in the 1980s the aver- 
age age of retirement for the enlisted ranks was forty- two. After 
completing regular service, recruits were required to fulfill seven 
years of obligatory service in the reserves. Officers were allowed 
to serve in each rank for a specified number of years, after which 
they had either to qualify for the next higher rank or retire. Be- 
cause of the small number of positions available at the higher levels, 
most officers were forced to leave the service at about forty-five 
years of age (see fig. 13). 

Separate recruiting was conducted for the First Commando Regi- 
ment of the army. Applicants for NCO positions had to be single 
and between eighteen and twenty-two years old, and must have 
passed the Ordinary Levels of the General Common Entrance ex- 
amination in six subjects. Candidates were offered the possibility 
of specialized training overseas in such fields as intelligence, 
parachuting, and dog handling. Within the navy, the small size 
of the total force enabled the leadership to remain highly selective 
in its recruitment, and naval personnel had a uniformly high liter- 
acy rate. Recruits committed themselves to ten years of obligatory 
service. 

After retiring from active service, officers and enlisted person- 
nel reportedly had considerable difficulty finding suitable employ- 
ment. Priority placement in civil service jobs, commonly offered 
under the British administration, was no longer available to mili- 
tary retirees in the 1980s, and former officers spoke out with bit- 
terness on the failure of the nation to repay its soldiers for their 
years of service. In addition, military pensions reportedly have not 
kept pace with inflation. 

In October 1985, the Parliament passed the Mobilization and 
Supplementary Forces Act, which gave the government the power 
to draft citizens into the National Armed Reserve. Under this law, 
the prime minister, with the approval of Parliament, was autho- 
rized to conscript Sri Lankan citizens eighteen years or older for 
one year of basic training and a total of ten years of reserve ser- 
vice. Under normal conditions, reserves could be called into active 
service for up to twenty-one days per year. At the request of the 
president, however, reserves could be deployed in active service 
for an indefinite period of time in the event of a war or "in the 



243 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 




244 



National Security 



prevention or suppression of any rebellion or insurrection or other 
civil disturbance." 

Ethnic Composition of the Armed Forces 

At independence the government inherited from the British a 
military establishment that was neither ethnically nor religiously 
representative of the population at large. Minorities, for example, 
were heavily overrepresented in the officer corps. Christians, who 
comprised about 8 percent of the population, accounted for about 
50 percent of all officers. Ethnically, Tamils and Burghers, who 
together comprised less than 20 percent of the population, accounted 
for 40 percent of the officer corps. This unbalanced representa- 
tion was the result of a number of deliberate policies and inciden- 
tal developments under the British. As in India, the colonial 
government in Sri Lanka tended to favor certain minorities in the 
selection of both military and civil service posts. In addition, the 
greater willingness of the Tamils to attend Christian missionary 
schools gave them the advantage of knowing the language, faith, 
and value system of the colonial administration. These Christian 
schools were also more likely than their Buddhist counterparts to 
offer rigorous physical training; the student cadet corps that were 
common in the colonial tradition were anathema to the Buddhist 
pacifist orthodoxy. Finally, the largely Westernized Burgher popu- 
lation adapted more easily to the social and public values of a co- 
lonial force. 

In the first few years of independence, the high representation 
of Christians and minorities in the military leadership was fully 
in step with the political currents of the time; the governments of 
Don Stephen Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawala were dominated 
by a Westernized elite that preached accommodation with all eth- 
nic groups. Starting in the mid-1950s, however, a new Sinhalese 
and Buddhist nationalism turned increasingly against the British- 
sponsored elite of the colonial period. Within the government, this 
tendency was reflected in the victory of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike 
in the 1956 elections. In the military, however, changes were much 
more gradual; most of the commissions that had become available 
in the newly created services were already filled, and the relatively 
young army had few officers approaching retirement age. As a 
result, this period was marked by an increasing strain between the 
civil and the military authorities. The government's program of 
nationalization and its attempt to establish a privileged place for 
Buddhism and the Sinhala language caused increasing conflict 
around the island. In January 1962, several high-ranking military 
officers were arrested and accused of planning a coup d'etat. They 



245 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



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246 



National Security 



reportedly had planned to restore order by detaining a number of 
prominent left-wing politicians from the Bandaranaike coalition 
and returning the UNP to office. By the time the conspiracy was 
made public, the original plans had already been abandoned. 
Nonetheless, the Bandaranaike government used the potential threat 
to bolster its pro-Buddhist campaign, making political capital from 
the fact that all of the conspirators had been Christians. 

Despite the initial resistance from a number of military officers, 
the government succeeded gradually in recasting the armed forces 
in its own image. Recruitment at all levels became increasingly 
dominated by Sinhalese Buddhists, and by mid- 1983 Tamils 
accounted for less than 5 percent of all military personnel. Mili- 
tary training that previously had been conducted in a variety of 
languages was now limited to Sinhala and English. Also, under 
the leadership of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, the army was sup- 
plemented with the new Sinha Regiment, whose name and un- 
precedented lack of regimental colors stood in clear opposition to 
the British colonial regalia of the Ceylon Light Infantry. Even the 
Light Infantry took on a new Sinhalese cast when in 1961 it adopted 
an elephant named Kandula as its regimental mascot; as the Times 
of Ceylon was quick to point out, Kandula was the battle elephant 
of Dutthagamani (or Duttugemunu), the ancient Sinhalese king 
who was credited with driving the Tamils out of Sri Lanka in the 
second century B.C. 

The Sinhalization of the armed forces continued under the United 
National Party government of President Jayewardene. The retire- 
ment of the British-educated cadre of Tamil and Burgher officers 
gradually depleted the ranks of minority members. At the same 
time, the growing ethnic divisions in the country and the deploy- 
ment of the armed forces against the Tamil population in the North- 
ern Province tended to discourage young Tamil males from 
pursuing a career in the military. By 1985 almost all enlisted per- 
sonnel in the armed services were Sinhalese. 

Women in the Armed Forces 

The Sri Lankan Army Women's Corps was formed in 1980 as 
an unarmed, noncombatant support unit. Set up with the assistance 
of the British Women's Reserve Army Corps, it was identical in 
structure to its parent organization, and its first generation of officer 
cadets was trained in Britain. Candidates were required to be be- 
tween eighteen and twenty years old and to have passed the lowest 
level of the General Common Entrance examinations. (Officer can- 
didates must have passed the Advanced Level.) Enlistment entailed 
a five-year service commitment (the same as for men), and recruits 



247 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

were not allowed to marry during this period. In the sixteen- week 
training course at the Army Training Centre at Diyatalawa, cadets 
were put through a program of drill and physical training similar 
to the men's program, with the exception of weapons and battlecraft 
training. Women recruits were paid according to the same scale 
as the men, but were limited to service in nursing, communica- 
tions, and clerical work. In late 1987, the first class of women gradu- 
ates from the Viyanini Army Training Center were certified to serve 
as army instructors. 

Women were first admitted into the navy in 1985. New recruits 
were given six weeks of training with the Sri Lankan Army 
Women's Corps. Although they were trained in the use of weapons, 
they were not assigned to combat positions or shipboard duty. In- 
stead, they assisted in nursing, communications, stores, and 
secretarial work. 

Awards in the Armed Forces 

In the period between independence and the establishment of 
the republic, members of the Sri Lankan armed services were eligi- 
ble for awards from the British government, including the Order 
of the British Empire (O.B.E.) and the Member of the British Em- 
pire (M.B.E.). After 1972 however, the nation established its own 
system of decorations, which was modified in 1979 to conform more 
closely with the practices of other South Asian nations. Under the 
system in place in 1988, the nation's highest decoration was the 
Parama Veera Vibushanaya, equivalent to the Victoria Cross of 
Britain and the Param Vir Chakra of India, and awarded "for in- 
dividual acts of gallantry of the most exceptional order." For acts 
of bravery performed outside a military context, individuals were 
awarded the Veerodhara Vibushanaya, a decoration equivalent to 
the British George Cross and the Indian Asoka Chakra. Other 
awards include the Visiatha Seva Vibushanaya for twenty years 
of service with an "unblemished record of moral and military con- 
duct;" the Uttama Seva Padakkama, equivalent to India's Meritori- 
ous Service Medal, and given to a soldier with not fewer than fifteen 
years of service marked by exceptional ability and exemplary con- 
duct; the Videsha Seva Padakkama, for active service in a foreign 
military mission; and the Veera Vickrama Vibushanaya, equiva- 
lent to the Military Cross of Britain, and given for acts of gallantry 
in saving the lives of others. 

Foreign Military Relations 

Sri Lanka's oldest and most enduring military relationship has 
been with Britain. As a British colony, the island was garrisoned 



248 



National Security 



with British troops and, following independence, its own indigenous 
armed forces were organized, trained, armed, and led by British 
military personnel. Under a mutual defense arrangement dating 
from 1947, the two nations have agreed to give each other "such 
military assistance for the security of their territories for defense 
against external aggression and for the protection of essential com- 
munications as it may be in their mutual interests to provide." 
The vague wording of this treaty has allowed it to survive a num- 
ber of political swings in Sri Lanka's domestic arena, and it re- 
mained in force in 1988. Even after the government of S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike withdrew island base rights from British forces in 
1957, the British continued to be a major supplier of military hard- 
ware. Although the British government has denied any direct in- 
volvement, for a time former British Special Air Service personnel 
under the auspices of the private firm of Keeny Meeny Services 
were instrumental in training Sri Lankan troops in counterterrorist 
and counterinsurgency techniques. 

After the anti-Tamil riots of 1983 and as the ethnic insurgency 
increased in the north, the government turned to a variety of for- 
eign nations to assist in its counterinsurgency campaign. In May 
1984, at considerable cost to its standing among Third World 
nations, the government arranged for the establishment of an Israeli 
special interest section in Colombo. Operating out of the United 
States embassy, agents from Shin Bet, the Israeli counterespionage 
and internal security organization, trained members of the Sri 
Lankan Special Task Force and other groups in intelligence gather- 
ing and internal security techniques. 

Other nations that have reportedly provided training include Aus- 
tralia, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the United States. Uncon- 
firmed press reports suggest that a number of foreign advisers, 
including Englishmen, Pakistanis, and South Africans, have actually 
taken part in combat operations against the Tamil insurgents. In 
April 1986, the Indian press announced that a Pakistani Air Force 
officer had been killed in an airplane crash shortly after participating 
in an air assault in Northern Province. 

Military relations between Sri Lanka and India underwent a 
major change in mid- 1987. For almost ten years, the Tamil insur- 
gency in Northern and Eastern provinces had been a major source 
of friction between the two nations because India provided shelter, 
training, and weapons to the insurgent groups. The Sri Lankan 
insurgents found abundant sympathy and support for their cause 
within the Tamil-dominated Indian state of Tamil Nadu, and 
Madras served as the headquarters from which they regularly issued 
condemnations of the government. Beginning in May 1987, the 



249 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Indian government changed its official role from that of intermedi- 
ary to active participant as it sought to abate the turmoil in the 
island and bring together the Tamil separatists and the Sri Lankan 
government. Although the resulting Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, which 
was signed in July 1987, offered an equitable formula for restor- 
ing peace to the troubled nation, a subsequent exchange of execu- 
tive letters accorded to India a substantial voice in Sri Lankan 
military affairs. In particular, Sri Lanka acceded to three major 
concessions. First, it agreed to consult New Delhi on the employ- 
ment of all foreign military and intelligence personnel in Sri Lanka 
"with a view to insuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo- 
Sri Lankan relations." Second, it guaranteed that no Sri Lankan 
ports would be made available "for military use by any country 
in a manner prejudicial to India's interests." Third, Sri Lanka 
agreed to review its contracts with foreign broadcasting organiza- 
tions to insure that none of their facilities in Sri Lanka would be 
used for military or intelligence purposes. This latter concession 
was specifically aimed at Voice of America broadcasting operations 
on the island. In return, New Delhi agreed to deport all Sri Lankan 
terrorists and insurgents operating on Indian soil and to provide 
military training and supplies to the Sri Lankan armed forces. Press 
reports in early 1988 suggested that Sri Lanka was prepared to 
expand and formalize its military relationship with India through 
a treaty of friendship and cooperation similar to that linking India 
with the Soviet Union. 

Foreign Military Presence 

Under the provisions of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, an Indian 
military contingent was dispatched to northern Sri Lanka. This 
contingent, named the Indian Peacekeeping Force was composed 
of army and paramilitary units from the Indian Army's Southern 
Command, headquartered in Madras. The IPKF, when it was 
initially dispatched to Sri Lanka, numbered about 1,600 person- 
nel. As the cease-fire failed to take hold, and as the tenacity of the 
Tamil insurgents became increasingly evident, the force was steadily 
augmented. Within three months of its deployment, the IPKF 
presence in Sri Lanka had grown to 20,000 personnel. At the end 
of the year, two brigades of Muslim troops were introduced into 
Eastern Province to deal with growing tension in the Islamic com- 
munity of that area. By January 1988, the overall force had a total 
strength of 50,000 personnel from three Indian Army divisions, 
plus supporting units. The following month" it was announced in 
the Indian Parliament that the IPKF would be increased to 70,000 
personnel organized tactically into fifteen brigades. Some Sri 



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National Security 



Lankan sources said privately that the force had grown well in ex- 
cess of this total, possibly surpassing 100,000 troops, and that its 
presence in Sri Lanka might well exceed the duration of the insur- 
gency. In mid- 1988, however, the Indian government did with- 
draw from Sri Lanka some of its more heavily armed artillery and 
armored units that were obviously unsuitable for fighting a coun- 
terinsurgency war. 

At the time of its deployment, the IPKF was intended as a truce 
supervisory force that would oversee the disarming of the Tamil 
insurgents and the disengagement of the Sri Lankan government 
forces. As the cease-fire between the two sides broke down, however, 
the Indians were compelled to assume a combat role and were sent 
into action against the Tamil guerrillas overrunning the Jaffna 
Peninsula. In this operation, codenamed Operation Parwan, IPKF 
units of the 54th Indian Army division launched a five-pronged 
attack to clear the area of insurgents. After sixteen days of fight- 
ing, Jaffna fell to the Indians, and the Tamil combatants retreated 
to the more inaccessible areas of Northern and Eastern provinces. 

Among the residents of Jaffna, the assault on the city provoked 
widespread bitterness toward the Indian troops, as reports spread 
of atrocities and high civilian casualties caused by careless bom- 
bardment of populated areas. Many of these reports were believed 
to be the result of Tamil insurgent propaganda. Nonetheless, in 
early 1 988 the Indian Army acknowledged that there had been seri- 
ous disciplinary problems during the campaign, and a number of 
soldiers were sent back to India after conviction on rape charges. 
Such gestures also hinted that the IPKF seemed disposed to apply 
the lessons learned from the Jaffna offensive and to abandon its 
previous hamfisted tactics and insensitivity to the civilian popula- 
tion. When continued insurgent activity required redeployment of 
IPKF units to Eastern Province and the inland districts of North- 
ern Province, the Indian forces embarked on an aggressive civic 
action program to restore the infrastructure in war-ravaged areas, 
and on an intensive campaign of heavy patrolling to keep the guer- 
rillas off balance. The Indians gained experience in both urban 
and counterinsurgency warfare and made some progress in keep- 
ing the Tamil insurgents at bay. However, the guerrillas were prov- 
ing a more intractable foe than anticipated, and observers were 
not optimistic about an early conclusion to the conflict. 

The Defense Budget 

The intervention of the Indian Peacekeeping Force in 1987 per- 
mitted the Sri Lankan government to decrease its defense outlays 
for the first time in ten years. Since the United National Party came 



251 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

to power in 1977, Colombo's efforts to quell the Tamil insurgency 
and the radical Sinhalese movement in the south had demanded 
an increasing share of the nation's resources; in the early 1980s, 
defense expenditures represented only 1 percent of the gross domes- 
tic product (GDP — see Glossary). By 1986 this figure had risen 
to 3.5 percent, and by 1987 it was estimated at over 5 percent. 
After a number of supplemental appropriations, 1987 defense costs 
were estimated at Rsl0.6 billion (for value of the rupee — see Glos- 
sary), including Rs3.5 billion for the army, Rsl.3 billion for the 
navy, Rsl .9 billion for the air force, and Rsl .7 billion for the police 
(see National Police and Paramilitary Forces, this ch.). The dra- 
matic growth in defense outlays took place at a time when Sri Lan- 
ka' s major exports were realizing significantly lower prices on the 
international market and in 1986, for the first time, the govern- 
ment was forced to resort to large-scale commercial borrowing. A 
continuation of this trend promised to undermine the government's 
development efforts and aggravate an already sizable trade deficit 
(see Trade, ch. 3). After the arrival of Indian troops in July 1987, 
the Sri Lankan government withdrew most of its forces from North- 
ern and Eastern provinces, saving significantly on operational costs. 
As a result, Sri Lanka projected a 37 percent cut in army expendi- 
tures and a total military budget of Rs9.2 billion, 13 percent below 
1987 levels. 

National Police and Paramilitary Forces 

The Sri Lankan National Police is an integral part of the na- 
tion's security forces, with primary responsibility for internal secu- 
rity. Specially trained commando units of the police are regularly 
deployed in joint operations with the armed forces, and the police 
command structure in Northern and Eastern provinces is closely 
integrated with the other security organizations under the authority 
of the Joint Operations Command. The police is headed by an 
inspector general of police who reports to the minister of defense. 

Organization 

In 1988 the police force was divided into three geographic 
commands — known as ranges — covering the northern, central, and 
southern sectors of the island. The ranges were subdivided into 
divisions, districts, and stations, and Colombo was designated as 
a special division. In 1974 there were a total of 260 police stations 
throughout the country. In more remote rural areas beyond the 
immediate range of existing police stations, law enforcement func- 
tions are carried out by locally elected village headmen {grama seva 
niladhari, literally "village service officers"). In addition to its regular 



252 



National Security 



forces, the national police operated a small reserve contingent and 
a number of specialized units responsible for investigative and 
paramilitary functions. Routine criminal activity was handled by 
the Criminal Investigation Department under the command of an 
assistant superintendent of police. More coordinated threats to in- 
ternal security, such as that posed by the radical Sinhalese Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna were the responsibility of the Counter subver- 
sive Division, which was primarily an investigative division. Spe- 
cial operational units included the Commando Squad of the 
Colombo police and the Special Task Force. The former, a 200- 
strong riot control force, was established following the anti-Tamil 
riots of 1983. The Special Task Force is a police field force. It was 
set up in 1984 with the assistance of foreign advisers (primarily 
former British Special Air Service personnel under the auspices 
of Keeny Meeny Services, see Foreign Military Relations, this ch.). 
Its 1 , 100-member force was organized into 7 companies and trained 
in counterinsurgency techniques. It played a major role in the 
government's combined force operations against the Tamil Tigers 
in Eastern Province before July 1987. Following the signing of the 
Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, the Special Task Force was redesignated 
the Police Special Force, and deployed in Southern Province, where 
it immediately went into action against the JVP terrorists. Com- 
panies of the force also served in rotation as part of the presiden- 
tial security guard. 

Until 1984 the police were responsible for national intelligence 
functions, first under the Special Branch, and later under the In- 
telligence Services Division. The perceived failure of the Intelli- 
gence Services Division during the riots of July 1983 led the 
Jayewardene government to reevaluate the nation's intelligence net- 
work, and in 1984 the president set up a National Intelligence 
Bureau. The new organization combined intelligence units from 
the army, navy, air force, and police. It was headed by a deputy 
inspector general of police who reported directly to the Ministry 
of Defence. 

Strength 

By late 1987, the police had an estimated total strength of 21 ,000 
personnel, with plans to increase to 28,000. The force expanded 
most rapidly in the years following the 1971 uprising, an event that 
constituted the nation's first major challenge to internal security; 
between 1969 and 1974, the police grew from 11,300 to 16,100, 
an increase of over 42 percent. According to the United States 
Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the 
force was less than 5 percent Tamil. 



253 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Equipment and Training 

Following the British tradition, Sri Lankan police were customar- 
ily unarmed during routine patrol duty in the years following in- 
dependence. With the growth of ethnic tensions in the late 1970s 
and the increasing tendency of both Sinhalese and Tamil extremist 
groups to target the police, the government decided in 1982 to issue 
handguns to all sergeants and constables. Chinese copies of Soviet 
pistols formed an important component of the police arsenal, and 
included the 7.62mm Type 54 (modeled on the Soviet TT-M1933) 
and the 9mm Type 59 (based on the Soviet PM). For emergen- 
cies, the police also used the British Lee Enfield .303 carbine. The 
Commando Squadron was equipped with Sterling submachineguns, 
repeater shotguns, revolvers, and tear gas. 

Regular force training in the 1980s was conducted at the Police 
College in Katukurunda, Western Province. Separate training fa- 
cilities for the Special Task Force have been established in Kalutara, 
96 kilometers south of Colombo. Starting in 1984, foreign train- 
ers affiliated with Keeny Meeny Services offered counterinsurgency 
pilot training in the use of Bell 212 and 412 helicopter gunships. 

The Home Guard 

As the Tamil insurgents accelerated their campaign for a separate 
state in the early 1980s, they turned increasingly against those Sin- 
halese settlers who, through government- sponsored resettlement 
programs, had "infringed" on traditional Tamil areas in the north 
and east. In response, the government authorized the formation 
and arming of small militias for local self-defense. These armed 
groups, known as Home Guards, were generally composed of poorly 
educated Sinhalese villagers with little or no military training. 
Armed with shotguns that had been provided by the government, 
they frequently exceeded their original mandate of self-defense, 
avenging terrorist attacks with indiscriminate killings of Tamil 
civilians. This violence was an important factor in the increasing 
radicalization of the Tamil population. By April 1987, there were 
reportedly 12,000 Home Guards throughout the country, and the 
National Security Council, a consultative body that meets on 
defense matters, had announced its intention of increasing the num- 
ber to 20,000. With the successful negotiation of the Indo-Sri 
Lankan Accord in July, however, the government moved to dis- 
mantle this poorly disciplined paramilitary force. The Home Guards 
in Northern and Eastern provinces were ordered to surrender their 
weapons to the authorities, and by August the police claimed to 
have collected 8,000 of the more than 10,000 shotguns that had 



254 



National Security 



been issued 3 years earlier. When the Tamil terrorist attacks re- 
sumed in late 1987, however, the government reportedly reversed 
its decision and allowed a partial rearming of the force. At the same 
time that it was acting to limit the Home Guards in the north, the 
government authorized an expansion of local and private militias 
in the south. The signing of the accord had unleashed a wave of 
violence among militant Sinhalese groups who opposed both the 
accommodation with the Tamil separatists and the presence of 
Indian troops on Sri Lankan soil. As Jayewardene moved to force 
passage of the provisions of the accord in Parliament, the Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna launched a campaign against members of the 
ruling United National Party who supported the pact. In the sec- 
ond half of 1987, the party chairman and more than seventy United 
National Party legislators were killed by Sinhalese extremists. The 
government responded by allocating 150 Home Guards to each 
Member of Parliament, leaving the legislators themselves respon- 
sible for the arming and training of these personal militias. At the 
same time, the press reported that pro- government gangs of thugs 
known as Green Tigers (named for the colors of the ruling party) 
had begun to attack opponents of the accord. 

The Criminal Justice System 

Founded on the principles of British law, the Sri Lankan crim- 
inal justice system underwent major changes in the 1970s as the 
government attempted to cope with the challenges posed by both 
Sinhalese and Tamil insurgencies. Through a series of new laws, 
constitutional provisions, and emergency regulations, Sri Lanka 
acted to enlarge the legal powers of the police and armed forces 
and to increase the capacity of the courts to deal with the growing 
number of cases. These changes were at the expense of individual 
civil liberties, and the new powers of the state evoked strong criti- 
cism from all ethnic communities. The most significant changes 
affected the rules of search, arrest, and seizure and the procedures 
by which criminal cases were investigated and tried. Through all 
this flux, the one element that remained relatively constant was 
the Penal Code, established in the late nineteenth century by the 
British colonial government. Although various individual provi- 
sions were amended to suit changing social conditions, in 1988 the 
general classification and definition of crime and punishment set 
forth in the code remained the basis of criminal law. 

Criminal Justice and the Effects of Insurgency 

Following the insurrection of 1971 , the judicial system was flooded 
with thousands of young insurgents who had played varying roles 



255 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

in the attempt to overthrow the government. The established legal 
channels — holdovers from the colonial era — were clearly insuffi- 
cient to deal with the crisis. At the same time, the government real- 
ized that any significant delay in the trial and settlement of cases 
would only serve to increase the alienation that had led to the 
rebellion. As a temporary measure, the parliament passed the 
Criminal Justice Commissions Act of 1972, providing for the estab- 
lishment of special commissions outside the normal judicial struc- 
ture and empowered to conduct cases free from the usual stringent 
rules of procedure. 

The judicial crisis of the early 1970s also served to promote long- 
term reforms that had been under consideration for more than 
twenty years. In 1973 the parliament passed the Administration 
of Justice Law, a bill to reorganize the entire judicial system. Her- 
alded as a major break with inherited British colonial traditions, 
the new law was intended to simplify the court structure and speed 
the legal process. It repealed thirteen acts and ordinances, includ- 
ing the Courts Ordinance and the Criminal Procedure Code of 
1898, replacing them with five chapters covering the judicature, 
criminal, testamentary, and appeals procedures and the destruc- 
tion of court records. The seven levels of the British court struc- 
ture were replaced with four levels, including a Supreme Court 
that held only appellate jurisdiction. The high courts, district courts, 
and magistrate's courts were assigned jurisdiction respectively over 
the island's sixteen judicial zones and their respective forty dis- 
tricts and eighty divisions. 

After Bandaranaike's defeat in the 1977 elections, the new United 
National Party government moved quickly to revise the workings 
of the criminal justice system. Of the five chapters of the Adminis- 
tration of Justice Law, two (on criminal procedure and appeals) 
were replaced by the Code of Criminal Procedure Act of 1979, and 
a third (on the judiciary) was substantially amended by the 1978 
Constitution. These radical changes, coming on the heels of the 
previous reforms, were motivated by a variety of concerns. First, 
there were political considerations. Jayewardene's electoral suc- 
cess had been based in part on a popular reaction against the ex- 
traordinary legal and judicial powers assumed by the Bandaranaike 
government; the previous six years had been marked by an un- 
broken state of emergency, the creation of the highly powerful 
Criminal Justice Commissions, and a growing constriction of the 
freedom of the press. In his first year in office, Jayewardene declared 
an end to emergency rule, repealed the Criminal Justice Commis- 
sions Act, and engineered a new constitution with explicit safeguards 
of fundamental rights. These rights, set forth in Article 13, included 



256 



National Security 



free speech, the right to a fair trial, and freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and detention. Although many of these rights had appeared 
in the previous constitution, the new document put them under 
the jurisdiction of the courts for the first time. 

A second motive for the changes stemmed from the sudden ex- 
pansion of the Tamil insurgency in the late 1970s. Faced with a 
growing number of terrorist activities in the north, the Jayewardene 
government moved to streamline the judicial system and establish 
clearer lines of jurisdiction between the various levels of courts. 
Primary jurisdiction over criminal cases, previously the concur- 
rent right of three levels of the judiciary, was now confined to two 
levels, the high court and the magistrate's courts, with their respec- 
tive domains clearly demarcated in the new criminal procedure 
code. 

The liberalizations of the Jayewardene government soon fell prey 
to the nation's deteriorating security situation. Hampered by the 
civil liberties embedded in the new laws and codes, the police and 
armed forces were unable to deal with an insurgent movement that 
involved a growing portion of the Tamil civilian population. Legal 
sanctions against terrorism began with the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act of 1979, followed by further antiterrorist provisions in 1982 
and full-scale emergency regulations in 1983. With the consent of 
Parliament, these regulations were renewed on a monthly basis. 
By early 1988, the existing criminal justice system was a compo- 
site of permanent and provisional legislation. In contrast with the 
relatively stable Penal Code, the judicial structure and the proce- 
dures for criminal cases reflected the complex and sometimes con- 
tradictory interweavings of the Administration of Justice Law, the 
Constitution, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the emergency 
and antiterrorist provisions enacted to cope with the Tamil insur- 
gency (see Judiciary, ch. 4). 

The Penal Code 

The passage of the Penal Code, Ordinance Number 2 of 1883, 
marked an important stage in the island's transition from Roman- 
Dutch to British law. Despite the wide variety of amendments to 
the code, from 1887 to as recently as 1986, it remained substan- 
tially unchanged, and established a humane and unambiguous foun- 
dation for criminal justice. Crimes are divided into eighteen 
categories that include offenses against the human body, property, 
and reputation; various types of forgery, counterfeit, and fraud; 
offenses against public tranquillity, health, safety, justice, and the 
holding of elections; and offenses against the state and the armed 
forces. The code provides for six different types of punishment: 



257 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

death by hanging, rigorous imprisonment (with hard labor), sim- 
ple imprisonment, whipping, forfeiture of property, and fine. For 
sentences that involve whipping, the provisions of the Penal Code 
have been modified by the Code of Criminal Procedure, which sets 
a maximum sentence of twenty-four strokes, and requires that a 
medical officer be present during the execution of the sentence. 
Offenders under sixteen are given a maximum of six strokes with 
a light cane, and the sentence must be carried out in the presence 
of the court and, optionally, of the parents. In cases of imprison- 
ment, the Penal Code specifies a maximum sentence permissible 
for each offense, leaving the specific punishment to the discretion 
of the judge. Imprisonment for any single offense may not exceed 
twenty years. The death penalty is limited to cases involving offenses 
against the state (usually of open warfare), murder, abetment of 
suicide, mutiny, and giving false evidence that leads to the con- 
viction and execution of an innocent person. If the offender is under 
eighteen years of age or pregnant, extended imprisonment is sub- 
stituted for a death sentence. 

An attempt by the government to eliminate capital punishment 
received mixed reactions. In April 1956, the Bandaranaike govern- 
ment proposed the suspension of the death penalty for murder and 
abetment of suicide for a trial period of three years; this experi- 
ment was to be reviewed thereafter with the aim of abolishing capital 
punishment from the statute book. Parliament passed the Suspen- 
sion of Death Penalty Bill in May 1956. 

In October 1958, the government appointed a commission on 
capital punishment to examine the question of whether the sus- 
pension had contributed to any increase in the incidence of mur- 
der. The commission released a provisional report shortly before 
Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was assassinated in Sep- 
tember 1959 (see Sri Lanka Freedom Party Rule, 1956-65, ch. 1). 
Concluding that there was no immediate evidence to support a 
resumption of capital punishment, the commission recommended 
that the suspension be continued until April 1961 to permit a more 
extensive and conclusive study. As a result of the assassination, 
however, the commission's recommendation was set aside. In 
October 1959, the government decided to restore the death penalty, 
and a bill to this effect was passed in November 1959. 

Criminal Procedure and the Structure of the Courts 

As defined by the Constitution of 1978, the judiciary consists 
of a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeal, a High Court, and a num- 
ber of magistrate's courts (one for each division, as set out in the 
Administration of Justice Law). In cases of criminal law, the 



258 



National Security 



magistrate's courts and the High Court are the only courts with 
primary jurisdiction, and their respective domains are detailed in 
the Code of Criminal Procedure. Appeals from these courts of first 
instance can be made to the Court of Appeal and, under certain 
circumstances, to the Supreme Court, which exercises final appel- 
late jurisdiction. In all cases, the accused has the right to represen- 
tation by an attorney, and all trials must be public unless the judge 
determines, for reasons of family privacy, national security, or pub- 
lic safety, that a closed hearing is more appropriate. 

The vast majority of the nation's criminal cases are tried at the 
lowest level of the judicial system, the magistrate's courts. Cases 
here may be initiated by any police officer or public servant, or 
by any oral or written complaint to the magistrate. The magis- 
trate is empowered to make an initial investigation of the complaint, 
and to determine whether his court has proper jurisdiction over 
the case, whether it should be tried by the High Court, or whether 
it should be dismissed. Magistrates' courts have exclusive original 
jurisdiction over all criminal cases involving fines of up to Rsl ,500 
or prison sentences of up to two years. If the magistrate's court 
is determined to have the necessary jurisdiction, prosecution may 
be conducted by the complainant (plaintiff) or by a government 
officer, including the attorney general, the solicitor general, a state 
counsel, a pleader authorized by the attorney general, or any officer 
of any national or local government office. At the trial, the accused 
has the right to call and cross-examine witnesses. Trials are con- 
ducted without a jury, and the verdict and sentence are given by 
the magistrate. Any person unsatisfied with the judgment has the 
right to appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law or fact. 

For criminal cases involving penalties over Rsl, 500 or two years 
imprisonment, original jurisdiction resides with the High Court. 
The High Court is the highest court of first instance in criminal 
law, and exercises national jurisdiction. Prosecution must be con- 
ducted by the attorney general, the solicitor general, a state coun- 
sel, or any pleader authorized by the attorney general. During the 
trial, the accused or his or her attorneys are allowed to present a 
defense and call and cross-examine witnesses. For more serious 
offenses, including crimes against the state, murder, culpable homi- 
cide, attempted murder, and rape, the law provides for trial by 
jury. In such cases, a jury of seven members is chosen by lot from 
a panel elected by the accused unless the court directs otherwise. 
Both the prosecution and the defense have the opportunity to 
eliminate proposed members of the jury. The jury is required to 
reach a verdict by a majority of no less than five to two. (Under 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979, the right to a jury was 



259 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

suspended for a wide variety of offenses involving violations of com- 
munal harmony defined as incitement of one ethnic group against 
another.) In cases where the law does not prescribe trial by jury, 
the judge gives the verdict and passes sentence at the conclusion 
of the hearings. As in the magistrate's courts, the accused has the 
right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any matter of law or fact. 

As its name suggests, the Court of Appeal has only appellate 
jurisdiction in matters of criminal law. Cases before the court are 
conducted without a jury. Appeals from the High Court must be 
heard by a bench of at least three judges, whereas appeals from 
a magistrate's court require at least two judges. Verdicts are reached 
by majority decision, and therefore a supplemental judge is added 
in cases of a split vote. As in other courts, appellants are entitled 
to representation by an attorney, but if they cannot afford legal 
counsel, the Court of Appeal may, at the discretion of the judges, 
assign an attorney at the court's expense. After the court has handed 
down its decision, further appeal to the Supreme Court may be 
made on any matter involving a substantial question of law, but 
an appeal requires the approval of either the Court of Appeal or 
the Supreme Court itself. 

The Supreme Court was substantially refashioned by the 1978 
Constitution, with many of its former functions reverting to the 
Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court in the 1980s consisted of 
a chief justice and between six and ten other justices who sit as 
a single panel on all cases before the court. Cases are conducted 
without a jury, and the court exercises final appellate jurisdiction 
for all errors in fact or in law. 

Rules of Search, Arrest, and Detention 

Despite the numerous protections of individual liberties embodied 
in the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
government has succeeded in greatly expanding the discretionary 
powers of the armed forces and police through a variety of regula- 
tions and temporary provisions. The legal basis for these provi- 
sions comes from the Constitution itself, which sets conditions under 
which the government may act to restrict fundamental rights. Article 
15 states that freedom of speech, assembly, and association may 
be subject to restrictions "in the interests of racial and religious 
harmony." It also allows the government, for reasons of national 
security, to suspend the right of a suspect to be presumed inno- 
cent until proven guilty. In addition, Article 155 authorizes the 
Parliament and, in certain circumstances, the president, to make 
emergency regulations which override or amend existing legislation. 



260 



National Security 



Under these special provisions, the government passed the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979. The act empowered a su- 
perintendent of police, or an officer at or above the rank of subin- 
spector authorized by the superintendent, to enter and search any 
premises and to arrest without a warrant upon reasonable suspi- 
cion of a crime. Although this act was originally slated as a tem- 
porary provision to be in effect for three years, the parliament voted 
in March 1982 to continue it indefinitely. In addition, an amend- 
ment passed in 1983 extended the police powers detailed in the act 
to members of the armed forces, and provided legal immunity for 
arrests and deaths occurring in the course of security operations. 

The Code of Criminal Procedure allows the police to detain sus- 
pects without a hearing for a maximum of twenty-four hours. Under 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act, however, this period has been 
extended to seventy-two hours, and if the subsequent hearing leads 
to an indictment, the magistrate is required to order continued de- 
tention until the conclusion of the trial. The act further provides 
that the minister of internal security may, upon reasonable suspi- 
cion, order a suspect to be detained for a period of three months, 
extendable by three-month intervals up to a total of eighteen 
months. These provisions have been supplemented by the state of 
emergency regulations, first put into effect in May 1983 and 
renewed on a monthly basis thereafter. Under these regulations, 
police are given broad powers of preventive detention. In addi- 
tion, a suspect may be detained for up to ninety days by order of 
the attorney general. At the end of this period, the suspect must 
appear before a magistrate's court which, with or without an in- 
dictment, is required by law to remand the suspect to prison. Sub- 
sequent detention may continue for an indefinite period of time. 

Executive Powers of Pardon and Commutation 

The president has the power to grant a pardon or a stay or com- 
mutation of sentence to any offender convicted in any court in Sri 
Lanka. In cases involving a sentence of death, however, the presi- 
dent is required to seek the advice of both the attorney general and 
the minister of justice before issuing a pardon. The president also 
has the authority to pardon the accomplice to any offense, whether 
before or after the trial, in exchange for information leading to the 
conviction of the principal offender. 

Penal Institutions and Trends in the Prison Population 

All correctional institutions were administered by the Depart- 
ment of Prisons under the Ministry of Justice. In 1980 the depart- 
ment had a reported staff of approximately 4,000 officers and a 



261 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



total of 28 prisons, including conventional prisons, open prison 
camps, and special training schools for youthful offenders. The fa- 
cilities were regulated by the Prisons Ordinance of 1878, and each 
was headed by a superintendent or assistant superintendent of 
prisons. Departmental staff are trained at the Centre for Research 
and Training in Corrections in Colombo. The center, which was 
established in 1975, provided new recruits a ten- week training 
course in law, human relations, unarmed combat, first aid, and 
the use of firearms. 

Between 1977 and 1985, the prison population remained rela- 
tively stable, averaging 11,500 new admissions each year. More 
than 75 percent of the new inmates in 1985 had been convicted 
of minor crimes, and 62 percent were serving sentences of less than 
six months. Those convicted of serious crimes (including murder, 
culpable homicide, rape, and kidnaping) represented less than 2 
percent of the prison population and, although the number of new 
convicts sentenced to death fluctuated over this period (between 
33 and 81), no prisoners were executed. Men represented more 
than 95 percent of the prison population, and more than one-third 
of the nation's prisoners were being held in the Colombo District. 

In the 1980s, convicted offenders between the ages of sixteen 
and twenty-two were being housed at separate correctional facili- 
ties and open work camps. Many of them were eligible for admis- 
sion to the Training School for Youthful Offenders, which provided 
a special program of rehabilitation. Offenders under sixteen were 
not accepted into the correctional system. 

Because of the small number of female prisoners at any one time, 
in the 1980s there were no separate institutions exclusively for 
women. Instead, each of the major prisons had a small women's 
section staffed by female attendants. All female convicts with terms 
longer than six weeks were transferred to Welikade Prison in 
Colombo. Mothers with infants were allowed to keep their chil- 
dren in prison, and a preschool program was established to pro- 
vide child care during daytime hours. 

In the 1980s, all male and female prisoners with terms longer 
than six months received vocational training during their stay in 
prison. Training was offered in twenty-two trades, including agricul- 
ture, animal husbandry, rattan work, carpentry, and tailoring. 
Every convicted offender was required to work eight hours each 
day and received a wage calculated according to the level of skill. 

Apart from the correctional system maintained by the Depart- 
ment of Prisons, the armed forces and the police have operated 
a number of detention camps for suspects arrested under the Preven- 
tion of Terrorism Act. According to the United States State 



262 



National Security 



Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, "there have 
been persistent reports of torture or ill-treatment by military and 
police" at these camps, and detainees have been deprived of the 
legal rights and conditions of incarceration that apply to conven- 
tional detention facilities. 

Drug Abuse and Drug Legislation 

Because of the traditionally accepted roles of both opium and 
hashish in indigenous ayurvedic medicine, the population of Sri 
Lanka has historically been tolerant of the use of a variety of psy- 
choactive drugs (see Health, ch. 2). As a result, the government 
has been slow to identify drug abuse as an issue meriting national 
attention, and until the late 1970s, no efforts were made to quan- 
tify the problem. In 1978 the Narcotics Advisory Board of Sri Lanka 
coordinated the first systematic field investigation of drug abuse. 
The survey revealed that opium, cannabis, and barbiturates were 
the drugs most commonly used for nonmedical purposes, and that 
the majority of drug abusers were under forty years old (for can- 
nabis, 48 percent were between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five). 
Between 1975 and 1979, an average of 4,000 persons per year were 
arrested for drug-related offenses, while an additional 3,000 peo- 
ple sought help for drug problems. A 1980 government survey 
estimated between 3,500 and 5,800 opium dependents and between 
16,000 and 18,000 chronic cannabis users. Based on the World 
Health Organization conversion factor of ten actual drug abusers 
for every one identified, the government estimated a total usage 
level as high as 1.5 percent of the population. 

The delayed appearance of drug abuse among the issues of na- 
tional concern is reflected in the state of antidrug legislation. As 
of 1981, one of the major statutes on the books was the Poisons, 
Opium, and Dangerous Drugs Ordinance. Although it has been 
amended several times since its enactment in 1929, the ordinance 
was seriously outdated for a society in the 1980s. It divides drugs 
into five categories (poisons; poppy, coca, and hemp; opium; dan- 
gerous drugs; and other drugs) and regulates their import, export, 
and domestic trade. Rather than attempting to define dangerous 
drugs, the ordinance simply appends a list of forbidden substances, 
and this has permitted greater flexibility in amending the law to 
suit changes in society. More recent efforts to regulate drug abuse 
include the Cosmetics, Devices, and Drugs Act of 1980, which re- 
quires companies trading legal drugs to obtain a license from the 
director of health services. This provision has given an important 
avenue for the authorities to monitor the import and export of phar- 
maceuticals. In spite of the government's efforts to eliminate illegal 



263 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

drugs, the strong Buddhist constituency has insisted on the legiti- 
macy of traditional medical practices, and the Ayurvedic Act of 
1961 assures ayurvedic physicians of continued legal access to opium. 
Because drug addiction in Sri Lanka has been far less prevalent 
than in the West, and because terrorism and insurgency have 
strained to the utmost the nation's security assets, a concerted cam- 
paign on illegal substance abuse is likely to await a return to nor- 
mal conditions in the country. 

As this chapter goes to press, the security crisis in Sri Lanka is 
more appropriately the subject of current events than of history; 
the analyses of scholarly journals are quickly outpaced by happen- 
ings in the field. Recent changes in the structure of the nation's 
legal and military institutions have yet to be reflected in any major 
monographs, and, as a result, this study has relied to an unusual 
degree on the piecemeal reportage of daily newspapers and weekly 
magazines. 

The most comprehensive survey of the nation's armed forces ap- 
pears in a special report by G. Jacobs in the July 1985 issue of 
Asian Defence Journal. Entitled "Armed Forces of Sri Lanka," the 
report deals with the strength, organization, training, and equip- 
ment of the three armed services and the police, and provides valu- 
able information on the difficulties that the security forces have 
faced in dealing with the insurgency. For treatment of the Tamil 
separatist movement, Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam's "The 
Tamil 'Tigers' In Northern Sri Lanka: Origins, Factions, 
Programmes" {Internationales Asienforum) and Robert Kearney's 
"Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement In Sri 
Lanka" {Asian Survey) provide excellent background material on 
the origins and organization of the insurgency. Hellmann- 
Rajanayagam focuses more on the composition and leadership of 
the individual groups, while Kearney delves into the political en- 
vironment that gave rise to the movement. S.J. Tambiah's Sri 
Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy focuses on 
the anti-Tamil riots of July 1983 and offers insights into the role 
of the government and the armed forces in intensifying the ethnic 
conflict. Similar background material on the Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna appears in A.C. Alles' Insurgency — 1971. The author was 
himself a member of the Criminal Justice Commission that in- 
vestigated the uprising, and his blow-by-blow account, although 
sometimes excessively detailed, provides a fascinating picture of 



264 



National Security 



the rebel group — its ideology, leadership, and the haphazard nature 
of its attempt to seize power. 

The United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices offers an annual update on the treatment of prisoners 
and the effect of the emergency regulations and antiterrorist pro- 
visions on the administration of criminal justice. Information on 
the nation's prison system appears in the annual proceedings of 
the Asian and Pacific Conference of Correctional Administrators 
published by the Australian Institute of Criminology. In his report 
to the first, third and sixth conferences, the Sri Lankan Commis- 
sioner of Prisons, J. P. Delgoda, summarizes the major changes 
of the previous year and offers information on the structure of the 
prison administration, the treatment of women and minors, and 
the vocational training program. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



265 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Projected Population Growth, Selected Years, 1991-2001 

3 Population According to Age-group, 1986 

4 Schools and Other Education Institutions, Selected Years, 

1975-86 

5 Summary of Major Exports, Selected Years, 1976-86 

6 Gross National Product, 1975, 1980, and 1986 

7 Gross Domestic Product, Selected Years, 1960-87 

8 Industrial Production, 1980, 1985, and 1986 

9 Medium-Wave AM Radio Stations of Sri Lanka Broadcast- 

ing Corporation, 1988 

10 Balance of Trade and Terms of Trade, Selected Years, 1970-86 

11 Government Fiscal Operations, 1982-86 

12 Party Performance in General Elections, 1947-77 



267 



Appendix A 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know 


Multiply by 


To find 




0.04 


inches 




39 




Meters 


3.3 


feet 


Kilometers 


0.62 


miles 


Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2.47 


acres 


Slnnarp kilnmpfprs: 


0.39 


scjuare miles 




35.3 


cubic feet 




0.26 


gallons 




2.2 


pounds 




0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 




9 


degrees Fahrenheit 


(Centigrade) 


divide by 5 






and add 32 





Table 2. Projected Population Growth, Selected Years, 1991-2001 * 

(in thousands) 





Lo 


w Estimate 


Medium Estimate 


Hi 


*h Estimate 


Year 


Male 


Female 


Total 


Male 


Female 


Total 


Male 


Female 


Total 


1991 
1996 
2001 


8,931 
9,501 
9,980 


8,776 
9,434 
10,021 


17,707 
18,935 
20,001 


9,018 
9,695 
10,320 


8,862 
9,624 
10,354 


17,880 
19,319 
20,674 


9,099 
9,875 
10,644 


8,940 
9,794 
10,665 


18,039 
19,669 
21,309 



* Sri Lankan government figures. 



Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Statistical Office, 
Landerbericht: Sri Lanka, 1988, Wiesbaden, 1988, 17. 



269 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



Table 3. Population According to Age-group, 1986 
(in percentage of total population) 



1986 1 

Age-group Male Total 



Below 5 6.4 12.5 

5-10 5.8 11.4 

10-15 .. 5.8 11.4 

15-20 5.5 10.8 

20-25 5.1 10.2 

25-30 4.3 8.6 

30-35 3.8 7.6 

35-40 2.8 5.6 

40-45 2.4 4.7 

45-50 2.1 4.1 

50-55 1.9 3.7 

55-60 1.5 2.8 

60-65 1.2 2.3 

65-70 0.9 1.7 

70-75 0.7 1.2 

75-80 0.4 0.7 

80-85 0.4 0.7 

85 and over 0.4 0.7 



TOTAL 51.4 100.7 2 



1 Based on population estimates as of June 1986. 

2 Percentage does not add to 100 because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Statistical Office, 
Landerbericht: Sri Lanka, 1988, Wiesbaden, 1988, 18. 



Table 4. Schools and Other Education Institutions, Selected Years, 1975-86 



Institution 


1975 


1980 


1984 


1986 


General, all-purpose schools 


9,386 


9,117 


9,556 


9,656 


Elementary schools 1 


7,656 


4,156 


4,000 


3,938 


Intermediate and upper level schools 2 ... 


1,730 


4,961 


5,556 


5,718 




1,058 


677 


358 


421 




289 


282 


307 


372 




n.a. 


36 


31 


36 




7 4 


8 


9 


9 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Grades 1-5. 

2 Grades 6-12. 

3 Including technical and farm schools. 

* Until the late 1970s, there was one university with seven parts; each became independent in 1979. 



Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Statistical Office, 
Landerbericht: Sri Lanka, 1988, Wiesbaden, 1988, 29. 



270 



Appendix A 



Table 5. Summary of Major Exports, Selected Years, 1976-86 



Export Sector 


1976 


1984 


1985 


1986 


1986 1 




(in 


percentage of annual total) 




A • 1 

Agricultural 














4.Q A 


49 9 


33 1 


97 9 


Q 9^3 




1 O A 


8.8 


7.1 


7.7 


o coo 




10.2 


5.7 


8.5 


7.0 


2,389 




, , 4.2 


3.7 


3.8 


4.4 


1,500 




*7 C O 


60.4 


52.5 


46.3 


1 J, /D't 


Industrial 














1.4 


on o 
20. 5 


no a 


28.3 


9,629 




10.5 


8.8 


10.7 


6.9 


2,358 


Other industrial 


3.0 


5.5 


6.8 


11.4 


3,891 




14.9 


34.6 


39.5 


46.6 


15,878 


Minerals 














5.4 


1.6 


1.6 


2.2 


755 




0.6 


0.6 


0.8 


1.3 


427 


Total minerals 


6.0 


2.2 


2.4 


3.5 


1,182 




2.8 


2.7 


5.6 


3.7 


1,249 


TOTAL 2 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


34,073 



1 In millions of SL rupees. For value of rupee — see Glossary. 

2 Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Review of the Economy, 1987, 
Colombo, 1988, 157-59. 



271 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



Table 6. Gross National Product, Selected Years, 1975, 1980, and 1986 
(current factor cost prices in millions of rupees) 1 



Sector 


1975 


1980 


1986 2 




8,643 


17,151 


44,355 


Banking, insurance, and real estate 


336 


1,785 


6,840 


Construction 


1,018 


5,552 


12,272 




3,217 


11,048 


24,869 




316 


1,249 


4,155 




463 


1,457 


4,578 


Public administration and defense 


798 


1,965 


7,945 


Transport, storage, communications, 








and utilities 


1,889 


5,894 


20,163 


Wholesale and retail trade 


3,076 


10,898 


31,808 


Other services 


2,320 


5,247 


6,728 


GDP at factor cost 


22,076 


62,246 


163,713 


Net income factor, from abroad 


-140 


-432 


-3,861 


GNP TOTAL 


21,936 


61,814 


159,852 



1 For value of SL rupee — see Glossary. 

2 Provisional. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Sri Lanka, 
1987-88, London, 1987, 8-9; and Quarterly Economic Review: Annual Supplement, 1977, 
London, 1978, 8. 



Table 7. Growth of Gross Domestic Product, Selected Years, 1960-87 
(in percentages) 



Sector 


1960-65 1 


1970-77 1 


1977-84 1 


1987 2 


Agriculture 


2.7 


2.2 


3.8 


0.8 




5.2 


1.6 


5.6 


6.0 


Services 3 


4.6 


3.2 


6.1 


3.2 


Gross Domestic Product Total 


4.0 


2.9 


6.0 


3.0 


Gross Domestic Product Per Capita . . 


1.5 


1.3 


4.3 


1.3 



1 Annual averages. 

2 Estimated. 

3 Including construction. 



272 



Appendix A 



Table 8. Industrial Production, Selected Years, 1980, 1985, and 1986 
(in millions of rupees) 1 



Sector 


1980 


1985 


1986 2 




478 


123 


281 


Chemicals, oil, coal, rubber, and plastics . . 


O' A 1 C 

y,4-io 


19 1 (\A 
1 J , 1 Ut 


I 1 (1QQ 

I I ,Uoo 


Fabricated metal products, machinery, 










620 


1,592 


1,754 


Food, beverages, and tobacco 


3,899 


10,497 


12,169 


Nonmetallic mineral products (except oil 










1,156 


1,854 


2,053 


Paper products 


476 


1,187 


1,289 


Textiles, clothing, and leather 


1,923 


9,505 


12,088 




289 


705 


632 




54 


125 


136 


TOTAL 


18,311 


38,692 


41,490 



1 For value of SL rupee — see Glossary. 

2 Provisional. 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Sri Lanka, 
1987-88, London, 1987, 17; and Country Profile: Sri Lanka, 1986-87, London, 1986, 
15. 



273 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



Table 9. Medium- Wave AM Radio Stations of Sri Lanka 
Broadcasting Corporation, 1988 



Location 


Frequency 
(kHz) 


Power 
(kw) 


Language 


Network 


Ambawela 


531 


40 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 1 


Ambawela 


648 


40 


Sinhala 


National— Channel 2 


Amparai 


693 


20 


Sinhala 


National— Channel 2 


Amparai 


855 


20 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 1 


Amparai 


972 


20 


Tamil 


National — Tamil 


Anuradhapura 


774 


10 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 2 


Diyagama 1 


558 


10 


Tamil 


National — Tamil 


Diyagama 


621 


20 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 1 


Diyagama 


873 


20 


English 


none 


Diyagama 


918 


25 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Diyagama 


702 


25 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 2 


Galle 


1026 


10 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 1 










National — Channel 2 


Kandy 


567 


10 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 2 


Kandy 


819 


10 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 1 


Kantalai 


585 


20 


Tamil 


National — Tamil 


Kantalai 


747 


20 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 1 


Mahiyangana 


1485 


1 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 1 


Mahiyangana 


1602 


1 


Sinhala 


National— Channel 2 


Maho 


639 


50 


various 2 


Regional 


Maho 


801 


40 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 1 


Ratnapura 


603 


10 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 1 


Ratnapura 


729 


10 


Sinhala 


National— Channel 2 


Wiraketiya 


675 


40 


Sinhala 


National — Channel 1 


Wiraketiya 


594 


50 


various 2 


Regional 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Diyagama is in Colombo District. 

2 Probably Sinhala. 



Source: Based on information from World Radio-TV Handbook, 1987, Amsterdam, 1987, 
229-30. 



Table 10. Balance of Trade and Terms of Trade, Selected Years, 1970-86 
(in millions of rupees) 1 





1970 


1975 


1980 


1985 


1986 2 


Imports 


2,313 


5,196 


33,942 


54,049 


54,609 




2,033 


3,968 


17,595 


36,207 


34,072 


Balance of Trade . . 


-280 


-1,228 


-16,347 


-17,843 


-20,537 


Terms of Trade . . . 


194 


107 


106 


108 


102 



(1981 = 100) 



1 For value of SL rupee — see Glossary. 

2 Provisional. 



274 



Appendix A 

Table 11. Government Fiscal Operations, 1982-86 
(in millions of rupees) 1 



1982 1983 1984 1985 2 1986 2 



Revenue 





2 9 


3.4 


5.5 


5.6 


4.8 


Sales and turnover taxes 


6 4 


9.5 


13.9 


14.2 


14.6 


Import and export duties 


6 1 


7.3 


11.1 


10.3 


11.6 




2.3 


5.1 


7.2 


9.0 


10.7 




17.7 


25.3 


37.7 


39.1 


41.7 


Expenditure 














19.2 


25.1 


31.8 


34.2 


34.6 


Capital 


18.7 


21.7 


21.8 


30.5 


35.1 


Total Expenditure 


37.9 


46.8 


53.6 


64.7 


69.7 


Budget Deficit 


20.1 


21.6 


15.9 


25.7 


26.6 


Financing of deficit 












Domestic bank borrowing 


4.0 


1.2 


-2.7 


7.5 


2.3 


Domestic non-bank borrowing . . . . 


7.6 


10.1 


6.6 


8.5 


9.2 


Foreign grants 


3.4 


3.5 


3.3 


3.3 


3.8 




5.4 


7.5 


8.0 


8.9 


12.1 


Use of cash balances 


-0.3 


-0.7 


0.7 


-2.5 


-0.8 




71.3 


86.4 


95.7 


123.7 


150.3 



1 For value of SL rupee — see Glossary 

2 Estimated — figures rounded. 



Source: Based on information from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Review of the Economy, 1986, 
Colombo, 1987, 232; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Sri Lanka: 
1987-1988, London, 1987, 22. 



275 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



Table 12. Party Performance in General Elections, 1947-77 
(showing percentage of popular vote and number of seats won) 













1956 




March 


1960 




% Votes 


No. of 


% Votes 


No. of 


% Votes 


No. of 


% Votes 


No. of 




Won 


Seats 


Won 


Seats 


Won 


Seats 


Won 


Seats 


UNP 1 


39.9 


42 


44.0 


54 


27.9 


8 


29.6 


50 


<sT T7P 2 
oLrr ... 






1 ^ 

1 J . J 


Q 


4.0 n 

ttU.U 


D 1 


on q 




LSSP 3 ... 


16.8 4 


15 4 


13.1 


9 


10.5 


14 


10.5 


10 


CPSL 5 . . . 


3.7 


3 


5.8 


4 


4.6 


3 


4.8 


3 


MEP 6 . . . . 














10.6 


10 


TC 7 


4.4 


7 


2.8 


4 


0.3 


1 


1.2 


1 


FP 8 






1.9 


2 


5.4 


10 


5.7 


15 


CIC 9 


3.8 


6 














Other 


2.3 


1 


2.9 


1 


0.3 





7.6 


9 


TULF 10 . . 


















Ind. 11 


29.1 


21 


14.0 


12 


11.0 


8 


9.1 


7 


TOTAL * . . 


100.0 


95 


100.0 


95 


100.0 


95 


100.0 


151 



July 1960 1965 19700 1977 

% Votes No. of % Votes No. of % Votes No. of % Votes No. of 
Won Seats Won Seats Won Seats Won Seats 



UNP 1 


37.6 


30 


39.3 


66 


37.9 


17 


50.9 


140 


SLFP 2 ... 


33.6 


75 


30.2 


41 


36.9 


91 


29.7 


8 


LSSP 3 ... 


7.4 


12 


7.5 


10 


8.7 


19 


3.6 





CPSL 5 . . . 


3.0 


4 


2.7 


4 


3.4 


6 


2.0 





MEP 6 . . . . 


3.4 


3 


2.7 


1 


0.9 





0.4 





TC 7 


1.5 


1 


2.4 


3 


2.3 


3 






FP 8 

CIC 9 

Other 


7.2 


16 


5.4 


14 


4.9 


13 






5.3 


7 


6.7 


7 


1.3 





1.8 12 




TULF 10 . . 














6.4 


18 


Ind. 11 


4.4 


6 


5.8 


6 


4.6 


2 


5.6 




TOTAL * . . 


100.0 


151 


100.0 


151 


100.0 


151 


100.0 


168 



— Means did not particpate. 

* Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 

1 UNP - United National Party. 

2 SLFP - Sri Lanka Freedom Party. 

3 LSSP - Lanka Sama Samaja Party. 

* Includes both factions of LSSP, which ran separately in 1947. 

5 CPSL - Communist Party of Sri Lanka. 

6 MEP - Mahajana Eksath Peramuna. 

7 TC - Tamil Congress. With FP, formed the TULF to contest the 1977 election. 

8 FP - Federal Party. With TC, formed the TULF to contest the 1977 election. 

9 CIC - Ceylon Indian Congress. 

10 TULF - Tamil United Liberation Front. 

11 Ind. - Independents. 

12 The Ceylon Workers' Congress. 

Source: Based on information from Craig Baxter, et al. Government and Politics in South Asia, 
Boulder, 1987, 330; and Robert N. Kearney, 'The Political Party System in Sri 
Lanka,' in Political Science Quarterly, 98, No. 1, Spring 1983, 19. 



276 



Appendix B 



Political Parties and Groups 

All Ceylon Tamil Congress — also known as the Tamil Congress. 
Founded in 1944 to champion the cause of the Tamils against 
Sinhalese Buddhist domination. A faction broke away in 1949 
to form the more aggressive Tamil Federal Party. 

Ceylon Equal Society Party (Lanka Sama Samaja Party — LSSP) — 
Trotskyite-oriented party founded in 1935. Though touted as 
the world's only successful Trotskyite party, in recent years 
the LSSP has been considered politically spent. 

Ceylon Indian Congress—founded in 1939. Political group repre- 
senting Indian Tamils that sought to revive Buddhism. 

Ceylon Workers' Congress — a minority-oriented party which en- 
joyed the support of the Indian Tamils and the Sri Lanka Mus- 
lim Congress in the late 1980s. 

Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL) — began as a Stalinist fac- 
tion of the LSSP, but was later expelled and founded as a 
separate party in 1943, remaining faithful to the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. 

Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV) — Patriotic Liberation 
Organization — emerged in 1987 as a splinter group of the 
JVP. 

Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) — a united front organi- 
zation formed in March 1985 by the LTTE, EPRLF, TELO, 
and EROS, which became largely inoperative by mid- 1986 
when LTTE quit, although the other groups sought to form 
a front without LTTE participation. 

Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) — a guer- 
rilla group that emerged in the early 1980s, part of the ENLF. 

Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) — militant 
Tamil guerrilla group that emerged in the early 1980s, part 
of the ENLF. 

Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP — People's Liberation Front) — 
insurgent extremist political group founded in the late 1960s 
by Rohana Wijeweera. A Maoist and primarily rural Sinha- 
lese youth movement based in southern Sri Lanka, it initially 
sympathized with the ' 'oppressed" of both the Tamil and Sin- 
halese communities, but by the early 1980s, became increas- 
ingly a Sinhalese nationalist organization opposing any 
compromise with the Tamil insurgency. 



277 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) — strongest of Tamil 
separatist groups, founded in 1972 when Tamil youth espous- 
ing a Marxist ideology and an independent Tamil state estab- 
lished a group called the Tamil New Tigers; name changed 
in 1976. Competitors include People's Liberation Organiza- 
tion of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Tamil Eelam Liberation Army 
(TELA), and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization 
(TELO). Membership generally drawn from the Karava or 
fisherman caste. By late 1986 LTTE had eliminated TELO 
and established itself as the dominant spokesman of the Tamil 
insurgency. 

New Equal Society Party (Nava Sama Samaja Party — NSSP) — a 
breakaway faction of the LSSP. 

People's Democratic Party (PDP — Mahajana Prajathanthra) — 
Sinhalese, founded in 1977 by six members of the SLFP. 

People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE, also 
PLOT) — insurgent political group with large percentage of 
members belonging to elite Vellala caste; a rival of the LTTE, 
from whom it broke away in 1981 claiming a purer form of 
Marxist orthodoxy. 

People's United Front (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna — MEP) — 
political party founded by Dinesh P.R. Gunawardene in 1955 
that has attracted Sinhalese support with its appeals to mili- 
tant Buddhist and Sinhala chauvinist sentiments. Originally 
opposed to the UNP, it is basically an SLFP-Marxist coalition. 

Sinhala Maha Sabha — Great Council of the Sinhalese. It was found- 
ed in 1937 to represent the interest of Sinhala-language speak- 
ers in the Ceylon National Congress and to mobilize popular 
support for the liberation of the country from foreign rule. 

Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) — first major non-Marxist left- 
of-center political party to oppose the UNP; founded in July 
1951 when S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's left-of-center bloc split 
with D.S. Senanayake and seceded to form the SLFP. 

Sri Lanka People's Party (SLPP — Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya) — 
political party formed in 1984 by a daughter of Sirimavo Ban- 
daranaike, Chandrika Kumaratunge, and her husband Vijay 
Kumaratunge, who claimed that the original SLFP, under the 
leadership of Bandaranaike's son, Anura, was excessively right 
wing and had become an instrument of the Jayewardene 
government. 

Tamil Eelam Army (TEA) — insurgent group. 

Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA) — insurgent group. 

Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) — guerrilla group 
decimated in 1986 by repeated LTTE attacks. 



278 



Appendix B 



Tamil Federal Party — also known as the Federal Party. Formally 
established in December 1949. Competitor of the more con- 
ciliatory Tamil Congress, also known as the All Ceylon Tamil 
Congress, the party desired a federal system of government 
and the right to political autonomy — an independent Tamil 
state. Renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) 
in 1971. 

Tamil New Tigers — guerrilla group, formed in 1972, that aban- 
doned the political process and geared itself for violence. The 
New Tigers espoused Marxist ideology and claimed to represent 
the oppressed of all ethnic groups despite its obvious ethnic 
affiliation; see also LTTE. 

Tamil Tigers — Tamil separatist underground of rival and some- 
times violently hostile groups based in the Northern and Eastern 
provinces and known collectively as Tamil Tigers. 

Tamil United Front — founded in May 1972 as a reaction against 
the 1972 constitution, a coalition of Tamil interest groups and 
legal parties including the Tamil Congress and the Federal 
Party; united by the goal of Tamil autonomy and espousing 
nonviolent means, called the Tamil United Liberation Front 
(TULF) in 1976. Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)— 
political party spawned by the Tamil United Front. 

Three Stars — insurgent Tamil coalition. 

United Front (Samagi Peramuna) — three-party political coali- 
tion (LSSP, CPSL, and SLFP), formed in 1968 by Sirimavo 
Bandaranaike to prepare for the 1970 general election and to 
oppose the UNP. 

United National Party — conservative, umbrella party founded by 
Don Stephen Senanayake in 1946 as a partnership of many 
disparate groups — including the Ceylon National Congress, the 
Sinhala Maha Sabha, and the Muslim League. Political party 
in power in Sri Lanka for ten years beginning in February 1948 
when the new constitution went into effect, and again from 1977 
to 1988; nickname is "uncle-nephew party" because of kin- 
ship ties among the party's top leadership. 



279 



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Violence in Sri Lanka. Ottawa: Crimcare, 1984. 

Jeffries, Charles. Ceylon: The Path to Independence. New York: Prae- 
ger, 1963. 



297 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



Judicature Act, No. 2 of 1978. Colombo: Department of Government 
Printing, 1978. 

Kearney, Robert N. "Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist 
Movement in Sri Lanka," Asian Survey, 25, No. 9, September 
1985,898-917. 

Keegan, John. World Armies. (2d ed.) Detroit: Gale Research Com- 
pany, 1983. 

Kodagoda, N. "Drug Abuse — A Barrier to Development," Progress 

[Colombo], 2, No. 1, March 1982, 8-12. 
Kurian, George Thomas. Encyclopedia of the Third World. Oxford: 

Facts on File, 1987. 
Leary, Virginia, A. Ethnic Conflict and Violence in Sri Lanka. Geneva: 

International Commission of Jurists, 1983. 
McDonald, Robert. "Eyewitness in Jaffna," Pacific Defense Reporter 

[Kunyung, Australia], 14, No. 2, August 1987, 25-9. 
Marks, Tom A. "Counter-Insurgency in Sri Lanka: Asia's Dirty 

Little War," Soldier of Fortune, 12, No. 2, February 1987, 38-47. 
Marks, Thomas A. " 'People's War' in Sri Lanka: Insurgency 

and Counterinsurgency," Issues & Studies [Taipei], 22, No. 8, 

August 1986, 63-100. 
"Sri Lankan Minefield," Soldier of Fortune, 13, No. March 

1988, 36-45. 

. "Sri Lanka's Special Force," Soldier of Fortune, 13, No. 7, 

1988, 32-39. 

The Military Balance, 1987-1988. London: International Institute 

for Strategic Studies, 1987. 
"Military Operations in the North," Asian Defence Journal [Kuala 

Lumpur], May 1987, 122. 
Miller, Matt. "Sri Lanka Mounts Crucial Jaffna Assault," Asian 

Wall Street Journal [Hong Kong], May 28, 1987, 1. 
Mills, Lennox A. Ceylon under British Rule: 1795-1932. New York: 

Barnes and Noble, 1965. 
Mobilization and Supplementary Forces Act, No. 40 of 1985. Colombo: 

Department of Government Printing, 1985. 
Nuri, Maqsud ul Hasan. "Sri Lanka: Profile of Guerrilla Groups," 

Muslim Magazine International [Islamabad], January 30, 1987, 3. 
O'Ballance, Edgar. "Sri Lanka and Its Tamil Problem," Armed 

Forces [Shepperton, United Kingdom], 5, December 1986, 542. 
Pasupati, Shiva. "Some Reflections on the Criminal Justice Sys- 
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1980-81, 28-40. 
Peiris, Gamini Lakshman. Criminal Procedure in Sri Lanka under the 

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Bibliography 



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Prakash, Sanjiv. "Indian Troops in Sri Lanka until 1989?" Defense 
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Pratap, Anita. "The Killing Fields," Telegraph Colour Magazine [Cal- 
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Stares, Judith. "Birth of a New Model Army," Soldier [London], 
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Tambiah, Stanley Jeyaraj a. Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dis- 
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Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Weintraub, Richard M. "Bomb Kills Up to 150 in Sri Lanka," 
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Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam. Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1979. (2d ed.) 
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Wriggins, W. Howard. Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation. Prince- 
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Yapa, Vijitha. "Colombo MPs Fear More Attacks after Official 
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(Various issues of the following publications also were used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Asiaweek [Hong Kong]; Ceylon Daily 
News [Colombo]; Daily News [Colombo]; Foreign Broadcast Infor- 
mation Service Daily Report: Near East and South Asia; Foreign Broad- 
cast Information Service Daily Report: South Asia; Frontline [Madras]; 
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Events [London]; Manchester Guardian Weekly [Manchester]; New York 
Times; Times [London]; Times of India [Bombay] and Washington 
Post.) 



300 



Glossary 



Accelerated Mahaweli Program — Begun in the 1960s as the 
Mahaweli Ganga Program, it "accelerated" in the 1980s. The 
project, damming the Mahaweli Ganga (river), was expected 
to make Sri Lanka self-sufficient in rice and generate enough 
hydroelectric power to supply the entire nation. 

ayurveda — System of healing based on homeopathy and naturopa- 
thy, with an extensive use of herbs. There are ayurvedic doc- 
tors, hospitals, and colleges, all recognized by the government. 

bhikku — Buddhist monk. When capitalized, an honorific title. The 
bhikkus are not priests or ministers in the Western sense of the 
terms. 

chena — Slash-and-burn agriculture. Forest or shrub undergrowth 
is cleared by cutting and burning. Land is farmed until its 
productivity falls, then new area is cleared. This type of agricul- 
ture usually is associated with shifting cultivation. 

crown land(s) — The equivalent of federal public lands in the United 
States. The crown lands were for the most part secured as state 
succession or as inheritance from the king of Kandy. 

Dravidian — Ethnic group; ancient Australoid race of southern 
India; a language family of India, Sri Lanka, and western 
Pakistan that includes Tamil, Telugu, Gondi, and Malayalam. 
See also Tamils. 

Durava — Sinhalese lower, minority caste who traditionally worked 
as toddy tappers. 

Eelam — Tamil name for Sri Lanka. 

fiscal year (FY) — calendar year. 

Goyigama, Govi — Highest Sinhalese (cultivator) caste. Traditional 
ruling caste and leaders of established order, comprising at least 
half of the Sinhalese population. Agriculturalists, now chal- 
lenged for status by Karavas (q.v.). 

gross domestic product (GDP) — The total value of goods and ser- 
vices produced within a country's borders during a fixed period, 
usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed 
by each sector of the economy in the form of compensation of 
employees, profits, and depreciation (consumption of capital). 
Subsistence production is included and consists of the imputed 
value of production by the farm family for its own use and the 
imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings. 

gross national product (GNP) — Gross domestic product (q. v. ) plus 
the income received from abroad by residents, less payments 
remitted abroad to nonresidents. 



301 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

Indian Tamils — Tamils whose forebears were brought from India 
in the late nineteenth century to work the tea and rubber plan- 
tations. The Indian Tamils were disenfranchised in Sri Lanka 
by legislation passed in 1948. See also Tamils. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange rates and payments. The main bus- 
iness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- 
quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- 
nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are 
developing countries. 

Karaiya — Caste below the Vellala (q. v. ) in the Tamil caste system, 
but still a high caste; original occupation was fishing, although 
group branched out into commercial ventures. 

Karava — Lower Sinhalese (fisherman) caste that became wealthy 
because of access to English education and opportunities for 
involvement with plantation agriculture and modern commer- 
cial enterprise. 

karma — Religious doctrine that each rebirth in the cycle of lives 
is based on the sum of the merit accumulated by an individual 
during his previous lives. Karma establishes the general ten- 
dency of a life but does not determine specific actions. In each 
life, the interaction between individual character and previ- 
ously established karma forms the karma of succeeding lives. 

maha — Greater monsoon — the main growing season under rain- 
fed conditions for paddy (rice) and most other annual crops. 
Sowing is between August and October, depending on the time 
of the monsoon, and the crop is harvested five to six months 
later. 

nibbana — The release from the cycle of rebirths and the annihila- 
tion of the individual being that occurs on achievement of per- 
fect spiritual understanding. More commonly known in the 
West as nirvana. 

paddy — Threshed, unmilled rice, which is the basis of the subsis- 
tence economy of much of South and Southeast Asia. It is grown 
on flooded or heavily irrigated flatland. 

Pali — The language of the Theravada Buddhist sacred scriptures. 
A Prakrit, or a language derived from Sanskrit. 

rupee — Monetary unit of Sri Lanka. The official exchange rate (par 
value) from January 16, 1952, to November 20, 1967, was 
Rs4.76 per US$1. In 1988 the official rate was approximately 
32.32 rupees per US$1. 



302 



Glossary 



Salagama — Sinhalese lower, minority caste (cinnamon peelers). 

sangha — The total community of bhikkus (q. v.), or Buddhist monks, 
in the broadest and most abstract sense; the sangha is composed 
of all Buddhist sects and residential communities and is the 
traditional Buddhist elite. 

Sinhala — An Indo-European language of the Indo-Iranian group. 
It was derived from a Prakrit, or dialectical, form of Sanskrit. 
Majority language of Sri Lanka. 

Sinhalese — The largest ethnic group, distinguished primarily by 
their language. As of 1981, Sinhalese constituted approximately 
74 percent of the population; over 90 percent of them are Ther- 
avada Buddhists. Their ancestors probably migrated from 
northern India around 500 B.C. 

Sri Lankan Tamils — Approximately two-thirds of the Tamils and 
those who have lived in Sri Lanka for many centuries. The 
Sri Lankan Tamils enjoy full voting rights. See also Tamils. 

Tamils — Ethnic group, predominantly Hindu, whose language is 
Tamil, a Dravidian language spoken by the Tamil minority 
in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka; and which 
is the major regional language spoken in Tamil Nadu State, 
southeast India. Sri Lankan Tamils are descendants of settlers 
and invaders and are a native minority that represented ap- 
proximately 12.6 percent of the population in 1981. Indian 
Tamils are descendants of estate laborers imported under British 
sponsorship to the island primarily in the nineteenth century, 
and represented approximately 5.5 percent of the population 
in 1981 . The Indian Tamil population has been shrinking be- 
cause of repatriation programs to Tamil Nadu. 

Theravada Buddhism — Literally, the Buddhism that is "the way" 
or "doctrine of the elders." Sinhalese called their beliefs Ther- 
avada. Their tradition, frequently described as Hinayana 
(Lesser Vehicle), preserves a clear understanding of the Buddha 
as a man who achieved enlightenment and developed monks 
as accomplished followers of his teachings. This is in con- 
tradistinction to the Mahay ana (Greater Vehicle) Buddhism, 
which often treats the Buddha as a superhuman and fills the 
universe with a pantheon of enlightened figures (bodhisattvas) 
who help others achieve enlightenment. The Sri Lankans, with 
rare exception, speak only of Theravada Buddhism, of which 
there is no central religious authority. 

Veddah — Last descendants of the ancient inhabitants of Sri Lanka, 
predating arrival of the Sinhalese. Veddahs have not preserved 
their own language, live in small rural settlements, and have 
become more of a caste than a separate ethnic group. They 



303 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 

are generally accepted as equal in rank to the Sinhalese 
Goyigama (q. v.) caste. 

Vellala — Highest Tamil (cultivator) caste, the members of which 
traditionally dominated local commercial and educational elites 
and whose values had strong influence on Tamils of other castes. 
The group comprises more than half of the Tamil population. 

wet zone — Area of southwest side of hill country and southestern 
plain receiving an average of 250 centimeters of rain per year. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of three 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in the less devel- 
oped countries. The president and certain senior officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (IMF— q.v.). 

yala — Lesser monsoon — the secondary growing season for paddy 
(rice) and most other annual crops with sowing between April 
and May and harvesting four or five months later. For some 
foodstuffs and cotton, when grown in the dry zone under irri- 
gation, the yala crop is more important than the maha (q. v. ) crop. 



304 



Index 



Abhayagiri monastery, 15 
Accelerated Mahaweli Program, 123, 126, 
128, 130, 131, 142-43, 159, 166, 215 
accommodessan, 30 

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 

(AIDS), 110 
ACTC. See All Ceylon Tamil Congress: 

ACTC 
Adams Peak, 63 

Administration of Justice Law (1973), 
256-57, 258 

administrative districts, 188-89 

administrative reform, 29, 31 

Adventist Radio, 149 

agricultural products, processed {see also 
food processing), 138, 140-41 

agricultural sector {see also cinnamon 
industry; coconut industry; coffee 
industry; plantation system; rice culti- 
vation; rubber industry; sugar industry; 
tea industry), 8, 10, 17, 121, 126- 
37; exports, 119, 126, 129; farming 
communities of, 67; government policies 
for, 130-33; shift in development of, 
127-28; shift in labor force from, 149-50 

Agro-Commercial Bank, 167 

AIADMK. See All-India Anna Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) 

Aid Sri Lanka Consortium, 166 

aircraft, 241-42 

Air Force Academy, 242 

Air Force Security Force, 241 

Air Lanka (airline), 148, 225 

Algemene Bank Nederland, 168 

All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress, 95 

All-Ceylon Buddhist Women's Associa- 
tion, 95 

All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), 37, 
44-45 

All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam (AIADMK), 205, 208 

All Party conferences (1984, 1986), xxxi, 
207-8, 210 

Alms Bowl, 17 

Amarapura Nikaya sect, 92-93 

Ambalangoda, 228 

American Express, 168 

Amnesty International, xxvi, 54, 207 



Amparai District, 78, 106, 211 
Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank, 168 
Ananda College, 35 
Anglican Church of Ceylon, 101-2 
antidrug legislation, 263 
Anuradhapura, 3, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 

35, 65, 67, 71, 225 
apatite, 143 

Arabian Peninsula, 100 

Arabic language, 101 

Arabs, 100, 210 

Arasaratnam, Sinnappah, 12 

armed forces {see also Sri Lankan Air 
Force; Sri Lankan Army; Sri Lankan 
Navy), 193, 219-20, 221, 235; awards, 
248; conditions of services in, 242-43, 
245; detention camps of, 262-63; ethnic 
composition of, 245, 247; expansion of, 
230, 234; increased power of, 255, 260; 
role in Sri Lanka, 230-31, 232-33, 235 

Army Training Centre, 238, 242, 248 

artificial lakes. See water storage tanks 

Aruvi Aru River, 63 

Aryans, 180 

ASEAN. See Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Ashraff, M., 210 
Asian Development Bank, 145 
Asoka (emperor), 7, 95, 180, 207 
assassinations, xxvi, xxxv, 5, 46, 53, 54, 

55, 258 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN), 14 
Athulathmudali, Lalith, 213 
Australia, 237, 239, 240, 249 
autonomous homeland, Tamils, xxvi, 

xxx, 42, 46, 54-55, 204, 222, 226 
Ayurvedic Act (1961), 264 
ayurvedic medicine, 109, 263-64 



Badulla District, 238 
Balakumar, V., 205 
balance of payments, 160, 161 
Balasingham, A. S., 204 
Bandaranaike, Anura, 51, 53, 196, 213 
Bandaranaike, S. R. D. (Sirimavo 
Ratwatte Dias), 5, 37, 42, 53, 176, 181, 



305 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



194, 199; administration of, xxix, xxx, 
47-48, 122, 184, 196, 202, 214, 221, 
223, 229, 256; coalition formed by, 49, 
211, 227-28; opposition stance of, xxxi, 
xxxiv, xxxv 

Bandaranaike, S. W. R. D. (Solomon 
West Ridgeway Dias), xxviii, xxix, 
4-5, 43-44, 46, 95, 176, 181, 194, 195, 
196, 201, 245, 247, 249, 258 

Bandaranaike International Airport, 141, 
147-48, 225, 229 

Bandung Conference (1955), 43 

Bangalore, 211 

Bankers' Trust Company, 168 
banking system, 167-68 
Bank of America, 168 
Bank of Ceylon, 167 
Bank of Credit and Commerce Interna- 
tional, 168 
Bank of Hong Kong and Shanghai, 167 
Bank of Oman, 168 
Bank of the Middle East, 168 
Banque Indosuez, 168 
Baptists, 102 
Barnes, Edward, 28, 30 
barrages. See water storage tanks 
Batavia, 22 

Batgam (Padu) caste, 83 

Batticaloa District, 22, 78, 149, 211, 226 

Batticaloa University College, 105 

Bay of Bengal, 35, 64 

Bentham, Jeremy, 28 

Berava caste, 83 

bhikku, 90-91 

Bhutan, 210 

Bhuvanekakabahu (king), 19 
Biyagama, 141 
Boer War, 232 
Bohra people, 77 
Bolshevik-Leninist Party, 38 
boycotts, 151 

Brahmanic civilization, 6, 97, 181 
Brahmans, 84-85, 96-97, 102; legal sys- 
tem of, 15 
Britain (see also Colebrooke-Cameron 
Commission; Donoughmore Commis- 
sion), 22, 209, 239, 240, 241, 242; 
colonial era of, xxviii, 4, 25-28, 32, 
33-34, 35, 122, 178, 182, 183, 188, 
219, 231-32, 248-49; Colonial Office 
of, 28, 29, 183; defense agreement 
(1947), 219; Eastern Fleet of, 39; 
influence of armed forces of, 230; mili- 



tary relations with, 248-49; replace- 
ment of Dutch by, 25; Royal Commis- 
sion of Eastern Inquiry, 29; Royal 
Navy, 38; in Sri Lanka in World War 

I, 35-36; in Sri Lanka in World War 

II, 38-40; trade relations with, 160 
British: in Ceylon, xxviii, 24-34, 35, 36, 

183; influence on constitution, 40, 182, 
183-84 (see also Soulbury Constitution) 

British East India Company, 25 

British Royal Navy, 38, 39 

broadcasting, foreign (see also Voice of 
America), 149 

Buddha, xxviii, 44, 90, 93-94 

Buddhism (see also Theravada Buddhism; 
Tooth Relic), xxvii, 5, 12, 13, 15, 
34-35, 50, 73, 78, 80, 89-95, 102, 
180-81, 222, 223, 245; art and architec- 
ture of, 10, 15; British policy toward, 
26-27, 32; introduction and impact of, 
3-4, 7-8, 10; special status of, 184-85 

Buddhist and Pali University of Sri 
Lanka, 105 

Buddhist kingdoms, 6 

Buddhist Theosophical Society of Ceylon, 
35 

budgetary process. See defense budget; fis- 
cal policy 

Burgher Political Association, 37 

Burghers, 24, 77, 78, 105, 178, 232; in 
armed forces, 245, 247 

Burma, 15, 16, 180, 231 

bus services, 147 



Caltex, 48 

Cambodia, 16, 180 

Cameron, C. H., 28-29 

Canada, 242 

canals, 10, 13, 63 

Cape of Good Hope, 18 

caste system (see also Chandala caste; cul- 
tivator caste; Durava caste; Govi caste; 
Goyigama caste; Karava caste; Salagama 
caste; Vellala caste; untouchable caste), 
10-11, 80-82; distinctions in, 85-86; 
political importance of, 178; problems 
of, 60; role in violence against Tamils 
of, 206; of Sinhalese, 15, 34, 59-60, 
82-84; of Tamils, 11, 15, 59-60, 76, 
84-85 

Cauvery (Kaveri) River Basin, 61 



306 



Index 



Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 124, 131, 156, 
167-68 

Central Highlands, 61, 63-64, 68, 83, 87, 
100, 120, 200 

Central Province, 145, 226 

Centre for Research and Training in Cor- 
rections, 262 

Ceylon, xxviii, 4, 183 

Ceylon Bank, 31 

Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948, 41 
Ceylon Civil Service, 29, 34, 183 
Ceylon Communist Party, 227 
Ceylon Defence Force, 232 
Ceylon Electricity Board, 145 
Ceylon Equal Society Party (Lanka Sama 

Samaja Party: LSSP), 38, 48, 49-51, 

155, 178, 193, 197, 199 
Ceylon Independence Act of 1947, 40 
Ceylon Indian Congress, 37, 41 
Ceylon Labour Union, 154 
Ceylon Light Infantry, 232, 247 
Ceylon National Congress, 36, 40, 43, 

195 

Ceylon Parliamentary Elections Amend- 
ment Act No. 48 (1949), 41 

Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, 139, 140, 
145, 147 

Ceylon Rifles, 231-32 

Ceylon Social Reform Society, 35 

Ceylon Tourist Board, 169-70 

Ceylon Transport Board. See Sri Lanka 
Transport Board 

Ceylon Workers' Congress (Tamil), 48, 
50, 155, 198, 199, 203 

Chalmers, Robert, 36 

Chandananda, Palipane, 181, 182 

Chandrabhanu (king), 17 

Chartered Bank, 167 

Charter of Justice (1833), 29 

Chase Manhattan bank, 168 

Chelvanayakam, S.J. V., 41, 45, 46, 52, 
198, 201 

chena, 127, 129 

Chetti caste (Tamil), 84 

Chilaw, 137 

China, 17, 160, 209, 237 
China Bay air base (Trincomalee), 240, 
241 

chinchona (quinine) production, 32 
Chola kingdom, xxvii, 11-13, 16, 18, 75 
Christianity (see also Dutch Reform Pro- 
testantism; Protestantism; Roman 
Catholicism), 4, 21, 73, 101-2 



Christians, 59; in armed forces, 245; 
government intervention in school sys- 
tem of, 48; as minority, 76; Nestorian, 
21 

cinnamon industry, 17, 22, 23, 25, 30, 

32, 119, 120 
Citibank, 168 

civil conflict, xxv, xxix, xxx-xxxi, xxxiii- 
xxxvi, 49-50, 53, 55, 169-70 

civil service (see also Ceylon Civil Service), 
192-93 

climate, 64-65 

clothing industry, 138 

coastal population, 68, 73 

Cochin, 18 

coconut industry, 32, 119, 121, 126-27, 

134, 136-37, 138, 140-41 
Code of Criminal Procedure Act (1979), 

256-58, 259, 261 
coffee industry, 28, 30-32, 119, 120, 127 
Colebrooke, W. M. G., 28-29 
Colebrooke-Cameron Commission, 29- 

31, 34 

College of Advanced Technology, 105 
colleges: medical and law, 103; technical, 
106 

Colombo Buddhist Theosophical Society, 
95 

Colombo: as city, 17, 18, 19, 20, 39, 55, 
71, 103, 105, 106, 112, 138, 143, 147, 
149, 176, 200, 206, 209, 210, 212, 213, 
225, 232, 262; as port, 147; as territory, 
24 

Colombo Conference (1954), 43 
Colombo Consumer Price Index, 154 
Colombo District, 69, 71, 78, 105, 112, 

137, 141, 205, 237, 239, 240, 242 
Colombo naval base, 239 
colonization (see also Britain; Holland; 

Portugal), 3, 5, 6-7, 8, 10-11 
Commando Squad (police force), 253 
commerce, domestic, 156-57 
Commercial Bank of Ceylon, 167 
commodity subsidies, 112 
Common Programme, xxxix, 49-50 
Commonwealth of Nations, 214, 219 
communal conflict (see also ethnic conflict; 

riots), xxx-xxxi, 3, 4, 5, 36, 46, 53, 55, 

71 

Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL), 

38, 44, 49, 51, 193, 197, 199 
Congregationalists, 102 
conscription, 220, 242, 243 



307 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



constitution: and amendments (1920 & 
1924), 36-37; of 1931 (Donoughmore), 
4, 37, 183; of 1946 (Soulbury), 4, 40, 
183, 191, 193, 222; of 1972, xxix, 5, 
50-51, 184, 185, 191, 193, 214, 222; 
of 1978, xxix-xxx, 53, 176, 185-86, 
191, 194, 201, 223, 236, 258, 260-61; 
of 1978 amendments, 186, 187, 188, 
213, 256, 261 
construction industry. See industrial sector 
Consumer Finance and Socio-Economic 

Survey, 156 
cooperative societies, 130, 157 
Co-operative Wholesale Establishment, 
157 

Cosmetics, Devices, and Drug Act (1980), 
263 

counterinsurgency: armed forces role in, 

230, 234-35, 241; operations of, 72, 

229; role of navy in, 239; training for, 

209, 239, 249, 254 
Countersubversive Division (po- 

Lice force), 253 
Court of Appeal, 258-60 
court system, 191-92, 221, 255, 258-60 
CPSL. See Communist Party of Sri 

Lanka: CPSL 
crime categories, 257 
Criminal Investigation Department 

(police force), 253 
Criminal Justice Commissions, 256 
Criminal Justice Commissions Act 

(1972), 256-57 
criminal justice system, 221, 255-57, 

258-60 
Culavamsa, 7, 15, 231 
cultivator caste, 11, 15 
currency: devaluation of, 161; rupee, 110, 

125, 252 
cyclones, 64 

da Gama, Vasco, 17-18 
Dahanayake, Wijeyananda, 46 
dams, 142, 145 
de Almeida, Lourenco, 18 
debt, external, 120, 157-58, 161-62, 167, 
179-80 

defense agreement (1947), 219 
defense budget, 43, 251-52 
deficit, domestic, 162, 166-67 
deficit, trade, 157-58, 160, 161 
deforestation, 130 



Democratic People's Republic of Korea 

(North Korea), 50 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North 

Vietnam), 50 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 

Lanka, 185, 195 
Department of Government Electrical 

Undertakings. See Ceylon Electricity 

Board 

Department of Prisons, 261-62 

Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya: DJV 
(Patriotic Liberation Organization) (see 
also extremism; insurgency), 200-201, 
229-30 

de Silva, Colvin, 51 

de Silva, K. M., 5, 12, 16, 200 

detention camps, 262-63 

Deutsche Welle station, 149 

Devanampiya Tissa (king), 7, 8, 180 

Deviyo, Gale Bandara, 94 

Dharmapala, 19-20 

Dharmaraja College, 35 

dharma, 10, 180-81 

Dhatusena (king), 12 

Dipavamsa, 6 

disease, 16, 109-10, 111 

dispensaries, 109 

district autonomy proposal, 208, 210 
district development councils, 54, 189 
district ministers, 189 
divorce, 88 

Dixit, Jyotindra Nath, 212 

Diyatalawa, 238, 242, 247 

DJV. See Patriotic Liberation Organiza- 
tion (Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya: 
DJV) 

dolomite, 143 

Donoughmore Commission, 36-37, 40 

Donoughmore Constitution (1931). See 
constitution 

draft. See conscription 

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, 205, 208 

Dravidians, 5, 180; kingdoms of, 7; lan- 
guage of, 1 1 

drought, 134, 137 

drug use, 263 

dry zone 10, 16, 65, 68, 69, 71, 122, 126, 
127, 129-30, 131, 134; abandonment 
of, 16; population in, 69 

Durava caste (toddy tappers), 83, 227 

Dutch East India Company, 23 

Dutch. See Holland 

Dutch Reformed Church, 22, 23, 101, 102 



308 



Index 



Dutthagamani (Duttugemunu): king, 11- 
12, 181, 247 



Eastern Province, xxxiv-xxv, 137, 166, 
177, 179, 194, 198, 207, 210-11, 
212-13, 220, 226, 249, 250, 251, 253; 
proposals for, 211 

East Germany. See German Democratic 
Republic 

East India Company, 183 

economic assistance (see also Aid Sri Lanka 
Consortium), 211, 215, 219; from other 
countries, 112, 120, 126, 145, 162, 166 

economic development, 30, 49, 120-21 

economic growth, 125, 150 

economic planning (see also Five-Year 
Plan; Ten- Year Plan; Two- Year Plan), 
124-26 

economic reform, 29, 30 

education system, xxv, xxviii, 29-30, 60, 
102-8 

Eelam. See Tamil Eelam 

Eelam National Liberation Front 

(ENLF), 205, 209, 224 
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation 

Front (EPRLF), xxvii, xxxv, 205, 209, 

224 

Eelam Revolutionary Organization of 
Students (EROS), 200, 205, 209, 224 
"Eelam Secretariat," 225, 235 
Egypt, 48 

Ekala, 148, 149, 242 

Elara, 11-12 

electoral system, 189-91 

electricity, 138, 145 

emigration, 69, 71 

Employees Provident Fund, 151 

employment (see also underemployment; 
unemployment); programs, 123; in 
public sector, 193 

energy sources, 143, 145 

English language, 30, 44, 106, 185, 212 

ENLF. See Eelam National Liberation 
Front (ENLF) 

EPRLF. See Eelam People's Revolution- 
ary Liberation Front (EPRLF) 

EROS. See Eelam Revolutionary Organi- 
zation of Students (EROS) 

Esso, 48 

Estado da India, 20 
ethnic conflict (see also Sinhalese; Tamils), 
xxxii, 72, 125-26, 179-80, 219, 221 



ethnic groups, 72-78, 80, 177; differen- 
tiation in political parties of, 193; ten- 
sion between Sinhalese and Tamils, 41 

Eurasians, 24 

European Asian Bank, 168 
Exchange Control Act (1953), 160 
exchange rate system: controls for, 157, 
160; dual, 161; liberalization of, 161 
Executive Council, 29, 35, 36 
executive offices of government, 186-88 
executive powers, 261 
export licenses, 160 

exports: of agricultural products, 126, 
138, 159; of coconut, 136-37, 159; of 
coffee, 30-31; control of, 119; of fuel 
oil products, 159; of gems, 159; of rub- 
ber, 136, 159, 160; of spices, 137; of 
tea, 134-35, 158-59, 160; of textiles, 
158; volume of, 156, 158 
external trade. See trade, foreign 
extremist groups (see also Deshapremi 
Janatha Viyaparaya; Eelam National 
Liberation Front; Eelam People's 
Revolutionary Liberation Front; Eelam 
Revolutionary Organization of Stu- 
dents; Janatha Vikmuthi Peramuna; 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; Peo- 
ple's Liberation Organization of Tamil 
Eelam; Tamil Eelam Liberation Orga- 
nization; Tamil New Tigers; Tamil 
Tigers), xxxiv, xxxv, 199-204, 221 

Factories Ordinance (1942), 151 
family unit, 86-87 
famine, 32 

farming. See agriculture 

Federal Party (Tamil), 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 
50, 51, 198, 201, 222 

Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger- 
many), 159-60, 209, 215 

fertility rate, 69 

First Commando Regiment, 243 
fiscal policy, 162-65 
fishing, 121, 126, 129 
Fitch, Ralph, 24 
five-year plans, 124-25 
floods, 134 
food processing, 138 
food stamp program, 60, 164-65 
food subsidy program, 112, 122 
foreign aid. .fe economic assistance; mili- 
tary assistance 



309 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



Foreign Investment Advisory Committee, 
142 

foreign relations, 48, 213-16 
forests and forestry, 121, 126, 127, 129- 
30 

Four Noble Truths (Buddhism), 90 
free trade zone, 164 
freight services, 145, 147 

Galle, 18, 22, 24, 63; as port, 147 
Galle District, 228 
Gandhi, Indira, 176, 208-9 
Gandhi, Rajiv, xxvi, xxxi, xxxxiii-xxxiv, 

xxxvi, 177, 208-9, 211-13, 215, 220 
Gautama Siddartha (the Buddha), 7, 

89-90 

gem industry, 138, 143 
gender roles, 88-89 
geology, 61 

German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many), 50 

Goa, 19, 20, 22 

Goonesimha, A. E., 38 

government, local, 188-89 

government, national, 185-88 

government agents, 189 

government role: in agriculture, 130-33, 
134; in economy, 121-25; in education 
system, 103-4; extension of, 119 

Govi people, 11 

Goyigama caste (see also Govi people), 
xxv, 11, 34, 59, 78, 82, 83, 92, 178, 
206-7 

graphite, 143 

Great Council of the Sinhalese (Sinhala 
Maha Sabha), 37, 40, 43, 195 

Greater Colombo Economic Commission, 
141-42 

Green Tigers, 255 

Grindlays Bank, 167 

gross domestic product (GDP), 125, 252 

Guaranteed Price Scheme, 131 

guerrilla activity. See insurgency; Liber- 
ation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); 
Tamil New Tigers; Tamil Tigers 

Gunawardene, Dinesh P. R., 197 

Guttika, 11 

Habib Bank, 167 
Hambantota District, 227, 239 
Hatton National Bank, 167 



Hatton Plateau, 63 

health care facilities, 109 

health system, 40, 60, 108-10 

Helitours, 241 

Hena (Rada) caste, 83 

High Court, 192, 258-59 

Hinayana, 91 

Hindu empires, 11, 12 

Hindu minority. See Tamils 

Hinduism, xxix, 12, 13, 17, 33, 59, 76, 

78, 80, 84, 95-99, 180 
Holland: colonial era of, xxviii, 4, 22-24, 

25, 183, 219, 231 
Home Guards, 220, 254-55 
hospitals, 109 
housing, 111, 143 

human rights organizations, xxvi, 54 

hydraulic societies, 10 

hydroelectric power, 138, 142, 145, 159 



ilmenite, 143 

immigrant status, 41 

immigration, 31, 33, 69 

import licenses, 160 

imports, 156; control of, 119, 157, 158, 

160-61; of oil, 159; of rice, 159, 160; 

sources of, 160 
import substitution, 121, 122 
independence (1948), xxviii, 3, 40, 183- 

84, 219 

Independent Television Network, 148-49 
India (see also Indian Peacekeeping Force; 
Indo-Sri Lankan Accord; Sinhalese; 
Tamil Nadu State (India)), xxxi, 3, 6, 
7, 8, 11-13, 17, 18, 22, 182, 208-9, 
231, 240, 242, 249-50; British control 
in, 26, 183; emigration of Tamils from, 
31, 33; favoritism toward Tamils of, 
xxvii; influence on Sri Lanka of, 59, 
219; intervention in civil conflict by, 
xxxii, 176-77; invasions from, 16; mili- 
tary relations with 249-50; regional 
leadership by, 221; relations with Sri 
Lanka of, xxvi-xxvii 211-14; role in 
Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, 211-13; 
social structure and politics in, 179; 
trade with, 120 
Indian Air Force, 211, 225, 229 
Indian and Pakistani Residents Act No. 3 

(1948), 41 
Indian Army, 72, 177, 251 
Indian Bank, 167 



310 



Index 



Indian Coast Guard, xxxiii 

Indian Mutiny (1857), 183 

Indian National Congress, 36, 41 

Indian Navy, xxxiii 

Indian Ocean, xxxiii, 18, 22, 38-39, 64, 
100 ; 101, 209, 214, 215, 221 

Indian Overseas Bank, 167 

Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) (see 
also Indo-Sri Lankan Accord; Opera- 
tion Parwan), xxvi-xxvii, xxix, xxxiii- 
xxxiv, xxxvi-xxxvii, 177, 203, 212-13, 
220, 225-26, 250-52 

Indo- Aryan language, 5, 8, 11 

Indonesia, 13, 22, 23, 77 

Indo-Pakistani border, 230 

Indo-Sri Lankan Accord (1987) (see also 
India; Indian Peacekeeping Force; 
Operation Parwan), xxix, xxxiii, xxxv, 
xxxvi, 126, 177, 201, 214, 220, 221, 
224, 225-26, 236, 250, 253, 254; imple- 
mentation of, 212-13, 250 

industrialization, 122 

industrial sector, 137-45; construction 
industry, 142-43; manufacturing in, 
140-42; shift in labor force to manufac- 
turing, 149-50 

inflation, 112 

infrastructure: development of, 28, 31, 
40, 121-22; government investment in, 
131, 164 

insurgency (see also guerrillas), 54; ethnic, 
249; Sinhalese, 221, 226-30; Tamil, 
xxxii, 177, 220, 221-26, 234-35, 249, 
250-51, 254-555, 257 

insurrection (1971), 220, 221 

intelligence functions, 253 

Intelligence Services Division, 253 

INTELSAT, 149 

internal trade. See commerce, domestic 
International Commission of Jurists, 54, 
234 

Investment and Credit Bank, 167 
investment promotion zone, 138, 141-42 
IPKF. See Indian Peacekeeping Force 

(IPKF) 
iron ore, 143 

Irrigation Department, 106 

irrigation projects, 10, 13, 15, 17, 71, 119, 
130, 131, 142; Mahaweli Ganga Pro- 
gram, 120 

Islam (see also Muhammad; Muslims), 
99-101 

Islamabad, 209 



Israel, 50, 209, 215, 237, 239, 249 
Italy, 237, 241 



Jaffna air base, 240 

Jaffna: as city, xxxi, xxxii, 53, 204, 207, 

223, 226, 251; as fort, 207 
Jaffna District, 55, 71, 194, 239 
Jaffna Kingdom, 17, 18, 20, 84, 231 
Jaffnapatam territory, 24 
Jaffna Peninsula, xxxii, 16, 63, 65, 68, 

72, 78, 177, 182, 198, 205, 207, 211, 

220, 221, 225, 235, 251 
Jaffna Prison, 228 
Jains, 181 
Jamaica, 30 

Janatha Estates Development Board, 134 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna. See People's 
Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi 
Peramuna: JVP) (see also extremism; in- 
surgency) 

Japan, 143, 183, 232; economic assistance 
from, 145; trade relations with, 160; in 
World War II, 38-39 

Jatika Sevaka Sangamaya (National Em- 
ployees' Union), 155 

Jayewardene, Hector, 210 

Jayewardene, Junius Richard (J.R.), 
xxvi, xxix- xxxv, 51-54, 176, 181, 184- 
86, 187, 188, 193, 194, 195, 198, 202- 
3, 206, 208-9, 210-13, 214, 215, 220, 
225, 234, 236, 247, 253, 256-57 

Joint Operations Command, 235, 236, 
252 

judicial system (see also criminal justice 
system), 191-92; Dutch contribution 
to, 23-24; reform of, 256 

jungle, 16-17 

JVP. See People's Liberation Front 
(Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna: JVP) 

kachcheri, 189 
Kalinga dynasty, 16 
Kalpitiya naval base, 239 
Kandula, 247 

Kandy (see also Kingdom of Kandy), 31 , 
65, 68, 93, 105, 147, 149, 169, 200 
Kandy Perahera, 83 
Karainagar naval base, 239 
Karaiya caste (Tamil), 84, 224 
Karava caste, 34, 73, 83, 92, 101, 204, 
207, 227 



311 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



karma, 96-97 
Karunaidhi, ML, 205 
Kasyapa, 12 
Kataragama, 94, 100 
Katubedda, 105 
Katukurunda, 254 
Katunayaka, 141, 147-148, 229 
Katunayaka Air Base, 240, 241 
Katz, Nathan, 181 

Keeny Meeny Services, 249, 253, 254 
Kegalla District, 228 
Khoja people, 77 

Kingdom of Kandy, 4, 8, 18, 20, 22-23, 
25, 26-27, 73, 83, 178, 183, 231; Con- 
vention (1815), 26; first war (1803), 26; 
National Assembly, 178; rebellion 
(1848), 32 

kinship systems, 86-87 

Knox, Robert, 24 

Knuckles Massif, 63 

Kobbekaduwa, Hector, 199 

Kokkaville, 149 

Kotelawala, Sir John, 42-43, 195, 245 
Kotmale, 142-43 
Kotte, 17, 18, 19, 20, 71, 231 
Kshatriya, 10 

Kumaratunge, Chandrika, 196 
Kumaratunge, Vijay, 196 
Kurunegala District, 94, 137 
Kuveni, 6 

labor force: shift in focus of, 149-50; 

shortages in, 30-31; for tea industry, 

33; unions in, 154-56; wages of, 154; 

working conditions of, 150-51 
labor legislation, 150-51, 154-55 
labor movement, 154 
labor policy, 150-51 
Labour Party, 38 
laissez-faire ideas, 30 
Laksapana hydroelectric project, 145 
Land Development Ordinance (1935), 

133 

land ownership, 15, 30-31, 111, 127, 

133-34 
land reform, 46 

Land Reform (Amendment) Law (1975), 
134 

Land Reform Commission, 133 
Land Reform Law (1972), 133-34 
languages (see also Official Language Act), 
Arabic, 101; Dravidian, 11, 75; 



English, 30, 44, 72, 105, 106, 185, 212; 
Indo-Aryan dialect, 5, 8, 11; Malay, 
77; Pali, 8, 91; Portuguese, 22; San- 
skrit, 180; Sinhala, xxviii, 5, 8, 22, 
44-45, 47, 49, 53, 59, 72, 78, 105, 107, 
175, 177, 181, 184, 185, 195-96, 201, 
212, 222; of Sri Lankan Moors, 76; 
Tamil, xxviii, xxx, 4, 11, 22, 44-45, 
47, 49, 53, 59, 72, 75, 76, 78, 105, 107, 
177, 184, 185, 195-96, 210, 212 
Lanka, 3, 6 

Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP). See 
Ceylon Equal Society Party (Lanka 
Sama Samaja Party: LSSP) 

Lawrence, D. H., xxxvii 

leather products industry, 138 

Lebanon, 204 

legal code, Tamils, 23 

legal reform, 29, 31 

Legislative Council, 29, 33, 35, 36 

Lenin, Vladimir, 38 

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) (see also extremism; insur- 
gency), xxvi, xxxii, xxxiii-xxxvi, 52- 
53, 177, 198, 209-10, 211-13, 223-25; 
violence of, 204-5, 207 

liberty, 28 

Libya, 204 

life expectancy. See mortality rates 

literacy rate, 106, 164 

living conditions, 110-12, 114 

LSSP. See Ceylon Equal Society Party 
(Lanka Sama Smaja Party: LSSP) 

LTTE. See Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ee- 
lam (LTTE) 

Ludowyck, E. F. C, 27 

Patrice Lumumba University, 227 



Madras, 22, 25, 249, 250 

Madurai, 6, 13 

Maduru Oya, 142 

Magha (king), 16 

magistrates' courts, 258-59 

maha crops, 134 

Mahasena (king), 13 

Mahavamsa, 6, 7, 11-12, 13, 180, 231 

Mahavihara monastery, 7, 15 

Mahaweli Ganga Program (irrigation) (see 
also Accelerated Mahaweli Program), 
67, 71, 78, 120, 131, 137, 142, 145 

Mahaweli Ganga River, 13, 63, 64, 68 

Mahayana, 91 



312 



Index 



Maheswaran, Uma, 205, 223 
Mahinda, 7, 207 
Mahinda College, 35 
Mahinda V (king), 13 
Majajana Eksath Peramuna, 208 
Malabar Coast, 18 
Malaya, 17 

Malaysia, 13, 239, 249 
Malays (Moors), 77, 178 
malnutrition, 112-13 
Manavamma (king), 12 
mandalaya, 189 

Mannar District, 69, 78, 226 

Mannar Island, 20 

Manor, James, 206 

manufacturing. See industrial sector 

Maoist ideology, 227 

marriage, 86-88 

Marxism, 38, 222-23, 224, 227 

Marxist parties, 38, 155, 197 

Matara District, 228 

Maternity Benefits Ordinance, 150 

maternity services, 109 

Mathew, Cyril, 206 

Mayadunne (king), 19 

medicine, traditional, 109 

Memon people, 77 

Mendis, C. G., 28-29 

merchant fleet, 147 

Methodists, 102 

Middle East, 154 

migration: from India to Sri Lanka, 75; 

to cities, 111; to the Middle East, 154 
military assistance, 209, 220, 249 
military bases, 219 
military equipment, 237-38 
military offensive: against Jaffna, 225, 

235-36; against LTTE, 211 
military training: domestic, 238; foreign, 

238-39 

militia, local {see also Home Guards), 220, 
254 

Mill, James, 28 

Million Houses Program, 143 

Mineral Sands Corporation, 140 

Ming dynasty, 17 

mining industry, 143 

Ministry of Defence, 253 

Ministry of Education, 104, 222 

Ministry of Finance, 124, 154 

Ministry of Finance and Planning, 125 

Ministry of Higher Education, 106 

Ministry of Highways, 145 



Ministry of Justice, 261 

Ministry of Labour, 106 

Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Affairs, 124 

Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica- 
tions, 148 

Minneriya Tank, 13 

missionaries, 20, 73 

Mobilization and Supplementary Forces 
Act (1985), 243 

Moneragala District, 69, 71, 94 

monks 90-91, 92, 102 

monsoons (see also maha crops; yala crops), 
10, 65, 134 

monsoon winds, 59, 64 

Moors, 18-19, 143, 178; Indian, 77; Sri 
Lankan, 76-77 

mortality rates, 69, 72, 108, 110, 164 

Moscow, 227 

motor vehicles, 145 

Movement for Defense of the Nation, 

181, 196-97, 211 
Mughal Empire (India), 24 
Muhammad, 99-100 
Mullaittivu, 69 
multiethnic society, 11 
Muslim League, 36, 40 
Muslims (see also Islam; Moors), 59, 

76-77, 78, 80, 100-101, 210; proposed 

councils for, 211; wish for autonomous 

status by, 210-11 
Muslim traders (see also Moors), 18-19 

Nagumo, Chuichi, 39 
Namunakuli (mountain), 63 
Narcotics Advisory Board, 263 
narcotics. See drug use 
National Armed Reserve, 243 
National Intelligence Bureau, 236 
nationalism (see also Tamils): Buddhist, 

245; East Indian, 36, 40; Sinhalese, 4, 

12, 20, 22, 37, 219, 234, 245; Sri 

Lankan, 32, 36, 40, 43 
nationalization, 46-47, 111, 119, 122, 

136, 145 
National Milk Board, 140 
National Paper Corporation, 140 
National Planning Council, 124 
national police. See police force 
National Security Council, 254 
national security threat, 219, 221 
National State Assembly, 184, 185 



313 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



Naval and Marine Academy, 240 
naval bases, 239 
naval fleet, 239-40 
Navandanna (Acari) caste, 83 
Naxalite group, 188 
Negombo, 22 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 43 
Nelundeniya, 228 

New Comprehensive Rural Credit 

Scheme (1986), 131 
New Equal Society Party (Nava Sama 

Samaja Party: NSSP), 197, 199 
Newfoundland, 215 
New Left, 227 
nibbana, 6 

Nissankamalla (king), 15, 16 
nonaligned position, 213-14, 219 
Non-Commissioned Officers' School, 238 
Northeastern Province, xxxiii 
Northeastern Provincial Council, xxvii, 
xxxvi 

Northern Province, xxxi, xxxiv-xxv, 166, 
177, 179, 194, 197, 203, 207, 210, 212, 
220, 224, 226, 249, 251; merger with 
Eastern Province of, 212-13; proposals 
for, 211 

North Korea. See Democratic People's 

Republic of Korea 
Norway, 215 

NSSP. See New Equal Society Party 
(Nava Sama Samaja Party: NSSP) 

Number One (Flight Training School) 
Squadron, 241 

nutrition program, 60 

Nuwara Eliya District, 64, 78, 149 

Oberst, Robert, 178 

officer corps, 245 

Officers' Cadet School, 238 

Officers' Study Centre, 238 

Official Language Act, xxviii, xxix, 

44-46, 175, 195-96, 201 
oil import agreements, 48 
oil industry, 138, 140, 145, 159 
Olcott, Henry Steele, 35 
Operation Liberation, 211 
Operation Parwan, 251 
Overseas Trust Bank, 168 



Paddy Lands Bill (1958), 133 
Padmanabha, K., 205 



Padukka satellite station, 149 
Pakistan, 209, 215-16, 239, 240, 249 
Palestinians, 204 
Pali language, 6, 8, 91 
Palk Strait, 207, 212, 239, 240 
Palla caste (Tamil), 84 
Pallava kingdom, 12 
Pallekelle army camp, 230 
Pandyan kingdom, 7, 12-13, 231; inva- 
sion of Sri Lanka by, 13, 16 
Paraiyar caste (Tamil), 84 
Parakramabahu I (king), 15, 231 
Parakramabahu III (king), 16 
Parakramabahu VI (king), 17 
Parakramabahu VIII (king), 18 
Parakrama Samudra (Parakrama Tank), 
15 

Parathan Chemicals, 140 

Parliament, 184, 186-88, 189-90, 191, 

192, 194 
Parvati, 98 

Patriotic Liberation Organization. (See 
Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya: 
DJV) 

patronage system, 193, 202 
Peace of Amiens (1801), 25 
Penal Code (see also Code of Criminal 

Procedure Act (1979)), 255, 257-58 
People's Bank, 167 

People's Democratic Party (Mahajana 

Prajathanthra: PDP), 196 
People's Front of the Liberation Tigers, 

xxvii 

People's Liberation Front (Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna: J VP), xxix, 
xxxiv-xxxvi, 50, 107, 194, 197, 199- 
201, 213, 220, 221, 222, 226-30, 
233-34, 253, 255 

People's Liberation Organization of 
Tamil Eelam (PLOTE or PLOT), 54, 
204, 205, 223-24 

People's United Front (Mahajana Eksath 
Peramuna: MEP), 44, 197 

Perahera, 8 

Pfaffenberger, Bruce, 182 
Philippines, 183 

Pidurutalagala (mountain), 61, 149 
plantations, 28, 30-32, 34, 39, 68, 111, 
119-21, 127, 133, 155; nationalization 
of, 46, 133-34 
PLOTE or PLOT. See People's Libera- 
tion Organization of Tamil Eelam 
(PLOTE or PLOT) 



314 



Index 



Poisons, Opium and Dangerous Drugs 

Ordinance (1929), 263 
Police College, 254 

police force, 193, 219, 221; command 
divisions of, 252-53; increased power 
of, 255, 260-61; strength of, 253; 
equipment and training, 254 
political parties, 37-38, 193-99 
political system: 182; effect of social struc- 
ture on, 178-79; two-party nature of, 
xxix, 193 

Polonnaruwa, 3, 13, 15, 16, 35, 67, 71 
Ponnabalam, G. G., 44-45, 198 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- 
tine, 204 
population, 60, 68-69, 71-72, 111 
ports, 147 

Portugal: colonial era of, xxviii, 4, 16, 
17-19, 20-22, 100, 219, 231 

Portuguese language, 22 

poverty, 32, 110-13 

poverty alleviation plan, xxxvii 

Prabhakaran, Velupillai, 52, 204-5, 212, 
222, 223 

Premadasa, Ranasinghe, xxv-xxvi, xxxii, 

xxxiv-xxxvii, 206, 213 
Presbytery of Ceylon, 102 
president, 186-87, 190-91, 236, 261 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (1979), xxx, 

192, 257, 259, 261, 262 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 

Provisions) Act (1979), 54, 55 
price control, 122 
prime minister, 184, 188 
prisons, 261-62 
Prisons Ordinance (1878), 262 
Protestantism, 4, 22, 23, 73, 102-3 
Provisional Revolutionary Government of 

South Vietnam, 50 
public debt. See deficit, domestic 
public health programs, 109 
punishment for crime, 257-58 
Punjab (India), 179 
Puttalam District, 61, 112, 137, 239 



radio services, 148-49 
railroad lines, 147 
Railway Department, 106 
rainfall, 64, 65, 69 
rajakariya, 10-11, 30, 31, 83 
Rajaraja the Great, 13 



Rajarata, 13 
Rajasinha, 19-20 
Rajasinha II (king), 22-23 
Rajendra, 13 
Rakwana Hills, 63 
Rama, 6 

Ramachandran, M. G., xxxii, 205, 208 

Ramanna Nikaya, 92-93 

Ramayana, 3, 6 

Randenigala, 142-43 

rationing system, food, 112 

Ratmalana, 238 

Ravanna, 6 

reconstruction program, 126 

recruitment, armed forces {see also con- 
scription), 234, 242-43 

Recruit Training School, 238 

refugees, xxxii, 46, 71-72 

religion (see also Buddhism; Hinduism; 
Islam; Muslims; Protestantism; Roman 
Catholicism; Theravada Buddhism), 
177, 180-82; role in educational system 
of, 102-5 

religious conflict, 4 

repression, 32 

Republic of Sri Lanka, 184, 185 

reservoirs. See water storage tanks 

resettlement programs, 111, 202 

retirement program, 151 

revenue sources, 162-64 

rice: cultivation of, 17, 119, 120, 121, 

126-29, 131, 133, 134, 156, 159, 160; 

rationing of, 49, 164 
riot control force (police force), 253 
riots, anti-Tamil, xxix, xxxi, 54, 55, 80, 

176, 200, 205, 220, 223, 229, 234, 249 
rivers, 13, 63-64, 68 
road network, 145 
Rohana, 13 

Roman Catholicism, 4, 18-22, 23, 73, 
101 

Romania, 48 

Royal Air Force College, 242 
Royal Ceylon Air Force. See Sri Lankan 
Air Force 

Royal Ceylon Army. See Sri Lankan 
Army 

Royal Ceylon Navy. See Sri Lankan Navy 
rubber industry, 32, 33, 39, 119, 121, 

126-27, 128, 129, 134, 136, 137, 138, 

140-41 
Ruhunu kingdom, 13 
Ruhunu National Park, 67 



315 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



SAARC . See South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 

Sabaratnam, Sri, 205 

St. John's fish market, 143 

Salagama caste (cinnamon peelers), 34, 
83 

salt, 143 

sangha, 15, 32, 34-35, 90, 92, 95, 181, 196 

Sanghamitta, 8 

Sangily (king), 20 

Sanskrit language, 180 

Saudi Arabia, 160 

School Biscuit Programme, 112 

schools (see also education system), 102-8 

Sea of Parakrama. See Parakrama Samu- 

dra 
Sena, 11 

Senanayake, Don Stephen (D. S.), xxviii, 
4, 36, 40, 42, 194-95, 214, 245 

Senanayake, Dudley, xxviii, 42, 47, 49, 
51, 195 

Senanayake, Rukman, 51 

service industries, 149-50 

Shell Oil Company, 48 

Shin Bet, 249 

shipbuilding industry, 239 

Shops and Offices Employees Act (1954), 
150 

Sigiriya, 12 

Sikhs, 179 

Simha, 6 

Singapore, 242 

Sinhala language (see also Official Lan- 
guage Act), xxviii, 5,8, 44-45, 47, 54, 
59, 72, 78, 80, 175, 181, 184, 185, 195- 
96, 201, 212, 222, 223, 242-43, 245 

Sinhala Maha Sabha. See Great Council 
of the Sinhalese (Sinhala Maha Sabha) 

"Sinhala only." See English language; 
languages; Official Language Act; Sin- 
hala language; Tamils 

Sinhalese, xxv, xxvii, 3-4, 8, 10-11, 12, 
17, 59, 72-73, 78, 80, 85, 178, 179-80, 
210; in armed forces, 242-43, 247; Bud- 
dist religion of, 73, 180; caste of, 11; 
highland and lowland groups of, 24; in- 
vasion of India by, 13; migration of, 16; 
political party identification of, 193-94; 
proposed coucils for, 211; representation 
in civil service of, 192-93; settlement in 
Tamil regions of, 202-3 

Sinhalese Kingdom, 18, 68; decline of, 
16-17 



Sinha Regiment, 237, 247 
Sino-Indian border war (1962), 48 
Sir John Kotelawala Defence Academy, 

238 
Sita, 6 

Sitawake Kingdom, 19-20 

Siva, 97-98 

Siyam Nikaya, 92-93 

slash-and-burn cultivation (see also chena), 

67, 127, 129 
SLFP. See Sri Lanka Freedom Party 

(SLFP) 

SLFP-United Front coalition, 184 
SLPP. See Sri Lanka People's Party 
(SLPP) 

social structure (see also caste system), 10, 

33-34, 73, 178-79 
Soulbury Commission, 40, 41, 183, 222 
Soulbury Constitution (1946). See consti- 
tution 

South Africa, 209, 232, 237 

South Asian Association for Regional 

Cooperation (SAARC), 211, 214 
Southeast Asia Command, 40 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 

(SEATO), 43 
Southern Province, 226, 228, 253 
Soviet Union, 38, 43, 48, 197, 221, 227, 

237-38 

Special Air Service (Britain), 209, 249, 
253 

Special Task Force (police force) (see also 
Police Special Force), 220, 235, 249, 
253, 254 

spending, government (see also defense 
budget; fiscal policy) 

spice trade, 17, 18, 22, 119, 120, 137 

Sri Jayewardenepura, 71 

Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation, 148 

Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) (see also 
SLFP-United Front coalition), xxviii, 
xxix, xxxiv, xxxv, 42-45, 47, 48-52, 
53, 119, 175, 176, 181, 193-99, 201, 
207-8, 214 

Sri Lanka Light Infantry, 237 

Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, 194, 198, 
210 

Sri Lankan Air Force, 219, 229, 236, 

240-42; role of, 241; squadrons of, 

240-41; training, 242 
Sri Lankan Army, 72, 219, 232, 235, 

236-39; reorganization of, 234, 

236-37; training, 238-39 



316 



Index 



Sri Lankan Army Women's Corps, 247- 
48 

Sri Lankan Military Academy, 238 
Sri Lankan National Police. See police 
force 

Sri Lankan Navy, xxxii, xxxiii, 211, 212, 
219, 232, 236, 239-40; Naval Area 
Commands of, 239; role for, 239-40; 
training, 240; women in, 248 
Sri Lanka People's Party (SLPP-Sri 

Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya), 196 
Sri Lanka Railways, 147 
Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation, 148 
Sri Lanka Shipping Corporation, 147 
Sri Lanka State Plantation Corporation, 
134 

Sri Lanka Transport Board, 147 
Sri Lanka Tyre, 140 
Sri Vijaya empire, 13 
Stalin, Joseph, 38 
State Bank of India, 167 
State Council, 37, 40 
State Distilleries Corporation, 140 
State Gem Corporation, 143 
State Industrial Corporation Act (1957), 
138 

state-owned banks, 139 

state-owned enterprises, 122, 123, 138- 

40, 145, 193 
State Petroleum Corporation, 48 
stock market, 168-69 
strikes, xxvi, 151, 154, 155 
submarine cable system, 149 
subsidy program, 112, 122 
suffrage, 183 
sugar industry, 137 
Sumatra, 13 

Supreme Court, 187, 188, 192, 213, 258- 
60 

Survey Department, 106 
Suspension of Death Penalty Bill (1956), 
258 



Tambiah, S. J., 180-81, 201, 205 
Tamil Congress, 41, 42, 51, 198, 199, 222 
Tamil Eelam Army, 224 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Army, 54, 224 
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization 

(TELO), 54, 205, 224 
Tamil Eelam ("Precious Land"), xxx, 

xxxi, 5, 52, 55, 176, 198 
Tamil kingdom, 18-10 



Tamil Language Special Provision Act 

(1959), 201 
Tamil Nadu State (India), xxviii, xxxii, 

54, 71, 75, 96, 176, 177, 204-5, 207, 

208, 212, 239, 249 
Tamil National Army, xxvii 

Tamil New Tigers (TNT) (see also Liber- 
ation Tigers of Tamil Eelam: LTTE; 
Tamil Tigers), 204, 222-23 

Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation Organiza- 
tion, 53 

Tamil Regulations, 49 

Tamils (see also Dravidians; Dravidian 
kingdoms), xxv, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 17, 
41 , 75-76, 80; in armed forces, 245, 
247; demands for autonomy of, xxvi, 
xxx, 42, 46, 54-55, 204, 222, 226; 
discrimination against, xxix, xxx, 5, 
51, 108, 155, 175, 202, 222, 234; eco- 
nomic support for, 224; educational 
standards of, 201-2; emigration and 
repatriation of, 69, 71; immigrant 
status of, 41; immigration to Sri 
Lanka of, 31, 33, 127, 136; Indian, 
41, 52, 53, 75-76, 78, 85, 200, 203, 

209, 210; Indian opposed to Sri 
Lankan, 33, 48, 193; language of, 
xxviii, xxx, 11, 44-46, 47, 54, 59, 75, 
78, 80, 177, 184, 185, 195-96, 201, 
212; legal code of, 23 ; limited politi- 
cal activity of, 47, 193; militant 
groups of, 52-53, 177, 198, 200, 
203-7, 209, 210-11,212, 223; over- 
seas representation of, 215; per- 
ceived threat to Sinhalese by, 12, 
16-17, 175-77; political party iden- 
tification of, 44-45, 193-94, 198; 
proposed councils for, 211; recruit- 
ment for plantation work of, 31; as 
refugees, xxxii, 46, 71-72, 208, 215; 
religion of, 76; representation in civil 
service of, 192-93; riots against, 200, 
204, 205-6; rule of, 11; separatist 
groups of, xxvi, xxviii; Sri Lankan, 
41, 52, 53, 75-76, 78, 85, 107-8, 
175-76, 179-82, 197, 201, 203, 207; 
Vellala caste of, 11, 182 

Tamil Tigers (see also Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam: LTTE; People's Front 
of the Liberation Tigers; Tamil New 
Tigers), xxvii, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiv, 
xxxvi, 52, 176, 194, 234, 253 

Tamil United Front (TUF), 51, 198, 222 



317 



Sri Lanka: A Country Study 



Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), 
xxx, xxxi, xxxiii, 51-55, 108, 176, 185, 
193-94, 198, 199, 204, 207, 208, 209- 
10, 223 
Tangalla, 227 
Tangalla naval base, 239 
tanks. See water storage tanks 
taxes (see also revenues), 162-64 
Taxation Inquiry Commission (1968), 
162, 163 

tea industry, 32-33, 119, 120-21, 126-27, 
129, 134-36, 137, 138, 140-41, 158-59 
technical colleges, 106 
telecommunications services, 148-49 
telephone services, 148-49 
television transmission, 149 
telex services, 148 

TELO. See Tamil Eelam Liberation 

Organization (TELO) 
temperance movement, 35 
Temple of the Tooth, 8, 93 
Tenant, Emerson, 15 
Ten-Year Plan (1959), 124 
terms of trade, 119, 122, 156, 158 
terrorism, 5, 52-54, 211, 213, 219, 225, 

255 

textile industry, 120, 121, 138, 140, 142, 

155-56, 158 
Thailand, 16, 180 
Theosophical Movement, 35 
Theravada, 91 

Theravada (or Hinayana) Buddhism, 7, 

15, 59, 80, 92-95, 180 
Thesavalamai, 24 
Thimpu, 210 

Thondaman, Suvumy amoorthy , 198, 203 
thorium, 143 

Three Stars coalition, 224 
Thriposha Programme, 112 
Thuparama Dagoba (stupa), 7 
TNT. See Tamil New Tigers (TNT) 
Tooth Relic, 7-8, 17, 93 
topography, 61, 63 
tourism, 120, 154, 160, 164, 169-70 
trade, foreign (see also balance of pay- 
ments; deficit, trade; exports; exchange 
rate system; imports; terms of trade), 
157-60 

trade liberalization, 123, 156 
Trade Union Ordinance (1935), 154-55 
trade unions, 38, 154-56; affiliations of, 
155 

trading corporations, 157 



training institutes, 106 
Training School for Youthful Offenders, 
262 

Trans-World Radio, 149 
Trincomalee District, xxxiii, 71 
Trincomalee naval base, 239, 240 
Trincomalee: as port, 22, 24-25, 38-39, 

63, 64, 147, 149, 209, 210, 211, 215, 

221; as territory, 24 
Tripitaka, 7 
Trotsky, Leon, 38, 197 
truck haulage, 145, 147 
trusteeship, 28 

TULF. See Tamil United Liberation 

Front (TULF) 
Two-Year Plan (1975-77), 125 

unemployment, 111, 151, 152, 154 

unions. See labor force 

Union Motors, 140 

United Arab Emirates, 160 

United Front (Samagi Peramuna) (see also 

SLFP-United Front coalition), 49-51, 

227 

United National Party (UNP), xxviii, 
xxix, xxxv, 40-45, 46-55, 142, 155, 
175, 176, 184, 188, 193-99, 201, 207, 
221, 223, 247, 251-52, 255, 256; eco- 
nomic policy of, 119-20, 122-24; emer- 
gence of, 41-43, 194, factionalism in, 
206; foreign policy position of, 214 

United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), 112 

United Nations peacekeeping force, 230 

United Nations (UN), 43 

United States, 49, 159-60, 209, 215, 221, 
237, 239, 240, 241, 249 

United States Agency for International 
Development (AID), 112 

United States Department of State, 253, 
262-63 

University of Ceylon, 104 

University of Perideniya, 105 

University of Ruhunu, 105 

University of Vidyalankara, 105 

University of Vidyodaya, 105 

university system, 60, 105 

UNP. See United National Party (UNP) 

untouchable caste, 15 

Upanishads, 96 

Up-Country Co-operative Estates Devel- 
opment Board, 133 



318 



Index 



urban councils, 189 

Urban Development Authority, 143 

urbanization, 69-70 

utilitarianism, 28 

Uva Basin, 63 

Uva Province, 211, 238 

Vahumpura caste, 83, 206-7 
Vanga, 6 
Vavuniya, 69 
Vavuniya District, 12 
Vedas, 96 

Veddah people, 6, 77-78, 178 
vegetation, 65, 67 

Vellala caste (Tamil), 11, 59-60, 84-85, 

102, 204 
Vibhisana, 94 
Victoria, 142-43 
Victoria Dam, 145 

Vietnam. See Democratic Republic of 

Vietnam 
Vijayabahu I (king), 13, 15 
Vijayanagara Empire, 17 
Vijaya (prince), xxviii, 6, 7, 44, 73 
violence, xxx-xxxi, 5, 55, 176, 177, 225 
Vishnu, 97, 98 

Viyanini Army Training Center, 248 
Voice of America, xxxiii, 149, 215, 250 



Wages Boards Ordinance, 150 
water delivery facilities, 111-12 
water storage tanks, 10, 13, 15, 64, 68, 
131, 142 



weapons: manufacture by JVP, 228; 

sources and design of armed forces, 237 
welfare programs, 60 
Welikade Prison, 206 
Welisara naval base, 239 
Wellesley (Lord), 26 
Western Province, 137, 138, 254 
West Germany. See Federal Republic of 

Germany 

wet zone, 17, 65, 68, 69, 71, 119, 127-30, 
134, 135, 136; population concentra- 
tion of, 69 

Wickramasinghapura, 149 

Wijeweera, Rohana, xxxvi, 200, 227-30 

Wilpattu National Park, 67 

women: in armed forces, 247-48; in labor 
force, 150, 155-56; labor laws related 
to, 150-51; in prison, 262; role of, 
88-89; suffrage for, 183 

World Bank: Aid Sri Lanka Consortium 
of, 166; loans from, 145 

World Tamil Research Conference, 204 



yala crops, 134 

Yamamoto, Isoroku, 39 

Young Men's Buddhist Association, 95 

youth movement, Maoist, 50 

Yugoslavia, 237 



Zeylanicus, 27 

Zia ul Haq, Mohammed, 209 



319 



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